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The Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference was held i n 
Mexico City from 15 to 20 July , 1974 to search for a new objective 
for the conference series . The first conference in this series 
was held in Tokyo in January 1968 ; the second in Hawaii in January 
1969 ; the third in Sydney in August 1970; the fourth in Ottawa in 
October 1971; and the fifth again in Tokyo in January 1973 . The 
conference started with a very simple premise . That is we people 
in the extended Pacific area , including Latin America and Asian de-
veloping countries , should pay keen attention to economic devel op-
ment and trade expansion among our neighbours who have huge poten-
tial for future development . This potential has tended to be neg-
lected in the past . Fortunately , since our conference series star t -
ed, the Pacific trade and development studies have established their 
influence upon trade and development policies in the Pacific-Lati n 
American-Asian region . 
We held this year's Conference for the first time outside the 
more advanced Pacific countries , in Mexico City, one of the most 
thriving centers in the less industrially developed nations . The 
Pacific trade and development studies have always to search for a 
new direction , especially in the present uncertainties in the int-
ernational monetary and trading system after the oil crisis . The 
new direction should be the acceleration of modernization and indus -
trialization of developing economies , including the oil produci ng 
areas . Technology transfer , foreign di r ect investment , trade , and 
even oil money will play a critical role if they are utilized appro-
priately . This book contains the papers and , proceedings of the 
Sixth Conference , discussion at which focussed on those important 
issues . 
"The role of technology transfer in Pacific economic development ," 
the theme we chose for the Mexican conference , was a topic of wide 
interest in Latin America and a large number of experts partici pat-
ed in the conference from various parts of that region . Unfortu~ 
nately the book was not able to include two or. three papers for e i-
ther they were written in Spanish or not presented to but came aft~ 
er the conference . Also we missed comments f r om some papers, and 
the summary of discussion for all papers mainly due to language dif-
ficulties . We have to apologize to those contr ibutors . However , 
all of them will be taken up in a Spanish- language version of this 
book which will be published somewhat later by the Mexican Organiz-
ing Committee . 
Finally , we are deeply grateful to all the participants , Consejo 
Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia and El Colegio de Mexico who made 
possible the success of the conference . We are also indebted to 
the Government and business circles in Mexico and the Asia Founda-
tion for their financial support to the conference. 
January 1975 
Kiyoshi Kojima 
Chairman, the International Steering 
Committee for Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference 
Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo 
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PREFACE 
Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia 
Mexico City 
C 0 M M U N I Q U E 
The Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference has just con-
cluded in Mexico City after one week of meetings (July 15-20, 1974) . 
This Conference was attended by economists from the developed and 
the developing countries of Asia and Latin America interested in 
the problems and policies of Pacific area countries. 
This was the first Pacific Conference held in Latin America and 
indeed, the first held in one of the less industrially developed 
nations . 
The host institutions for this Conference were the Consejo Na-
cional de Ciencia y Tencnologia and the Colegio de Mexico. Parti-
cipants included a number of scholars associated with these and 
other Mexican Institutions and from elsewhere in Latin America. 
For the first time, two economists from the Soviet Union partici-
pated in the Conference. Other participants were from the Andean 
Group, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Republic of Korea, New 
Zealand, Thailand and the United States. 
The main theme of the Conference was the transfer of technology, 
particularly between developed and developing countries of the Pa-
cific Region, and the technology needs of that second group . It 
was emphasized that technology is very heterogeneous and that it 
affects patterns and processes of both production and consumption. 
Among the factors involved in transfer of technology, major atten-
tion was paid to the impact of multinational corporations, trade 
in capital goods, technical assistance and the impact on technolo-
gical development of domestic economic policies in respect to tari-
ffs, incentives, patents and trademarks, and related technological 
policies including the screening of technological agreements in the 
importing countries. 
Participants discussed the experience of some developing count-
ries of Asia and Latin America in acquiring and adapting technology 
in such widely varied industries as agriculture, fishing and fish 
processing, chemicals, capital goods and various consumer goods. 
Policy views on which there was wide agreement included: 
1. The necessity of reconciling and liberalizing protective 
trade measures, especially when these have the effects of segregat-
ing national markets and facilitating the concentration of market 
power (by multinational and other enterprises), thus making it more 
difficult to establish markets of magnitude that would permit deve-
loping more distinctive adaptations of production technology and 
consumer goods. 
2. The desirability of providing developing country producers 
with a wider choice among technologies available in the internatio-
nal markets, through better information on available products and 
processes, and through the strengthening of indigenous R-D institu-
tions including those providing technical training, engineering 
skills and industrial research capability. 
The proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Conference will be publish-
ed in Spanish and English later this year. 
The Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference will be 
held in Auckland, New Zealand, in August 1975. 
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PART I 
THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
IN THE PACIFIC REGION 
AS IT AFFECTS DEVELOPMENT 
TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY 
1 
THE GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
THE TRANSFERENCE OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC BASIN: 
LATIN AMERICAN VIEWPOINT 
OMAR MARTfNEZ LEGORRETA 
The Pacific Ocean, largest in the world, occupies an area greater 
than all of the land masses together. Nearly half of the world popu-
lation lives in countries with coasts on the Pacific, including the 
two military superpowers (the United States and USSR), the most popu-
lated nation (China), the one with the fastest economical growth (Ja-
pan) and two intermediate powers with a great future ahead of them 
(Canada and Australia) . In the Pacific there are also twenty-six 
states in various stages of development: most of them in Southeast 
Asia and many in Latin America. 
A variety of systems coexist in the Pacific Basin: capitalist and 
socialist nations, authoritarian and democratic systems , centralized 
economies, mixed or free enterprises, civil and military governments, 
and institutional and pretorial systems. This variety, besides mak-
ing any attempt of a global analysis very difficult, is responsible 
for the Basin being considered until today as a geopolitical concept 
rather than a political-economic reality; a reality which, on the 
other hand, is within a world context of complex power struggles. 
The decade of the seventies is witness to an agile readjustment 
of international politics: 
a) The tensions that characterized the previous decade are dilut-
ed; tensions which were mostly due to the profound irreducibility of 
principles which underlay the world's ideological frontiers between 
socialist and capitalist fields. 
b) These frontiers of political bipolarism are being broken, and 
an experiment in multipolarism, which will ideally lead to universa-
lism, is in process . 
c) Parallel to the spread of multipolarity (identified with the 
United States and the USSR, Japan, China and the European Economical 
Community) the countries in development tend to regional integration 
(Arab world, Latin American Community, etc . ). 
The new scheme has its roots in the economic and political pheno-
mena of horizontal tensions (at the level of power relationship) and 
vertical ones (at the level of relations between poor and rich coun-
tries). Among these phenomena the most important are: 
a) The restriction of economic and commercial interchange within 
the artificial limits of a world ideologically split in two . 
b) The imminent danger of a nuclear conflagration of very high 
human and economic costs between the two superpowers, as a result of 
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maintaining ideological rigidity. 
c) The emergence in the developing countries of a national aware-
ness of the necessity for economic independence as a complement of 
political independence . 
d) The growing politization and fragmentation of the so-called 
Third World, to cover a wide range of positions ranging from the ra-
dical point of view to the most diluted neutralism . 
e) The consciousness of the vital interdependence between the eco-
nomies of the industrialized countries and those of the developing 
countries, heightened by the world fuel crisis, the scarceness of 
raw materials, the population explosion and environmental pollution . 
In definite terms, the new scheme is operating against a back-
ground of such events as the approachment between the United States 
and China and between the United States and the USSR, the prelimina-
ry talks in Vienna to reduce the contingents of OTAN and of the War-
saw agreement, the first results of the SALT talks related to the 
limiting of nuclear weapons on the two superpowers, the Paris agree-
ments on Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli negotiations, the lessening of 
the conflict between both Germanies, the Pan-European conference; 
the Nixon doctrine for Southeast Asia, the Russian proposition of 
opening frontiers to the World based on the Brezhnev doctrine, the 
Chinese diplomacy for the Third World based on the Five Principles 
of Pacific Coexis tence, the "economic diplomacy" of Japan , the Third 
UNCTAD, the conferences of Non-aligned Countries, and so on. 
Nevertheless, although the forces of the world economy have been 
important in this trend of international politics, the signs are 
less clear in the field of economic and financial transactions. Mo-
netary crises follow one after the other; the inflation process cov-
ers all regions of the capitalist world and undermines its transac-
tions with planned economies. The consolidation of transnational 
firms makes the main centers of political power feel that their deci-
sion possibilities are restricted by those invisible superstates. 
They rebel against the ministers of finance in Washington, Tokyo or 
Bonn, surprising the Group of Twenty in the International Monetary 
Fund or the executives of the Common Market and are even able to ma-
nipulate the precarious economic and political balance of many under-
developed countries. 
The presence of four world powers in the Pacific Basin has moti-
vated the operation of new world diplomacy in the zone, and the in-
direct effect of others is being felt in the countries of the Basin. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the strategic weight-
ing here of USA-USSR-JAPAN-CHINA does not necessarily correspond 
that of any other area in mil itary and economic aspects. Here, the 
military power of the Pacific Basin is concentrated overwhelmingly 
in the United States. 
We only need to remember its bases and military installations in 
Asia, the American alliances with Japan and the Southeast Asian coun-
tries, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Seven-
th Fleet and the control over the Panama Canal. The Soviet Union 
presence is felt with its naval base in Vladivostok and with hund-
reds of submarines and other ships operating in the area, but the 
specific weight of this military presence is still far from that of 
the United States. This fact, combined with the uncertain frontier 
resulting from the Sino-Soviet conflict, reduces the significance 
of the USSR as a power in the Pacific Ocean . 
Postwar Japan has become the first case in history of an economic 
power without war power also . This political "schizophrenia" is re-
flected in the almost exclusive orientation of Japanese diplomacy 
towards commercial and financial problems. Although the controversy 
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of rearming Japan is beginning to have importance in relations with 
the United States, China and the USSR, it can be foretold that in 
the near future Japan will not become a military power. 
The economic balance between the four powers of the Basin is also 
almost impossible . Because of their socio-economic structure, the 
two commercial and financial giants are the United States and Japan. 
In this sense, the USSR is still a European power, remote from 
the Pacific . China, whose reason for being among the world powers 
is due to the future projection of its growing economy and popula-
tion volume , is still far from making its presence felt in the Paci-
fic Basin in economic and financial transactions . ll 
According to foreign trade information for 1970, the Pacific Ba-
sin contributed 41 percent of total world exports, 40.6 percent of 
imports and 40.8 percent of total world trade. In other words, 
transactions with a total value of 234 thousand million dollars. 
The developed areas of the Basin (United States, Japan , Australia , 
New Zealand and Canada) participated with 31 . 2 percent of world ex-
ports, 29 . 7 percent of imports and 30 .4 percent of international 
trade . The developing nations of the Asiatic~American basin contri-
buted 9 . 8 percent of exports, 10 . 9 percent of imports and 10 . 4 per-
cent of world trade.2) · 
The United States led the international trade of the Basin, with 
15.5 percent, 15.9 and 15 percent of the exports , imports and total 
trade respectively. Japan followed with 6 . 9 percent, 6.4 percent 
and 6 . 6 percent, respectively . 
This active participation of the United States and Japan is re-
flected in the high level of dependence that other Basin countries 
have in their trade with these two countries. Eighty-five percent 
of Canada's foreign trade, 80 percent of Mexico, 65 percent of the 
Andes Group, 38 percent of Australia and Central America and 29 per-
cent of Southeast Asia's trade was done with the United States . Re-
garding Japan, the order of dependence of transactions of other coun-
tries in this regard was as follows: Southeast Asia 42 percent, Au-
stralia 37 percent, and Andes Group with 11 percent. 
No less intense is the dependence of the Basin's countries on in-
vestment of American and Japanese capital . Of approximately 2,000 
million dollars that Japan had invested in the world between 1951 
and 1968, 340 million were located in Southeast Asia. Of these 34 
percent was in mining and 8 percent in the exploration of natural 
resources with the well defined purpose of assuring supply of raw 
materials. 
Seventy-one million dollars were oriented towards manufacturing 
investment, with the textile industry at the head . This meant the 
transfer to Southeast Asia of those weaker industrial sectors of the 
industrial structure of Japan, due to the relatively slow technolo-
gical development of the textile industry, the lack of adjustment 
of organizational structure (medium and small firms) and the exploit-
ing of cheap non-specialized manpower . 3) In Latin America U. S . in-
l)It should be pointed out that in the souhtern and south-eastern 
region of Asia (limited to Malaysia, Pakistan, Ceylon, Singapore 
and Hong Kong) China has had a trade surplus that reached 890 mil-
lion dollars in 1969. (JETRO, How to approach the China Market, 
Tokyo 1972. Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Pap-
ers of Japan, 1969-1 970; 1970-1971, Tokyo 1972.) 
2)The figures of foreign trade and of the Basin are from information 
that appeared in the International Monetary Fund, Direction of 
trade, Annual 1966-70; United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statis-
tic~, November 1972; see appendices 1 to 5 in this work. 
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vestments are over 17 thousand million dollars . The area ' s debt 
with the United States is increasing and the political tendency of 
the hemisphere is clearly anti- American . 4) 
In view of the dominance of the United States and Japan in the 
trade area what degree of cohesion and dynamism do figures on for-
eign trade reveal among the subregional groups of the Basin? On the 
basis of data from 1970, the Central American Community circulated 
688 million dollars in its trade between the six countries of the 
community, which corresponds to 19 . 4 percent of Central America ' s 
foreign trade . The eight countries of Southeast Asia , plus South 
Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong circulated 1,800 million dollars in 
their intraregional trade , or 5 . 5 percent of their total trade . Sev-
en countries of the Andes Group interchanged 305 million dollars or 
2 . 01 percent of their foreign trade . To sum up, on the American 
coast of the Pacific the least integrated and the most integrated 
sub-regions of the Basin are simultaneously located here : Andes 
Group and Central America , respectively . SJ 
These low figures of interregional trade , apart from the United 
States and Japan , as well as the overwhelming presence of these two 
economic powers in commercial transactions and capital investment , 
suggest the urgency of finding new approaches to the economic rela-
tions prevailing in the Pacific Basin , oriented towards lesseni ng 
this accentuated bipolar dependence . 
On the other hand , the l ow levels of trade carr i ed out in the 
subregions indicate that projects of subregional i ntegration have 
not diminished the polar attraction exerted by the Uni ted States and 
Japan to a desirable extent . We should wonde r if these pro j ects are 
not creating a better structuring of the subregional communicat i on 
mechanisms benefiting ultimately the two commercial superpowers . 
In any case , it seems to be evident that , in terms of the new 
trends of international life mentioned at the beginning, subregional 
integration is one of the few possible solutions to the problem of 
dependence and underdevelopment from which most of the Basin's na-
tions suffer . 
In the case of Southeast As i a innumerable subgroups have appear-
ed . Almost all suffer negative perspectives derived from the bipo-
lar political tension that originated it . SEATO (Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization which originatedin the Manila conference of 1945) 
and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States security treaty , 
signed September 1951) are security treaties with the purpose of 
helping the United States with military operations in the region . 
In 1967 the Japanese Prime Minister Sato and his counsellor Miki de-
clared that Japan was interested in forming ASPAC (Asia-Pacific) 
which would attempt to join the Asiatic nations of the Pacific in a 
great regional coopeation project . However ASPAC excluded the so-
cialist countries, even though it was generically referred to as a 
"promotion for cooperation between the advanced nations of the Paci-
fic area". Between 1961 and 1967 the ASA (Southeast Asia Associa-
tion) was in operation grouping together Malaysia , Thailand and the 
Philippines . From 1967 onwards ASEAN (Association of South East 
Asian Nations) was formed, uniting the ASA members and Indonesia 
and Singapore . 
3)Saburo Okita, Japan and the World Economy, Tokyo, JERC, 1971 , page 
47. 
4)For th~ general Latin American view of its economic dependence on 
t~e ui:nted States, see the article by Maria Rosario Green; "For-
e7gn investment help and dependence in Latin America", Interna-
tional Forum . El Colegio de Mexico, XII : 1, 1971 , pages 1~26 . 
S)See parenthesis 2 . 
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Unfortunately, all of these organizations have ended up giving 
priority to military security over economic and social development. 
It could be that ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and Far East), 
organ of the United Nations with a role similar to that of CEPAL in 
Latin America, could encourage a consciousness of Pacific regional-
ism, separating the great powers interested in exerting a hegemony 
in the area. Nevertheless, the climate of political tension and in-
stability has not allowed the growth of that consciousness. Neith-
er has the Asian Development Bank been able to do it, due to its 
heavy dependence on Japan and the United States. 
In spite of many promises, the present decade does not seem to 
be one in which social preoccupations prevail over strategic and 
military ones . The great powers present in the Basin have a vital 
interest in maintaining the Ocean's unrestricted use. The product 
that crosses the Pacific in largest quantities and with most frequ-
ency is oil. Its scarceness in the world and its very important 
role in the powers' war machinery requires an equilibrium of milita-
ry power in Southeast Asia, something very difficult to maintain . 
The Sino-Soviet conflict, the rising of Chinese and Soviet naval 
power and the fear of the spreading of socialist regimes in Asia 
have raised the continent's underdeveloped countries' military ex-
enses above any consideration of economic and social development. 
It need only be said that twelve countries of Southeast Asia assign 
8.2 percent of their GNP to military expenses, while those of the 
Andes Group assign only 1 . 4 percent . 
Mexico uses in its armed forces a little over 4 dollars per capi-
ta. In other words, 0.6 percent of their GNP (calculated on over 
600 dollars per capita). The states of Southeast Asia spend on 
their armed forces an average of twelve dollars per capita, or 8 . 8 
percent of their GNP , which in terms of income per capita barely 
reaches 146 dollars. 
If the Me xican proportion of 0.14 military personnel per inhabi-
tant was applied to that region, we would have 669,634 men instead 
of 3,907,000. This would imply the allocation of 1,975 million dol-
lars for defence, instead of the actual figure of 7,780 million dol-
lars, even if average investment per man were to increase from 1,990 
dollars per capita to 2,950 according to the Mexican average. This 
demilitarization would ~ree 5 , 800 million dollars which could be 
used for socio-economic development.6) 
The Latin American Pacific is not immersed in a war. In compari-
son with Southeast Asia, a larger proportion of its resources is us-
ed for the struggle against underdevelopment . Nevertheless, its de-
pendence on the hegemonic pole of the United States is much more ac-
centuated than that of the other side of the ocean . Multipolarity, 
key to the political and diplomatic strategy of Asia, does not yet 
exist in the Latin American Pacific. The military control of the 
United States via the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
plus the bilateral agreements of the superpower with many countries 
of the sub-region, guarantee North American domination. We have al-
ready indicated the clear orientation of foreign trade of these 
countries towards the United Sates and their acute dependence on 
capital investments. Paradoxically, it could be said that South-
east Asia has the geopolitical elements for negotiating the reduc-
tion of its dependence on a superpower, but it does not do so be-
6)The data on military expenses are 
MILITARY BALANCE, 1972-73 and the 
tegic Studies of London for 1970 . 
work . 
from the IIDD publication, THE 
studies of the Institute of Stra-
See appendices 6 and 7 of this 
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cause economic development is not a realistic priority to most of 
the subregion's regimes, which are involved in problems of security 
and of maintaining the status quo. Meanwhile the Latin American 
Pacific attempts to speed up its process of independent development, 
but it lacks the geopolitical elements, as well as the transpacific 
contact paths necessary for reducing the high degree of dependence 
regarding the United States. For all purposes, it can be considered 
that the sub-region is totally dependent on the superpower and with-
drawn from Asia ' s multipolar tensions. 7) 
The landscape of the Asiatic nations of the Pacific reveals lit-
tle encouraging aspect: internal political instability in many of 
them, difficult economic relations with Japan (mostly due to the geo-
political factor), an anti-Chinese tendency intensified by the ac-
tions of the Chinese minorities in the southeast of the continent, 
apparently unsolvable conflicts between China and the USSR and a de-
cline in regional integration efforts for development . 
On the Asiatic side of the Basin, each of the four powers obtains 
benefits from conflicts between the others, but surely none desires 
any other to be involved in nuclear war . On the other hand, each 
one fears that the others ally against it. It can be said that, since 
the actions of the powers in the area will .. hardly produce alliances 
or antagonisms of the cold war type, the main characteristic of which 
was bipolarity and ideological upheaval, the tensions among the four 
powers will persist for a long time and a combination of two against 
a third one will not be easy . 
In the Latin American side of the Basin, efforts for regional in-
tegration do not seem to have diminished dependence on the United 
States, which still has total military control over the sub-region 
and economic pressure of great intensity. At the same time, the so-
cialist experience of Chile and the later establishment of a milita-
ry dictatorship in that country have reduced even more the possibili-
ties of political and diplomatic freedom. 
Of the intermediate powers, Australia and New Zealand have showed 
a very low level of regional integration . In 1970 their foreign 
trade in the region reached only 30 percent of their transactions, 
while the other 70 percent was done in nations outside of the basin, 
mainly the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community.8) 
With its GNP growth rate, expansion of its foreign trade and its 
technological progress, Australia has an important role in the world 
economy, but the countries of the Basin, mainly the Latin American 
ones with their traditional isolation, are unaware of the Australian 
situation . 
Canada's case is similar; although its presence begins to be felt 
in Latin America, its diplomacy for the south of our continent is 
still far from the strength that it could have. The historical back-
ground of Australia and Canada deserves careful attention by the La-
tin American countries . The type of economic nationalism that these 
two countries have, with a parallel situation in both of them (Cana-
da regarding .the USA and Australia regarding the United Kingdom), is 
frustrated by the activities of the transnational companies, which 
prefer to concentrate on the extracting and manufacturing industries . 
Under these conditions it becomes a lesson for the developing count-
ries to establish national objectives for those giants by means of 
legislation which will allow effective control without closing the 
doors to the capital and technology that they represent. 
7)In this sense, see Mario Ojeda Gomez's analysis on the Rockefel-
ler Report ori Latin America: "The military and security relations", 
International Forum, X:3 1970, pages 257-264. · 
8)See table 4 
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The weak nations of the Pacific Basin do not seem to have consid-
ered carefully the fact that Australia, thanks to thorough explora-
tion of its resources, will in this present decade become the world's 
largest exporter of such important minerals as iron, aluminium, coal, 
copper, lead and zinc . 
The only important mineral product that Australia will import in 
significant quantities will be oil , even though its internal produc-
tion increases at a considerable rate . 
In Canada systematic exploration has been successfully undertaken , 
and this has led to the discovery of vast natural resources. Though 
Canada's GNP and its foreign trade grow at a rate slower than that 
of Japan and Australia , this is not due to a lack of resources , but 
to other factors . Maybe the most important of these is its depend-
ence on the United States and Great Britain as markets for i t s pri-
mary products , as well as the difficulties that Canada finds for 
speeding up export of its manufactured products because of the res-
trictive policies that most of the industries owned by transnational 
firms in the United States impose and which are Canada ' s most import-
ant technology source . In spite of this , the Canadian economy will 
undergo a swift change, in which the governmental decision to spons-
or and coordinate national scientific and technological effort with 
state financing is very important , assigning a considerable portion 
of the GNP to maintain this experimental measure. 
In the uncertain conditions of the Pacific Basin we cannot omit 
the rise of the Japanese presence in Latin American markets . For 
Japan these countries represent a market for the products of its 
heavy and chemical industries , and they form an important group of 
economies receiving Japanese investment in the mining and manufactur-
ing fields . At the same time this sub-region is an important source 
of iron and textiles for Japanese consumption . This double interest 
has been confirmed by the increasing of Japanese trade in Latin Ame-
rica and the rising level of direct and joint Japanese investments 
in many countries of the area . 
According to Japanese calculations , Japan ' s economy will continue 
growing at the average annual rate of 12.4 percent in real terms dur-
ing the first five years of the present decade . In monetary terms 
the GNP will reach 440 , 000 million dollars in 1975 , in other words , 
an average of 17 . 5 percent annual growth. For that same year it is 
estimated that Latin America ' s GNP, in total , will represent barely 
7 . 4 percent of the world GNP, while the Japanese is already 10 per-
cent of the world . 9) This growth rate necessarily implies a formid-
able Japanese participation in ~nternational trade . Japan will con-
tinue importing great amounts of raw materials and foods to maintain 
its growth rate . The Latin American countries have the natural re-
sources that Japan needs , so they want to participate in exploiting 
these resources . 
On the other hand , concentration of exports from Japan to the 
United States and the countries of Southeast Asia provokes friction 
and difficult situations which force Japan to increase the diversity 
of its export markets. Japan has concentrated its economic assist-
ance projects in Southeast Asia partly for the convenience of sup-
porting its commercial transactions with other underdeveloped areas , 
and this has proved to be politically unsustainable , judging by the 
reactions that this situation has provoked in the region . 
The two socialist powers of the Pacific Basin do not participate 
in this international trade with the strength that should correspond 
9)According to data from a world economy projection in 1975 . The 
Japan Economic Research Center, Japan's Economy in 1975, Tokyo, 
1970 . 
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to their economic potential . The secondary role assigned to foreign 
trade in planned economies partly explains this phenomenon, mainly 
in China's case which is still, in good measure, a society of self-
sufficient development. Its trade surplus with some countries of 
Southeast Asia mentioned earlier on, is related to the presence of 
the Chinese communities in the area and to political rather than 
economic considerations . 
On the other hand, it seems that China is willing to buy from 
those countries of the Third World whose governments are considered 
by the Chinese to be friendly regimes. Nevertheless, . these purchas-
es, like those in Mexico , barely modify the figures of commercial 
interchange in the Basin . 
In recent years, the Soviet Union has shown a growing interest 
in Middle East Oil, the Indian subcontinent and the countries of 
Southeast Asia . It is presently enlarging its participation in 
transportation with modern merchant ships and systems that lower 
costs. Their ships can be found in all of the oceans of the world , 
mainly occupied wi t h exploring and mapping the ocean. This effort 
is unsurpassed by other powers, judging by the size of its oceano-
graphic and hydrographic fleet , which is larger than all similar 
fleets in other countries . 
The present situation and the Soviet fleet ' s continuous growth 
allow the USSR a presence of great tactical importance in places 
where their political interests require them . This gives great psy-
chological support to its diplomacy and opportunities to exert pres -
sure in crisis areas. Nevertheless , regarding their foreign trade , 
the USSR seems to concentrate on a European dialogue and transac-
tions with the other great powers . The commercial operations with 
the United States and the financial relations that can develop with 
the North American companies because of their high volume and their 
enormous political importance do not allow any parallel with the 
commercial transactions undertaken with Southeast Asia, and even 
less, with Latin America. Finally closer ties with Japan and the 
viability of joint exploitation of the natural resources of Siberia 
confirm this tendency . 
From what has been said previously one can deduce that, in terms 
of commercial interchange, the Pacific Basin is still essentially a 
field of free enterprise in which two capitalist powers, the United 
States and Japan, dominate product interchange and capital invest-
ment. In this context the so-called transnational firms make their 
power felt, always enlarging. The most important ones have their 
headquarters in the United States or in North American interests, 
and participate actively in its financing and administration coun-
cils . United States diplomacy frequently supports the line of ac-
tion of these multinational firms . 10) 
It is in this complex framework that the transference of techno-
logy in the Pacific Basin is undertaken. As in the structure of 
economic transactions, the interests of Japan and the United States 
dominate this important mechanism, with implications beyond the eco-
nomic field. The transference of military technology and the train-
ing of technicians and professionals with consequent impact on edu-
cation systems, involve extremely important political implications 
which can not be left unmentioned under the pretext of taking a 
purely technical approach to the problem.11) 
lO)See table 7 
ll)There is an interesting resume of the discussion on the oolitical 
implica~ions of direct foreign investment in SEADAG Repo~ts, Ad 
hoc Seminar on Multinational Corporations in Southeast Asia, Dec. 
12 24, 1973 La Jolla, California, pages 11-15. 
O.M. LEGORRETA l1 
In the market of transference of technology from industrialized 
countries to underdeveloped ones government participate (via agree-
ments of government to government cooperation), as well as interna-
tional organizations (via ad hoc organs of the United Nations and 
other specialized agencies), and the transnational companies. The 
latter carry out a more ambitious and better coordinated operation. 
In importing technology, the developing countries are trying to 
speed up their industrialization process, in response to growing 
popular demands for a better level of life. 
When they resort to the transnational firms to provide them with 
this technology, they find that the transaction is frequently enclos-
ed in a framework of stern conditions which undermines the economic 
and political independence of the weak states, to the point of be-
coming a threat to the country's sovereignty . That is why it is es-
sential that the supposedly free technology market in the Pacific 
Basin be liberated, and this should be accompanied by the search 
for new sources in the socialist countries and by the joint efforts 
of developing countries on both sides of the Basin . Restricting 
the transnational firms' control of the technological markets , re-
ducing the cost of that technology and increasing research in our 
countries so that they can adjust more closely to our demands seem 
to be immediate needs. 
Finally, when attempting to delineate a scheme in which the trans-
ference of technology is to be effected in the Pacific Basin, it is 
important to keep in mind that although the region can be geographi-
cally separated in traditional terms, it is now in an age of global 
communication (which originated in the technological development of 
the superpowers) that links it so intimately to other parts of the 
world that it daily renders more obsolete the attempt to reduce it 
to its geographical form for purposes of analysis. The great powers 
have reached a stage of scientific advancement that allows them to 
perceive the world as a unit whose continental segmentation is mere-
ly an element for the designing of planetary policies and projects. 
It is symptomatic of the underdevelopment of our Latin American and 
Asian societies not to clearly perceive this fascinating phenomenon . 
The result is that for the purpose of political, diplomatic and 
commercial planning the governments of the great powers key their 
operations in the Pacific Basin to those designed for other geogra-
phic zones. This can also be said of the transnational companies 
which only conceive their action at a global level. 
When speaking of the powers in the Pacific Basin we consider that 
Western Europe, the fifth multipolar giant, is absent in the zone. 
This assertion is only valid in terms of relative influence on the 
great decisions that affect it. In the Pacific, the presence of 
Western European power is felt wherever traditional colonialism sur-
vives in Southeast Asia and where economic neo-colonialism is exert-
ed over excolonies which, while politically independent nations, 
still depend in good measure on European markets for their economic 
life . It is a phenomenon which contributes to the universalization 
of the Basin's problems. 
12 GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
Appendix 1 Pacific Basin and World Trade (1970 data) 
~ 
Export Import Global 
Partici- Partici- Foreign 
pation pation Trade 
Partici-
pation 
% % % 
WORLD TOTAL 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
Pacific Basin Total 41. 0 40 . 0 40 . 0 
Developed Areas 31.1 29 . 6 30 . 1 
Japan 6.9 6 . 4 6 . 6 
Australia and New Zealand 2 . 9 3 . 4 3 . 2 
Canada 5 . 8 4 . 9 5 . 3 
United States 15 . 5 14 . 9 15 . 0 
Areas in development 9.8 10.8 10 . 4 
Latin America 5.1 4 . 7 4 . 9 
(Andes Group) (2 . 7) (2 . 3) (2 . 5) 
Asia 4 . 7 6 . 1 5 . 5 
(Southeast Asia) I ( 2.1) (2 . 7) (2 . 4) 
source : Data compiled based on FMI : Direction of Trade, Number 7 
Appendix 2 The Pacific Basin and The Interzonal Trade (1970 data) 
Pacific Basin Total 
Deve loped Areas 
Japan 
Australia and New Zealand 
Canada 
Unitd States 
Areas in development: 
Latin America 
Asia 
(Southeast Asia) 
Export 
Partici-
pation 
% 
100.0 
77 . 0 
18.3 
4 . 4 
17 . 6 
36.7 
23 . 0 
11. 8 
11. 2 
( 5 . 4) 
Import 
Partici-
pation 
% 
100.0 
71. 4 
17 . 1 
3.4 
15 . 4 
35 . 5 
28 . 6 
13 . 2 
15.4 
(7 . 4) 
Global 
Foreign 
Trade 
Partici-
pation 
% 
100 . 0 
74 . 2 
17 . 7 
3 . 9 
16 . 5 
36 . 1 
25 . 8 
12 . 5 
13 . 3 
(6 . 4) 
Source : Data compiled based in FMI: Direction of Trade, Number 7 
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Appendix 3 Orientation of interzonal trade of the Pacific Basin in 
comparison to orientation towards world trade (outside 
of the Basin) - 1970 data 
exports imports total 
% % trade 
oriented oriented % 
to the to the oriented 
Pacific Pacific to the 
Basin Basin Pacific 
Basin 
Pacific Basin 62 . 1 59 . 7 60.8 
Developed Areas 63 . 0 58 . 2 60 . 6 
Japan 67 . 4 64 . 8 66 . l 
Australia and New Zealand 38 . 6 24 . 1 30 . 6 
Canada 77 . 5 75 . 0 76 . 3 
United States 60 . 3 57 . 7 59 . 7 
Areas in development 58 . 3 67.4 62 . 8 
Latin America 58 . 3 67.4 62 . 8 
Andes Group 
Asia 59 . 7 60.5 60 . 2 
Southeast Asia 64 . 6 66 . 6 65 .4 
Source : FMI : Direction of Trade, Number 7 
Appendix 4 Pacific Basin : relation of foreign trade dependence 
regarding Japan and the United States . 
II\) dependence on the United States: B) dependence on Japan 
1.- Canada 85 . 0 % 1. - Southeast Asia 42 . 0 % 
2 . - Andes Group 65 . 0 2 . - Asia 41. 0 
3 . - Latin America 58 . 0 3 . - Australia 37 . 0 
4 . - Australia 38 . 0 4 . - Latin America 12 . 0 
5 . - Asia 38 . 0 5 . - Andes Group 11. 0 
6.- Central America 38 . 0 6 . - Central America 7 . 2 
7 . - Southeast Asia 29 . 0 7 . - Canada 6.0 
Source : 1970 data , compiled based in FMI : Direction of Trade 
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COMMENTS ON LEGORRETA'S PAPER - HELEN HUGHES 
I propose to take up some of the issue more particularly concern-
ed with the transfer of technology. 
Firstly, I would like to raise some definitional points. The 
problem, it seems to me, is not simply one of " the transfer of tech-
nology" but rather a series of problems concerned with the transfer 
and adaptation of appropriate technologies. A wide range of engin-
eering and management practices, attuned to varying skill, manage-
ment and market conditions is characteristic not only of industria-
lized countries, but also of rapidly growing industrializing count-
ries which pay adequate attention to the matching of technologies 
with changing factor endowments and national and international mar-
ket opportunities . "Best practice" technology in an economic sense 
is thus a spectrum of engineering and management practices . When 
the "shelf" of existing technologies available in developing as well 
as developed countries is taken into account, the choice is very 
considerable. This applies not only to manufacturing, mining power 
and other "modern" sectors, but also to agriculture, construction 
and the service sector where the bulk of the G. D.P . (if measured in 
international, rather than protected local prices) is created. 
To ignore the range of appropriate technologies available, or to 
allow an economy to be divided into two sectors--a technologically 
complex and capital intensive, highly productive modern sector and 
a traditional, informal sector of low productivity--is to ignore 
the social aspects of development and to place a brake on the pace 
of development by failing to utilize important natural resources--
people . 
It seems to me that Dr. Legorreta's paper is in some danger of 
failing to stress the complexity of the transfer and adapatation of 
appropriate technologies by concentrating solely on the transfer of 
highly complex and capital intensive technologies for the modern 
sector . It is true of course that in this sector the multinational 
corporations are important in technology transfer, although it must 
be noted that this is not necessarily so in all modern sectors. 
The most advanced technology for steel, fertilizers and power gene-
ration--to name but three very important basic industries, is avail-
able in a quite competitive patent, license and construction market 
without ties to direct capital investment. 
Dr. Legorreta's paper, however, concentrated on the less competi-
tive technology transfer markets, consisting mostly though not en-
tirely, it should be noted , of semiluxury and luxury consumer goods. 
Here, if I may caricature the "Latin American Viewpoint" a little, 
I am reminded of a situation in which a young lady or gentleman ac-
cepts an invitation from a person of the opposite sex to visit their 
apartment late at night, and, two brandies later, cries " rape! rape !" 
There can be no doubt that the prime purpose of multinational corpo-
rations is to make the maximum profits they can, that they are usu-
ally operating in an oligopolistic or monopolistic environment, and 
that they bring whatever pressures to bear they can in bargaining. 
But far from fighting back on just as tough a basis (as several, in 
some cases more economically backward, developing countries in other 
parts of the world have done) , the Latin American countries have 
given the multinational corporations high protection for integral 
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markets, high incentives for exports and capital incentives of vari-
ous sorts. Until quite recently they failed to attend to the build-
ing up of the technological and administrative expertise which make 
adaptation and arm's length pricing possible, let alone mandatory. 
It seems to me that three principal conditions have to be satis-
fied if an equitable transfer and adaptation of appropriate technolo-
gies is to take place. 
Firstly, the overall development strategies have to take into ac-
count equity as well as output growth objectives. Such an approach 
would form intersectorial priorities, the linkages between the "low" 
and "high" technology components of sectors and of the economy as a 
whole, and thus provide the basis for a mass consumption market for 
consumer goods, services and for production inputs , particularly in-
to agriculture . This theme is taken up in Dr . Helleiner's paper. 
Secondly, the price structure determined by trade , monetary , f i s~ 
cal and other policies has to be at least headed in the right direc-
tion. This does not mean a pure free trade approach , but it does 
require the elimination of the extremes of distortion which at pre-
sent characterize most Lat i n American (and many other) economies , in-
hibiting rather than encouraging socially desirable behavior by fo -
reign owners of technology as well as the local , private and public 
purchasers . 
Thirdly , there seems to me to be a need for far greater attention 
to the absorptive technical and administrative capacity particularly 
for adapting technology to local needs . A socially oriented overall 
strategy and sensible price signals are necessary conditions, but 
they are not likely to be sufficient for the creation of a vigorous 
entrepreneurial, technological community capable not only of purchas-
ing technology on equitable grounds and adapting i t to local needs, 
but also of that indigenous innovation which is one of the prime 
sources of comparative advantage in the modern world . 
The policies needed to create the v igorous entrepreneurial absor p -
tive approach to technology are obviously wide reaching . A rigorous 
yet practically oriented education and research structure is essen-
tial to create skills at all levels from the factory floor and farm 
field upwards . It is important to note that population planning is 
essential to the widening and deepening of human- skills and capital 
labor ratios . Countries that do not adopt population planning pol i-
cies place themselves at a very grave disadvantage in the technologi-
cal race . The creation of an administrative structure can consoli-
date to the improvement of the state of knowledge about technological 
needs as well as sources of supply and thus make arm ' s length bargain-
ing more likely . The international exchange of information among 
developing countries could moreover, lead to an important extension 
of information . 
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SOVIET VIEWPOINT (1) 
EMERGENCE OF THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC COMPLEX AND 
SOME ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PACIFIC COUNTRIES 
V, YAKUBOVSKY 
Processes which have been developing in the Pacific area in re-
cent years turn it into a new political and economic centre of the 
capitalist world. Of special significance among these processes 
is the formation of the ever deeper, closer and stabler relations 
in foreign trade, investments, and technological exchange between 
the countries of this area. All this makes it possible to speak 
of the tendency towards the emergence of the Pacific economic com-
plex. 
Economic and manpower potential which may become associated 
with the newly emerging economic unit is great. The territory of 
either Pacific or economically Pacific-oriented capitalistic coun-
tries is about 42 million square kilometers, which is more than 
one-third of all dry land. These countries account for about 40 
percent of the world population. In 1971 GNP of the five leading 
capitalist countries of this area comprised 1,400 billion dollars, 
nearly double the GNP of the nine EEC countries. 
A number of global and regional factors predetermined the deve-
lopment of the abovementioned trends. 
First it should be noted that scientific and technological re-
volution, as well as structural changes in the economy, have caus-
ed further deepening of the international division of labour and 
internationalization of individual economies, which in their turn 
made necessary the rapid growth of international economic relations. 
The latter includes those between the Pacific countries. 
One of the regional prerequisites was the rapid growth of the 
economic potential of a number of Pacific countries, particularly 
Japan, which has become the second economic power in the capitalist 
world. Rapid development of such "medium" capitalist countries of 
this region as Canada, Australia and New Zealand has opened the 
way for their extended participation in Pacific regional economic 
intercourse. At present some of the industrially advanced capital 
ist countries have reached certain comparativeness of the level of 
their economic development, which sets the basis for possible in-
tegration processes among them . The relatively fast economic de-
velopment of some countries of East and Southeast Asia, makes pos-
sible their more active participation in the new division of labour 
in this area. 
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Establishment of trans-Pacific economic ties was speeded substan-
tially by formation of vast coastal industrial urbanized zones in 
the leading capitalist countries of the area. The Californian me-
galopolis in the us, which has emerged as a result of vigorous de-
velopment of the Pacific coast states in the post-war period, can 
be cited as an example of such zones. Another example is the Paci-
fic coast industrial belt of Japan, which at the end of the sixties 
accounted for 72 percent of the population, 81 percent of the indust-
rial enterprises and 87 percent of the manufacturing industries out-
put of the country. The same might be said about the largest indus-
trial cities and ports of Australia--Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane--as 
well as about fast development of the Canadian Pacific coast and es-
tablishment of industrial centers there. 
Technological progress in merchant mari11e and sea transportation 
has contributed to turning the Pacific into a powerful integrating 
factor. This was also assisted by the rapid development of air 
transportation and other means of communication in this area. 
Large deposits of minerals and fuel in Australia, Canada and 
along the Pacific coast of Latin America, as well as traditional 
world-wide-scale production of natural rubber, tin, jute, copra, 
and other products in the countries of Southeast Asia provide a raw 
material base for the emerging capitalist economic unity. 
When raw materials and energy become scarce, substantially due 
to the practices of giant transnational corporations, the resources 
of Pacific Ocean will play a special role in the economic develop-
ment of this region, especially considering progress in oceanogra-
phy and development of economically sound technology of the ocean 
resources extraction industry . 
The Pacific Ocean is a giant store of mineral resources and a 
source of valuable food products . According to the estimates of 
the US experts, the seabed of the Pacific Ocean contains eight bil-
lion tons of copper , 15 billion tons of nickel, 358 billion tons 
of manganese and five billion tons of cobalt , which at the 1972 
rate of consumption is sufficient for 1,100, 23,500 , 34,800 and 
260 , 000 years correspondingly . 
It is significant that unlike the mineral resources deposited 
in the dry land , "ore nodules " are permenently reproduced at a rate 
of thousands of tons a year . Compared to the world output in 1972 , 
the annual formation of copper on the seabed of the Pacific is 0 . 8% , 
nickel 16% , manganese 24% and cobalt 180% . In some time their ex-
traction may prove to be more profitable than mineral extraction 
on the continents . 
Geological structures suggesting potentially r i ch deposits of 
natural oil and gas , were discovered in the shallow seas of the 
Eastern and Southeast Asia and near Australia . Their industri al 
development would make this region one of the largest world produc-
ers of these valuable raw materials and fuel , which could compete 
with the countries of the Near and Mi ddle East . 
In recent years the Pacific Ocean has become the world sea fish-
ing center. Investigation and practical utilization of its vast 
food resources are urgent problems . 
The emergence of the new economic complex in the Pacific area 
was accompanied by deep changes in the system and nature of econo-
mic ties between the capitalist countries of this region, and es-
pecially of foreign trade relations between them . Characteristic 
of the latter was their dynamism which contributed to the economic 
development of the region and opened avenues for economic rappro-
chement. In the period 1960 to 1972 overall export of the five 
largest capitalist countries of the region and of the developing 
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nations of the Pacific Asia area , has increased more than twofold. 
In the post-war period considerable restructuring of regional 
trade relations took place , especially between the countries of the 
Western Pacific . Before World War II the Pacific Asian countries- -
then colonies--were tied to European monopolies in their foreign 
trade . Great Britain traditionally accounted for the major share 
of the foreign trade of her former dominions, Australia and New Zea-
land . 
Starting in the fifties, the process of regionalization of for -
eign trade of the Pacific countries has become much more active . 
It involved first of all such industrially developed countries as 
the USA, Japan , Canada , Australia and New Zealand . Between 195 4 
and 1972 the share of intra-regional export of these countries in-
creased from 29.8 to 45.7 percent , compared to their overall e x-
port . Corresponding figures for intraregional import were 38 . 8 
percent in 1954 and 49.9 percent in 1971. It is noteworthy that 
those figures do not differ significantly from the similar indicat-
ors for the Common Market countries although expansion of foreign 
trade between the Pacific countries is taking place under far less 
favourable conditions than that of the EEC . 
The abovementioned countries have restructured their foreign 
trade towards the region to a different degree . Considering the 
weakening of traditional ties with Great Britain and her membership 
in the Common Market which have shaken the preferential position 
of Australian and New Zealand products on the British market, the 
latter two countries have decisively moved towards regional trade . 
Whereas in 1954 the other four of the five already mentioned Paci-
fic countries accounted for 16 percent of Australian imports and 
19 percent of its exports, in 1971 their share was 44 and 48 per-
cent correspondingly . The share of export operations of New Zea-
land with the Pacific four has increased from 10 to 37 percent dur-
ing the same period . At the same time the US, which followes a 
global foreign trade strategy, has increased the share of its ex-
ports to the Pacific countries only from 24 to 35 percent, and 
their imports from the Pacific from 28 to 46 percent . 
At the same time it should be noted that the process of re- ori-
entation of foreign trade towards the region has gone beyond those 
five industrially developed capitalist countries of the Pacific 
area, and has to a greater or lesser extent involved virtually all 
the nations of this region . It would be enough to note that during 
the last two decades the share of intraregional export in the total 
export of the five industrially developed capitalist countries and 
of the developing countries of the Pacific Asia has reached 56 per-
cent. 
Owing to the fact that formation of the new regional trade pat-
tern took place within the framework of a capitalist economy, a co-
rollary of which is the uneven development of different countries, 
the specific positions of various states within the newly emerging 
Pacific division of labour happened to be very much different and 
far from equal . 
Dominant positions in the arising economic community of capital-
ist countries are occupied by the USA and Japan which account for 
20 and 13 percent respectively of all mutual export operations of 
the Pacific countries, while similar figures for the countries of 
the rest of the Pacific Asia area and for Australia and New Zealand 
correspondingly are 9 and 3 percent . 
Trade and economic relations between these countries of the area , 
which may be characterized as relations of both partnership and 
competition, are an important component of the system of regional 
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economic ties . In 1972 mutual export between the USA and Japan, 
which are the largest trade partners not only in the region but in 
the world , was 13.8 billion dollars or more than 20 percent of the 
total intra-regional export in that year. Special place belongs 
to the trade between Japan and the rapidly advancing Pacific coast 
of the US . "Our trade with such states as California, Washington 
or Hawaii e xceeds our trade with any European country"-- once re-
marked Mr. M. Ohira, Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry of Ja-
pan . 
Structural shifts in the Japanese industry and in its t rade 
with the United States have made Japan a dangerous competitor of 
the US in the markets of new industrial products and processes. 
The share of heavy and chemical industries products in Japan ' s ex-
ports to the USA has increased sharply from 17 . 3 percent in 1955 
to 78 . 1 percent in 1972 , while the share of machinery and equip-
ment in America ' s exports to Japan is only 28 . 5 percent . In 1972 
Japan managed to sell in the US market 8 . 5 billion dollars worth 
of industrial goods (with respect to which the clash of interests 
of American and Japanese corporations is most acute) while the USA 
sold only 2.7 billio n dollars worth of such products in Japan . 
In the 70s one can expect trends towards further increase of 
trade and economic relations between Japan and the USA due to such 
factors as structural shifts in American and Japanese economies 
under the impact of scientific and technological revolution. 
These shifts increase mutual dependence on the other country 's 
market, speed up the process of assimilating each other 's capital, 
widen the use of state-monopoly methods of economic control, as 
well as increase exchanges of a political nature . 
At the same time trade and economic contradictions between the 
USA and Japan will keep growing and cover new spheres of activity. 
These anomalies are caused by sharp shifts in the balance of power 
between the two countries both with respect to regional and world 
economy and by the unprecedented expansion of the Japanese corpora-
tions in the American market , Underlying these conflicts of in-
terests is the desire of both the USA and Japan to provide their 
monopolies with advantageous positions in the competitor ' s markets, 
while at the same time protecting domestic markets of uncompeti-
tive products by some sort of protectionist measures, usually of 
an indirect nature . 
The growing protectionist mood in the USA , restrictions on Ame-
rican agricultural export s to Japan, difficulties in promoting 
American products in the Japanese market in spite of considerable 
liberalization of import operations in Japan continue to nourish 
Japanese-American trade contradictions even though the problem of 
trade balance deficit between the two countries has become less 
acute. 
Mutual penetration of capital has been proceeding rapidly dur-
ing recent years, although the significance of capital exchange 
in the total structure of economic relations between the two na-
tions still falls behind their foreign trade . In particular , 
private direct investments of the USA in Japan have increased 10 
times during the last decade and amounted to nearly 2 . 2 billion 
dollars in 1972 . At the same time total Japanese direct invest-
ments in the USA were only 1 .4 billion dollars. 
Due to the restriction upon import of capital which existed in 
Japan until recently, export of private American capital to that 
country had only a minor share in the total foreign investments in 
the Pacific countries , accounting for only one- sixteenth of the 
total investments in the developed capitalist countries of the area 
in 1972. At the same time about one-fourth of the Japanese invest-
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ments in the Pacific area were made in the USA. 
There are noticeable differences in the structure of American 
and Japanese investments. Serving the promotion of export expan-
sion on the American market, 60 percent of the Japanese investment 
in the USA are made in trade and services and only 10 percent are 
directed to the manufacturing industries. On the contrary, Ameri-
can capital in Japan is invested in the most modern branches of in-
dustry, such as oil, chemical, electric and general engineering in-
dustries. 
Due to a number of reasons one could expect rapid growth of the 
mutual export of private capital by the two countries, which will 
contribute to deepening economic ties between them. At the same 
time this process is likely to produce a number of specific prob-
lems, which may result in no less sharp relations between the two 
countries than those which existed at the time of substantial trade 
imbalance in favour of Japan. 
Because of the scale of trade and economic relations between the 
two leading industrial powers of the capitalist world, aggravation 
of trade and economic clashing between the USA and Japan cannot but 
have a destabilizing effect upon the system of economic ties in the 
Pacific area. 
The ever-increasing role in the system of economic ties, especi-
ally among the countries of the Western Pacific, belongs to the mu-
tual economic dependence of Japan and Australia, to formation of 
stable and long-term ties between them . Very similar trends can 
be noted with respect to relations between Japan and New Zealand, 
although these relations are not yet at the same level of develop-
ment. Underlying it is the rapid development of trade relations 
between those countries, above all between Japan and Australia, 
which took place as a part of re-orientation of Australian trade 
and economic ties towards the Pacific Asian countries, which in 
the beginning of the seventies accounted for about 66 percent of 
Australian export and 53 percent of its imports. 
During the last two decades the share of Japan in Australian ex-
port has increased from four to 29 percent, the USA from eight to 
12 percent, New Zealand from three to five percent, while the share 
of Great Britain has sharply declined from 39 to 11 percent . Japa-
nese penetration of the Australian markets has been rapid . The 
share of Japan in Australian imports has increased 16 times during 
the last 20 years and is now 16 percent, while the share of the USA 
has increased from 10 to 25 percent , and the share of Great Britain 
has considerably declined from 52 to 21 percent . Australia has be-
come the second after the USA as a trade partner of Japan . 
In the newly emerging economic complex Australia supplies raw 
materials and high-quality foodstuffs, and--to a lesser extent--ma-
chinery and equipment in exchange for Japanese industrial goods. 
The following data prove a high degree of mutual trade and economic 
interdependence : in 1971 Japan received from Australia 100 percent 
of imported alumina, more than 54 percent of bauxite, about 40 per-
ent of iron ore and concentrates, about 33-1/3 percent of coal and 
more than 88 percent of wool and beef . In all of Australia ' s ex-
ports Japan's share 87 percent of iron ore and concentrates, 83 
percent of coal, 95 percent of salt, 53 percent of timber products 
and 42 percent of wool. 
A particular feature of trade exchange between the two countri-
es is a considerable positive balance in favour of Australia. In 
the year 1971/1972 Australian exports to Japan were double its im-
ports from that country. 
Economic ties between the two countries show a tendency to 
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strengthen . Besides trade, investment relations also developed be-
tween the two countries, mostly due to the export of Japanese capi-
tal to Australia . Japanese private direct investments in Australia 
are still small compared to those of the USA and Great Britain . 
They are directed mostly to the raw material and mineral extraction 
industries and pursue the aim of providing stable supplies of raw 
materials and concentrates for the growing Japanese industries . 
Behind the rapidly developing Japanese- Australian ties, as well 
as similar ties emerging between Japan and Canada and between Japan 
and New Zealand, there are international monopolies, sometimes with 
local participation, and of course the US transnational corporations . . 
The gigantic size of these corporations, their growing role in the 
economies of individual countries and their global strategies which 
sometimes intrude upon the national interests of particular states, 
cause deep concern in the business and political community, mostly 
in the "medium" capitalist countries of the region . It should be 
noted that competition and cooperation among these giants may have 
a strong influence on the development of economic ties between Jap-
an and Australia, as well as on the formation of other similar re-
gional economic complexes and on their place in the structure of 
economic relations in the area as a whole . 
It seems likely that in the near future there will be further 
strengthening and widening of economic ties between the two count-
ries, including technological exchange, on the basis of comparative-
ly rapid development of both economies which continue to maintain 
their mutually complementary nature. 
Together with increasing export of iron ore, coal , non-ferrous 
metals, etc . to Japan, Australia is considering starting export of 
new types of raw goods, in particular enriched uranium . Australi-
an business opinion believes that the growth of GNP per capita in 
Japan, adoption of the "Tanaka Plan" with its stress on the "quali-
ty of life" and changes in the tastes of Japanese consumers will 
contribute to the growth of Australian export of high-quality pro-
ducts to Japan. 
In the light of the energy crisis in the capitalist countries , 
the lack of a number of raw materials and the struggle between 
the US and Japanese monopolies for fuel and energy resources , one 
could expect greater Japanese interest in deliveries of raw materi-
als from the "fifth continent" . According to some estimates, by 
the end of the seventies Japan will account for about 42 percent 
of Australian exports . By 1975 about half of the Japanese demand 
for iron ore and coking coal will be covered by deliveries from 
Australia . 
At the same time one could also expect increased export of Aust-
ralian manufactured goods to Japan, particularly processed raw ma-
terials. This may happen as a result of the Japanese desire to 
move abroad industries known for environmental pollution, as well 
as higher transportation costs associated with importing raw mate-
rials in large quantities and the desire of Australian manufactur-
ers to raise the price per unit of exported products . 
Politically a treaty on trade and navigation presently consider-
ed by both governments and previously opposed by the Australian po-
litical and business community because of the possible greater Jap-
anese economic influence , could contribute to strengthening and 
broadening the already existing economic ties . 
Several factors will work against developing trade and economic 
relations between two countries, towards aggravating disparities 
between them . Among these factors is the Japanese policy of agri-
cultural protectionism, which to a substantial degree touches upon 
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the interests of the Australian exporters of agricultura l products . 
With a deficit in the trade balance of Japan one also cannot exclude 
her striving to balance t hi s considerable deficit in her tra de with 
Australia. 
Trade and investment e x pansion of the Japanese monopolies will 
find certain obstacles in the recent measures of the Australian La-
bour Government, aimed at establishment of control over foreign in-
vestments in order to observe the national interests more closely 
and to increase participation of local business in developing natu-
ral resources of Australia . 
The problem of price s of Australian raw materials, f ixed in long-
term contracts with the Japanese importers seems to be growing in-
to a serious difficulty. When tied to the US dollar, Australian 
manufacturers had to bear significant losses as a result of devalua-
tion of the dollar and general instability of the capitalist financ-
ial system . It has also been disclosed in Australia that a number 
of long-term contracts provide for deliveries of raw materials to 
Japan at prices below the world level . 
Considering both centrifugal and centripetal trends in Japanese-
Australian relations, one still has to expect a greater role of the 
emerging complex: its greater impact on the system of regional eco-
nomic relations . Japanese participation in this complex will to a 
certain degree lessen her dependence on US raw materials. Both 
countries will try to use the potential of economic cooperation to 
improve their position in the developing countries of Pacific Asia, 
with Australia looking first of all towards her position in South-
east Asia . The struggle for the markets in those countries will 
result in aggravating contradictions between Japan and Australia. 
During the postwar period the developing countries of East and 
South Asia were drawn into the capitalist structure of economic ti-
es in the Pacific area. The degree of regional dependence of some 
countries of East and Southeast Asia has increased from 39 to 84 
percent in exports and from 43 to 82 percent in imports . 
While establishing economic relations with the developing count-
ries of Pacific Asia , the developed capitalist countries of the 
area are interested in them not only as a source of raw materials 
and a large market for their products but also as reservoirs of 
cheap and relatively skilled labour . They are also interested in 
using the territories of these countries especially because of air 
pollution in the largest industrial centers of the capitalist coun-
tries . 
The two greatest capitalist powers of this region--the USA and 
Japan--hold leading positions in economic relations with the deve-
loping nations of the area. Relations between them are competitive 
and in some cases cooperative in Pacific Asia . 
During recent years the Japanese monopolies , as a result of 
their broad trade expansion, have managed not only to overtake Ame-
rican exporters in the markets of the Pacific Asia countries (in 
1972 total Japanese exports to these countries was 5 . 2 billion dol -
lars, or 1.5 times. higher than that of the US), but also to press 
them in the traditional markets of Latin America . One can also ex-
pect future clashes between the two countries in their struggle for 
Chinese markets and raw materials. 
The imperialist trade struggle was made even sharper by the de-
sire of some Western European countries to maintain or even to ex-
pand their markets in the Pacific countries, using to this end the 
potential of the EEC, whose export to the Pacific Asia countries 
has doubled, reaching 2 . 1 billion dollars in 1972. During the same 
period Australia, which is striving to firm its position in the 
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markets of Southeast Asia, has increased its export to the countri-
es of the region by more than three times. 
At the same time the USA continues to maintain absolute leader-
ship in export of private capital to these countries, which contri-
butes to maintaining long-term positions in the area . In 1971 pri-
vate direct investments of the USA were 3.1 billion dollars, compar-
ed to only 0.8 billion dollars of Japanese investments. In recent 
years Japanese monopolies have sharply intensified export of capi-
tal to the countries of Pacific Asia in order to "dovetail" their 
economies with the economic needs of Japan on the basis o f "new 
division of labour" in the a rea. In spite of a certain degree o f 
industrial and economic development Asian countries again happen 
to be in the dependent position in the emerging division of labour 
because they develop labour- and capital-intensive industries, usu-
ally with an unfinished cycle of production, while head enterprises 
and science-intensive indus tries remain in Japan and in other in-
dustrially developed capitalist countries. 
In order to develop their economy on the basis of modern techno-
logy and to take joint measures against expansion of the transna-
tional monopolies, the developing countries of Pacific Asia are be-
ginning to increase subregional economic cooperation, including 
that within the framework of ASEAN, which, of course, contributes 
to the establishment o f subregional economic complexes. 
In general, two contradicti ng tendencies will exist in the regi-
on in the future . One i s the definite development of stable long-
term ties, preparing conditions for integration on a private-mono-
polistic basis . The other tendency is the centrifugal trends due 
to the still great gap between the levels of economic development 
of the leading capitalist powers , to the enormous gap between them 
and the developing nations of the region and also to some extent, 
to the US desire to follow the global and not the regional strate-
gy, as well as to the Atlantic orientat ion of Canada in her econo-
mic contacts . 
For historical, geographical and economic reasons the Soviet 
Union is the one of the largest Pacific powers . A high level of 
economic development, richness of natural resources and the size 
of its domestic market dictate the simple necessity of the USSR's 
participation in the emerging complex of economic ties in the Paci-
fic area . 
Recently , decisions of the higher party and government organs 
of the Sovi et Union put forward the task of accelerating develop-
ment of Siberia and the Far East--that is the areas directly bord-
ering the Pacific . Measures are planned to increase the energy 
base of that area, to develop large-scale p r ojects of exploration 
of natural resources , timber, fishing, general engineering and 
other industries and agriculture, to modernize existing communica-
tions and to construct new ones , including new ports . An import-
ant step in this direction is the construction of the Baikal-Amur 
railway which will provide access to the natural resources of East-
ern Siberia and the Far East and will assist in formation of a 
large new industrial region . 
Success already achieved in the economic development of the 
Eastern regions of the USSR , as well as complex development of the 
economy of Siberia and the Far East, contribute to the increasing 
overall economic potential of the Pacific area and has created the 
conditions for greater participation of the Soviet Union in the in-
ternational division of labour in the Pacific. 
A specific feature of the economic relations of the Soviet Union 
with the countries of the vast Pacific region is that the USSR has 
to deal with a number of states different in their social systems, 
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levels of economic development, territories, population, patterns 
of trade and economic ties, etc., which certainly creates some dif-
ficulties in developing relations with them. 
The Soviet Union maintains diversified economic relations with 
those states. Total trade of the USSR with the countries of the 
region has increased nearly twice during the last ten years and 
was 4.5 billion roubles in 1972, which was about one-fifth of the 
total volume of foreign trade of the USSR . The USSR has provided 
economic and technological assistance to the developing countries 
of Pacific Asia. It has also promoted international specialization 
and cooperation, technological exchange, credit relations, as well 
as joint ventures in the exploration of natural resources, const-
ruction of industrial enterprises, etc . 
The leading place in the economic ties of the Soviet Union with 
the countries of the region belongs to the socialist countries 
which account for more than 40 percent of the Soviet foreign trade 
in this region . 
Membership of Mongolia and Cuba in the Council for Mutual Econo-
mic Assistance (CMEA) made possible their closer economic relations 
with the Soviet Union and transferred the focus of those relations 
from foreign trade to the field of production, capital construction, 
science and planning . 
Participation of the Mongolian People's Republic and Cuba in the 
complex programme of economic integration of the socialist countri-
es has opened the way to new forms of bilateral and multilateral 
economic cooperation which considerably accelerate their economic 
development and increase efficiency of production. These forms in-
clude joint Soviet-Mongolian enterprises for the exploration of 
copper-molybdenum deposits (one of the largest projects of this 
kind in the world) for the exploration of fluorspar, non-ferrous 
and rare metals, as well as a decision to set up nickel-producing 
enterprises in Cuba through the joint efforts of several countries . 
The Soviet Union and the other member countries of CMEA stand 
for further development of economic relations with all the social-
ist countries, including those which are notmembersof CMEA at pre-
sent . Most of these are countries of Asia. 
The Soviet Union supports steady development of cooperation with 
the developing nations of the Pacific Asia region--cooperation 
which assists these countries in starting to solve their basic pro-
blems of economic development, in undertaking progressive socio-eco-
nomic reforms and fulfilling programmes of economic construction 
responsive to their national interests. Trade between the Soviet 
Union and these countries has increased from 0.3 billion roubles 
in 1960 to 0.7 billion in 1972. The major trade partners of the 
USSR among this group of countries are India, Pakistan and Malaysia . 
The USSR supplies the developing countries of the Pacific Asia 
with machines and equipment , as well as other manufactured products . 
Exports of those countri e s to the USSR consist mostly of r~w materi-
als and food items, but in recent years some of them h a ve expanded 
exports of manufactured goods, including those produced by the en-
terprises constructed with the assistance of the socialist countri-
es . So, Indian exports to the USSR include such new items as roll-
ed metals, tires, medicine, footwear, instruments, clothing and 
knitwear . 
Division of labour emerging between the Soviet Union a nd the de-
veloping countries of South and Southeast Asia is based on large-
scale technological assistance provided to these countries through 
construction of industrial, transportation and agricultur al enter-
prises, as well as in training manpower for these enterprises . 
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Large metallurgical and non-ferrous metals plants are being con-
structed with Soviet participation in India, and general engineer-
ing plants in India and Sri Lanka . 
Credits are usually provided to pay for complex deliveries of 
equipment for the enterprises under construction . On one side, it 
makes it easier for the developing nations to implement their plans 
of economic development . On the other it promotes selling Soviet 
goods in their markets, widening mutually beneficial trade and eco-
nomic relations in general, and gives cooperation its long-term and 
stable nature . 
Newly developing cooperation between the USSR and the developing 
nations, especially India, in the field of long and medium term 
planning will contribute to further cooperation and division of la-
bour between them . 
In the future, closer economic cooperation of the Soviet Union 
with the developing countries will include both technological and 
credit assistance, as well as technical cooperation which will em-
brace state industrial enterprises constructed in those countries . 
Joint enterprises also seem possible, which could contribute to im-
proving industrial relations , utilization of advanced technological 
experience, better use of production capacities, sales and so on . 
Formation of rational division of labour with the developing count-
ries is inseparable from consideration of their needs and with the 
expansion of production capacities to meet those needs. 
Objective needs connected with the development of the world di-
vision of labour, existence of states with different social systems 
in the Pacific area, improvement of international climate and posi-
tive shifts in the relations between the Soviet Union and the lead-
ing capitalist states, five of which belong to the Pacific area, 
determine the necessity of accelerating trade and economic relations 
of the USSR with these countries. 
Among the factors providing favourable conditions for consider-
able expansion of trade and economic ties between the Soviet Union 
and industrially developed capitalist countries of the region are 
the following: 
--high levels of economic development and a considerable degree of 
complementarity between the different branches of the economy of 
the USSR and some capitalist countries of the region (notably 
Japan and the USA) provide possibilities for a wide spectrum of 
mutually beneficial economic ties; 
--geographical location of these countries makes relations between 
them logical; it also makes it possible to save on freight and 
time of delivery due to the improvement of sea transportation . 
This is especially important for mass deliveries of raw materials 
--oil, coal, ores, timber, etc . Thus, delivery of oil from Nakho-
dka to Niigata takes only two days, while from the countries of 
the Near and Middle East 22 days. The cost of freight, according 
to the estimates of Japanese economists, is six times lower. 
Transportation costs for deliveries from the eastern areas of the 
USSR to the Pacific coast of the USA and reverse are substantial-
ly lower than those for transportation to Western Europe; 
--the problems of energy and raw materials facing capitalist count-
ries, particularly Japan and the USA, stresses the necessity of 
cooperation with the USSR in the exploration of the power and 
mineral resources of Siberia and the Far East which are rich with 
coal, oil, natural gas, iron ore, timber and non-ferrous metals; 
--the task of accelerated development of the eastern areas of the 
USSR creates a promising, large and permanently growing market 
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for the general engineering and consumer goods of the countries 
of the Pacific; 
--finally, of no small significance is the fact, that the Soviet 
economy knows no depressions or crises. Its planned development 
guarantees a corresponding increase of foreign trade and accurate 
fulfilment of the obligations taken . 
Recently there was an expansion of trade between the USSR and 
the economically developed capitalist countries of this region . 
This trade has more than doubled since 1965 and was 1.8 billion 
roubles in 1972. Of course, this figure reflects neither latent 
capabilities nor interest in cooperation between the abovernentioned 
countries. 
Together with the growth of trade and other ties there are shifts 
in their structure due to cooperation in science, technology and 
license exchange . 
To be considered presently is the problem of large-scale joint 
projects, including those on a compensation basis, which provides 
for participation of the countries of the Pacific area in construc-
tion of extraction and other enterprises in Siberia and the Far East 
with the following compensation credits in the form of products of 
corresponding enterprises . It also provides for industrial coopera-
tion and credit relations . 
Considerable experience in this has already been acquired through 
cooperation with Japan, especially in exploration of the local re-
sources of the Far East and during construction of the Eastern ports . 
An important stage in utilization of opportunities for Soviet-Japa-
nese economic cooperation was the inter-governmental protocol on 
a bank credit of 1,050 million d~llars, signed in April 1974--the 
largest such credit in the history of Soviet foreign trade . This 
credit will cover purchase of machinery, equipment, ships , construc-
tion materials and consumer goods which will be necessary in order 
to implement the projects concerned with developing coking coal de-
posits, exploration for natural gas in Yakutia , and further explora-
tion of natural resources in the Far East . 
Possibilities open for multilateral cooperation in the explora-
tion of Siberian resources, specifically , Yakutian natural gas, for 
industrial construction in the Far East and for applying this expe-
rience in other parts of the area in the future . In this context 
one cannot but agree with the estimate given by the American scho-
lar Malmgrenn who stressed that possible cooperation of the USSR , 
USA and Japan in the exploration of Siberian resources could become 
a model to be applied in other parts of the Pacific area. 
Broader cooperation between the USSR and the Pacific countries 
can have a highly positive effect on branch structure and territo-
rial location of their economies . Thus, it could contribute to ac-
celerate development of the Pacific coast provinces of Canada. 
Looking into the future it could be possible to organize power-
intensive industries on the basis of the cheap hydroelectric power 
resources of Siberia with Canadian and Australian raw materjals . 
Overall, economic cooperation between the USSR and the Pacific 
countries would certainly contribute to the development of regional 
ties, make them more stable and planned in nature, and would cont-
ribute to the democratic foundation of regional economic relations . 
Broad development of economic cooperation on the basis of strict 
adherence to the principles of equality and respect for each other ' s 
interests will make an important contribution to the further dec-
rease of international tensions in this region, and will provide a 
material foundation for the process of establishing collective se-
curity by promoting further development of friendly and neighbourly 
V. YAKUBOVSKY AND I .A. LEBEDEV 29 
relations between the countries of the Pacific area . 
SOVIET VIEWPOINT (2) 
INTEGRATION TENDENCIES IN PACIFIC ASIA AND EXTERNAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE USSR 
I. A. LEBEDEV 
It is evident to any attentive observer today that in the west-
ern part of the Pacific Basin or in Pacific Asia, if we are to use 
the term coined by Japanese specialists to define the vast region 
adjacent to the Pacific Ocean from Japan to Indonesia and Australia, 
a new specific system of economic relationships with certain inte-
gration tendencies present is taking shape. Without going into de-
tails and without attempting to characterize this system, we would 
like to stress only that the co ncept of the transformation of Paci-
fic Asia into a special area based on close economic links with 
and gravitating toward Japan has in recent years become a common 
one when economic trends in the region are analysed. Consideration 
of complex economic processes, including processes of integration, 
in Pacific Asia a nd still more in the Pacific as a whole does not 
come within the scope of this paper. Besides, these matters have 
already been discussed at the conferences on Pacific Trade and De-
velopment which were attended by some of the participants of the 
present conference . But it is worthy of note that the situation 
in the region, especially under the impact of the energy crisis, 
has undergone serious changes, and to come back to the issues al-
ready discuss e d, including problems of integration and integration 
tendencies, would be only natural and advisable. In the paper no 
more than an attempt is made to touch upon the prospects of the 
Soviet Union's, and first and foremost of Siberia's and the Soviet 
Far East's, participation in an evolving system of economic rela-
tionships in the Western part of the Pacific Basin as it appears 
to a Soviet specialist. 
But before doing so it is advisable to focus attention on some 
general concepts concerning the p l a ce of the Soviet Union in the 
global economy and the possibilities of economic cooperation be-
tween the USSR and the capitalist world (there still exist a num-
ber of erroneous preconceived notions such as the USSR's alleged 
traditional preference for autarchy, etc.). 
Soviet economists base their analysis of present-day interna-
tional economic relations on the general concept of the global 
economy. The global economy has come into being as a result of 
economic development accompanied by deepening of international 
division of labour, growth of trade exchange between countries 
and their deeper involvement in mutual economic relations, with 
all this leading to greater interdependence of their national eco-
nomies. This process was defined by V.I. Lenin as "internationali-
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zation of economic life . " Before the Socialist revolution in Rus-
sia and the emergence of the Socialist economic system there exist-
ed a single global capitalist economy. But the emergence of the 
socialist system (represented at first only by the Soviet Union) 
did not spell the end of the global economy. It is significant 
that V.I. Lenin in some of his works propagated the idea that after 
the socialist revolution Russia would remain within the framework 
of the global economy, exerting a revolutionising influence on the 
whole system of global economic relationships (by this is meant 
the influence contributing to the transformation of the global eco-
nomy on a democratic basis, on a basis of independence and equali-
ty). Moreover the Soviet government headed by V.I . Lenin in the 
immediate postwar period (after the end of World War I and the Civil 
War in Russia) worked out a whole plan for the restoration of the 
global economy. The main components of the plan were: 
--Combining efforts of Soviet Russia and other countries (with equal 
participation of the colonial peoples) in order to restore the 
global economy and the productive forces of Russia grievously af-
fected by the War; 
--enlisting cooperation of foreign companies and other bodies in 
the development and processing of natural wealth of Soviet Russia 
and in bringing Russia ' s raw materials into use for purposes of 
speedier economic development of the country and the restoration 
of the global economy suffering from scarcity of raw materials, 
this last being one of the consequences of the War. 
Incidently, such a plan was put forward by the Soviet delegation 
to the Genoa conference in 1922 . The statement of the Soviet dele-
gation ran as follows : "In the current historical period, when the 
parallel existence of the old and the new social systems is a fact, 
the economic cooperation between the states representing these two 
different systems is of vital importance ." 
The existence of the two world systems does not mean, as some 
of the economists suggest, the end of the glo~al economy . Being a 
complex, a sum total of national economies belonging to different 
economic and political systems and interrelated on a basis of in-
ternational division of labour, the global economy as an objective 
reality could not have and did not vanish . But neither did it re-
main unchanged . A new global economy, within which the two world 
systems compete and cooperate with one another, came into being. 
The two socially different world economic systems develop not in 
an autarchic way, a way of isolation, but in a way of interaction 
and interconnection . The pattern of this interaction between stat-
es with different economic systems is complex and contradictory . 
Competition and elements of struggle are dialectically interconnect-
ed, they coexist with relations of exchange and cooperation. 
Problems of the expansion of international economic relations 
on a global scale have recently acquired special importance. In 
the beginning of the 1970's there occurred in international rela-
tions a turn towards detente. This brought about more favourable 
conditions for the growth of economic cooperation between the stat-
es of the two different systems and for their joint approach to 
solving the most urgent economic problems resulting from the scien-
tific and technological revolution. In their turn, the internation-
al economic relations and economic cooperation now form an import-
ant integral part of the policy of consolidating international se-
curity. The Soviet stand on the necessity of broadening interna-
t~onal economic cooperation was clearly formulated by the General 
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L . Brezhnev (in his speech 
at the World Congress of Peace Forces in October 1973): "Broad in-
ternational division of labour is the only basis for keeping pace 
with the times and being abreast of the ~equirements and potentiali-
ties of the scientific and technological revolution. This, I should 
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say, is axiomatic today . Hence , the need for mutually beneficial , 
long- term and large-scale economic cooperation , both bilateral and 
multilateral . Of course , this applies not only to Europe but also 
to all continents , to the enti re system of present- day internation-
al economic relati ons . Another reason why we advocate such coopera-
tion is that we regard it as a r eliable means of mater i ally consoli-
dating peaceful relations among states ." 
By this general position is determined the Soviet approach to 
the specific economic processes that develop in the western part 
of the Pacific Basin , to the new system of economic relationships 
evolving in that region . The Soviet Union stands for the e xpansion 
of equal and mutually beneficial trade and economic links wi th all 
the countries of the region . 
Because the terri t ory of the Soviet Union is so large there 
exists in its economic relations with the aforesaid countries one 
specific aspect : these relations are of special importance to East-
ern Siberia and the Soviet Far East ( "Pacific Siberia") and may in 
the future seriously affect the economic development of these regi-
ons of the USSR . 
Soviet planning is based on the assumption that rational and 
economi cally effective development of any given region is possible 
only with due consideration paid to the concrete conditions of that 
region . For the eastern regions of the Soviet Union , rich in na-
tural resources , such concrete conditions, apart from effective 
participation in regional division of labour within the country , 
consist in participation in international division of labour . It 
is for these regions that the the economic relations with the Paci-
fic Basin countries are of paramount importance (it goes without 
saying that the other regions of the Soviet Union participate in 
these relation, the country as a whole acting in the sphere of ex-
ternal economic relations as a single unit) . 
It is but natural that the first place in economic relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and the Western Pacific countries is held 
by Japan . In the last five years the volume of Soviet-Japanese 
trade has approximately doubled (in 1972 it reached 815 million 
roubles; in 1973 about 950 million roubles) . If, in order to make 
the general trend more evident, a longer period (1957-1972) is con-
sidered, then we see that trade turnover between the two countries 
in those years increased SO-fold . It is not these figures alone 
that are important (though admittedly, the actual volume of Soviet-
Japanese trade is far below the possibilities of both countries ; 
notwithstanding the fact that the rapid growth of this trade has 
made Japan one of the most important trading partners of the USSR, 
Japan ' s share in Soviet foreign trade only slightly exceeds 3 per-
cent, while the Soviet Union ' s share in Japanese foreign trade 
amounts to only 2 percent, according to data for 1971) but the 
constant expansion of Soviet-Japanese trade . 
Along with ususal trade transactions, it should be noted, an 
ever greater role in Soviet-Japanese relations in recent years is 
being played by economic cooperation . For a number of years the 
Soviet-Japanese agreements on cooperation in development of the 
timber resources of the Soviet Far East have been carried out (they 
provide for Japan supplying machinery and equipment on credit re-
payable in deliveries of timber; the first such general agreement 
has already been carried out) . 
The agreement on the delivery of Japanese-made equipment and on 
Japanese assistance in the construction of Vostochny port in Wran-
gel Bay has been operating successfully. Ten million tons of cargo 
will be discharged and shipped at the new port annually . The con-
struction of Vostochny port is only a part of a whole programme of 
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building new ports and reconstructing and enlarging the old ones on 
the Pacific coast of the USSR . Obviously , it means further expan-
sion of economic contacts not only with Japan but with other West-
ern Pacific countries. 
At present Soviet- Japanese talks on a number of large-scale 
joint projects for the development of natural resources of Siberia 
and the Soviet Far East on a mutually advantageous basis are in 
progress (these talks are in various stages; the general agreements 
on some of these projects have already been concluded) . Among 
these projects are the following : 
--The development of Southern Yakut coal deposits . The Soviet Uni-
on buys machinery , equipment and other goods for the big coal 
mining complex on credit repayable in coal deliveries over 20 
years . The general agreement on this project was signed in Mos-
cow on June 3 this year . Among other things, this agreement pro-
vides for a credit of 450 million U. S . dollars e x tended to the 
Soviet side by the Japan Export-Import Bank . This agreement is 
viewed in the Soviet Union as a beginning of large-scale and long-
term cooperation between the two countries . 
--Soviet-Japanese cooperation in prospecting and development of na-
tural gas deposits in Yakutia . This project provides for suppli-
es of Japanese equipment, first of all for prospecting and con-
struction of gas pipe-lines , on credit in exchange for natural 
gas . 
--The supply of Tyumen oil (from Western Siberia) to Japan . The 
Japanese side is expected to provide equipment for prospecting 
and development of the oil fields, for overland transportation 
of oil and tanker-loading installations on the Pacific coast . 
The Soviet side will supply oil to Japan over a period of 20 
years, starting with 1981, first in gradually increasing quanti-
ties, and, from 1985 till 2000 , at an annual rate of 25 million 
tons . 
Mention should also be made about the project for developing 
Far Eastern timber resources . This project envisages Soviet deli-
veries of timber in exchange for Japanese equipment for timber 
mills, road-building machinery and machinery for building port in-
stallations . 
It is worthy of note that the Soviet side has agreed to the 
participation of American companies in the realization of any of 
the above mentioned projects if the Japanese side wishes it . 
Lately the Soviet Union has advanced some new suggestions on 
venues of long-term economic cooperation with Japan. For instance, 
the Soviet side proposed (and the Japanese side agreed) to explore 
the possibilities for the construction of a big cellulose mill in 
Eastern Siberia. Another Soviet proposal concerns the possibility 
of Japanese companies supplying Japanese equipment for atomic sta-
tions to be built on Sakhalin on credit repayable in subsequent 
Soviet deliveries of electricity to Japan . This proposal is under 
consideration by the interested Japanese companies . 
An important step towards the realization of these large- scale 
projects was made when in April, 1974, the Soviet-Japanese inter-
governmental protocol, which provides for the Japan Export- Import 
Bank lending 1,050 million U. S. dollars to finance Soviet purchas-
ing of machines, equipment, building materials needed for the de-
velopment of Southern Yakut coking coal deposits, prospecting of 
Yakut natural gas deposits and exploitation of timber resources of 
the Soviet Far East , was signed . Repayments will be made by the 
Soviet side in coal , gas and timber deliveries . The Soviet-Japan-
ese arrangements for financing the Southern Yakut coal project and 
the conclusion of the general agreement on this project mentioned 
above are part of the practical implementation of this protocol. 
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As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the realization of the 
above mentioned projects will contribute to further and speedier 
expansion of the economy of Siberia and the Far East and consequent-
ly to the growth of the Soviet economy in general . 
The development of the economy of Siberia and the Soviet Far 
East will open broad opportunities for an expansion of Soviet-Japa-
nese trade and economic cooperation . This development will in-
crease resources available for export and will make it possible to 
satisfy to a greater extent Japan ' s needs in raw materials and 
fuels . Simultaneously it will contribute to an expansion of ex-
change of manufactured goods between these regions of the Soviet 
Union and Japan (and other Pacific countries) . In its turn the 
wide-scale programme for the construction of chemical plants, oil 
refineries, textile mills , non-ferrous metals plants, paper mills , 
wood processing plants, oil and gas pipe-lines, railways and ports 
will result in a stable demand for a broad range of Japanese manu-
factured goods which it is economically more sensible for the USSR 
to buy in Japan rather than transport from the western regions of 
the Soviet Union, and in an expansion of demand for goods from oth-
er Pacific countries . For instance, the construction of the giant 
Baikal-Amur railway, running across areas of Eastern Siberia and 
the Far East rich in mineral deposits , will greatly increase the 
possibility of large-scale trade and economic relationships with 
foreign countries, particularly Japan and other countries of the 
Pacific Basin . It is significant that the Soviet press calls this 
new Trans-Siberian railway the "second road to the ocean." One 
cannot but stress in this connection that the possibilities for 
the overland transit shipments of goods (by the Pacific countries) 
across the Soviet Union to Europe and to Western Europe in parti-
cular will increase considerably. 
Economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan develops 
mainly on thebasisof arrangements which Soviet economic literature 
calls compensation agreements or investment-production ·programmes . 
The Soviet state organs and economic organisations along with for-
eign companies, banks and state agencies take part in the implemen-
tation of compensation agreements . Compensation agreements (the 
above mentioned projects belong to this category) enable the Soviet 
Union to develop natural resources, certain branches of its natio-
nal economy and some insufficiently developed regions. They make 
it possible to economize time and financial recourses by using 
long-term foreign credits which are repaid by exporting a part of 
the products produced at the new enterprises (plants, mines, etc . ) 
built with these credits . The projects themselves remain in Soviet 
ownership and under Soviet management . 
At the same time, and this must be stressed, large-scale compen-
sation agreements (cooperation projects) come within the production 
sphere of the participating countries' economies. As far as the 
Soviet Union is concerned, one speaks not about separate and spora-
dic commercial deals with companies of the capitalist countries 
but about large-scale use of the whole complex of Soviet P.xternal 
economic relationships in the interests of the development of Sovi-
et national economy . These relationships thus become an important 
component of the overall economic plan. Objective necessity for 
developing external economic relations is dictated by many factors, 
in the first place by transition to mass production which requires 
a large market, international specialization and the combining of 
resources of a number of countries. Inadequate distribution of 
natural resources also serves as a stimulus to expansion of exter-
nal economic relations . 
The most important feature of the economy of defeloped socialism 
as was stated at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU is the ecomplex cha-
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racter of the economic solutions planned and realized . Long-term 
complex programmes (projects) form the basis of long-term plans in 
various industries and regions of the country. We have thus enter-
ed into a qualitatively new stage in the development of external 
economic relations, that of long- term forms of economic cooperation 
of the Soviet Union with foreign states . Compensation agreements 
(cooperation projects) occupy an important place among these forms 
of cooperation . Compensation agreements are a form of economic co-
operation in conditions of peaceful coexistence, a form which is 
based on international division of labour and , resulting as it does 
in the growth of national incomes of two (or more) countries , is 
mutually advantageous . 
At present the Soviet Union ' s involvement in an emerging system 
of economic relations in the West Pacific proceeds first of all along 
the line of expansion of large-scale and long- term economic rela-
tionships with Japan . Nevertheless the external economic relations 
of the USSR in the region are not confined to Japan (the assertions 
one meets with that Japan may come to dominate the Soviet Union ' s 
"Pacific" economic relations are entirely unfounded) . There are, 
for i nstance , a number of opportunities for the development of con-
tacts between the USSR and the other developed country of the regi-
on--Australia--and again not only along the line of expansion of 
mutual trade but along the line of economic cooperation. It is pos -
sible, for example, to visualize Australian participation in the 
development of timber resources of Siberia and the Soviet Far East 
in forms similar to those that have been evolved in Soviet-Japanese 
relations in this field . "Triangular " economic cooperation between 
the USSR, Japan and Australia might also prove promising . 
Obviously, there exist ample opportunities for trade and econo-
mic cooperation between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Malay-
sia, Singapore (economic cooperation between the City-state and the 
Soviet Union has grown considerably in recent years) , the Philippin-
es and other countries of the region, including New Zealand, on the 
other . 
An ever more active participation of the Soviet Union in an emer-
ging system of economic relationships in Pacific Asia will in our 
view have the most positive influence on economic processes in the 
region and will contribute to their developing not according to a 
pattern of economic domination and dependence but to that of mutual-
ly beneficial cooperation in the interest of economic development 
and growth of living standards in all countries of the region . 
As has already been stated above, the consideration of the pro-
cesses leading to the emergence of a new system of economic rela-
tionships in the western part of the Pacific does not fall within 
the scope of this paper . The aim has been only to draw attention to 
the " Soviet factor" in these processes . An attempt has also been 
made to show that the Soviet Union's desire to develop in every pos-
sible way large- scale and long- term economic contacts with the coun-
tries of the other economic system is not a manoeuvre dictated by 
present- day ex ped i ency but a manifestation of the Soviet Union ' s 
general line in the sphere of relations with the countries of the 
other economic system , and to stress that this applies in full to 
the Pacific . 
At the Second Conference on Pacific Trade and Development (Hono-
lulu , 1969) an i dea was voiced that the Soviet Un i on "will need to · 
be brought into the orbit of any planning for the future of the Pa-
cific Basin ." This idea seems ext remely timely in present- day con-
ditions . Scholarly study , in a constructive spirit , of the possibi-
lities for develop i ng the economic ties between the USSR and the 
countries of the West Pacific can become a valuable contribution to 
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the development of mutually advantageous economic cooperation and 
one that will help bring about the strengthening of peace . 
COMMENTS ON YAKUBOVSKY's AND LEBEDEV's PAPERS - KIYOSHI KOJIMA 
I. Professor Yakubovsky and Lebedev present us with an excellent 
review of the growing economic potentials and trends in the direc-
tion of economic integration among Pacific Basin countries. Their 
presentation of the Russian viewpoint is a welcome addition to this 
conference . But what the participants of this conference really 
want to know is the Russian position, attitudes, and interests in 
Pacific economic cooperation . In other words, what is their evalua-
tion of Russian policy towards economic cooperation. Professor Ya-
kubovsky does touch on these issues briefly in the last part of his 
paper and Professor Lebedev does explain the Pacific Siberian re-
source development in detail, but their assessment of overall poli-
cy is vague. 
I am most impressed to learn that Russian interests in partici-
pating in Pacific economic development and cooperation are very 
keen. Professor Yakubovsky states, "Success already achieved in 
the economic development of the Eastern regions of the USSR, as 
well as complex development of the economy of Siberia an:1 the Far East, 
contribute to increasing overall economic potential of the Pacific 
area and create conditions for deeper participation of the Soviet 
Union in the international division of labour in the Pacific". Si-
milarly, Professor Lebedev explains that the Russian principle is 
that "enlisting cooperation of foreign companies and other bodies 
in the development and processing of natural wealth of Soviet Rus-
sia's raw materials into use for purposes of speedier economic de-
velopment of the country and the restoration of the global economy 
suffering from scarcity of raw materials, this last being one of 
the consequences of the war". 
I see, as I am sure other participants would agree, Russia's 
utmost interest in the Pacific at present is natural resources de-
velopment in Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East ("Pacific Si-
beria") and in this certainly Japan and United States and even 
other countries are keenly interested . But those gigantic projects 
are bound up in international political problems and I am not in a 
position to express any view on these questions. Particularly we 
are concerned with the Russian-Chinese relationship. We cannot ne-
glect China's presence and interests. I do hope some comments on 
this point will be given by our Russian colleagues. 
II . From an economist's point of view I would like to raise two ques-
tions on Pacific Siberian natural resource development . First, re-
cently, developed countries' efforts to develop and import natural 
resources from developing countries have often been condemned and 
viewed as exploitation and new imperialism on the part of the deve-
loped countries . The Siberian development plans seem to fit this 
pattern . However, the Russian Professors obviously do not regard 
this development scheme as imperialistic or exploitative. Why not? 
Secondly, I am much interested in what Professor Lebedev called 
"compensation agreements or investment- production programmes" . Per-
haps this is what we call the "production-sharing" method. There 
is a number of ways to promote economic development and technology 
transfer to developing countries, which is the main theme of this 
conference, for example, through foreign direct investment , produc-
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tion-sharing, production and management contracts, licensing of 
know-how, etc. I would like to know more exactly what is the mecha-
nism of the production-sharing method, as compared with other ar-
rangements, its merits and demerits, and in what conditions it is 
applied most effectively . 
III . Russia ' s other interests in the Pacific economic development 
and cooperation certainly involve other developing countries in the 
region. Professor Yakubovsky mentions Russia's "large-scale techno-
logical assistance provided to developing countries in construction 
of industrial transportation and agricultural enterprises . " I would 
be most grateful if Professor Yakubovsky would explain more details 
of Russian technology assistance, especially how it differs from 
capitalist countries' transfer of technology and the reason why the 
Russian form is not "imperialistic". 
IV. Lastly, I am not able to understand what Professor Yakubovsky 
means in the following: "In spite of a certain degree of industrial 
and economic development Asian countries again happen to be in the 
dependent position in the emerging division of labour because they 
develop labour and capital intensive industries, usually with an 
unfinished cycle of production, while head enterprises and science 
intensive industries remain in Japan and in other industrially de-
veloped capitalist countries" . Eastern European countries do re-
ceive direct investment and joint ventures from Russia and Western 
countries. In this case, is there a special principle which is not 
discussed above? I am convinced that developing countries will be 
better off developing step by step from labor-intensive industries 
and from least technology-gap activities through the help of foreign 
direct investment and unpackaged transfer of technology, although 
which specific measures are preferable should be carefully examined. 
3 
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC REGION 
THE NORTH AMERICAN VIEWPOINT 
GUSTAV RANIS 
I 
The panorama implied by the above title which the Conference 
organizers have bestowed upon me is terrifyingly broad. What is 
even worse, it is difficult to deal with these issues in the absence 
of at least some consideration of the broader global context within 
which Pacific Region developments are bound to take place. Finally, 
to round out the difficulties facing this intrepid author, we do 
not feel competent to present "the" North American viewpoint--if one 
exists. Thus, to avoid any misunderstandings at the outset, we must 
insist that we shall at best be able to deal with some selected di-
mensions of the factors affecting development, trade, and technolo-
gy in this Region--and from the viewpoint of one North American ob-
server. 
That any consideration of economic relations among the coutries 
of the Pacific would be foolhardy in the absence of some assessement 
of the broader international economic context will appear especial-
ly obvious today at a time of substantial turmoil in international 
economic relations generally. Even since the last meeting of the 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference the nature of the interna-
tional economic crisis has shifted and become more pronounced. Sup-
erimposed on such long-smouldering problems as stagnation in global 
trade liberalization and substantial fatigue in the North with the 
concern for development in the South, we have now had to contend 
with the oil crisis, rampaging global inflation, and, last but not 
least, the implicit threat of more North-South and North-North con-
frontations. There is the danger--in spite of some reassuring re-
cent OECD noises--that advanced countries, not getting "their share" 
of the oil profits reflow, will try to solve their external problems 
by restrictions or competitive devaluations. In the euphoric after-
math of the, perhaps as yet all too short, experience with oil, more 
LDC's, smarting from nee-colonial concerns of longer standing, seem 
to be ready to test their market power in such other sensitive raw 
material areas as bauxite, copper, even bananas. Finally, the non-
oil majority of LDCs is experiencing additional severe problemscaus-
ed by rapidly rising petroleum and fertil.izer prices, along with ge-
neral inflation abroad. This is on top of their long term problem 
of substantial rural neglect plus distorted urban-industrial deve-
lopment patterns within, leading to unsatisfactory employment and 
distribution outcomes even in situations where overall growth has 
been fairly satisfactory. 
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It is thus fair to say that this Conference is meeting at a time 
when virtually everyone thinks he is facing serious short term as 
well as long term economic problems-~with the possible exception of 
the OPEC countries--and even they are concerned with the possible 
breakdown of the international economic order and with where to in-
vest their new found huge surpluses . In such a period of crisis 
there is a good deal of talk about "going it alone" i . e., autarky 
in trade, in investment and even in technology (and ideas) , as dome-
stic objectives seem to be threatened by external pressures and events. 
Consequently, we see indeed many signs of disarray potentially 
affecting the setting for the Pacific Region and affecting its fu-
ture in a substantial way. The Committee of 20 on international 
monetary reform has felt itself obliged to put off basic reform, 
trying to institutionalize the current chaos in relations among the 
rich, with a substantial moth-balling of the rest, at least for the 
time being. Prospects for any major new initiative in global trade 
liberalization--not to speak of initiatives directed toward the so-
lution of North-South problems in trade or aid are , at this point, 
extremely limited . In fact, the best one can hope for at this mo-
ment is probably the avoidance of further back-sliding , especially, 
in this Region, by the hardest hit Northern countries, such as Japan. 
But this new overlay of issues of a quasi crisis dimension, on 
top of the fundamental longer term problems which were in existence 
long before, also has its compensating aspects--mainly perhaps that 
of drawing attention to these very less ephemeral bed-rock issues 
which might otherwise continue to have gone ignored for some time 
yet. With all our moorings loose it is perhaps not too much to say 
that this is also a time for a substantial reexamination of rela-
tions between the North and South generally, and the countries of 
the North and South in the Pacific Region in particular . It may 
therefore be not only a time of travail and difficulty but also a 
time of substantial opportunity. Certainly substantial neglect of 
the problems of development, trade, and technology in this part of 
the world is much less likely today than it even was a short year 
ago . Not only is there a concern--probably exaggerated--about the 
shift in the secular trend of the terms of trade (no one noticed 
what happened to wheat and soya prices two short years ago) butalso 
a more general--probably healthier--realization of the room for "do-
ing mischief" by the develooing countries who have long been more 
or less taken for granted . The threat of nuclear proliferation "on 
the cheap" raised by India ' s recent explosion of a nuclear device 
will probably reinforce this reassessment . Thus, while some ofthese 
feelings and fears may border on the hysterical rather than the his-
torical, it is not at all clear--as is so often true in human affairs 
--that the present atmosphere of general crisis, instability and re-
assessment cannot be turned into an advantage , especially as far as 
the developing regions of the world are concerned . It is polyanna 
to assume that this will necessarily happen; but it is not too much 
to say that the chances have been somewhat enhanced (see the most 
recent U. S . "willingness to reconsider the link") . 
In discussing development, trade, and technology in the Pacific 
Region--with an eye to the future under conditions of possibly addi-
tional flexibility--we shall endeavor to first assess the present 
situation in the Region in an historical context (section II) ; then 
turn to the potential for the future in the context of some idealiz-
ed vision (section III); and finally, conclude with some global , re-
gional as well as country-specific suggestions for policy on the 
part of both the rich and the poor countries to move us in that di-
rection (section IV). 
G. RANIS 41 
II 
Any discussion of the Pacific Region--past, present or future--
should not, we believe, be conducted in terms of any monolithic 
North-South partitioning but must recognize the substantial diver-
sity among both the DC's and LDC's represented in the Region. While 
we could, of course, extend this point to emphasize that there ex-
ists inherent diversity between any two countries, we shall content 
ourselves here with the more reasonable intermediate position of 
differentiating further among the developing countries in the Reqion 
by those major typologic·al characteristics, which, we believe, af-
fect the assessment of both the present and the potential for the 
future. 
Turning to the developing countries of the Region, we must re-
cognize, first of all, that there are no "least developed" countri-
es--using the UNCTAD definition--in the area, nor, with the possibie 
exception of Indonesia, are there any extremely rich economies repre-
sented.l) Instead, there are basically two types of developingcoun-
tries: type I, the relatively small labor surplus, human resources 
rich, natural resources poor variety, including South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, some already "graduated" or about to graduate 
from LDC status; and type II, the labor surplus natural resources 
rich type represented by the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Mexico . One could further differentiate, in this latter group, be-
tween those with fairly substantial entrepreneurial strength and 
industrial experience, such as the Philippines and Mexico , and the 
others in which the human resources basis is still somewhat less 
fully developed. 
Similarly, there can be said to exist two types of developed 
countries in the Region, the relatively mature land and capital 
rich economies of the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, on 
the one hand, and the more recent graduate into modern growth, 
emerging from its own prior labor surplus state--Japan. Again, a 
further subdivision between the U.S. and Canada, the more technolo-
gically advanced industrial DC's, on the one hand, and Australia 
and New Zealand, the relatively more agriculturally oriented DC's, 
might prove helpful but will not be pressed. 
Any attempt to assess development, trade, and technology patterns 
in the countries of the Pacific Region must be embedded in the his-
torical context within which these countries have been operating, 
at least for the last quarter century . Turning, first, to the de-
veloping countries, this period (with a somewhat earlier start in 
Mexico) has marked the first sustained effort atnational development . 
If we view the development problem as essentially one of attempted 
transition between a long epoch of agrarian stagnation and an equal-
ly long epoch of modern growth , such transitions may last--if histo-
ry is any guide-- from 30 to 50 years. Moreover, they are likely to 
be composed of important sub-phases during which the major develop-
ment and trade characteristics of the system undergo substantial 
change, i.e., a first sub-phase of primary or consumer goods import 
substitution, followed by either a secondary or capital goods :inq:iort 
substitution sub-phase, or by an export substitution sub-phase. 
Little time need be spent here in elucidating the nature of these 
sub-phases of transition. Once LDCs , in the wake of political in-
dependence, gained full control of their critical traditional raw 
material export earnings , these were reallocated , along with domes-
tic saving , towards domestic industrial and overhead expansion . The 
policy tools used were typically exchange controls and licensing , 
l)Even in Indonesia , oil hardly begins to swamp the economy as it 
does, say, in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. 
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increasingly overvalued exchange rates, low interest rates and cre-
dit rationing, plus domestic terms of trade rigged in favor of the 
industrial sector. Both the type I and type II LDC's in the Region 
(with the exception of Hong Kong, which is the most special of spe-
cial cases and immediately opted for export orientation) moved vigo-
rously into primary import substitution industrialization in the 
early post-war. Such regimes do, however, run out of steam sooner 
or later--mainly because the size of the domestic market is limited. 
This point was essentially reached by the mid 50s in Mexico, the 
Philippines, and Thailand; by the late 50s and the early 60s in Tai-
wan, South Korea and Singapore; it has not yet been reached in Indo-
nesia. One relevant index is the rapidly declining proportion of 
total consumer good supplies imported. 
The differential response to this gradual exhaustion of the pos-
sibilities for continued "easy" import substitution as between the 
type I and type II LDC's in the Pacific Region is both remarkable 
and instructive. In Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, as is well 
known by now, primary import substitution, fuelled by land intensive 
exports, was followed by export substitution, fuelled by labor in-
tensive industrial exports. Once entrepreneurial experience had 
sufficiently matured and infrastructural construction sufficiently 
progressed, these countries embarked upon a gradual "opening up" of 
their economies to trade, through a combination of policy changes 
including devaluation, interest rate reform, liberalization of im-
ports, improvement of domestic agriculture's terms of trade , etc . 
In consequence, the production and export structure of these econo-
mies underwent rather remarkable change as the industrial sector 
was called upon to begin to provide the fuel for its own future 
growth . Raw material or land intensive exports gave way to a drama-
tic increase in labor intensive industrial exports penetrating in-
ternational markets on a competitive basis (see Table I, contrast-
ing 1960 and 1970), as the total trade orientation of the economy 
soared . 
As a consequence of this successful transition from primary im-
port substitution to export substitution, the type I subset of Paci-
fic Region LDC was thus extremely successful during the 60s and in-
to the early 70s, not only in terms of domestic growth performance 
but also in alleviating the underemployment problems plaguing labor 
surplus economies and in avoiding a worsening distribution of income 
as well. In fact, these systems were able to reallocate labor suf -
ficiently rapidly so that they have moved out of labor surplus and 
into a labor shortage condition . 2l Their production and export st-
ructure has become increasingly technology and even capital inten-
sive in recent years . 
It should, moreover, be noted that , contrary to some frequently 
expressed views, the outstandingly good performance of Taiwan, while 
certainly benefitting from access to the U. S . market for industrial 
consumer goods, cannot be written off as a simple case of heavy fo-
regin capital inflows; in fact, foreign aid and foreig n private ca-
pital together accounted for only 6 percent of the total investment 
between 1952-54 and 1967-69; the rest was generate d via the balanc-
ed contribution of domestic agriculture, and industry . 3) 
What is interesting for the type I LDC in the Region, then, is 
that the policy choice of moving to export substitution when primary 
import substitution gave out, facilitated by the early mobilization 
2)This undoubtedly true for all type I cases, with the possible ex-
ception of South Korea. The record of achievement in these cases 
has been well documented elsewhere and need not be repeated here. 
See papers by Balassa, Fei and . Ranis, Helen Hughes, and others . 
G. RANIS 43 
of the agricultural sector, permitted successful graduation from 
developing economy status via the full, dynamically changing, ex-
ploration of the opportunities for international trade, related to 
the selective mobilization of advanced country technology and its 
adaptation to a labor surplus context. A sustained period of ex-
port substitution, with industrial sector labor absorption proceed-
ing at a rate substantially ahead of population growth did permit 
the labor surplus reservoir to be exhausted and the dualistic nature 
of the economy to be eradicated. While the brute act of savi ng and 
the role of turn-key technology was more important during the pri-
mary import substitution sub-phase, the role of appropriate or adap-
tive technology in its relation to radically changing output mixes 
in penetrating international industrial markets became extr emely 
important during the export substitution sub- phase . This is indi-
cated by a declining industrial capital-labor ratio in Taiwan's ma-
nufacturing sector during this period , as well as the many evidenc-
es of labor-using technology change at the micro level, in the ex-
port processing zones and elsewhere . 4) 
Turning now to the type II LDC ' s in the Pacific Region, they can 
be said to have made a different choice at the end of their primary 
import substitution sub-phase, i . e . , they, by and large, moved into 
secondary import substitution . For example, both the Philippines, 
Mexico and , to some extent, Thailand can be said to have moved into 
import substitution in the areas of durable consumer goods, capital 
goods, and raw materials processing , as domestic markets for non-
durable consumer goods became exhausted. 
This attempt to prolong import substitution , characteristic of 
many LDCs on a global basis, can be related to the availability of 
a sufficiently favorable natural resources base to permit the con-
tinued fuelling of an ever more costly and inefficient production 
structure on an inward looking domestically oriented basis . In oth-
er words, you have to be able to afford it- - either because of tra-
ditional exports which are finding favorable and secure markets 
(right now mostly minerals) , or via the search for new export commo-
dities, such as bananas in the Philippines or tourism in Mexico . 
Especially wheQ the terms of trade seem to be shifting in favor of 
the natural resources rich LDC type, it is possible to maintain es-
sentially the old policy package, that of substantial protection 
and orientation towards the domestic market by continuing to favor 
the domestic entrepreneurial industrial class at the expense of 
food producing agriculture , as well as industrial e xports . However , 
even in these cases, the costs of continuing to fuel the industrial-
ization process via land based exports is likel y to rise over time 
(see the Philippine case where this has been empirically demonstrat-
ed) SJ so that, after a point, the terms of trade deteriorate rather 
badly for the industrial sector not only in terms of the inability 
of domestic agriculture to continue to provide the essential food 
and savings for continued industrial ization but also in terms of 
the increasing resort to food imports . The capital goods and raw 
materials required to maintain the secondary import substitution 
momentum must be purchased at a higher and higher total resource 
3)This is in contrast to the case of South Korea where agricultural 
development was relatively neglected , agricultural savings played 
a much smaller role and foreign capital consequently had to pro-
vide more than 60% of total investment over a similar period . 
Singapor.e and Hong Kong are of essentialiy less interest from a 
developmental point of view since they represent somewhat atypi-
cal city-states without an agricultural hinterland . 
4)See the author ' s " Industrial Sector Labor Absorption," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, April , 1973 . 
S)See Sharing in Development : A Program of Employment , Equity , and 
Growth for the Philippines, ILO, 1974 . 
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Table IA EXPORTS OF PACIFIC 
DC's in 
Aust- N. Pacific 
Canada Japan ralia Zealarrl Region Mexico 
U.S .A. 1,554.2 329.1 79.8 5, 652 . 6 892 . 2 
Canada 65.1 24 . 1 3,211 . 4 38 . 0 
Japan 1,106 . 6 91.3 21.6 1,329.9 17.9 
Australia 167 . 0 30.6 556.9 7.0 
N. Zealand 108.8 10.8 26.4 186 . 2 0.2 
DC's in 4,325.7 3,841.3 2,055 . 8 525.7 188.5 10,937.0 Pacific Region 
Mexico 703.1 21.0 2.5 4.6 0.0 731.2 
s. Korea 3. 6 o.o 20.2 0.0 0.0 23.8 0.0 
Hong Kong 127.0 14.9 38.9 20.0 5.8 206 . 6 0.0 
Philippines 284 . 1 1.3 131.6 0. 9 0.2 418 . 1 0. 0 
Taiwan 18.1 1.2 59.8 0.2 0. 0 79.3 0.0 
Indonesia 175.0 2. 2 30 . 2 28 . 2 0.3 235.9 2 . 8 
Singapore 80 . 5 16.4 52 . 2 45 . 2 18.0 212.3 1.2 
Thailand 48 . 0 0. 2 61.0 0. 5 0.0 109 . 7 0.0 
IDC's in 1,439 . 4 57 . 2 396 . 4 99 . 6 24.3 12,016 . 91 4. 0 Pacific Region 
Rest of the World ~ ,248 . 9 1 , 382 . 1 2,039 . 3 1,412.8 496.1 14,579 . 2 275 . 8 
Grand Total(World 15,014 . 0 5,280 . 6 4,491.5 2,038 . 1 708 . 0 27 , 533 . l 1 , 235 . 1 
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N. Department of Econ:rnic 
Table IB EXPORTS OF PACIFIC 
Exports to DC ' s in 
Aust- N. Pacifi c 
Exports Canada Japan ralia Zealand Region Mexico 
U. S . A. 1 ,141.4 161.3 16 , 359 . 3 1 , 567 . 5 
Canada 762. 6 50 . 6 11,569 . 1 91.5 
Japan 6, 015 . 5 557 . 1 7 ,271.4 86 . 0 
Australia 598 . 6 132 .4 1 ,101.5 13 . 0 
N. Zealand 207 . 7 41.1 120 . 0 466 . 6 1.9 
DC's in Paci- 17,400 . 0 10, 222 . 5 6, 572 . 3 1 , 993 . 1 36,767 . 90 1 , 759 . 9 fie Region 
Mexico 846 . 8 45.3 68 . 9 4 . 8 0. 4 966 . 2 
s. Korea 390 . 6 19.6 234 . 3 2. 9 5. 4 652 . 8 0 . 4 
Hong Kong 896 . 7 68 . 7 177 . 6 70 . 0 19 . 7 1,232 . 7 6 . 3 
Philippines 441 . 9 2.7 419 . 2 4 . 2 0 . 3 868 . 3 0 . 02 
Taiwan 400 . 9 39 . 5 157 . 6 15 . 5 0 . 0 613 . 6 1.4 
Indonesia 119 . 7 0 . 01 251.7 61.4 0 . 7 434 . 5 0.1 
Singapore 172 . 2 18 . 6 118 .1 52 . 3 5. 2 366 . 4 6. 7 
Thailand 92 . 7 0 .7 180 . 0 3 .1 0. 6 277 . 1 0 .1 
LI:C ' s in Paci- 3, 361. 5 195 . 2 1 , 607 .4 214 . 2 32 .3 15, 129.31 15.0 fie Region 
Rest of the World 19,190 . l 2, 930. 8 10 , 703 . 0 2, 275 . 2 625. 3 35 ,724.4 685. 8 
Grand Total(World) 39, 951.6 ' 13,348 . 5 18 , 882 .7 4,482 . 5 1237 . 6 83 ,349 .4 2, 460 . 7 
Source : Yearbook Qf In:!;;~ational Trade Statis:!;;iQ~, U.N. Department of Econ:rnic 
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COUNTRIES 1960 (Million U.S. $) 
Ibng Philip- Tai- Irrl:>-
S.Korea Kong pines wan nesia 
133 . 7 120.0 255.3 108.2 122.6 
2.3 19.6 13 . 8 2.9 1.6 
70.4 158.2 159.5 102.2 83 . 0 
6.0 23.1 7.0 3.6 8.0 
0.0 1.1 2.2 0.0 o.o 
212 . 4 322.0 437.8 216.9 215.2 
o.o 0.0 0.4 0.0 2.1 
2.7 0.0 0.4 0.0 
5. 6 
9.0 
1.2 13.3 25.7 
0.6 
5. 9 19.6 1.8 
0. 7 15 . 2 29 . 0 
0.1 20.3 
0. 1 29 . 0 
1.2 
0. 1 
21 . 4 87 . 4 33.7 
95 . 3 567.9 132 . 3 
2.9 0. 2 
2. 8 13 . 7 
20 . 6 51.8 
71.0 307 .4 
Singa-
p:>re 
52 . 0 
4 . 6 
99.3 
35 . 3 
2. 2 
193.4 
2.5 
0.4 
sin 
Thai- Pacific 
larrl Region 
64.2 1,748.2 
2. 1 84 . 9 
96.0 786.5 
4. 7 84. 7 
0.2 8.9 
167 .2 12, 102 . 2 j 
0.0 5.0 
0.1 3.6 
49.4 23.6 118.8 
15.1 
35.0 
233 .7 
62.1 
83 . 7 
2. 3 0.1 
38.0 
271 . 0 67.1 557 . 0 
894 . 8 243.6 2,588.1 
of the 
World 
12,957 . 2 
1,965.5 
1,938.5 
7,409 . 1 
645.9 
18,916.2 
58.5 
4.4 
330.9 
127.2 
56 . 2 
380.9 
854.6 
227.7 
2,060.4 
45 
World 
20,358 . 0 
5,261.8 
4,054.9 
2 , 050.7 
848.0 
32,573.4 
794.7 
31 . 8 
656 . 3 
560.4 
170.5 
840.5 
1 ,159 
421.1 
4 , 634 . 6 
199,230 . 7 216 , 398 . 0 
329 . 1 977 . 3 603.8 308 . 5 574 . 2 1,359 . 2 477.9 5 , 865.1 220,207 . 3 253 , 606 . 0 
arrl Social Affairs . 
COUNTRIES 1970 (Million U. S . $) 
Hong Philip- Tai- Irrlo-
S.Korea Kong pines wan nesia 
584 . 1 382. 3 354 . 9 
23 . 2 20 . 3 21 . 0 
809 . 3 691 . 0 369 . l 
292 . 5 157 .7 
15.2 2. 2 
537 . 0 262 . 8 
13 . 7 71 . 0 56 . 4 36 . 5 24 . 7 
5. 4 6. 2 0. 3 0.0 0.5 
1170.8 801 . 7 881 . 2 447 . 9 
1.8 1.6 8. 4 0. 2 
1 . 1 4.9 2. 7 
Singa-
p:>re 
266 . 1 
13 . 4 
476 . 3 
111.2 
1.5 
868 . 5 
13 . 4 
11. 0 
41. 7 
19.0 46.1 101 . 8 
14.5 1.6 7 .2 
23.2 93.1 
19.8 26.1 
13.5 59 . 1 
1.8 52 . 2 
117.6 271.9 
430 . 0 1462. 4 
29 . 5 
4 . 5 
0. 4 
68 . 3 
340.4 
27 . 2 
10 . 3 
31.6 16. 0 
95 . 1 128 . 4 346.6 
190 . 2 315 . 8 1 , 245 . 9 
Thai- :rD2's in 
larrl . Pacific 
Region 
192 . 8 3, 797 . 3 
9. 6 196.4 
485 . 9 3,717 . 4 
40 . 9 267 . 4 
5. 4 21.3 
734 . 6 17,999 . 81 
1.2 27.6 
5. 0 52. 7 
24.2 
3.2 
30 . 2 
19.2 
230.0 
80.2 
203 . 0 
241.8 
145.8 
147 . 4 
105 . 6 1,148 . 5 
453.2 5,123 . 7 
Rest 
of the 
World 
World 
23,067 . 4 43 , 224.0 
4,419 . 4 16 ,180 . 9 
8,430.4 19,319 . 2 
3,252 . 4 4,621 . 3 
714.7 1,202. 6 
39,884 . 5 83 , 349.4 
211.6 1,205.4 
129 . 7 835 . 2 
1,051.6 
1,112.2 
433 . 4 
124.3 
1,041.4 
260 . 7 
2,514 . 3 
1,059 . 7 
1,250.0 
799.6 
1,553.6 
685 . 2 
3,463 . 9 9,903 . 0 
2131 899 . 5 254 1 747.6 
1,983.3 2905 . 1 1,210 . 4 1,415 . 8 892 . 1 2 , 461 . 0 1 , 293 . 4 14,421.8 250 , 229 . 0 348 . 000 
arrl Social Affairs . 
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cost, as food deficits become commonplace in countries which have 
a substantial potential for agricultural productivity gain. Of 
course, if demand conditions in international trade are sufficient-
ly favorable, such a policy can presumably be maintained for a long 
time; certainly. no one would question the ability of an oil rich 
country such as Venezuela to move along this path for some decades 
to come without any major problem as far as growth is concerned . 
However, it is increasingly clear that, even here, there may be a 
"fly in the ointment," i.e ., the emerging problems of distribution 
and lack of employment absorption in the labor surplus context may 
become socially and politically intolerable even when a substantial, 
in fact quite high, growth rate can be indefinitely maintained. 
The recent reversal in the terms of trade has probably been over-
stated, especially if we take as our base a period preceding the 
global wheat, soya, and rice shortage and take into account what 
has been happening to the price of industrial good imports. But 
even if we admit that the type II LDC's in our Region are relative-
ly well endowed and are benefitting from current raw material price 
trends, this advantage is likely to be, at best, short-lived , and 
their ability to maintain this pattern of growth indefinitely, limit-
ed. 
Thus, an important question is whether or not the relatively 
natural resources rich labor surplus economy like that of Mexico 
or the Philippines really has as much of an advantage over the na-
tural resources poor labor surplus economy as might be imagined. 
More resources should presumably always be better than less, cer-
tainly in negotiating a difficult transition from one policy regime 
to another--since no one would doubt that finance ministers and 
central bankers are likely to be more ready to consider such shifts 
when foreign exchange receipts are rising and a dependable foreig n 
demand for cash crop traditional exports seems to be in the offing. 
Yet there exist perversities in the affairs of man which cannot be 
discounted. We all know that reforms represent a problem in poli-
tical economy; and the contrast between Taiwan and the Philippines 
may at least suggest that a natural resources rich developing count-
ry, while more able, may also find itself less willing to effect 
the necessary painful policy changes--largely because it is not " up 
against it." Especially at a time when raw material prices are on 
the upswing, there is a very natural human temptation to avoid the 
unpleasantness which is associated with the withdrawal of protec-
tion, the elimination of windfall profits, the lowering of the tem-
perature generally for the groups favored during the import substi-
tution regime. A quarter century of protectionist habits, paterna-
lism and centralization in government, neglect of the rural hinter-
land, and all the rest that we have come to associate with sustain-
ed periods of import substitution, are not easily broken. To the 
extent policy makers feel that nature has seen fit to be permanent-
ly kind to them, as the terms of trade have finally moved to their 
" rightful" or "fair" place, they will be more reluctant to confront 
vested interests in both the private and the public sectors and ex-
pose society tothevagaries of a more competitive growth regime . . 
Under such circumstances the odds are overwhelmingly for a continua-
tion of the present pattern of development, which, if foreign demands 
for new raw materials indeed continue strong, may ensure continua-
tion of substantial growth but can be expected to be accompanied by 
conditions of deepening dualism, underemployment and income maldis-
tribution in the type II LDC's of the Region. 
If the (likely) choice is made to continue import substituting 
into technologically ever more difficult and more capital intensive 
areas, the consequences may be predicted on the basis of the recent 
past. If we take, for example, the case of Mexico, the export/GDP 
ratio has been declining steadily, especially since 1950 when import 
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substitution controls became more direct and pronounced: This ra-
tio which is one measure of an economy's participation in the world 
economy, stood at 10 percent in 1950 and fell to about 3 l/2 percent 
by 1970 . Contrast this with Taiwan which went from 11 percent in 
1953 to almost 30 percent in 1970 . Note also that capital intensity 
in Mexico's industrial sector is rising steeply, with a virtual doubl-
ing of the capital/labor ratio during the same period--partly due to 
the increasingly modern imported technology adopted, as the distor-
tion of relative factor prices continues , and partly due to theshift 
in the output mix towards the ever more capital intensive and tech-
nology intensive sectors . Meanwhile, the industrial sector labor 
absorption rate is about 1/3 that experienced under an export sub-
stitution regime and the unskilled labor surplus condition persists 
and is probably worsening . 
In the Philippines the same general phenomenon can be observed . 
overall industrial capital intensity has been increasing, both due 
to output mix and technology changes - -and industrial goods continue 
to account for only around 8 percent of total exports in 1970 (Table 
III) . The export/GNP index did not decline but held more or less 
steady at around 15 percent between 1950 and 1972, indicating the 
absence of any transition to exports substitution, but a perhaps less 
severe case of inward oriented secondary import substitution than 
in Mexico which started its industrialization earlier . (In fact, 
the ratio of consumer goods imports to total imports in the Philip-
pines has kept on declining until 1970, indicating that a good deal 
of "easier" or primary import substitution was still going on through 
the 1960s . ) 
Thus we have here the phenomenon of increasing unemployment and 
a worsening distribution of income,6) side by side with an increas-
ingly capital intensive industrial sector, all fuelled by more or 
less traditional cash crop e xports . Moreover, food producing agri-
culture is lagging badly and food imports are becoming an addition-
al burden on the foreign exchange requirements of the economy in-
stead of food exports helping to finance further industrialization, 
as in the case of Taiwan. 
Indonesia finds itself in a somewhat different situation . Sub-
ject to run-away inflation, food shortages and a generally deterio-
rating economic situation during the Sukarno period, she has during 
the last 7 to 8 years made substantial economic progress but can be 
said to still find herself very much within the primary import sub-
stitution sub-phase of transition . Whether or not she will choose 
to move in the direction of export substitution or continue on the 
path of secondary import substitution is not yet clear- -although 
the anticipation of substantial oil revenues over the next few de-
cades and a consequent strengthening of the control-oriented forces 
in the government are clearly an important ingredient in determin-
6)In Mexico, in 1950 the poorest 40 percent received 14 . 3 percent 
of total income; by 1969 they received 11 percent . In the Phili-
ppines, the poorest 20% received 4.5% of total income in 1956; by 
1971, they received 3% . Regional distortions have similarly wors-
ened . The inflow of short-term capital from the U. S . and the Euro-
Currency market is being increasingly resorted to in the case of 
both Mexico and the Philippines . The publicized portion of Euro-
Credits to the Philippines reached $587 million in the first quart-
er of 1974 and that to Mexico (which receives more than 70% of its 
capital from the U. S . ) $535 million . While some of this is un-
doubtedly influenced by the oil crisis--especially in the case of 
the Philippines--an examination of the balance of payments of these 
type I Pacific LDC ' s indicates an increasing reliance on shorter-
term capital inflows over the past few years . 
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Table IIA PERCENTAGE SHARE OF 
DC ' s in 
Pacific 
U.S.A. Canada J apan Australia N.Zealand Region Mexico S .Korea 
U. S.A. 18.12 7.63 1.61 0. 39 27 .76 4 . 38 0. 66 
Canada 55 . 94 3. 4n 1.24 0 . 46 61.03 0. 72 0. 04 
Japan 27 . 29 2. 72 32 . 80 0. 44 1. 74 
Australia 8 . 14 1.49 14.45 27 . 16 0.34 0. 29 
N. Zealand 12. 83 1.27 3. 11 21.96 0. 00 
DC's in Paci- 13.28 11 . 79 6. 31 33 . 58 fie Region 
Mexico 88 . 44 2. 64 0. 31 0. 58 0. 00 91.97 
S. Korea 11.32 0. 00 63 . 52 0. 00 0. 00 74 . 84 
Hong Kong 19 . 35 2. 27 5. 90 30 . 05 0. 88 31.48 0. 00 0.85 
Philippines 50 . 69 0. 23 23 . 48 0. 16 0 . 03 74 . 61 0. 00 1.60 
Taiwan 10.61 0. 70 35 . 07 0. 12 0. 00 46 . 51 0 . 00 3.46 
Indonesia 20.82 0. 26 3. 59 3. 35 0 . 03 28 . 06 0.33 0.08 
Singapore 6. 94 1.41 4. 50 3.90 1.55 18 . 32 0. 10 0.01 
Thailand 11.40 0 . 05 14 . 48 0. 12 0. 00 26 . 05 0 . 00 0.02 
LDC' s in Paci- 31 . 06 1.23 8. 55 2. 15 0. 52 143 . 521 0. 09 0. 46 fie Region 
Rest of the World 9.05 1.35 2.00 1.38 0.49 14 . 28 0.27 0.09 
Total 14 . 83 3.83 2. 95 1.49 0.62 23 . 74 0.58 0. 02 
Source : Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N. Department of Econanic 
Table IIB PERCENTAGE SHARE OF 
Exports to DC ' s in 
Pacific 
Canada Japan Australia N.Zealand Region Mexico S.Korea 
21.96 12 .87 2.64 0.37 37 . 85 3. 62 1.35 
Canada 1.10 0. 31 71.48 0. 56 0.14 
Japan 31.14 0. 63 37 . 64 0. 44 4 . 19 
Australia 12.95 2. 86 2.70 23 . 83 0. 28 0 . 30 
N.Zealand 17 . 27 3.42 9. 99 8 . 12 38 . 80 0.16 0.45 
DC's in Paci-
20 . 87 12 . 26 7. 88 2.39 fie Region 0. 69 
Mexico 70.25 3.76 5.71 0. 39 0.03 
Is. Korea 46 . 77 2. 35 28.05 0.35 0. 65 
Hong Kong 34.59 2 . 73 7.06 2.78 0. 78 
Philippines 41. 70 0. 25 39.55 0. 40 0.03 81 .94 0. 00 
Taiwan 32 . 07 3.15 12 . 63 1.24 0. 00 49.09 0.11 1.86 
Indonesia 14.97 0 . 00 31.48 7. 68 0. 09 54 . 21 0.01 2. 48 
Singapore 11.08 1.20 7.60 3. 37 0. 33 23 . 58 0.43 0. 87 
Thailand 13 . 53 0 . 10 26 . 27 0. 45 0.08 40 .44 0 . 01 0. 26 
LDC ' s in Pa-
33.94 1.97 16.23 2.16 151. 791 0 . 15 cif ic Region 0. 33 1.19 
Rest of the Worl 7. 57 1.15 4.22 0 . 90 0.25 14 . 08 0 . 27 0. 33 
Grand Total 
12 . 42 4.65 5.55 (World) 1.33 0. 34 23 . 95 0. 35 0.24 
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N. Department of Econanic 
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EXPORTS OF PACIFIC COUNTRIES 1960 
sin s 
Hong Pacific of the Grand 
Kong Philippines Taiwan Irrlonesia Singapore 'lllailand Region World Total 
0. 59 1.25 0. 53 0. 60 0. 25 0. 31 8 . 59 63 . 65 100 . 0 
0.37 0. 26 0. 05 0 . 03 0. 09 0. 04 1.61 37 . 35 100 . 0 
3. 90 3. 93 2. 52 2. 04 2. 45 2. 37 19 .40 47 . 81 100 . 0 
1.13 0. 34 0.17 0.39 1.72 0 . 23 4 . 13 68 . 71 100 . 0 
0.13 0. 26 0. 00 0. 00 0. 26 0. 02 0. 69 76 . 17 100. 0 
0.99 1.34 0. 66 0 . 66 0. 59 0. 51 18 . 351 58 . 07 100 . 0 
0. 00 0.05 0. 00 0.26 0 . 31 0.00 0. 63 7 . 36 100 . 0 
8.49 0. 00 1.26 0. 00 1.26 0. 31 11 . 32 13 . 84 100. 0 
3.91 7. 53 3. 59 18 .10 50 .42 100 . 0 
0. 03 0. 41 0. 02 2.69 22.70 100. 0 
1.49 2.11 2. 40 20 . 53 32.96 100 . 0 
1.81 3. 45 20 .79 1.33 27 . 80 45.32 100 . 0 
1. 75 0.10 0. 10 0. 87 5.36 76 . 32 100.0 
6.89 0. 02 0. 66 3. 25 19 . 88 54 . 07 100 . 0 
1.88 0. 73 0.44 1.12 1.45 12 . 02 44 . 67 100 . 0 
0.56 0.13 0. 07 0. 30 0. 88 0. 24 2.54 83 .17 100.0 
0. 48 0. 41 0.12 0 . 61 0. 84 0 . 31 3. 38 72.88 100 . 0 
and Social Affairs . 
EXPORTS OF PACIFIC COUNTRIES 1970 
:UX::'s in Rest 
Hong Pacific of the Grand 
Kong Philippines Taiwan Irrlonesia Singapore 'lllailand Region World Total 
0. 88 0. 82 0. 68 0. 36 0 . 61 0. 45 8. 78 53.37 100.0 
0.13 0.13 0.09 0. 01 0 . 08 0.06 1.21 27 . 30 100.0 
3. 58 1.91 2. 78 1.36 2.46 2. 51 19 . 24 43 . 64 100 . 0 
1.54 1.22 0.79 0. 53 2.41 .0 . 88 5.79 70.38 100. 0 
0.52 0.2 0. 00 0. 04 0.12 0.45 1. 77 59 . 43 100 . 0 
1.40 0. 96 1.06 0.54 1.04 0.88 19 . 601 47.85 100.0 
0. 15 0.13 0. 70 0. 02 1.10 0. 09 2. 29 17.56 100.0 
3. 30 0.13 0. 59 0. 32 1.32 0. 59 6.31 15 . 53 100 . 0 
0 .75 1.83 4. 05 0. 96 9.15 41.82 100.0 
0.15 0. 68 0 . 30 7 . 57 10 . 49 100 . 0 
7. 45 1.22 2. 18 2. 42 16 . 24 34 .67 100.0 
3.26 3.69 0.80 2. 40 30 . 24 15.55 100 . 0 
3. 80 0. 29 0. 66 3.16 9 . 38 67 . 04 100 . 0 
7.62 0. 06 4. 61 2. 33 38 . 05 100 . 0 
2. 74 0. 69 0. 96 1.30 3 . 50 1.06 26.62 100 . 0 
0.58 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.49 0 .18 2.02 83 . 90 100 . 0 
0. 72 0.30 0. 36 0.23 0. 45 0. 20 2.84 73 . 21 100. 0 
and Social Affairs 
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ing the outcome. 7 ) 
With the exception of the smaller type I countries in the Region, 
it may thus be said that the developing countries in the Pacific 
are still fairly heavily engaged in import substitution, either 
through the use of direct or indirect controls, i.e ., QR's or the 
use of adjustable tariff cascading; that they are basically import-
ers of advanced technology with relatively little domestic innova-
tive capacity and little adaptive technological change in evidence, 
that they are suffering from increasing capital intensity in their 
industrial sectors, along with unemployment and income distribution 
problems; that their agricultural sectors, especially food produc-
ing agriculture, have been relatively neglected and discouraged 
Table III SECTORAL GROWTH OF EXPORTS OF THE 
1 9 6 0 1 9 6 5 
Agriculture 
Non- Non-
Agriculture 'Ibtal Agriculture Agriculture 
Value % of Value % of Value % of Value % of Value % of 
'lb- 'lb- 'Ibtal 'lb- 'lb-
tal tal Ex- tal tal 
Ex- Ex- ports Ex- Ex-
port port port port 
U.S.A. 7 ,061.5 34.6 13,296.5 65 . 4 20,358 . 0 100.0 8,778 . 5 39 . 9 18,224.8 60 .1 
Canada 2,950 . 8 56.1 2,311 . 0 43 . 9 5,261.8 100 . 0 4,234.0 52 . 5 3,830.5 47 . 5 
Japan 437 . 1 10.7 3,617 . 8 89.3 4,054.9 100.0 625.6 7.4 7,826 . 8 92 . 6 
Australia 8,960.7 15.6 90.0 4 .4 2,050.7 100.0 2,336.4 80.1 581.7 19 . 9 
N. Zealand 811 . 0 95.7 37.0 4 . 3 848.0 100 . 0 931 . 8 94.6 54 . 5 5.4 
I 
I 
Sub 'Ibtal 
for OC's 13, 221.1140 . 5 19,352.3 59 . 5 32,573.4 100 . 0 16,906 . 3 35 . 7 30,518.3 64.3 in Paci-
ficRegion 
Mexico 580 . 5 73.0 214 . 5 27.0 795.0 100.0 I 874 . 8 78.7 237.7 21.3 
s. Korea 27.3 85.9 4.5 14.1 31.8 100 . 0 68.0 38.8 107.1 61.2 
Hong Kong 116.0 17 . 7 540 . 3 82 . 3 656.3 100.0 I 134 . 0 12.4 452 . 3 87 . 6 
Phili{r 540.1 86.4 20.3 3.6 560 . 4 loo.o I 724 . 9 91.3 68 . 9 8.7 pines 
Taiwan 130 . 8 76 . 7 39 . 7 33 . 3 170.5 100.0 258 . 7 57 . 4 191.4 42.6 
Indonesia 787 . 4 93.7 58 . 1 6. 3 840 . 5 100 . 0 703.7 99.4 4.0 0 . 6 
· Singapore 844.3 72 . 9 314.7 27 . 1 1,159.0 100.0 597.5 59.7 74 . 7 40 . 3 
Thailand 420.4 99.8 0 . 7 0 . 2 421.1 100.0 356.9 58 .8 250.2 41.2 
Sub 'Ibtal 
for UX:'s 3,446.8 74.4 1,187.8 25 . 6 4,634.6 100.0 3,718.5 62.6 7.,215 . 4 37.4 in Paci-
ficRegion 
Grand 'lb-
tal for 16,667.9 44.8 20,540.1 55.2 37,208.0 100.0 20,624 . 8 38.6 32,733.7 61.4 Pacific 
Region 
Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, U.N. Department of Ea:manic 
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and that their production and trade pattern has consequently not 
changed very dramatically . 
Tables I, II, and III demonstrate the contrast in the recent his-
torical path of the type I and type I I LDC ' s in the Pacific Region . 
We need only look at a few indicators to make our point . South Ko-
rea ' s and Taiwan ' s total exports rose at an annual rate of 38 . 7 
percent and 22 . 0 percent respectively during the 1960 ' s contrasted 
with 9 . 8 percent for Mexico and 6 . 5 percent for the Phi lippines 
(Table III) . But even more interesting is the breakdown into agri-
cultural and non-agricultural exports, and the astounding 64 per-
cent and 37 percent non- agricultural export growth rates for South 
Korea and Taiwan, contrasted with 15 . 9 percent and 14 . 8 percent 
PACIFIC COUNTRIES (All values in mill i on U. S . $) 
1 9 7 0 Averl, Average 
Non- Anrrual Anrrual 
Total Agriculture Agriculture Total Average Agricul- ltm-Ag-
Value % of Value % of Value % of Value % of Annual tural ricultu-
To- To- To- To- Growth Growth ral 
ta1 ta1 ta1 ta1 Rates Rates Growth 
Ex- Ex- Ex- Ex- (1960- (1960- Rates 
Value ports port port ports 1970) 1970) (1960-70) 
27 , 003 . 3 100 . 0 15,575 . 9 36 . 0 27 , 648 . 1 64 . 0 43 , 224 . 0 100 . 0 7 . 7 8 . 2 7 . 6 
8, 064 . 5 100 . 0 6. 342. 6 39 . 2 9, 842 . 3 60 . 8 16 ,184 . 9 100 . 0 11.9 7 . 9 15. 6 
8,452 . 4 100 . 0 1 , 006 . 3 5 . 2 18 , 312 . 9 94 . 8 19,.319 . 2 100 . 0 16 . 9 13 .9 17 . 6 
2, 918 . 1 100 . 0 3, 311 . 3 71. 7 1,310 . 0 28 . 3 4 , 621. 3 100 . 0 8. 5 5. 3 30 . 7 
986 . 3 100. 0 1 , 064 . 7 88 . 5 137 . 9 11. 5 1 , 202 . 6 100 . 0 3.5 12 . 6 14 . 0 
47,424 . 6 100.0 27 , 300. 8 32 . 8 56 , 048 . 6 67 . 2 83 , 349 . 4 100. 0 9 . 8 7 .5 11 . 3 
1 , 112 . 5 100 . 0 265 . 9 22 . 0 939 . 5 78 . 0 1 , 205 . 4 100 . 0 4. 2 - 8.1 15 . 9 
175.1 100 . 0 188.5 22 . 6 646. 7 77 . 4 835 . 2 100. 0 38 . 7 21.4 64.4 
1, 086 . 3 100 . 0 167 . 6 6 . 7 2, 346.7 93 . 3 2, 514 . 3 100. 0 14 .4 3 . 8 15 . 8 
793 . 8 100 . 0 978 . 8 92.3 80 . 9 7 . 7 1 , 059 . 7 100 . 0 6 . 5 6 .1 14 . 8 
450 .1 100 . 0 313 . 2 25.0 936 . 8 75 . 0 1 , 250.0 100 . 0 22 . 0 9 .1 37 . 2 
707 . 7 100 . 0 768 . 3 96 . 0 31.3 4. 0 799 . 6 100 . 0 -0 . 6 - 0 . 2 - 5 .4 
1,001.3 100 . 0 1 , 076 . 0 69 . 3 477 . 6 30 .7 1 , 553 . 6 100 . 0 2. 9 2. 4 4. 2 
607 .1 100 . 0 555 . 4 81.1 129 . 8 18 . 9 685 . 2 100 . 0 5. 0 2. 8 68 . 6 
5, 933 . 9 100 . 0 4, 113 .7 41. 6 5, 889 . 3 58 .4 9, 903 . 0 100 . 0 7 . 9 1. 7 17 . 3 
53 , 358 . 5 100 . 0 31 ,414. 5 33 . 7 61 , 837 . 9 66 . 3 93 , 252 .4 100 . 0 9. 6 6 . 5 11 . 7 
arrl Social Affairs 
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for Mexico and the Philippines, respectively . An interesting con-
trast at the micro level is presented by the comparative perform-
ance of the garment industry, a very labor intensive activity . Bl 
In 1963, the Philippines e xported $25 million of garments compared 
to $5 million for South Kor ea and $10 million for Taiwan . By 1971 
the Philippines total was $36 million, while South Korea exported 
$294 million and Taiwan $374 million. The export substituting 
countries in the Region, in other words, expanded their total by 
leaps and bounds, in spite of quota restrictions abroad, while the 
still import substituting Philippines failed at times to even fill 
half her quota for cotton-based garments in the U.S. and faced no 
quota restrictions on synthetics . Moreover, while type I LDC ex-
ports to the U.S. and Japan were large and increased very rapidly, 
it should be noted (Table II) that a substantial percentage of Tai-
wan's total exports went to other LDC's in the Pacific Region, as 
contrasted to only 2 percent to 8 percent, of a much lower total, 
in the case of the Philippines. This gives testimony to the in-
creased ability during export substitution tonot only penetrate 
DC but also neighboring LDC markets, a feature often lost sight of 
in discussions of the potential for this kind of activity, if si-
multaneously adopted by a large number of LDC' s. As trade libera-li-
zation takes place, it takes place not only with respect to the 
rich countries to which most of the exports, traditional and non-
traditional, have historically been directed but also with respect 
to LDC's, and especially if they are also growing vigorously (for 
the same reasons). 
We must, of course, take care to distinguish between "export 
substitution" as we have witnessed it in the cases of South Korea 
and Taiwan and "export promotion" as it has been encountered in 
Mexico and the Philippines. As we have seen in Table III, there 
has indeed been a substantial increase in the industrial exports of 
both the Philippines and Mexico in past years-- even if the export 
orientation and the export growth rate, and the shift of composi-
tion from traditional to non-traditional, are all much less pronounc-
ed than in the Taiwan case . Industrial exports are generally recog-
nized as a "good thing" these days and are rising. Export orienta-
tion has become fashionable in the developing world even where im-
port substitution policies remain in force. Nevertheless when we 
look a little more closely at the nature of these exports, we find 
that there is a substantial difference between industrial export 
growth resulting from greater competitiveness of the domestic econo-
my through liberalization, and the "pushing out " of exports through 
outright subsidization . In Mexico as well as, to a certain extent, 
in the Philippines the recent modest growth of industrial exports 
has been accomplished in large part by government pressure, often 
quite direct , forcing companies to export a certain percentage of 
total output regardless of price competitiveness . If, due to the 
maintenance of protection and inefficiency, sales below cost are 
required in such cases, this is accomplished via an official sub-
sidy or, more frequently, the implicit understanding that losses 
on the export front are to be made up through the guaranteed conti-
nued enjoyment of non-competitive profits in the protected domes-
tic market . Such "showing of the flag" is especially noteworthy 
in the case of automobiles in Mexico and cement in the Philippines 
and represent a form of activity more properly labelled " export 
7)The prospective strength of indigenous entrepreneurial capacity , 
especially relative to the Chinese minority, represents another 
important dimension of the problem. 
S)Wearing apparel, excluding footwear and embroideries . For more 
details see Sharing in Development: A Prograrrune of Employment , 
Equity and Growth for the Philippines, ILO, Geneva , 1974 
G. RANIS 53 
promo t ion" rather than "export substitution" of the more natural , 
organic type . There s hould be no doubt that while the pendulum 
has globally swung towards export orientation in recent years, the 
pursuit of exports "at any price" can be just as costly i n terms 
of fail i ng to reflect a n e c o nomy ' s changing resource endowment o v e r 
time as the pursuit of import subst itution. Examples of negative 
value added at international prices may one day be just as abundant 
in the case of exports . 
Finally , a comparative note on the role of factor mobility in 
the type I and type II LDC ' s of the Pacific Region. With respect 
to the movement of capital there has been a substantial flow from 
the rich to the poor countries, shifting from bilateral aid to a 
greater emphasis on multilateral aid and, finally, during the most 
recent period, private capital. Table IV indicates this change in 
pattern in the total outflows from the rich countries of the Paci-
fic Region to all LDC's--superirnposed on the relative overall dee-
Table IV THE FLOW OF LONG-TERM FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO L . D. C . 's 
(Million U.S.$) 
~ 
TOTAL PRIVATE 0 F F I C I A L 
(Official& Multi-
Private) Bilateral lateral Total 
U. S . A. 
1964 4759 . 6 1297 . 0 3188 . 0 274.6 3462.6 
1968 5723 . 0 2116 . 0 3355 . 0 252 . 0 3607 . 0 
1972 7574 . 0 4029 . 0 2920 . 0 625 . 0 3545 . 0 
Average annual % 6 . 4% 26.3% -1. 0% 15 . 9% 0 . 3% 
growth rate (1964 
-1972) 
CANADA 
1964 156 . 9 29 . 2 111 . 3 16. 4 127 . 7 
1968 307 . 6 93 . 6 171. 4 42 . 6 214 . 0 
1972 1015 .4 409 . 3 452 . 4 153 . 7 606 . 1 
Average annual % 68 .4 % 162 . 7% 38 . 3% 104.7% 46 . 8% 
growth rate (1964 
-1972) 
AUSTRALIA 
1964 126 . 8 20 . 0 101.3 5 . 5 106.8 
1968 208.5 48 . 7 147.1 12.8 159 . 8 
1972 421.9 145.6 258 . 6 18 . 0 276 . 3 
Average annual % 29 . 1% 78.5% 19 . 4% 28 . 4% 19 . 8% 
growth rate (1964 
-1972) 
JAPAN 
1964 303 . 8 188.1 106.2 9 . 5 115 . 7 
1968 1029.8 351.5 597.7 80 . 6 678.3 
1972 2725.4 1257 . 9 1008 . 8 458.7 1467.5 
~verage annual % 99.6% 71.1% 106 . 2% 591.1% 141.1% 
growth rate (1964 
-1972) 
Source: Yearly Reviews (1964 to 1973) of "Development Cooperation" . 
DAC/OECD 
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line of the U.S . role and the relative overall increase of that of 
Canada and Japan. The better the development performance of the 
LDC the more pronounced the shift, and the larger the volume . 
The main carrier of private foreign capital has, of course, been 
the multi-national corporation. As expected, the wholly owned sub-
sidiary has been the natural manifestation of the multi-national 
corporation phenomenon during the import substitution sub-phase--
partly because of the inequality of domestic and foreign entrepre-
neurial capacity and bargaining power in that phase and partly be-
cause the brute act of saving and "getting things started" may in-
deed be among the more important contributions in the bundle of 
services available. At this point in time the role of relative 
prices, efficiency and the search for "appropriate technology" are 
essentially put aside in order to ensure as rapid a rate of indust-
rial growth as possible. On the other hand, once export substitu-
tion gets under way, i ; e., in the type I countries, there is a na-
tural tendency to shift in the direction of more flexibility, joint 
ventures and other forms of local participation. At this point the 
role of appropriate technology and output mixes in penetrating in-
ternational markets becomes much more necessary and important. 
There is much argument, and a growing literature, on the pros and 
cons of the MNC, including its role in technology transfer and adap-
tation. We can certainly conceive of a productive combination of 
the advantages of the MNC, with its global scan of markets and te-
chnology, and the now more mature domestic capacity based on the 
specificity and pecularities of the local resource endowment, ins-
titutional factors and markets. Sometimes, corporate "rules of 
thumb" and exaggerated worries about quality effects have to be 
overcome. During export substitution, the MNC presence in the form 
of joint ventures seems to make increasing sense, as there is a 
larger need for coming up with the right amalgam of imported and 
adaptive technology to ensure the continued competitive expansion 
of industrial sector activities. There seems to be some tendency 
in this direction. For example, for Asia as a whole the percentage 
of new investments of multinational corporations which were wholly 
owned, while still the predominant pattern, declined from 66 to 61 
percent between 1957 and 1967 while joint ventures increased from 
16 to 26 percent during the same decade.Ba) Data were not avail-
able to distinguish between the type I and type II cases, but we 
would certainly expect the trend to be more pronounced in the form-
er. 
As far as labor is concerned, it is a well recognized fact that 
there remain important asymmetries in the vigor with which differ-
ent aspects of resumed factor mobility in the Pacific Region are 
pushed. In fact, the DC's, while arguing more and more vigorously 
for the liberalization of capital flows, have become, if anything, 
more restrictive on the entry of, especially unskilled, labor. A 
second observation is that type I countries seem to be exporting 
more of their labor through commodity exports while type II LDC's 
find themselves under greater pressure to let more of the labor sur-
plus migrate directly, e . g . , Philippine "guest workers" in Guam . 
Finally, political factors aside, type I LDC's seem to have had 
less of a problem in losing their trained manpower , via the brain 
drain, than type II LDC ' s. As we would expect, the transition from 
primary import substitution to export substitution, rather than to 
secondary import substitution, provides not only greater domestic 
employment possibilities for the unskilled labor surplus but also 
greater mobility, flexibility and opportunity for its higher talent 
manpower . 
Ba)Multinational Corporations in World Development, United Nations, 
New York, 1973. 
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As far as the DC's are concerned , there is, in evidence , as we 
have already noted , a large dosage of uncertainty , instability and 
soul- searching at the present time in all of the countri es concern-
ed . The U. S ., in particular , something of a pace-setter through 
most of the post-war period , in trade liberalization , in foreign 
assistance and in the revival of private capital movements--especi-
ally via the MNC--seems to have run out of economic initiatives . 
It cannot , of course , avoid taking positions on all of the major 
issues affecting the Pacific Region since it is "the" major Pacific 
power , but it has been in a largely defensive mood, responding to 
its own balance of payments problems , concentrating on the "unfair " 
trade practices (non-tariff barriers) of the Common Market, o r re-
pairing the breakdown of the international monetary system , along 
with, more recently, energy and oil . Surely there is , given domes-
tic circumstances , a fairly liberal trade bill under discussion; 
surely also some concern with the LDC ' s in and outside of the Regi -
on manages to survive in the form of foreign assistance (b i lateral 
and multi - lateral) , investment guarantees and some half- hearted at-
tempts to increase the scope for adjustment assistance and , possibly , 
global preferences . But , all in all , the past (almost) decade has 
witnessed a U. S . pulling back from economic as well as political 
involvement . Import restrictions of the tariff and quota variety , 
along with voluntary export restrictions exacted by explicit or im-
plicit threats have become mere commonplace ; unions and even inter-
national businesses have become more protectionist ; official assist-
ance , especially outside of such " security areas" as South- East 
Asia (and the Middle East) has plummeted ; and there seems to be a 
general boredom with the problems of the developing world in gene-
ral--if admittedly somewhat less pronounced in the case of the Pa-
cific Region LDC ' s with many of which , especially Mexico , the Phi-
lippines, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan, the U. S . maintains some 
sort of a "special relationship ." Only its concern for MNC survi-
val and prosperity abroad seem to have gone on undiminished on a 
global basis . 
As Helen Hughes pointed out at last year ' s Conference , 9 ) while 
the DC's in the Region remain absolutely less protectionist than 
the LDC ' s, their trend is worse--i.e., there has been more libera-
lization and reduction of tariff cascading among the LDC ' s . 10) Ca-
nada, Australia and New Zealand, like the U.S ., have become more 
seized with their own internal problems and those attending their 
relations with each other and Western Europe under conditions of 
rampant inflation, oil crisis and balance of payments pressures . 
Japan, which had been gradually opening up its highly protected 
domestic economy to imports and foreign investment-- and had begun 
to substantially enlarge its foreign assistance program--has found 
itself most affected , in real terms and psychologically , by the 
most recent global events and is currently undergoing a searching 
reevaluation . This reevaluation has no doubt been compounded by 
the increasingly tender feelings South-East Asia has been demonst-
rating with respect to the inflow of Japanese private capital-not 
so different from Mexico ' s feelings vis-a- vis the U. S . Thus, while 
9) "Trade and Industrialization Policies : The Political Economy of 
the Second Best" in Structural Adjustments in Asian Pacific 
Trade, K. Kojima, editor, The Japan Economic Research Center, 
1973, p . 95. 
lO)The DC effective rate of protection against LDC industrial pro-
ducts has undoubtedly risen, especially if all the real and psy-
chological non-tariff barriers could be "added in" (for an earli-
er assessment see B. Balassa, " The Impact of Industrial Countri-
es' Tariff Structure on Their Imports of Manufactures from Less 
Developed Areas, " Economica, Nov . 1967) . 
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none of the DC's in the Region seem to be in anything approaching 
an heroic mood, but are rather more interested in retrenchment or, 
at best, stability in their relations with LDC's , there also exists 
a painful awareness that the development problem is not likely to 
go away--moreover that LDC's may have an increasing capability to 
inflict pain on their Northern partner if mutually satisfactory 
solutions are not found . 
Nevertheless over the longer haul , as a comparison of Tables IIA 
and IIB reveals (note the "blocked" cells) there has been an in-
creased "regionalization", at least of trade, among the countries 
examined . Whether we are considering the exports from and to Paci -
fic DC ' s !which rose from 33 percent to 44 percent of total exports 
during the decade) or the exports from LDC's to the DC's of the Re-
gion (which rose from 44 percent to 52 percent of the total), there 
has been a substantial increase in the natural or "organic" inter-
action among the countries of the Region . 11) The reasons for this 
may perhaps be found, in part, in the reduction of the importance 
of Commonwealth preferences but also in the underlying natural com-
plementarities that do exist in the Region. 
III 
We have by no means managed--nor really tried--to summarize in 
any rigorous, coherent fashion the basic current conditions among 
the various main actors in the Region--or how they got there. Nev-
ertheless we must now press on to make some equally general but 
hopefully suggestive comments as to what the future may hold in re-
lation to Pacific development, trade and technology patterns. Nor 
are we in any position--or have any desire--to make projections or 
even predictions as to what is actually going to happen. Rathe~!_ 
we shall indi~~t~ what potentially may happen in an idealized sense 
based on what we conceive to be some of the underlying economic and 
non-economic features of the current and prospective situation in 
the Region--and gloablly, as it affects the Region. 
We do not, first of all, expect any major strides towards new 
global solutions which would favorably affect the Pacific Region in 
the near term. By that we mean that no brave new major initiatives 
in restructuring North-South or even North-North economic relation-
ships can be counted upon--either in the field of trade or the move-
ment of capital or technology. Nor do we franky believe that_ great 
strides can be expected in terms of purely regional "solutions" or 
improvements . . rt is quite possible (though not likely) that ASEAN, 
for example, will become a more viable focus for pragmatic regional 
or sub-regional solutions to the problems of minimum scale, multi-
lateral payments etc . The LDC's in the Region do have a consider-
able ~moun~ of homogeneity in per capita income combined with hete-
rogeniety in resource endowment--cettainly as between the type I and 
type II representatives--all favorable to common market or freetrade 
solutions . But we would nevertheless tend to agree with Miguel Wi-
onczekl2 that, based on the accomplishments of the past in this area , 
no great strides can be expected in the near future. As the Andean 
ll)The only exception is trade among the Pacific LDC's which has 
stayed about constant. On this general subject, see also Donald 
R. Sherk, "The Tendency Toward Regionalism in the Pacific Trade 
Basin," The Developing Economies, September, 1969. 
12)"Latin American GrCMt.h and Trade Strategies in the Post-War Period" in Struct-
ural Adjustments in Asian-Pacific Trade, op.cit., p.211. 
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Pact indicates, some things can be accomplished in forging policies, 
e.g., vis-a-vis the multinational corporation, on a regional basis- -
as long as the objectives are not too ambitious and there is provi-
sion for sufficient flexibility and escape clausing . 
But this relatively restrained view of the possibilities for glob-
al or regional initiatives in the Region does not inhibit one from 
seeing the possibilities for substantial mutually beneficial inprove-
ment in the patterns of development, trade and technology in the years 
ahead . With each of the major countries in the Pacific Region act-
ing in a responsive, if self-interested fashion, substantialinprave-
ments in welfare can, we believe, result from more natural or orga-
nic regionalization. 
Let us take the prospective pattern of production and trade in 
the Region, for instance. If we could construct a dynamic scale of 
comparative advantage we could dimly see the following type of pat-
tern unfolding in our Region--under optimistic assumptions with re-
spect to individual country actions : 
1) The Type I LDC's would continue to "climb up" the technology 
intensive ladder of production for world markets, "chasing" Japan, 
for example, out of electronic component manufacturing as they pre-
viously chased her out of electronic assembly and, earlier, out of 
textiles, wigs, and toys. In 1955, to cite but one example, Japan 
provided 55 percent of U.S. textile imports; by 1965 this had fall-
en to only 29 percent. Increasingly Japan can be expected to move 
into the more capital and high technology intensive areas--e . g ., 
the export of capital goods out of which she can be expected to 
"chase" the U. S. and Canada (as well as Germany, etc.) . The prrolan 
of Taiwan and South Korea will increasingly become one of gradual 
agricultural mechanization to avoid too rapid a rise in wage costs--
combined with the training of high skilled manpower and the avoid-
ance of politically-caused brain drain. Since they are basically 
resource poor countries, we would expect them to become net import-
ers of food in the future--once domestic agriculture has fulfilled 
its historical mission--from such places as Australia and New Zealarrl, 
as well as the U.S. and Canada. 
2) The type II LDC's in the Region would, first of all, ensure 
that their own agricultural hinterlands are mobilized for develoµrent . 
The requirements for such balanced rural growth are paramount in 
such countries as Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia , 
since, without it, the export oriented traditional or industrial 
activities cannot be expected to make a real dent on the severe em-
ployment and income distribution problems--and even on the ability 
to sustain past levels of per capita income growth . In most of these 
countries there exists a large potential for labor productivity in-
crease in food producing agriculture through technology change of 
the seed/fertilizer variety--assisted from abroad as in the case of 
the short-lived "Green Revolution" but much more sustained via count-
ry-based adaptive research and non-agricultural rural growth in in-
frastructure and rural industry . 13 The mobilization of the rural 
sector is important, moreover, for the successful participation of 
these countries in international trade on a continuous, flexible 
and efficient basis . The Philippines and Mexico, for example, have 
a tremendous opportunity, along with Thailand, to almost immediate-
ly step into the labor intensive industrial production and export 
lines just being vacated by the type I countries who are "suffering" 
from the rapidly rising real wage levels which accompany the end of 
labor surplus. All natural fears concerning the reduction of long 
13)This is too big a subject to be detailed in the context of this paper. See, 
ho.vever, Sharing in Develoµnent: A Program of Dnployrnent, :E?quity, arrl GrCMth 
for the Philippines, II.O, 1974, op.cit . 
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standing habits or protection to the contrary, Mexican and Filipino 
producers are ready to engage in large-scale natural export substi-
tution rather than the small-scale and costly export promotion now 
being practiced . Brassiere manufacturers in Mexico ' s border indust-
ries, for example, exposed to a more competitive international mar-
ket environment, are in a position to undersell domestic producers 
serving the protected internal marke t- - in spite of the substantial 
transportation cost and the loss of tariff benefits that would be 
involved . 14 Type II LDC's with somewhat less pronounced entrepreneu-
rial strength, such as Indonesia, may have to wait a little longer , 
but can already test the waters via the use of export processing 
zones in which both domestic firms and MNC's can be asked to parti-
cipate . 
The potential for such international subcontracting by process, 
e . g . , in electronics, leather goods, gloves, etc , seems to be sub-
stantial; it has been growing by leap s and bounds and now consti-
tutes more than 1/6 of total U. S. imports from the LDC ' s. Their re-
jection or at least bad press in labor surplus LDC ' s is somewhat 
puzzling and undoubtedly related to the customary predominance of 
MNC's . While such export platforms have relatively small spill-over 
effects, it should be recalled, however, that they may ease the 
transition from import substitution to export substitution; more-
over, these are enclaves which do not exploit irreplaceable natural 
resources (as in the case of the minerals of an earlier day) but ab-
sorb otherwise unemployed and thus permanently lost human ~esources . 
3) As far as the DC's in the Region are concerned, their contri-
bution to developemnt via official foreign assistance to the LDC ' s 
of the Region is likely to decline even further in relative import-
ance from its present levels. Most of the LDC's have either already 
"graduated" to economic maturity (type I) or are sufficiently natu-
ral resources rich so as not to require much capital assistance. 
The only exception to this might be the necessity of some temporary 
"aid ballooning" in type II developing countries to assist with the 
real or psychological transition problems of moving from an import 
substitution to an export substitution policy package. The same 
thing would hold for the need for a diversification fund in relation 
to any real free trade zone or common market initiative in the Regi-
on. In both instances increasing use of such regional institutions 
as the Asian Development Bank to minimize inevitable frictions 
arising from performance criteria, surveillance, etc. might be 
considered . 
The main foreseeable contribution of the DC's in the Region to 
development must, however , reside in permitting maximum, political-
ly feasible, access to DC domestic markets for the products of ex-
port substitution in the course of Pacific Region LDC import lib-
eralization and gradual decontrol. This means, realistically, a 
substantial effort in adjustment assistance in all the DC's, but 
especailly the U. S . and Japan . Any "foreign aid" funds reallocat-
ed and acutally spent at home to ease the economic and political 
pains of domestic employers and workers are bound to be substantial-
ly more productive . 
Japan whose pollution and congestion problems continue to weigh 
heavily just below the surface of current concerns will want to 
persevere in moving towards the high technology, brain-intensive 
and "clear" range of products described in the 1971 White Paper on 
International Trade and Industry--and away from industrial goods 
now more efficiently producible in, say, Singapore, and agricultu-
ral goods much more cheaply available in Australia and New Zealand . 
The gradual dismantling of the protective controls over DC domes-
14)Author's interview data. 
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tic agriculture, while politically the most difficult, has also 
progressed the most in recent years, e.g . , in the U. S . and will 
hopefully continue . 
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Finally, with respect to the related issues of the internation-
al movement of capital and technology, certain actions on the part 
of both the rich and the poor countries are required if internatio-
nal flows and choices are to be rationalized. The most sensitive 
issue in this area is, of course, the role of the multinational 
corporation which has given rise to more polemical discourse and 
less analysis than virtually any subject of concern to us here. 
If we attempt to disaggregate the various functions of foreign 
investment, the roles of capital and management are probably most 
important during the import substitution phase, yielding to entre-
preneurship and technological adjustability in export substitution, 
and gradually terminaing--after graduation from labor surplus--in 
the flow of portfolio capital, supplemented by occasional manage-
ment contracts and licenses to transfer specific proprietary know-
ledge. This could be seen as the "final" manifestation of an MNC 
presence in the interplay among now mature countries--along with 
the movement of capital in response to differences in the rate of 
return. We would expect such interactions to be a continuing flex-
ible feature of the international movement of capital and, needless 
to add, of labor--accompanying multilateral trade on both final 
and intermediate products. 
Unfortunately both parties don't always as yet understand that 
the advantage to the LDC of a full bundle of MNC activity, say via 
the wholly owned subsidiary, which may be considerable in the be-
ginning, is likely to diminish over time. On the part of the MNC 
there has thus been a clear reluctance to move towards joint ven-
tures, licensing, etc. as host LDC entrepreneurial capacity matur-
es and the pure contribution to saving assumes a lesser importance . 
On the part of LDC's there similarly is often a desire to retain 
import substitution controls long after their rationale has lost 
its force but, as the MNC mystique declines, large MNC profits are 
noted, and nationalistic resentment increases, to attempt to turn 
the temperature down only for the foreign investor . This is likely 
to be due to a mutual misunderstanding of the predictable dynamics 
of an ideal relationship over time . The bargains struck initially 
in the early import substitution phase are almost bound to guaran-
tee the MNC an extremely high rate of return, based in substantial 
part on the public grant of monopoly position, which it is later 
loathe to surrender. The LDC, for its part, initially wants the 
MNC presence largely for prestige, bandwagon and security reasons, 
almost regardless of the terms~-and often on terms much in excess 
of what it would take to attract it. Neither party has anticipated 
the inevitably changing nature of the basic relationship--if they 
are to continue to coexist and benefit in some mutually agreeable 
fashion . Moving from presnt reality to a somewhat idealized , but 
nevertheless not hopelessly naive view of what is feasible in the 
future is consequently most difficult in this area, perhaps the 
most sensitive of all in terms of future relations between the rich 
and poor countries in the Region . 
IV 
There are a number of t hings , within the realm of the possible , 
which should be consider ed for policy option both by the rich and 
the poor countries in the Region if we are to move somewhat c l oser 
to the ideal. None of these proposed actions are in the category 
of global solutions of an heroic type but rather in the nature of 
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moremodeststeps that seem feasible in the present environment in 
the Region with respect to trade, technology and development . 
Turning first to the LDC's, we have already referred to the need 
for further liberalization of the foreign trade regimes in the de-
veloping countries of the Region, especially in the type II repre-
sentatives. Such liberalization for countries moving toward export 
orientation should, of course, include exchange rate adjustment where 
appropriate, and adjustment assistance to its own entrenched older 
industries which may be threatened by a gradual change in the envi-
ronment. More action on these fronts and less concern with either 
foreign aid, on the one hand, or preferences extended by the rich 
partners, on the other, would be in the interest of both the growth 
objectives and the achievements of a better distribution and employ-
ment outcome for the developing countries in the Region. Neutral 
protection for all industry both of the import substitution and ex-
port oriented variety would be a possibility as an immediate step 
in the present situation. The establishment of export processing 
zones similarly would help to convince skeptics that the new regime 
could, in fact, have a substantial pay off for all dimensions of 
development. It is especially important that the type I developing 
countries of the Region, which have themselves benefitted so much 
in the past from their own liberalization measures in both foreign 
exchange and capital markets, not revert to protectionism as they 
graduate to maturity, e . g . , as Japan did in earlier days, but to 
ungrudgingly make room for new emerging competitors in areas which 
they must ultimately vacate . The question is usually one of how 
big a struggle and how long it takes . 
With respect to the movement of private capital , we would strong-
ly argue for a more realistic and pragmatic attitutde on the part 
of LDC ' s, hand in hand with the unbundling of the MNC package into 
its component parts and a much more explicit examination as to just 
what is being transferred and being paid for and at what price at 
each stage of the development process . 15 Many misunderstandings 
arise simply because the so-called "powerful foot-loose MNC's bar-
gaining with the weak optionless LDC's" is pressured to buy what is 
essentially a ''pig in a poke . " LDC's instead of competing with each 
other with r e spect to income tax holidays and other incentives of a 
fiscal variety bestowed on foreign enterprise, should coordinate on 
the kind of screening procedures which are objective, impersonal and 
"continuous", i . e . , avoid i ng all-or-nothing acceptance or rejection . 
Fade-out and diverstiture agreements can similarly be negotiated 
much more intelligently ab initio in the light of some historical 
perspective which might provide, for example, for a transition from 
wholly owned subsidiary to joint venture after 10 years and possib-
ly further reassessments in the direction of licensing or manage-
ment contracts thereafter . 
We must, of course, contend with the argument that "it is unlik-
ely that multi - national firms will eve r be willing to repeat the 
Japanese experience elsewhere because , from their point of view , 
they helped create formidable competition to thems e lves for very 
meager returns." 16 Clearly, if offered more at e v ery stage they 
will seek more . But if there is a c lear and antic i pated trans i tion 
from one function (and one bundle) to another within a particular 
LDC, competitive pressures among the MNC ' s should ass e rt thems e lves 
to dictate a willingness to accept reasonable rates of return . In 
lS)See also Carlos F . Diaz-Alejandro, "North- South Relations : The Econ::xnic Ccrnj::o-
nent," Growth Center Discussion Paper No . 200, April 1974, who argues for arms ' 
length relationships . 
16)Larry Krause, "The International Econanic Systen and the Multinational CorfQ-
ration," Annals of the American Acad6!1Y of Political and S=ial Science , Sept-
enber 1972, p . 99 . 
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this we would be safer in relying on the MNCs ' long-run profit ma-
ximization objectives rather than on some public spirited impulse.17 
Automaticity moving towards greater flex i bil i ty over time is 
clearly desirable in all dimensions of North-South relations . Such 
procedures should reflect a recognition that some of the excesses 
of the MNC, ranging from transfer pricing to the payment of unduly 
high wages, to the inappropri ateness of the technology selected , 
to the underutilization of patents and the overutilization of do-
mestic credit and export prohibition clauses, are not unrelated to 
the import substitution policy environment created by the LDC's for 
all industry. The MNC can be most effectively forced to put its 
energies into building better mousetraps, and using adaptive (lab-
or intensive) technologies in doing so, if it is forced to give up 
the "quiet life" of the satisficing monopolist as the transition 
to a more liberal policy regime is effected. MNC's are quite cap-
able of coming up with appropriate technology and output ideas when 
there are pressures to "scratch around " further, witness the above 
cited experience in the export processing zones and the labor in-
tensive multi-purpose Ford and GM vehicles , using simple sheet met-
al, j i<_:)"s and fixtures, currently being produced in South-East Asia . 18 
Some of the windfal l profits created through protection , subsi-
dization , etc . are , of course , necessary to compensate entrepreneurs 
for undue risks during the neces sary period of early import substi-
tution . Even "old" MNC subsidiaries have learning and institution-
al problems to overcome . There are advantages, however , even then , 
in working for some harmonization among neighboring LDC ' s to avoid 
being played off one against the other, on the one hand, and grant-
ing concessions far in excess of what is required to effect the 
move, on the other. Moreover , where the major "advantage" of the 
MNC is trad6nark recognition in a low technology area, with domes-
tic producers threatened by displacement and domestic consumers by 
demostration effects , screening procedures should restrict entry . 
Removal of the veil of secrecy and full disclosure requirements 
thereafter would constitute a giant step in the direction of avoid-
ing unnecessary frictions . Much of the present problem is one of 
perception and mutual suspicion causing secular love/hate rather 
than arm ' s length business-like relationships . 
Finally, the performance of the past decades indicates that , 
even under non-optimal conditions, the LDC ' s in the Region have 
managed to grow rapidly ; the type I sub- set have , moreover, absorb-
ed their unemployed labor surplus and , in at least the Taiwan case, 
even impro v e d the size distribution of income . Thus an important 
element of success for the LDC 1 s in the Region is to not let export 
pessimism, vis- a-vis each other due to the unfamiliarity of these 
new trading partners, or vis-a- vis the rich countries of the Paci-
fic as well as of the rest of the world, influenced by actual and 
prospective trade restrictions-- deter them from following pragma-
tic, gradually liberalizing policy trends in their own interest. 
The alternati ve of increasing autarky has some superficial attrac-
tiveness, e . g ., through the improvement of performance as a conse-
quence of " self reliance" , but i n the long run is bound to incur 
higher costs in achieving a set of development targets , or likely 
to make it utterly impossible to meet them--especially those con-
cerned with distribution . 
17)As Henry Ford II put it recently : "A =rporation can serve society only if it 
is profitable . An:"! it can ~rofitable only if it is responsive to the 
[changing] neErls ... . of the society in which it operates ." (material in brack-
ets and underlining added). 
18)As a Ford executive put it (William o. Bourke , "Basic Behicle for South East 
Asia, " in Technol and E=nanics in International Develo t , AID Seminar, 
May 1972, p . 75) "s:irrplicity is often harder to achieve than op 'stication"--
but it can be achieved when the rootive is there . 
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The DC's in the Region, again acting not through global mechan-
isms, but pragmatically, each in their own interest, of course also 
have an important contribution to make in moving the Pacific Region 
closer to the naive vision we have presented . Turning, first of 
all, to trade, there is little need to emphasize the oft-repeated 
comment that opening up of the internal markets of the rich, through 
their own trade liberalization, coupled with a meaningful adjust-
ment assistance program, would constitute the single most import-
ant act of assistance to the complementary poor countries of the 
Region, as well as at the same time assisting the welfare of the 
citizens of the DC's. Most of the LDC's in this particular Region 
are ready for major participation in world trade--unlike in other 
regions--and the worst possible lesson for an LDC is to watch ano-
ther being "slapped down" by import restrictions as soon as it be-
comes successful in the international market for industrial goods . 
The DC's can also do much on the capital and technology side. 
We have already commented on the fact that the developing countries 
in this Region do not belong to the least developed category and 
are therefore less likely to be recipients of concessionary foreign 
assistance in a major way. It is nevertheless important for Paci-
fic Region DC ' s to move away from the image of a knee jerk reaction 
in favor of MNC citizens abroad--right or wrong. Hickenlooper and 
Gonzales amendments are viewed as only slightly modernized versions 
of gunboat diplomacy, and are equally ineffective. The U. S. has 
made no major effort in recent years to get rid of these and other 
well encrusted barnacles on the body of vintage 1961 aid legisla-
tion. The extension of domestic anti-trust and Trading With the 
Enemy legislation and other forms of extra-territoriality to U.S. 
MNC's abroad represents, in general, another ineffective and highly 
offensive instrument. Similarly the administrative practice of 
public sector aid tying sets an unfortunate example for intra-MNC 
movements of capital, both adversely affecting the LDC's choice of 
technology . 
Closely related is the issue of OPIC-type government investment 
guarantees . There would seem to be little reason to provide MNC's 
quasi-automatically with DC subsidized specific or extended risk 
guarantees on the basis of financial criteria only. Any MNC invest-
ment thus guaranteed by the DC carries with it the implied blessing 
of the rich country; it is incumbent on the DC to satisfy itself 
that no unfair trade practices, exclusive market demands, export 
prohibition clauses or other objectionable procedures are being 
contemplated before any guaranty is extended . 
Instead DC's, should, if requested, be willing to support LDC 
efforts to move out of import substitution and into export-oriented 
growth regimes . It is often substantially easier to overcome both 
vested interests and honest doubts concerning an impending import 
liberalization, for instance, if temporary aid ballooning is feas-
ible to protect exchange reserves and public revenue positions in 
the transition . On the technical assistance side , donors should 
assist efforts to beef up LDC legal and economic staffs in order 
to deal more effectively--and on a more equal footing- - with their 
large and powerful MNC counterparts. International assistance with 
research on adaptive industrial technology (see the analogies to 
rice and wheat research) as well as in providing greater market ac -
cess and information to all parties on an equitable basis could 
also be of considerable help . But the main point on aid is that 
relatively little is needed, that DC ' s should wait to be approach-
ed and use as much multi-lateral channeling, e . g. , via the ADB , as 
seems feasible . 
An important aspect of liberalization with respect to factor mo-
bility as a corrollary to commodity trade is a gradual relaxation 
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or, more realistically, a reversal of the trend toward restriction-
ism in the countries of the Region. Immigration policies with res-
pect to unskilled labor in particular in the DC's have been harden-
ing of late. This trend should at a minimum be halted, if not re-
versed . It is difficult to convince LDC's in this Region or else-
where about the merits of free capital movements in the absence of 
a more forthcoming attitude on migration. On the other hand, with 
respect to the migration of skilled labor from poor to rich count-
ries, a more responsible attitude on the part of the rich consist-
ent with minimum intervention, is indicated. For example, accept-
ance of an export tax of the kind, unfortunately first employed by 
the Soviets on Israel-bound Jews, is not a bad way to ensure some 
return on scarce resources invested in human capital formation in 
these countries. 
In summary, the Pacific Region is currently being buffeted by 
strong winds of change--especially as they affect the sphere of 
trade, technology and development . This could lead to increased 
autarky both as between rich and poor and as between rich and rich 
--and even as between the type I and type II less developed count-
ries. It is especially at this time, however, that it is important 
to resist succumbing to crisis analysis and to try to keep one 's 
eye on the underlying historical features of the situation. This 
would tend to make one rather more optimistic with respect to future 
performance of the Region . It is a relatively rich region, well 
endowed in terms of both its DC and LDC components . Secondly, it 
is a region with substantial diversity in resource endowment both 
as among the LDC's, e.g., Indonesia and Taiwan, and among the DC's, 
e . g . , the U.S. and Japan. Thirdly, foreign aid, having fulfilled 
its function in the past, especially that of easing the transition 
from one growth regime to another in the type I cases, could be us-
ed in a similar, selective way in the future if the occasion arises. 
With that exception, it is the opportunities in trade, and the pro-
spect for private capital movements, both equity and (increasingly) 
portfolio, which are likely to be important. We have noted the mark-
ed trend toward organic regionalism in the past, even in the pres-
ence of substantial obstacles to trade plus asymmetries and misun-
derstanding on factor movements . Given some historical perspective, 
a better understanding of what is pragmatically feasible, --and per-
haps (even) better policies on the part of both the DC's and LDC's 
in the Region--we have no reason to be despondent about the future. 
4 
* TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND JAPANESE EXPERIENCE' 
SABURO 0KITA AND SHUJI TAMURA 
Introduction 
In the world's long history of industrialization, the transfer 
of technology has played an important role in the establishment of 
new industry in many countries. In the eighteenth century, the in-
dustrial revolution of Britain spread rapidly to the continent. 
But it was not a natural phenomenon but a result of intensive effort 
to transfer technology and establish new industry in the national 
economy of each European country by the leadership of the government , 
state or entrepreneurs. 
Through the process of technology transfer , relations in trade, 
transportation, and communication between countries have been great-
ly strengthened . The evolution of international trade is still go-
ing on, showing a tendency to shift from the early phase of trade 
in commodities to trade in capital and technology . Thus it is quite 
important to evaluate the effect of technology transfer from the 
standpoint of trade and development, because it is technology which 
generates and creates economi c activities in both domestic and in-
ternational markets. 
During the 1960s , along with the surge of nationalism and move-
ments seeking economic and political independence in the developing 
countries, there was a growing awareness of the importance of inter-
national cooperation which is based to a large extent on effective 
transfer of technology . In 1969 the Pearson report was presented 
to the World Bank calling for the importance of developing human 
abilities to adopt and create necessary technology. 
Transfer of technology is not as easy a deed as the purchase of 
commodities . The technology itself involves in many such factors 
systematically related to production as raw materials, energy, ma-
chinery, and labor and management . In addition, the effectiveness 
of the transfer of technology is highly influenced by the social 
and economic condition of a recipient country as well as the charac-
teristics of the technology itself and the choice of it. 
For this reason, it would be meaningful to analyze how and under 
what condition a specific tenchnology was transferred from other 
countries . The real value would be realized only when such experi-
* The authors wish to akcnowledge the helpful comments made by Mr . 
Aaron Martin Cohen, the International Development Center of Japan 
in the preparation of this paper. 
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ences had been implemented based on the industrial conditions of 
each country. 
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Japan has adopted many technologies and developed many industri-
es. Without this import of technology, Japanese economic achieve-
ment would have been much more meagre than it has actually been . 
Let us first review the historical perspective of the transfer of 
technology in Europe, and then consider the state of the transfer, 
and then Japanese experience in the process of transfer . 
Transfer of Technology and Industrialization 
During the 17th and 18th centuries, a nation ' s wealth and produc-
tive power was a key to its survival in the keen competition between 
countries. Each government made great effort to strengthen economic 
performance . 
Britain was able to initiate the Industrial Revolution in its 
domestic environment, which gave full opportunity for an individual's 
creative activities to be used, and which had strong entrepreneur-
ship and the decentralized free enterprise system . But in the count-
ries on the Continent, the economic conditions had not yet suffici-
ently matured so as to generate an Industrial Revolution by themselv-
es . There were still strong trends of aristocracy, mercantilist and 
guild controls of economy, in addition to the low per capita income . 
1) But even in imitating Britain, the situation was favorable only 
in the countries where there were already a system of centralized 
economy . Thus every government made great efforts to transfer new 
technology from Britain. 
The first step in introducing new technology was concentrated on 
the acquisition of machines and the services of qualified personnel 
in order to start production . In 1750, a British Manufacturer, John 
Helker was invited by the French government to establish a royal 
textile factory for which ample financial support was to be provid-
ed . The necessary machinery and skilled craftsmen were brought in 
from Britain . 
Then the British machine was copied , and the copies were set up 
in other factories, while French craftsmen were trained by the Bri-
tish craftsmen. Through the activity of this first factory , which 
would be called a "transfer center of technology", technological 
knowledge, business acumen , and adminis trative skills were transfer-
red to the French economy . 
In case of Prussia, disadvantages of geographical distance and 
the difference of language made it difficult to obtain access to 
British technology by means of securing machines and skilled crafts-
men . Thus the Prussian government sent specialists to Britain under 
a systematic plan to gain new technology . For instance, in 1819, a 
young Westphalian locksmith named Egells was sent to Britain to 
study recent developments in machine production, and he established 
a machine-building works and iron foundry in Berlin using a state 
subsidy . 2) A rather sophisticated approach for the transfer of te-
chnology was thus adopted by many countries, that is, they sought 
to train and educate people and make the transfer of technology easy 
by means of the help provided by scientific and technological know-
ledge . In Prussia, the Industrial Institute was established in Ber-
lin in 1816, and Peter Beuth, head of the Prussian Department for 
l)David S . Landes, "The Unbound Prometheus", Cambridge University 
Press, London 1969, pp.126-138 . 
2)W .O. Henderson, "Britain and Industrial Europe 1750-1870", Leice-
ster University Press, London, 1965, p.147 
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Industry, was appointed as a director.3) Many similar educational 
and training institutes were established in this period, and they in-
vited foreign specialists to teach and train various fields of spe-
cialists. 
The final stage was the adoption and modification of transferred 
technology and the application of it to other sectors of technology 
and industry. John Cockerill's experience in Belgium showed an un-
limited expansion of technological linkage. He first established a 
woolen machinery factory and gradually added new industries--an iron-
works, steamship building, steam engine manufacturing, railways--, 
and eventually, he monopolized most of Belgium industry.4) 
After the 1820s, when the technology became linked with more sci-
entific knowledge and facilities, the problem of market size became 
important. To secure markets, many governments imposed import taxes 
and gave subsidies for the protection of their own manufacturers . 
The problem of insufficient size of domestic markets thus appeared 
in this period. 
In the case of Japan, the Meiji Restoration which took place in 
1868 was the period when great effort was devoted to adopt modern 
Western technologies and approaches in many fields of culture, soci-
ety, and economy.SJ 
The first step the Meiji Government took was to create a strong 
and centralized administrative structure in order to cope with the 
challenges of modernizing and to unify the nation so as to prevent 
any crisis which could endanger the new government and its efforts 
to both safeguard Japan and bring her into the community of nations . 
To secure qualified personnel to serve as government officials, a 
nation-wide selective system of the prominent people was introduced 
and it was linked to the national educational system. 
The next step taken was to improve overall educational standards, 
and a compulsory education system was introduced throughout the 
country. In relation to the industrial infrastructure, the Govern-
ment facilitated creation and extension of a communication and trans-
portation network and social infrastructure such as by city planning 
and establishing city water supply systems to replace wells. In 
fields directly related to industrialization, the Government provid-
ed utilities (gas and electric power), and promoted industrial stand-
ardization. Many governmental testing and research laboratories 
were established. These activities were aiming at supplying scienti-
fic and technological assistance to traditional industries to enable 
them to adopt and diffuse modern technology. 
One urgent necessity for the Government was to find out the way 
to adopt foreign technology in combination with the management re-
quired to use the technology and to diffuse it the two among domes-
tic industries. To make efficient use of limited resources such as 
qualified personnel, capital and technology, the government had to 
create nuclei of production fully supported by the national efforts. 
The first activities of the government-run enterprises were to 
send students and missions abroad and make surveys of the latest 
state of the art of foreign technology, in their search for the most 
appropriate technology. The next stage was to construct factory 
3)W. O. Henderson, "The State and the Industrial Revolution in Prus-
sia 1740-1870", Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1958, pp. 
16-23 
4)0p.cit., W. O. Henderson, "Britain and Industrial Europe 1750-1870" 
pp.106-138 
S)Hiromi Arisawa (ed), "One Hundred Year History of Japanese Indust-
rial Development", Vol.l, Vol.2 Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, Tokyo, 
1967 
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buildings and to equip with imported machines under the supervision 
of foreign engineers hired overseas. At first, the main operations 
in the production processes were performed by foreign skilled crafts-
men. Then foreig~ op~rators were gradually replaced by domestical-
ly trained workers. When the production increased and some expan-
sion of factories was carried out, enough experience had been obtain-
ed so that some of the machines could be domestically assembled, al-
though the main parts were still imported. At the last stage, the 
Japanese became capable of producing whole machines and facilities 
by themselves. In this stage, domestic factor endowment was fully 
taken advantage of, to build the most suitable facilities. 
Government-run enterprises were established in various fields of 
industry such as textile, cement, paper, iron and steel, and coal 
and metal ore mining. In these factories, modern Western technolo-
gy was adopted and assimilated. At the same time foreign engineers 
were hired and brought to Japan and many skilled workers were train- · 
ed on the job. 
Once the management of the government-run enterprises was estab-
lished and the adoption of transferred technology was assimilated, 
then the transfer of ownership from Government to private sector 
was carried out in order to secure efficient operation and smooth 
transfer of technology in the private sector. 
Iri the middle of the Meiji era, the industrial foundation of light 
manufacturing was developed and in the last half of the Meiji era, 
heavy industry such as iron and steel, and machinery was establish-
ed. The industrial infrastructure and many enterprises which were 
established during the Meiji era played a very important role in 
the transfer of technology as an institutional recipient of techno-
logy since then. 
Industrial Policy and Transfer of Technology 
The process of the transfer of technology is analogous to the 
transplantation of a living plant. In order to sustain transplant-
ed technology, it is necessary to provide a receptive environment 
in the form of a sound industrial base including adequate supply of 
energy, raw materials, capital and skilled labor, and the existence 
of related industries . 
If the available resources of a country are limited, the first 
preliminary step for a successful transfer of technology will be to 
select a certain area of industry where limitations are minimal or 
can be easily rectified and concentrate all the efforts to provide 
an adequate environment for that industry. 
In the case of Japanese economic reconstruction during the post-
war period, the "priority production system" was introduced in or-
der to achieve a self-sustaining economy and a higher standard of 
living under the constraint of limited savings and foreign exchange . 
In this system, the importance of an industry was evaluated in terms 
of its influence on the entire economy and its relation to the total 
industrial structure, by using as analytic tools technological link-
age as well as simplified input-output relations. The future pros-
pects were discussed on the basis of the anticipated degree of dy-
namism of market expansion, outlook for technological progress, and 
economies of scale in production . 
After the priority production system was introduced by the govern-
ment in 1947, coal mining, iron and steel, electricity and fertiliz-
er were identified as the industries of first priority . 6) The fo-
6)Hiromi Arisawa, op.cit., Vol.2, pp . 6-30 
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reign exchange which could be allocated for the system was used to 
import heavy oil and raw materials for the iron and s.teel industry . 
A large part of the coal then mined in Japan was used for i ron and 
steel production , and the increased ou tput of iron and stee l produc-
tion which resulted was primar ily allocated t o expand coa l mining 
operations . Then , the i ncreased coal production could be used for 
i ron and steel production as well as for power gene ration and che-
mical fertilizer production . 
Through this virtuous circle of e xpanding production among indus-
tries of high priority , other industries such as agriculture , machi -
nery, and chemistry could be stimulated through technological and 
material linkages . 
The transfer of technology was encouraged after the industrial 
infrastructure was strengthened and the production activities recov-
ered . The stimulus to adopt new technology mainly came from the 
necessity to reduce costs . It was a national necessity to provide 
energy and basic industrial raw materials for the whole economy, 
and produce competitive products for export, since the Japanese eco-
nomy had to import almost all necessary natural resources . Thus in-
ternational trade always put pressure on the quality and cost of 
Japanese products, and both the government and private sector have 
been very eager to lower the cost of production and improve techno-
logy . 
The administrative system for introducing foreign technology in-
to Japan was established in 1950, and was intended to encourage in-
vestment and transfer of technology on a selective basis . Under 
this system, a Japanese company which intends to make a licensing 
contract to receive technological assistance from a foreign company, 
is required to obtain validation under the Foreign Investment Law 
or the Foreign Exchange Control Law . Then the governemnt guarantees 
remission of fees, royalties and other payments as agreed . 
The regulation concerning technological assistance contracts was 
eased in 1961 when improvement of international balance of payments 
was realized. It was further liberalized in 1968 and 1972 , and now 
most technological licensing agreements can be automatically approv-
ed . 
However, at the initial stage of post-war reconstruction of the 
economy, imports of technology had to be put on a selective basis 
in order to make effective use of the limited foreign exchange avail-
able . Top priority was given to contracts which served to the im-
provement of the balance of payments , followed in order of priority 
by the anticipated contribution to development of essential industri-
es, and the development of industries serving public purposes . 
Assigning priority was carried out by the concerned ministry. 
Many engineers and spec i a l ists in a ministry were mobilized to make 
development programs for each industry and some cost-benefit studi-
es of the effects of new technology were carried out . These studi-
es usually considered the impact on other existing industries and 
on small-scale industries so as to avoid sudden disruption of exist-
ing equilibrium conditions between industries. 
Necessary coordinated measures were arranged by the government 
including tax incentives , special depreciation , and financial sup-
ports for introducing new technology . 
In line with the priority ordering of the government, each com-
pany made its own effort to select most suitable technology. Tech-
nological information was collected through industrial federations, 
academic circles, trading companies, and many overseas observation 
and fact-finding missions. Then contact would be made to a source 
of technology . 
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The price of technology was not uniform reflecting the characteri-
stics of technology , terms and contents of the agreements , the tech-
nological level of the r ecipient company , and the barga i ning condi-
tions among competitiv e suppl i e r s of technology. The content of a 
licensing agreement would be d i vided into patent rights , know-how , 
technological data and blueprints , trademark use, sales and manage-
ment information , and technical training and consulting . Thus , if 
a company wanted to obtain all of thi s , the price could be very ex-
pensive , but if i t purchases only patent rights and makes use of i t s 
own potentiality , trademark and so on , the price could be far lower . 
The ratio of average royalty payments to sales was 4 . 6 percent 
in the period from 1949 t o 1960, 4 . 1 percent in 1963 , 3 . 5 percent 
in 1965 , 4 . 2 percent in 1966 in the case of Japan . 7) But recently 
more than half of the imported technology requires payment of a 
royalty exceeding 5 percent , though it must also be noted that the 
nature of technology today differs from that purchased in the past . Bl 
The cumulative number of instances of technology imports by Japan 
from 1950 to 1971 through licensing agreement of more than one year 
duration is about 10,000 items , and the annual royalty payments 
amounted to $488 million in 1971 . The active industrial sectors in 
importing foreign technology coincides with those which are also 
export-oriented and have a high technology intensity . 9) That is to 
say , the proportion of the machinery sector is 26 . 0 percent, elect-
ric machinery 17 . 9 percent, and chemicals 17 . 0 percent . 
Most of the technology was imported in order to improve the exist-
ing system of production and to modernize old processes . In the 
case of coal mining, new machinery had been introduced from the U. S . 
A. and West Germany in 1950 and thereabout, and during the expansion 
of coal production in the 1950s , the imported machinery was modified 
to fit the working conditions in Japanese coal mines. In the iron 
and steel industry, in 1952 an advisory committee to the government 
proposed "The First Modernization . Plan of the Iron and Steel Indust-
ry", and the industry started the modernization program concentrat-
ing on the improvement of strip mills. The Japan Development Bank 
provided necessary financing for purchase of investment facilities . 
The modernization of the iron and steel industry was further aided 
by introducing a total production system including the choice of 
plant site , and factory layout • 
. The priority production system could stimulate other industries 
linked by technological and material input- output relations . In 
the case of machine industry which is central in the field of en-
gineering technology, the adoption of modern technology was done as 
follows . 
The first step of the domestic production usually started from 
the so-called dead-copy production . It is said that the successful 
domestic production could decrease the price of a machine by one-
thirds of that of the import . 10) To do this, one set of the trans-
fer of technology was essential . That is , the assembly stage of a 
completed machine, and then necessary parts production such as hyd-
raulic system parts, tools , gears, and bearings, and finally the 
basic material production as special alloys , foundry products , 
steel, and ingots of various metals . For instance , the number of 
cases of technology imported up to 1971 in each stage of the indust-
rial machinery production was 859 for the assembly stage , 229 for 
7)"Annual Report of the Import of Foreign Technology , 1967 " , Sci-
ence and Technology Agency , Tokyo 1967 , p . 45 
B)"Annual Report of the Import of Foreign Technology, 1971" , op . 
cit . pp . 14- 15. 
9) Ibi. pp . 25- 27. 
lO)Hirokazu Nakaima, ' Development of Industrial Machinery' in "Steel 
Design No.117", Shin Nihon Seitetsu Co . , Tokyo, 1973, p.33. 
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parts production, and 236 for the basic materials . 11) 
It would be clearly understood that in order to adopt such number 
of technology, the recipient company had to be specialized and had 
enough experience in production. In this respect , the development 
of small scale industries which can supplement a big company in mak-
ing specialized products will be of great value for the transfer of 
one set of technology . 
Transfer of Technology and Establishing New Industry 
In such fields as the petrochemical industry, synthetic fibers, 
and electronics, new industries were developed on the bases of the 
transferred technology . 
In this case more careful examination of the effects of the tech-
nology was required than in the case of an existing industry . The 
first problem to be examined was the impact on other existing indus-
tries of which products might be replaced as a result of the trans-
fer of new technology . Second was the formation of a new company , 
so organized as to make highest use of the new technology . Finally , 
there was a problem of stimulating effective competition in the do-
mestic market . 
The followings are the case study of the development of the pet-
rochemical industry in Japan . 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) approved 
the "Petrochemical Development Program" in 1955 . 12) In the program , 
three objectives were pointed out; to provide a stable supply of 
the intermediate raw materials to synthetic fiber and plastics in-
dustries, to substitute increasing imports of petrochemical products 
with domestic products and thereby save foreign exchange, and to de-
crease the price of petrochemical products . Thus the structure of 
industry could be up-graded and the economy could become competitive . 
MITI set the target that the petrochemical industry should meet 
the entire domestic demand projected for the future at prices no 
higher than those of equivalent imports . It was very important for 
the Japanese economy to purchase semi-finished materials at prices 
no higher than the world price since Japan has to earn foreign ex-
change by the exports of finished products made from the imported 
raw and semi-finished materials . 
The determination of expected domestic demand was a base for the 
estimation of production cost and plant scale . The cost of produc-
tion of course is closely related to the scale of a plant in many 
processing industries such as petroleum refining, petrochemical in-
dustry, and metal refining . 13) 
The estimation of domestic demand was done by MITI which consider-
ed many factors such as the increase of imports, the growth of the 
economy , the development of user industries, and the level of per 
capita national income . Necessary basic statistics were linked with 
the overall development plan of the government. The period of the 
estimation was usually five to ten years . The supply prices for 
this estimate were usually assumed to the initial price, hence the 
11) Ibid . p . 33 
12)"Ten-Years History of the Petrochemical Industry, " The Associ-
ation of Petrochemical Industries in Japan , 'lbkyo, 1971 , pp. 68-69 
13)L . Lau and S. Tamura "Economies of Scale, Technical Progress, and 
the Nonhomothetic Leontief Production Function : An Application to 
the Japanese 'Petrochemical Processing Industry", in the Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol . BO, No . 6, 1972, pp . 1167-1187 
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increase of demand by the decreasing supply price was neglected . 
por this reason, the realized demand was always larger than the 
estimate reflecting the decreasing supply price. 
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The next step was the establishment of new companies which could 
adopt new technology. It was required by MITI that these companies 
be well equipped both with technological and managerial ability, 
to make the best use of the transferred technology. 
Thus the new companies were established on the basis of either 
existing chemical companies or petroleum refiners, and this could 
certainly help the new companies to acquire raw materials, skilled 
workers, and access to markets . 
The selection of technology was carefully done, by considering 
the proposal submitted by each company . It included a production 
and sales plan, the share of exports in total output , the degree 
of import substitution , the necessary foreign exchange for the pur-
chase of the facilities , and the cost of production . Each produc-
tion and sales plan covered the period of five years . For the im-
port of technology , the data required were the contents of the te-
chnology, the royalty payments, terms of the contract , and export 
restrictions. 
The government arranged all the necessary initial conditions for 
the development of petrochemical industry ; the opening of new plant ' 
sites , stable supply of raw materials, financing by the Japan Deve-
lopment Bank, special depreciation , and so forth . 
Another important role of the government was to keep the domes-
tic market effectively competitive by controlling the entry of new 
companies . In the initial phase of the development of the petro-
chemical industry the number of central companies was limited to 
four so as to secure for each market shares greater than the mini-
mum efficient scale of the plant . After the first group success-
fully commercialized its products , the government started to encour-
age the entry of the second group . The number of the central com-
panies thus became nine altogether . Namely , the number of the ope-
rating central company was two in 1958 , four in 1960, nine in 1964 , 
and eleven in 1969 . The share of the leading company in ethylene 
production decreased from 62 . 5 percent in 1958 to 22 . 4 in 1964 , and 
to 14 . 7 in 1969 . 14) Under the decreasing cost curve to the scale 
of production, the competition by the new entry worked effectively 
to decrease the price . The average price index of petrochemical 
products in Japan decreased signi ficantly from 100 in 1956 to 88 . 8 
in 1958, 80 . 8 in 1960, 50 . 2 in 1964 , and to 37 . 0 in 1969 . 15) 
Japanese petrochemical industry relied on foreign companies for 
almost of its technology . However, the new companies whi ch adopted 
the transferred technology usually inherited the technol ogical and 
managerial experiences from the existing chemical companies. The 
accumulation of production experiences was also favorable to adop-
tion of new technology . 
The establishment of a synthetic rubber company in Japan was a 
unique case of direct investment by the government . It was announc-
ed in 1951 that a study group for the synthetic rubber industry was 
set up by MIT! , and in 1957 a joint venture of rubberand petrochemi-
cal companies with 40 percent capital participation by the govern-
ment was established under a special law, and that this company be-
came entirely privately owned in 1969 with the termination of the 
special law after the company established the foundation and made 
profit since 1961 . 16) 
14)"Ten- Years History of Petrochemical Industry" op . cit . · p . 198 
15)Ibid. pp . 538 - 539 
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This is a typical example of a traditional method of establish-
ing new industries in Japan by the government initiative for the 
purpose of securing public benefits, sharing huge risks , and avoid-
ing private monopoly . 
Transfer of Technology and Pacific Trade and Development 
In the world ' s long history of industrialization, the trans£er 
of technology has played an important role in the establishment of 
new industry in many countries . 
Such transfer of technology normally takes place along with the 
flow of technological know-how, blueprints, and capital goods such 
as machines and plants . Thus relations in international trade be-
come more important once a country starts to industrialize . 
The first stage of the transfer of technology usually takes 
place when a country imports machines and learns how to operate 
them. Such operation technology is built up in skilled workers 
and engineers . 
The second stage is to acquire maintenance and repair technology. 
If a machine is simple and manually operated, then the repair and 
maintenance are not difficult as they may be accomplished with 
simple tools and simple replacement parts . But if the machine is 
complex and automatically controlled, then the repair and mainte-
nance technology is correspondingly advanced and requires specializ-
ed tools and parts . 
The third stage is to establish engineering technology . In this 
stage, great accumulation of productive facilities and skilled work-
ers are necessary, and various kind of specified materials are need-
ed. Engineering technology bears great importance, since the level 
of engineering technology can be easily reflected by the level of 
productive facilities to be made, and the quality of products pro-
duced by the facilities. 
The final step is that of planning and design technology. It in-
cludes the research and development activities for new products, and 
the designing of actual products. It is at this stage that a country 
can develop its own technology which is most appropriate to the con-
ditions of its factor endowment . 
A self-sustained industrial activity requires one set of technolo-
gy at each stage, namely the operation, the maintenance and repair, 
the engineering, and the planning and design technology. 
Thus it is important in the long run that a country develop a set 
of efficient technology in many sectors of industry including a tra-
ditional and indigenous industry where such one set of technology 
has already established though it may not be at an advance level. 
At the initial phase of industrialization, a country has to im-
port many facilities and semi-finished materials for production . 
Then it needs much more capital goods and internmediate products 
when the country starts building engineering industries. 
Druing these periods, the problems of financing and impact of 
foreign purchases on the balance of payments usually appear . If 
such problems can be solved by international cooperation, the deve-
lopment process will be greatly aided . 
16)Keichi Oshima, "Government Measures for Technological Development" 
prepared for the seminar on the Transfer of Technology of the 
OECD, Istanbul, Turkey, October 5-10, 1970, pp . 13-14 
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There are great possibilities in the future of Pacific regional 
development, since as a whole there are well developed markets , count-
ries of different stages of development , sources of natural resources , 
and engineering industries and new technology. 
The future step will be to establish a workable program of develop-
ment in the Pacific region based on the long- term prospect of the 
transfer of technology . 
COMMENTS ON 0KITA-TAMURA PAPER - BRIAN JOHNS 
The paper provides an interesting historical survey of the Japane-
se approach to the importation of foreign technology and know-how . 
It shows that the transfer of technology to Japan was an integral 
part of that country ' s industrial policy, which in the post- war peri-
od has resulted in the promotion of certain key industries under the 
"priority production system". A particularly useful feature of the 
paper is the emphasis placed upon the requirements for the efficient 
diffusion of technological knowledge within each industry. The trans-
fer of foreign technology does not cease at the point when a licens-
ing agreement is signed with a foreign corporation . As the Japanese 
have recognised, the subsequent diffusion of that technology is a 
matter of vital importance . Thus in the case of new industries and 
new technology steps were taken to ensure that new corporate organi-
zations were formed to adopt the technology, that there were adequate 
supplies of labour with the requisite skills , and that other comple-
mentary factors were present . 
However the unique feature of the Japanese approach to technology 
transfer has been the extent of government intervention. In general 
the government acting through MITI has severely restricted that flow 
of foreign direct investment into Japan . Joint ventures between Jap-
anese and foreign corporations have been permitted but mainly in cas-
es where there was no other way of acquiring the required foreign 
technology . 
In short the Japanese Government has sought to split the foreign 
investment "package" in such a way as to secure foreign technology 
which could then be used in cooperation with the relatively abundant 
domestic supplies of managerial and administrative personnel and skil-
led labour . The paper makes no reference to the cost of acquiring 
foreign technology in the way that this has actually been done. It 
would be interesting to have more information on this point . However 
Dr . Sekiguchi reports Mr . Okita ' s recent view that Japan has been too 
slow in liberalising the inflow of foreign direct investment . This 
view could be taken to imply that the cost of acquiring technolgical 
know-how from abroad might have been lower than it actually has been 
if the multinational corporations had been allowed greater freedom 
to establish production facilities in Japan . It is certainly worth 
reminding ourselves that the multinationals are producing a continu-
ing flow of new technology as they adapt to changing conditions in 
both their home and overseas markets. 
A host country can sometimes benefit ' from the presence of MNC if 
this gives better access to new evolving techniques and to the more 
advanced techniques which only become appropriate at a later stage 
of the country's development. 
How far is the Japanese experience on the transfer of technology 
applicable to the situation of the less-developed countries? There 
is no doubt that the Japanese had certain advantages in importing 
technology which are rarely found in the less-developed countries . 
In particular the supply of skilled and educated manpower and of 
managerial ability was more abundant than that typically found in the 
LDC's today. For that reason the Japanese policy on technology trans-
fer should not be regarded too readily as an example to be followed 
by the less-developed countries. However as Mr. Okita has indicated, 
Japan is now emerging as an exporter of technological know-how to the 
74 
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rest of the world . For reasons which J shall indicate this feature 
of Japanese experience may bring benefits to the LDC ' s . 
Jt is often said that Japan has been " catching up " with the deve-
loped high-income nations in the possession of advanced technology 
and in the process of industrialization . Jn the present context it 
may be more helpful to think of Japan as passing through a stage of 
technology intermediate between that of the developed and the less-
developed countries . Japan has been obliged to adap~ the technolo-
gy imported from the advanced countries to her own particular situa-
tion . Adaptation has meant taking account of local factor propor-
tions, the size of the domestic market , local tastes and indigenous 
culture and the availability of local manpower and skills . This 
adaptation by the Japanese of the technology originating in the 
advanced countries means that the technology which Japan can now 
transfer is likely to be more appropriate to the conditions in some 
LDC ' s than the alternative technologies whi ch they could acquire 
from the advanced countries . 
Jn Helleiner's paper there is reference to the possibility that 
particular products which contain a mix of characteristics demanded 
by consumers in the developing countries may nevertheless cease to 
be produced because a new product has been developed which fits in 
better with the characteristics sought by consumers in the advanced 
countries. Following that line of approach but applying to process-
es rather than products, one can say that certain technologies which 
were employed in the advanced countries 50 years or more ago would 
be applicable to the present factor proportions in some LDC's, but 
in fact such technology has disappeared because it has ceased to 
be appropriate to the factor ratios in the advanced countries . 
However Japan may be a source of intermediate technology for the 
LDC ' s as labour-intensive methods of production once appropriate 
to factor proportions in Japan become less and less economical in 
that country due to the rising relative price of labour . As we 
have seen in recent years industries such as cotton textiles and 
electronics may tend to shift away from Japan to certain less de-
veloped countries because of changing factor price ratios . Associ-
ated with this shift there is usually a transfer of technology to 
the particular LDC's . 
Thus there are some reasons to be optimistic about the transfer 
of technology to the dev eloping countries . Jn the first place the 
entry of Japan as a seller in the world market for technology im-
plies additional competition in that market . This extra element 
of competition can certainly do no harm to the buyers of foreign 
technology, including the LDC's . Secondly , the adaptation of im-
ported technology by the Japaneqe means that it may have been modi-
fied in such a way that it is now more appropriate to the require-
ments of the developing countries . 
One final matter . The paper points out that in Japan the Govern-
ment arranges tax incentives, special depreciation allowances and 
other subsidies, to assist in the adoption of new technology by 
domestic firms . The less-developed countries ought to be warned 
of the danger of following a similar policy and subsidising the 
importation of foreign technology . This warning is not applicable 
when the buyers of the overseas technology have perfect knowledge 
about the alternative open them . For in that situation , and it is 
probably typical of the less developed countries , the subsidisation 
of technology transfer may not bring the expected benefits and may 
only serve to increase the rents of the multinational corporations . 
PART II 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF TECHNOLOGY 
5 
THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES' TRADE IN TECHNOLOGY* 
GERRY K. HELLEINER 
I. Introduction 
In the study of multinational enterprise, which has burgeoned 
during the past decade, there has been a steady shift in convention-
al modes of analysis and of perceptions away from the earlier focus 
upon international capital flows and the direct investment package, 
and away from the earlier presumption of competitive markets. To-
day, analysis tends to assume that the various components of the di-
rect investment package are decomposable (capital, technology, man-
agement, marketing, etc . ) and that the markets for some of the key 
components are highly imperfect . Most attention has recently been 
lavished upon the international market for technology, which proves 
to be the most complex and imperfect of them all . Knowledge, it 
seems, is not only not free but it is not even available on competi-
tive markets . Moreover, it is itself decomposable into constituent 
elements each of which has its own market . 
The major sellers in this market, because they are the prime pro-
prietors of nonmilitary technology in the West, are private multi-
national corporations . (In this paper, the term "multinational cor-
porations" includes small firms as well as large, provided that 
they operate in several countries) . These firms are frequently al~ 
so the buyers, and a considerable proportion of the international 
trade in technology is at the same time intrafirm - and "not arms -
length" - trade . Because there exists a massive deficit in thechno-
logy trade of the less developed world with the industrial countries 
(i.e., the flow of technology is pretty much one way), the terms at 
which it is traded has emerged as a major area of confrontation be-
tween poor nations and rich . With the increasing insistence upon 
and achievement of national ownership , in whole or in part, of major 
productive enterprises in the less developed world , payments on 
technology will constitute an increasing share of the earnings of 
multinational corporations operating there. 
At the same time there is increasing intern ational emphasis upon 
the role of science and technology in the development process and 
the need for greatly expanded research on the technological needs 
*I am very grateful to Helen Hughes, Sanjaya Lal l , Paul Streeten , 
Frances Stewart and the participants i n the Six th Pacific Conference 
on Trade and Development , Mexico City , July 1974, for coI1111ents on an 
earlier draft . I alone am responsible for remai ning errors and in-
terpretations. 
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of the Third World . 1 This stems not merely from the appreciation 
of the major contribution of technological change to the aggregate 
growth of every economy i n which measurements of the various factor 
contributions have been attempted, but also, and increasingly , from 
the perception that new technologies, adapted or developed to suit 
the peculiar resource and factor endowments, market sizes, and con-
sumption patterns and needs of poor countries, are required if deve-
lopment aspirations of the type now considered appropriate in the 
Third World are to be realised. 
While there is general agreement that an indigenoui and independ-
ent capacity for technological development must be erected in the 
less developed countries as quickly as possible, for many elements 
of required technology "one cannot disregard that for many years to 
come the research and development potential will be highly concen-
trated in the developed countries . "2 In keeping with the static 
theory of comparative advantage, industrial technology, particular-
ly "high" technology, will continue to be exported by those coun-
tries with the relatively strongest skill base , experience , and re-
search capacity for its production , in return for other goods and 
services in which less developed countries are, for the present, re-
latively more efficient . The creation of a factor endowment which 
permi ts significant indigenous industrial research and development 
requires a wide range of developmental policies together, no doubt, 
with some ''infant industry" protection . Such policies are subject 
enough for a separate paper. 
The bulk of the literature concerning the role of the multina-
tional enterprise in the transfer of technology to the less develop-
ed countries has been addressed to two issues: 1) the "appropri-
ateness" of the technology being transferred; 2) its availability 
and cost to the purchaser, both absolutely and relative to the a-
vailable alternatives . Both of these issues must be addressed si-
multaneously, since achievement of progress with one, without any 
change in the other, may generate negligible or even harmful results 
for the less developed countries . 3 
For some elements of "high" technology, the issue of "appropriate-
ness" does not really ar i se since there are no alternatives remote-
ly approaching the available one in total productivity . On the. 
other hand, it has long been recognized that a technology importing 
country's national product can be lowered in consequence of a new 
labour-saving technology , even if it is accompanied by capital im-
ports . 4 (Particularly is this so where demonstration effects lead 
more indigenous firms also to adopt the new technology) . The pro-
vision of special government incentives for the foreign technology 
supplier or investor can also generate further negative net effects 
for the recipient country . Not only, then, can the gains from the 
introduction of new technology be fully appropriated by its foreign 
owners but it is also quite possible for the foreigners' gains to 
be realised at the absolute expense of the recipient country . The 
increasing concern at the international level with national distri-
butional and employment objectives, which may even be traded off 
against income targets, provides a further dime nsion to the analysis 
of the impact of foreign technology upon less developed countries.5 
1 . See UN, World Plan of Action, 1971 . 
2 . UN, World Plan, p . 48 . 
3 . Streeten, 1972 . 
4. MacDougall, 1960; Cohen, 1972 . 
5. See, for instance, Vaitsos, 1973 . 
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As far as the cost of production or consumption technology in 
international markets is concerned, the crucial problem will con-
tinue to derive from the fact that oligopolistically organized mul-
tinational firms are the principal owners and sellers of industrial 
technology, on markets in which many of the purchasers are extreme-
ly badly informed and thus possessed of a minimum of bargaining 
strength. This cost is extremely difficult to measure since one 
cannot easily isolate one aspect of a multinational firm's activi-
ties, where it simultaneously derives income from earnings on capi-
tal (equity or loan), r oyalties and licence fees, sales of inputs 
and purchases of. outputs at favourable prices, management and mar-
keting fees, etc. It is difficult to establish even conceptually 
wherein its true earning strength (and market power) actually lies. 
This "fungibility" of its market power renders it difficult, if not 
impossible, to analyse technology markets by themselves in those 
instances in which international trade does not take place at arms~ 
length. Moreover, when technology contracts include clauses grant-
ing the supplier considerable continuing control over the buyer's 
production and marketing decisions, or otherwise restricting his 
business practices, as they frequently do, it is still more diffi-
cult to establish the total "price" of the technology transferred. 
A disproportionate share of the literature on technology "trans-
fer" to less developed countries has been devoted to production 
technology in the manufacturing sector. While the development and 
dissemination of appropriate agricultural and other non-industrial 
technologies are no less important than those of industrial techno-
logies, the role of the multinational corporations therein is not 
as central . Their comparative disadvantage in agriculture stems 
from the greater uniqueness of local ecologies, the consequent need 
for more locally specialised expertise , the relatively free inter-
national exchange of information; inputs, and research results, the 
comparative efficiency and widespread practice of smallholder agri-
culture, and the heavy research investments undertaken by government 
- all of which are interrelated.6 Since this paper is concerned 
with the role of the multinational corporations, technology trans-
fer in the non-industrial sectors will not be considered further 
here. 
The paper is divided into four principal sections. The succeed-
ing section summarizes the general character of the international 
market in technology and the role of the multinational corporations 
in it. The next two consider the corporations' role in the inter-
national transfer of production and consumption technology respec-
tively. The last offers some views on technology policies with re-
spect to the multinational corporations and reflections on the like-
ly development of more appropriate technologies for the less deve-
loped countries . 
II. The Nature of International Technology Markets and Multinatio-
nal Firm's Participation Therein. 
6 . The classic work on international diffusion of agricultural tec-
nology is Ruttan and Hayami, 1971~ Multinational corporations ' 
role in the suppression and/or spread of agricultural technology 
in the banana industry is discussed , together with more general 
analysis of technology in sugar and coffee, in Evenson, Houck, 
and Ruttan , 1970. If incentives become sufficiently great, some 
multinational firms may seek to commercialise aspects of agri-
cultural technology which have not hitherto been considered pro-
pietary. Freeman, 1973 p.30. 
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It has become usual to refer to the principal contribution of 
the multinational firm to a host country, and the principal source 
of its market power , as its technology. In the words of one recent 
authoritative study, "Technology has b7en the trump card for most 
U. S . investors as they went overseas ." 
The Components of the Market 
Is it possible clearly to identify the "products" which are be-
ing traded in technology markets? Many have tried their hand at 
comprehensive definitions . a For the present purposes, it is suf-
ficient to c9nsider the following components of technology trans-
fers: 
1) technology, in the legally recognized form of patents or 
trademarks; 
2) technology in the form of unpatentable or unpatented know-
how; 
3) technology embodied in skilled labour; 
4) technology embodied in physical goods. 
The principal emphasis here, as in most other such analyses, will 
rest upon the "disembodied" technology, the first two components on 
the above list . 
International technology transfers frequently take place without 
their being placed upon arms-length markets at all, as when multi-
national firms make certain information ("trade secrets ," etc . ) 
available only to their subsidiaries; such sales may or may not in-
volve the recording of a price for the technology on the corporate 
books . Such international transfers are nevertheless just as much 
part of the international technology market as intrafirm goods trade 
which crosses international boundaries is part of the international 
commodity market. In other instances, technology payments may be 
recorded in circumstances where it is difficult to uncover any spe-
cific good or service provided to the purchaser which might have 
generated them; and which, presumably , must therefore be serving 
some other function. 
What are the roles of patents and trademarks in international 
technology markets, and how do they relate to unpatented knowhow? 
While there has recently been a lively discussion of the benefits 
and costs to the less developed countries of adherence to the inter-
national patent conventions , 9 the consensus emerging seems to be 
that unpatentable knowhow with respect to the process of production 
is of greater significance than patented knowhow anyway. Technology 
payments in licensing and collaboration agreements in which patent 
rights are not involved typically exceed those in agreements in 
which they are. Knowledge embodied in the patent is, in any· case , 
normally insufficient , by itself, to permit its efficient working . 
7 . Stopford and Wells, 1972 , p . 177. 
8 . Perhaps the best- known and comprehensive attempt is that con-
tained in UNCTAD , Guidelines, 1972 . See also Vernon, 1 970. 
9 . United Nations , 1964 ; Cooper, 1973 ; Vaitsos , 1972; Sercon-
vich , 1973; Grundmann, 1970; Katz, 1973. UNCTAD , 197 4. 
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"In contemporary conditions, public tolerance and legal protection 
of commerical secrecy has become more important than the patent sys-
tem. 111 0 The legal status of non-patented business knowhow (trade 
secrets) is not totally clear, but the importance of legal stipula-
tions can, in any case, be overdone , in the analysis of market phe-
nomena. While the U. S. courts, for example, have ruled that they 
cannot enforce the payment of royalties for unpatented technology, 
11 this ruling does not affect in a ny way the capacity of owners 
of unpatented knowhow to continue to collect for its use where they 
are its sole possessors . 12 
What, then, is the purpose of the patent system? The ostensible 
function of patents is to stimulate invention, innovation or both 
by artifically restricting imitation and competition and thereby 
creating quasi-rent for the innovator. The overwhelming majority 
of patents in less developed countries, however, are registered by 
foreign corporations . Patent protection there is thus of miniscule 
importance for the very small number of indigenous innovators and, 
since these countries do not develop, let alone export, technologies 
likely to be patentable abroad they do not receive reciprocal be-
nefits from adherence to the Paris (patent) convention in foreign 
countries. Yet these patent rights are also of insignificant im-
portance to invention and innovation in industrial countries since 
the much larger markets there can be expected to dominate their cor-
porate decisionmaking. To make matters worse, few of the patents 
registered by multinational corporations in less developed countries 
are actually utilised in production there; and much of the "know-
ledge" they protect is, in fact, "mature" and freely available. The 
patents can therefore be presumed to restrict technology transfer 
rather than facilitate it; the patentees' main concern is likely to 
be the protection of export markets from potential competitors, or 
the facilitation of international flows of earnings . It follows 
that, while there may be minor benefits in the form of protection 
for indigenous innovators , "the presumption is strong that the less-
developed countries gain l±ttle or nothing, and may even lose, from 
granting patents on inventions developed, published, and primarily 
worked abroad ."13 
Another important legal instrument for the maintenance and explo-
itation of market power is the trade mark . Its ostensible function 
is to provide a guarantee of quality standard. Trade-marks, unlike 
patents, are unlimited in their duration . Objectively speaking , 
they ought not to carry much worth to the purchaser, upon their a -
cquisition in a country where they have not been employed before . 
Except for that small part of the market which may have encountered 
the mark abroad or in foreign publications , or in those countries 
where tourist demands may be a significant input into the pattern 
of "local" demand,14 it carries no meaning to local purchasers and 
therefore little value to potential owners. Any goodwill accruing 
to the trademark in a country in which it is new will be the product 
of the performance of the trademarked product in that particular 
market, and therefore should be the property of the local developer 
of that market who has thereby earned it. Whether it eventually 
10. Johnson, 1970, p.37. 
11. Joelson , 1973. 
12 . If these courts' jurisdictions could be extended beyond their 
borders, it might provide some incentives for rapid acquisition 
of such knowhow and restriction of such possibilities by the 
seller. 
13. Penrose, 1973 , p . 783 . 
14. Stopford and Wells, 1972, p .17 7 . 
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carries local value or not will depend upon its local success. Yet 
under present conventions not only are payments made for the use of 
the mark from the first day of its use but goodwill is also consi-
dered to belong to the owner, not the user, of the mark; when the 
user's licence .expires, he must either renew it - at a price - or 
acquire a new mark.15 As a U.S . Senate study has sourly commented , 
"the food processors seemed to be profiting rather handsomely from 
teaching affiliated or non-affiliated foreigners how to accomplish 
the technological marvels of putting soup in a can, spicy rice in 
a box, or vegetables in frozen packages . 11 16 
The price for technology embodied in skilled labour or human cap-
ital presumably reflects, to some extent, supply and demand in that 
particular labour market. In this instance, however, human capital 
which is "on the market" independently of well-known multinational 
firms with reputations to protect may be of questionable quality. 
The effective part of even this portion of the technology market is 
therefore dominated by the same firms as sell knowhow in more dis-
embodied form. Needless to say, so is the market for technology 
embodied in inputs and equipment. 
As soon as it is granted that some technology is embodied in hu-
man capital, and that it can therefore be transferred international-
ly through the movement of engineers, scientists and managers, it 
follows that the "brain drain" can also be viewed as part of the 
international technology transfer question. While it is quite cus-
tomary to consider the role of the multinational firms in transfer-
ring technology through human capital from rich countries to poor, 
it has been less usual , though no less logical, to analyse their 
role in transferring it in the reverse direction. Their employment 
of indigenous talent for the pursuit of their own particular inter-
ests may deflect it from more socially profitable research and deve-
lopment activity, even if it does not physically leave the country . 
On the other hand, "knowledge which has the capacity of generating 
more knowledge in a single head is ... . exclusive and becomes pro-
perty to the individual possessing it . " To the extent that train-
ing by the multinational firms generates such "property" in supplier 
or otherwise related firms or in employees who subsequently leave 
their employ, there can be corresponding technological transfers 
in the desired direction. As Baranson has phrased it: "more im-
portant than the imparting of technical knowledge and manufacturing 
capabilities is the ability and willingness to implant indigenous 
engineering and design capability for continued technological trans-
formation". 
The Nature of the Market 
Vaitsos has cogently anallsed the peculiarities of the interna-
tional market in technology. 7 Technology is a good, the use of 
which involves the owner in no marginal cost (except to the extent 
that some adaption to new surroundings might be necessary); it is 
non-exhaustible since it is not used up through use. It is also usu-
al for the possessor of any particular type of technology to hold 
a monopoly on the right to its use. This may take the legal form 
of a patent or trademark , or it may simply consist of knowledge 
15. UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices (Tockey) , 1972, pp. 
22-23 . 
16. U. S . Senate, 1973, p.602 . 
17. Vaitsos, 1970 and the summary of the most important points in 
Vaitsos, October 1970 . 
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which is unique to the process or product in question but which is 
secret . On the other hand, its value to a purchaser - as represent-
ed, say, by the cost of developing it for himself de ~ - may be 
great indeed . At the same time, the information available to many 
potential purchasers in this market, contrary to the usual assump-
tions of orthodox market theory, is very imperfect. "The item it-
self that one needs to purchase is at the same time the information 
that is needed in order to make a rational decision to buy it. 
What is needed is knowledge about knowledge" . The problem rests 
with the very high costs of search. 
There are two schools of thought on the consequences of this mono-
polistic and imperfectly informed market for the cost of technology 
imports to the less developed countries . Harry Johnson argues that 
since a discriminating monopolist will extract the highest possi-
ble price from each individual buyer, and since the demand from a 
low-income buyer will be more elastic than that of a high-income 
buyer, poor nations will acquire their technology imports at lower 
prices, albeit "monopolistic" ones, than must be paid by others.18 
On the other hand, those who emphasize power in the bilateral bar-
gaining process between buyer and seller ~onclude that the bargain 
will be struck to the greatest disadvantage of the purchaser when 
his power relative to the seller is least . Extra-market activities 
and uneven-ness in strength between the two parties to a bilaterally 
monopolistic bargain are likely to generate an outcome unfavouri~le 
to the weakest bargainers, in this case the poorest countries . 
Sufficient evidence is not available to settle this issue as yet; 
nor does it matter greatly. In either case, it is clear that great-
er information for the low-income purchasers and greater competi-
tion among the sellers will be likely to produce more satisfactory 
terms of trade for the less developed c ountries . (In some sectors, 
such as steel, there is already vigorous competition since the re-
levant knowledge is fairly standardized and "mature".) 
Multinational Firms and the Market 
It is frequently difficult, as has been seen, to assess the full 
costs attributable to technology imports themselves when there is 
a package of other inputs - capital, management, a variety of cap-
ital-goods and intermediate- goods - being supplied from the same 
source as the technology, and when there are other dimensions than 
price to the transactions. Wherever the multinational enterprise 
controls both the purchase and sale of goods and services crossing 
international boundaries, their prices will be established so as 
best to serve the firm's own objectives . These are most generally 
considered to be tax minimisation but they may also include liquid-
ity requirements in particular national jurisdictions, risk minimi-
sation, or the making of a better case for governmental protection 
or assistance. 
The multinational enterprise may supply technology to less deve-
loped countries in a variety of ways. In addition to the over-dis-
cussed form of direct investment in a wholly-owned subsidiary , it 
may enter into a joint venture, licence, sell inputs of equipment, 
18. Johnson, 1970, p . 41. 
·19. See the discussion of such influences in Walker, 1971. In the 
context of technology markets, Vaitsos takes essentially this 
position. 
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negotiate a management or marketing contract, erect plant on a 
turnkey basis, provide training , or various combinations of all of 
these . The circumstances in which particular firms will supply 
technologythroughone such means or another, and their decision 
processes in this regard, have already been the object of consider-
able study . 20 Rapid change in this sphere makes continued monitor-
ing desirable . 
Their preferences will depend upon elements of tax structure 
(tariff structure, profits taxes, taxes on royalties and other in-
ternational transactions) , legal provisions and restrictions of 
various kinds (relating to capital repatriation, foreign exchange 
controls, arbitration procedures , etc . ) , and the factors which en-
ter into the economics of location (factor costs, transport costs, 
etc) . The institutional form which multinational firms prefer for 
their exploitaticn of technological advantage seems to be related 
to their size, the nature of the technology, country of origin, 
and other such factors . In particular, simple technologies requir-
ing a minimum of local adaptation and relatively "mature" in their 
development are more likely to be made available through licensing 
agreements than newer and more complex technologies, for which mul-
tinational firms prefer to retain wholly-owned subsidiaries. Lar-
ger firms and firms selling in conditions of differntiated oligopo-
ly also tend to a preference for direct investment rather than li-
censing agreements . 21 
The benefits and costs of various institutional forms from the 
perspective of the technology purchaser have not been as carefully 
analysed as yet, and there is a dearth of empirical research upon 
relationships between host country or purchaser characteristics and 
the extent and nature of "unpackaging" of the direct investment 
package . There does exist some evidence, however, on the pricing 
of technology in joint ventures as against wholly-owned subsidia-
ries . Stopford and Wells succinctly summarize the issues. "Royal-
ty payments have served as another way (in addition to capitaliza-
tion of knowhow) for the multinational enterprise to capture some 
of the monopoly rents from a technological lead . In subsidiaries 
in which the enterprise holds all the equity , royalty payments are 
not needed to provide a return on technology . All the profits ac-
crue to the multinational enterprise in any case - though even in 
this case royalties may play a role in reducing taxes or in moving 
profits through foreign exchange controls . However, in a joint 
venture , royalties play the additional role of distributing to one 
of the partners a share of the profits over and above the profits 
associated with his share of the equity . There is some evidence 
that joint ventures pay larger royalties and fees for knowledge and 
management than do wholly owned subsidiaries" . 22 
20 . See the series of studies commissioned by UNITAR, e . g. Baran-
son, 1971, Ozawa, 1971 and especially that by Chudson 1971; 
Stopford and Wells, 1972; Gabriel, 1967; Chudson and Wells, 
1974. 
21. For discussion of these issues and results, see UNCTAD, Guide -
lines, 1972; Chudson, 1971; Stopford and Wells, 1972; BarariSOn, 
1970; Chudson and Wells, 1974. Vernon, 1971; Balasubramanyan , 
1973; Cooper, 1973; Caves, 1971. 
22. Stopford and Wells, 1972, pp.121-122. See also Lall, 1971, 
1971, pp.93-5, 119-120 . 
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While the multinational enterprise will seek to hold down the 
level of profits in countries where they are participating in joint 
ventures so as not to share their earnings with local equity owners , 
these local owners can also force the firm to be more circumspect 
in its dealings with the parent firm . How this balance is eventual-
ly struck will vary with the circumstances. There is some evidence 
to suggest that whereas transfer prices for the provision of know-
how, trade names, and management services from parent firms were 
higher for joint ventures than for wholly-owned subsidiaries, (in-
deed these charges are frequently non-existent in wholly owned sub-
sidiaries) those for goods purchases were generally lower.23 
In what parts of the industrial technology market does the multi-
national corporation typically sell? By and large, it is usual to 
find the accusation in the literature that the multinational firm 
only sells industrial technology whic h it had already developed for 
use in its own main markets, and which is therefore frequently in-
appropriate to the needs and demands of the less developed countries. 
III. The Transfer of Production Technology by the Multinational 
Firm 
The theory of the product cycle is the best known general account 
of the factors affecting the transfer of production technology in 
the manuf~~turing sector to less developed countries by multination-
al firms . This theory is based upon the fact that firms with tech-
nological leads acquired through the development of new products 
possess quasi-monopolistic positions in the production and sale of 
these products and the hypothesis that they will exploit them in a 
varying but predictable manner as the product matures. The less 
developed countries, according to the theory, acquire the relevant 
technologies only late in products' life, when production has become 
standardized , the monopolistic position has been eroded, price, 
rather than other forms of, competition exists, and current scienti-
fic and technical inputs are no longer required. At this point, the 
less developed countries' comparative advantage based on cheap un-
skilled and semi-skilled labour comes into play . 
Unfortunately, this theory "breaks down rather badly 11 25 as far as 
observed technology transfers to less developed countries are con-
cerned since : 
1) quasi-monopoly frequently endures far beyond the point of 
"maturity," as when it is based upon firm-specific experi-
ence and knowhow, brand names and trademarks, etc.; 
2) international factor flows within the firms may enable and do 
produce transfers of location to less developed countries 
long before a product has "matured;" local factor endowments 
are not the sole determinant of the possibility of production 
there . 
3) oligopolistic market structures and the creation of protec-
tive tariffs and quotas in the less developed countries may 
force multinational firms to locate production there for de-
23. Stopford and Wells, 1972 pp. 160-162. 
24 . Vernon, 1966; Hirsch, 1967; Wells, 1972. 
25. Cooper, 1972, p.11. The first three of the points which follow 
are Cooper's. 
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fensive reasons well before the product is mature; moreover, 
these same protectionist measures enable the firms to earn 
from their original monopolistic advantage long after it has 
been eroded at the international level . 
4) the theo~y is based upon final products, whereas there is in-
creasing resort to the production of components and interme-
diate activities in the less developed countries within ver-
tically integrated manQfacturing industries some of which are 
also quite "immature ." 26 
It would seem wisest now to abandon the theory of the product cy-
cle as a general theory of technological transfer, retaining it only 
for those segments of the technology market to which it is still 
clearly applicable . In its place we shall have to erect an eclectic 
theoretical structure which allows for a variety of technological 
characteristics . 
We might begin by considering what types of industrial production 
technology have, in fact, typically been transferred under the aegis 
of the multinational firm. There are many reasons for believing 
that multinational firms tend primarily to participate in that seg-
ment of the production technology market in which capital-intensive 
technologies and/or technologies requiring relatively large scale 
for efficient operation are employed, and that the technical change 
which they conduct research upon and create tends to be of an un-
skilled-labour saving kind. Among the most frequently cited argu-
ments for such an unfortunate bias in their resulting technological 
transfers to less developed countries are the following. 27 
1) Non-existence and Non-development of Appropriate Technologies. 
Efficient technologies for use where labour is cheap relative to 
capital, as it is today in less developed countries, simply do not 
exist . Nor are there incentives for their development by the multi-
national firms in their principal markets where the relative price 
of labour continues to rise . The smal l markets in the less develop-
ed countries, together with other factors mentioned below, do not 
offer sufficient incentives to the firms to justify the development 
of more appropriate technolog ies for exclusive use there . 
2) Inadequate or Inappropriate Price Incentives . 
(i) Multinational firms have access to relatively cheap capital. 
The factor prices upon which they base their decisions are 
not those of the particular less developed country in which 
they happen to be located; they are therefore selecting capi-
tal-intensive techniques on the basis of rational calcula-
tions in which factor prices do not reflect the social oppor-
tunity costs of capital in the host country. 
(ii) Factor and other prices in the less developed countries are 
26. Helleiner, March 1973. 
27 . It would be tedious to cite references for the most familiar 
of these arguments. They will therefore only be provided where 
the argument may be less familiar and the reference l es s well 
known . Particularly useful sources are Mason, 1971 ; Strass-
man, 1968; Chudson and Wells, 1974. 
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themselves dis torted so that they do not reflect local fac-
tor endowments or encourage labour-intensive activities or 
techniques: capital is underpriced in consequence of invest-
ment allowances , accelerated depreciation , overvalued cur-
rencies , subsidised credit, and the structure of the tariff ; 
while labour is overpriced because of minimum wage and other 
social and labour legislation (some of which, however, may 
slow the rate at which capital can be substituted for labour 
once a new plant is in place) . 
(iii) Unskilled labour is frequently of very low productivity so 
that, while the wage rate may seem relatively low, it is not 
cheap in terms of efficiency wages . (This explanation is 
more applicable to some places and periods than to others . 
It is presumably becoming generally less plaus i ble and is 
certainly at variance with recent evidence that Mexican anq 
Southeast Asian labour learns new tasks faster than American 
labour) . 28 
(iv) The heavy protection and monopolistic or oligopolistic posi-
tion typically enjoyed by the multinational firm in the mar-
kets of less developed countries removes any pressure upon 
it to adopt the most efficient (labour-intensive) technolo-
gies . 
3) Technological "fixity" ' 
The decisions of multinational corporations are characterised by 
technological "fixity" in the sense of factor substitution in elas-
ticity. In part, this reflects the fact that their advantage in for-
eign markets derives from their monopoly of knowledge over the speci-
fic techniques which they first developed in home markets and which 
are therefore likely to be inappropriate. In part, it results from 
the fact that multinational firms have tended to operate in indus-
tries (like minerals processing) in which technology is both capital-
intensive and " fixed". In the manufacturing sector the products they 
sell, which were originally designed for richer populations, are ty-
pically standardi~ed and subjected to strict quality control ; these 
controls over standards imply relatively capital-intensive and in-
flexible techniques of production for these particular products al-
though it might have been possible to meet consumer demand for the 
same basic characteristics through the provi~ion of an alternative 
product with a more appropriate production technology and/or more 
flexible quality controls . 29 In part, this " fixity" may also be the 
consequence of the employment of engineering rather than economic 
criteria in their corprate decision-making, with a resulting tendency 
to prefer "modern" capital-intensive techniques irrespective of re-
lative factor prices and possible alternatives . 30 
4) Scale and Complementary Inputs as Complications 
(i) While efficient labour-intensive technologies do exist, in 
the present state of knowledge they tend to be-S:ssociated 
28. Ranis, 1973, p .4 03 ; Ranis, 1972, p . 33 . 
29 . Stewart, 1972, pp. 112-114 . 
30. Wells, 1972 ; Yeoman, 1968. 
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with small scales of production . (Medium and small scale 
fi rms a re usually more efficient in t h e economic sense than 
a re l a r ge firms , e xcept in continuous proce s s i ndustries ; 
scale economi es i n the indus tr i a1
1
sector are not alwavs a s 
important as many have thought) . The multina t ional fi rm 
typically (but not always) n.roduces on a large scale and it 
is that scale which determines the efficient factor-inten-
si ty; i . e ., scale economies dominate factor price consider-
rations, with t~e result that the technology chosen is capi-
tal-intensive.3 
(ii) Shortages of skills, which are complementary inputs to un-
skilled labour, make it difficult to use labour-intensive 
technologies; capital is rationally substituted for labour 
in order to circumvent skill shorgate . 33 
(iii) In less developed countries material inputs often constitute 
a large proportion of total costs in the manufacturing sec-
tor. Where they are imported they may be particularly cost-
ly and difficult to acquire because of foreign exchange con-
trols . In such circumstances there are incentives to sub-
stitute other factor inputs for such materials, and capital-
material substitution elasticity (through storage faciliti e s 
which reduce spoilage , mechanised materials handling which 
reduce breakage, and electronically controlled equipment 
which mixes ingredients to the exact specifications, etc . ) 
is greater than labour-materials elasticity . 34 
5) The Role of Uncertainty. 
(i) Mult i national firms are risk-averters . They are reluctant 
to face the uncertainties and possible diruptions associat-
ed wi th labour relations in less developed countries, and 
consequently opt for c apital-intensive techniques and smal l, 
stable work forces even if the average return is thereby low-
ered . Since payment of higher wages may actually lower the 
efficiency wage bill in less develop ed areas where lower 
turnover, better health, nutrition and morale are the cons e -
quence, this practice may generate both lower risk and high-
er return . -- --
(ii) In some instances capital-intensive techniques may also pro-
vide insurance against unexpected fluctuations in demand 
more effectively than labour-intensive ones . It may be eas-
ier and cheaper to alter the number of shifts or the machine 
speed in an automated plant, in response to fluctuations in 
demand, than to hire and train, or lay off employees in a 
labour-intensive one. Variable costs are also typically 
lower in a capital-intensive plant than in a labour-inten-
sive plant than in a labour-intensive one, making it easier 
for a firm to ride out future periods of low prices and/or 
increased competition when once the capital costs have been 
recouped . 35 
31. 
32 . 
33 . 
34 . 
35 . 
Berry, 1972; 
Berry, 1972; 
Pack, 1974. 
Hughes, 1973 , 
Roemer, 197 2, 
Wells , 1972. 
Todd, 1971 ; Ranis , 1973 ; pp . 401 - 402 . 
Strassman, 1968; Silbertson , 1972 ; Yeoman, 
p . 331; Mason, 1971, p . 46 . 
pp . 5-6 ; Pack, 1974. 
1968 ; 
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6) "Good Citizenship." 
Governments or private purchasers of technology in the less deve-
loped countries often prefer to have "the latest" in terms of techno-
logical development (or "modernity") and resist the use of second-
hand equipment even when it is economically more efficient and when 
the multinational firm is able and willing to supply it at a suit-
able price . (Sometimes problems with parts and servicing make these 
preferences quite rational) . In such cases good corporate citizen-
ship, which is not such a problem for indigenous businessmen , con-
sists of bowing to these pressures for "prestige" technologies rather 
than efficient ones . Pressure to create jobs could , however , work 
in the reverse direction . 
Non-existence of appropriate technologies and technological fix -
ity are in increasing disrepute as explanations of the use of capi-
tal-intensive technology in the i ndustrial sector in the less deve-
loped countri es . A number of recent studies suggest that there may 
be rather more elasticity of factor substitution in the manufactur-
ing sector than had been suspected . Empirical estimates in both 
rich nations and poor while resting on weak methodological and em-
pirical foundations, indicate sectoral elasticities significantly 
different from zero;36 cross-section data typically yield higher 
elasticities than do time series data suggesting that opportunities 
to alter technology in response to country-specific factor prices 
have frequently been seized . More detailed and micro-level studies 
confirm these aggregative findings . Not only has this substitution 
been found in ancillary activities (handling, preparation, packaging, 
and grading, finishing , manual transfers between production line seg-
ments, office administration , etc . )37 but also in the production 
process itself - notably through adaptation of machinery , greater 
machine speeds , lower quality material inputs , the use of increased 
shifts , and subcontracting activities in selected production pro-
cesses . 38 Some of this observed substitution also reflects alter-
ations in product-mix , within the industr i al classifications s t udied ; 
such alterations also constitute a major means of planned factor sub-
stitution . Bruton ' s survey concludes "Fj9tor substitutability is 
alive and well in developing countries ." 
Moreov er , while it may, superficially , be true that capital-in-
tensity in foreign-owned (particularly Ameri~5nl firms in less deve-
loped countries exceeds that in local firms , this finding frequent-
ly does not survive disaggregation . In particular industrial sec-
tors, the multinational firm has often proven more responsive and 
adaptable in its factor and input use, especially in the ancillary 
activities associated with the basic production process, than local 
firms; arrl so it perhaps should with its wide range of experience up-
on which to draw . Vaitsos suggests a number of other reasons why 
foreign firms may employ more labour-intensive techniques than local 
36 . A very useful compendium of research results on factor substitu-
tion has been prepared in Morawets , 1974; I have benefited 
greatly from it. For results and critiques see also Bruton, 
1972; Winston, 1972; Stewart, 1973; Pack, 1974 . 
37. Mason, 1971; Pack, 1972; Strassmann, 1968; Doyle, 1965 . 
38 . Ranis, 1973; Pack, 1972; Wells, 1972 . 
39. Bruton, 1972 . 
40 . Hughes and Seng, 1969. 
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firms when both are producing the same products : their better mana~ 
gerial capacity and/or greater capacity to hire local skilled super -
visory staff, their larger markets and therefore capacity to use e x -
tra shifts in minimum effi c i ent scale plants , their greater need t o 
demonstrate "good corporate citizenship . "41 Preliminary re s u lts o f 
a detailed study of 1400 firms in Israel , Colombia , the Phi l i ppines 
and Malaysia indicate that in industries in which capital -labour sub-
stitution is evident , the multinational firms used their capital more 
intensively than local firms so as more than to off set their higher 
capital-in- place to labour ratios . 42 
On the other hand, the multinational firms ' choice of product 
within broad import-substituting demand categories does tend frequent-
ly to be capital- intensive in production . It may therefore be help-
ful to consider this question at two levels - 1) that where the capi-
tal is still "putty" and there is freedom to select the products to 
be produced on the basis of their technological requirements and flex-
ibility in use , and to choose the specific technique to be employed 
in the production of each product; 2) that where the capital is al-
realy "clay" and the issues relate to its adaptation , speed and capa-
city in use - "capital-stretching" procedures . 43 
The fact that absolute technological rigidity has been shown not 
normally to be an issue except, perhaps, within a limited range of 
continuous process industries, does not alter the fact that attempts 
to add to the technology shelf on the labour-intensive end by multi-
national firms or by anyone else have so far been limited. What all 
this evidence suggests is that the provision of sufficient incentives 
might engender private sector responses in technological adaptation 
and development; factor prices do matter. 
There also exists evidence to suggest that multinational enter-
prises are more likely to employ more labour-intensive techniques 
and use capital more intensively in their plants in less developed 
countries when they face more intense price competition44 just as 
theory would lead one to expect would be the case for all firms . It 
follows that policies seeking to influence the choice of technique 
through influencing the structure of input prices will be less l i kely 
to work where price competition is weak . There is therefore a pre-
sumption that there will be stronger incentives to utilise efficient 
technologies in production for world markets than in production for 
protected home ones . Labour- intensive technologies are already be-
ing transferred in dramatic volumes for use in low-wage countries ' 
manufacturing for export . 
Multinational firms already play a very great role in the develop~ 
ment of manufacturing for export in the less developed world , both 
within that world and for export to the industrial countries . In 
1969, about 44% of intra-LAFTA trade in manufactured products was 
conducted by firms which were 90% foreign- owned or more; and another 
14% was accounted for by joint ventures in which the foreign interes t 
varied between 30% and 90% . 45 In 1971 foreign firms accounted for 
over 15% of South Korean manufactured exports , over 20% of those of 
Taiwan and over 50% of those of Singapore . 46 
Particularly where they have lost their complete cont ro l over 
41 . Vaitsos , 1973, p . 17 . See also Mason , 1971 ; Pack , 1 97 2; 
Strassman, 1968 . 
42 . I am indebted to Hel en Hughes for this information . 
43 . This formulation I owe to Winston , 1972 . 
44 . Yeoman , 1968; Wells , 1972 . 
45 . Casas, 1972, referred to in Diaz-Alejandro , 1973 , p . 22 . 
46 . Cohen, 1973 , pp . 3-4 . These percentages would undoubtedly be 
higher if a broader definition of foreign firm " par t ici pation" 
were employed, e . g . in marketing , licensing , etc . 
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"older" technologies, the multinational firms have offered access to 
foreign markets, over which they can often retain control , as a sub-
stitute. Multinational firms may move increasingly into the "soft-
ware", organisation and marketing, of international production leav-
ing the problems of managing labour and raising capital to others .4 7 
While there is an obvious presumption that manufacturing for ex-
port from the less developed countries will be relatively labour-in-
tensive , there exists some scattered evidence that manufacturing for 
export can be quite capital-intensive , apparently because of the ef-
ficiency derived from large-scale operations which are themselves 
"inherently" capital-intensive , even when found in what are usually 
regarded as labour-intensive industries.48 This capital-intensity 
may also be the product of excessive or inappropriate export incen-
tives. 
This association between capital-intensity, scale economies and 
export performance may have profound implications for the desirabi-
lity of economic integration in the less developed world. While the 
rationalization of industry which may follow common market and/or 
complementation agreements may generate scale economies , the increas-
ed scale may be associated with greater capital-intensity ; the ef-
ficiency gains may therefore be offset by employment losses . If, 
at the same time, the overall degree of protection against third 
countries remains unaltered and the rationalization is taking place 
within a foreign-owned sector, these efficiency gains may be wholly 
appropriated by the multinational enterprise (together, perhaps, with 
local "partners" ); even the domestic tax obligations may be avoided 
through the appropriate manipulation of transfer prices, fees, etc., 
in such a way as to leave local reported profits unchanged. In such 
a case, the impact of the rationalization upon the host region is 
negative. All of this suggests that research attention be devoted 
to large-scal'e labour-intensive techniques in sectors in which there 
is technological fixity at present, and not be confined to the deve-
lopment of more efficient small-scale technologies . 
On the whole, however, the participation of multinational firms -
whether as sourcer/traders or as investor/technology suppliers - in 
the development of manufacturing for export from the less developed 
countries to the industrial countries has been primarily on the 
labour-intensive end of the technology spectrum. A wide variety of 
products are now being so exported and, provided that their markets 
are not cut off by restrictionist trade policies in the im~~rting 
countries, their volume can be expected rapidly to expand. The 
influence of the multinational manufacturing firms can be expected 
to be wielded in the formation of these policies in such a way as re-
latively to favour the free importation of those cormnodities in which 
they have a particular interest.. Trade barriers are therefore like-
ly to be erected primarily against the manufactured exports of less 
developed countries in those European and North American industries 
in which relatively weak domestic owners of capital ally with labour 
unions to demand protection and in which the multinational manufac-
turing firms are not involved; in these sectors, even if multina-
47. Hymer, 1972 , p.48 ; The Economist , as cited in Helleiner, March, 
1973, p . 34 . 
48. Diaz-Alejandro, 1973; Watanabe, 1974;. Hufbauer, 1970, p.176; 
Gruber and Vernon , 1970, p.263 onwards. Gruber and Vernon also 
noted that some less developed countries were selling technolo-
gy-intensive products to more developed countries . 
49 . Good discussion of the prospects can be found in Hughes, 1973 . 
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tional trading firms are aligned against such barriers, and even if 
more liberal adjustment assistance policies were to be introduced, 
the combined pressures -of labour and capital can be expected to 
prevail . 
Thus the multinational firms are emerging as major suppliers of 
labour-intensive technologies in circumstances where they also ex-
ert major influence upon the likelihood that they can effectively be 
used (by exporting). Particularly dramatic are the possibilities 
for accelerating "the internationalization of production" under the 
auspices of the multinational firms by farming out unskilled-labour 
intensive processes and components within vertically ig5egrated manu-
facturing enterprises to the less developed countries . 
It is high time for research and analysis of the international 
(and internal) distribution of the gains from the development of ex-
ports of manufactured goods from less developed countries and the 
influence upon them of transferring the required technologies in al-
ternative institutional ways . For too long it has been assumed that 
diversification out of primary commodity exports into manufactured 
exports was, of its very essence, "a good thing . '' Now that it is 
occurring and s hows every sign of continuing its recent trend, some 
doubts are beginning to surface . 51 As far as multinational firm 
activity is concerned, and the pricing of their services, manufactur-
ing for export places the less developed countries at a particularly 
great bargaining disadvantage since they have neither scarce re-
sources (as in the minerals sector) nor their own markets (as in the 
import-substituting sector) to withhold in the bargaining process. 
All they are able to off er is low-wage labour and there is no short-
age of that particular input in the world arena. Hence the exemp-
tion of foreign investors who are manufacturing for export from the 
investment and technology codes of even those countries which have 
developed relatively advanced legislation fo~ regulating the multi-
national firms (e.g., the Andean Pact and Mexico). 
As long as the economy and polity are such as to leave large num-
bers of unemployed workers who would otherwise be contributing no-
thing to GNP and earning nothing, the multinational firm ' s provision 
of technology and/or capital, unless it has been induced to come by 
excessive subsidies, adds to the exporting countries' incomes (and 
employment) even if it does not alter any factor or product prices 
or contribute anything to tax revenues . If, however, the unemploy-
ment problem were to be resolved - as it appears to have been in 
some countries, particularly the socialist ones - the opportunity 
cost of labour would have to be considered in the assessment of the 
foreign contribution; if in these circumstances the multinational 
firm absorbed 1 00 % of the return on the new technology itself, as 
posited above, there might no longer be any reason for the country to 
have it. The net benefit would depend upon the opportunity costs of 
the labour , capital and other inputs tied up in the activities in 
question; evidently, the gains from this type of technology transfer-
where the bulk of the gains accrue to the multinational firm in con-
sequence of the host countries' weak bargaining position - decline 
as the unemployment problem diminishes . 
IV. The Transfer of Consumption Technology by the Multinational 
Firm 
50. See Helleiner, March 1973 , and references therein. 
51 . Cohen, 1973 ; Helleiner, July 1973; Streeten, 1973. 
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Until very recently, the international transfer of technology has 
been considered to be a matter exclusively of production technology . 
Foreign influences, among which that of the multinational firm is 
predominant, also profoundly influence the character of consumption 
in the less developed countries . ("Consumption" in this context 
should be broadly interpreted to include investment and development-
al expenditures in both the public and private sectors) . In many 
instances, the influence of the multinational firm upon consumption 
patterns is developmental or at least benign, as when it introduces 
new productive inputs for use in smallholder agriculture or new life-
sustaining medicines; in these cases, the importing country may even 
welcome the firm's advertising and marketing efforts , although it 
must still be concerned with the products ' costs and the possibili-
ties for their reduction . In other cases, however, the multination-
al firm introduces and promotes the sale of totally "inappropriate" 
new products - products embodying characteristics which are super-
fluous or even undesirable, and unnecessarily costly, in the ~~n­
text of consumer requirements in the less developed countries . 
Such unnecessary characteristics may be a matter of "brand names" 
and artificially stimulated differentiations in consumer demand, or 
of objective characteristics which "planners", subjectively , see as 
superfluous to social needs. (The latter is a far more controver-
sial and philosophically difficult matter than the former) . The 
transfer/sale of "consumption technology" to the less developed coun-
tries through the agency of the multinational firm deserves far more 
attention than it has so far received outside the courses in inter-
national marketing in North American business schools. It can best 
be analysed through the use of Lancaster's "new" theory of demand
3 with its reliance upon the concept of product "characteristics."5 
Since this aspect of the multinational firms' activity in technologi-
cal transfer is still relatively imperfectly understood, an appendix 
to this paper expounds on it a little. 
The Theory of Consumption Technology 
Frances Stewart, who has made most of the question of the inade-
quate "appropriateness" of products offered for sale by multination-
al firms, and her supporters , have been accused of an "arrogant and 
paternalistic" approach to consumers in less developed countries and 
of wishing "to ram down the throats of poor countries second rate 
products that they themselves would not look at. 11 54 Such accusations 
betray failure to grasp the essentials of consumption technology 
theory - a failure which, perhaps, deserves sympathy in view of the 
manner in which the presentation of the case has frequently confused 
production technology questions with those of consumption technology; 
these issue~, while interrelated in practice, are conceptually sepa-
rable. 
In the Lancaster approach, each product possesses certain objec-
tive "characteristics . " Thus most soaps for sale in the US market 
not only possess the basic ingredients which make them useful for 
washing but also are characterised by a variety of colours, smells, 
packages and brand names; other products can similarly be decomposed 
into their characteristics. The translation of these ultimate pre-
52 , 
53. 
54 . 
ptewart, 1972; Stewart, 1973 . 
Lancaster, 1966, April and May . 
Streeten, 1973, p . 5. The charge 
summarizing others ' debate . 
See also Haq, 1973 . 
See also, Green, 1971 . 
is not Streeten ' s own; he is 
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ferences into market demands is constrained by the particular man-
ner in which characteristics are congealed into products in the 
economy in question - that is by its technology of consumption. 
(At this point the technical reader may want to look at the appen-
dix). 
Poor consumers, because of their budget constraint, can be expect-
ed to demand products incorporating more "essential" characteristics 
and fewer "luxury" characteristics than rich consumers, although 
they may, of course, consume inefficiently. 
Consumption technology changes through the appearance of new pro-
ducts (incorporating new pacakges of characteristics) and/or through 
the disappearance of old ones. Clearly, such changes benefit differ-
ent people to a different degree, depending upon the nature of their 
preferences and the direction in which the consumption "frontier" is 
extended or withdrawn. ·In particular, it can be shown that technic-
al change in consumption can be absolutely (as well as relatively) 
harmful to particular consumers. Thus the poor may lose from the 
disappearance of essential-intensive products which are replaced by 
more luxury-intensive ones. 
The selection of a society's consumption technology is a fundamen-
tal policy question which is intimately related to the overall stra-
tegy of economic and social development and the political complexion 
of the state. The focus here on the multinational corporation's 
role should not be interpreted as reflecting the view that its role 
in these matters is always dominant. 
The Role of the Multinational Firm 
How are we to interpret the role of the multinational corporation 
in the development and diffusion of new consumption technologies? 
In the early years in which the trading companies first "opened up" 
parts of the less developed world to external trade the new consump-
tion technology transferred may have been relatively "neutral" as 
far as such essential/luxury distinctions were ·concerned. In more 
recent times, however, it would be difficult not to accept the pro-
position that the consumption technological innovations introduced 
to the less developed countries by the multinational corporations 
have been biassed in the luxury direction; The bias in the introduc-
tion of new products is likely to have favoured the tastes of the 
wealthier classes, because their incomes were nearer the norm in the 
developed country markets for which the products sold by the multi-
national firms were originally developed. 
To this discussion of characteristics must now be added the cru-
cial element of "brand name," which usually serves to differentiate 
those consumer-goo<ls marketed by multinational firms in less develop-
ed countries, purports to guarantee their standards, and which is 
the basis of their advertising efforts there . ControJ_ over consump-
tion technology, through control over the use of the brand name or 
trademark, is a major source of market power for multinational firms 
in some industries. In such marketing-oriented sectors as food, be-
verages and tobacco, detergents, and ethical drugs, product differ-
entiation and associated advertising and marketing skills are the 
principal source of the multinational firm's advantage over local 
competitors. In these cases, the firms concerned show a marked pre-
ference for wholly-owned subsidiaries rather than joint ventures or 
licensing arrangements so that they can maintain firm control over 
distribution channels (permitting price discrimination among coun-
tries without fear of commodity arbitrage) and the returns from the 
ownership of the relevant consumption technology. In some instanc-
es, where local governments have required the establishment of 
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joint ventures for the local manufacturing establishment, the mul-
tinational firms have maintained full ownership and control over 
the consumption technology by establishing wholly owned sales firms 
which handles their output or by at least retaining control over 
their exports.SS This would seem to suggest that quality control 
and product standardization are not as crucial to the firm as ulti-
mate control over the marketing of the "brand name." (Knowledge of 
local markets may, however, be an important advantage of indigenous 
firms or partners in some cases - particularly those in which multi-
national firms are diversifying their product lines and have not 
yet built up much marketing skil1.S6 Joint ventures are therefore 
frequently found in such circumstances). In consumption technology, 
as in production technology, the, multinational firms not only earn 
monopolistically based returns but also sell inappropriate, or at 
least unnecessary, technology. 
An area deserving of far more research than it has so far attract-
ed is the advertising and marketing activity of the multinational 
firm, and its role in the development and diffusion of consumption 
technologies. Very large sums are spent in these activities and the 
multinational firms' proportion of the total messages conveyed 
through the media in many less developed countries is overwhelming. 
One of the few studies of this kind uncovered the facts that in 
Kenya, multinational firms sponsored over 80% of radio advertising 
in the Swahili language, over 7S% of all newspaper advertising in 
Swahili and English, and owned the two major local advertising agen-
cies which, by themselves, accounted for 4S% of all advertising 
placed in the country and which constituted a major source of mar-
keting influence and advice to locally-owned firms. Advertising 
played a particularly great role (over 6% of sales) in those multi-
national firms catering to brand-differentiated consumer demands -
pharmaceuticals, soaps and detergents, toiletries, etc.S7 
The most favourable possible view of marketing research and ad-
vertising effort by multinational firms assumes that advertising 
and marketing are unlikely significantly to influence consumer 
preferences, particularly when considered in terms of characteri-
stics rather than products.SS The object of the firms' market 
research can then be seen as the unearthing of characteristic pre-
ferences in foreign cultures, the better to design products which 
efficiently cater to them; advertising then simply provides in-
formation as to the characteristics of the resulting "new" pro-
ducts. These new products can be expected to dominate older ones 
in at least some consumers' efficiency space, thus improving their 
welfare. While such new products may be socially beneficial and 
frequently are, the possibility of distribution effects such as 
were discussed above, removes any presumption that they should be. 
Above average shares of total research and development expendi-
tures by US multinational firms are conducted abroad in the soaps 
and cosmetics, and food products industries. These are industries 
SS. Stopford and Wells, 1972, pp. 108-113. See also Lall, 1974 . 
S6. Stopford and Wells, 1972, pp. 12S-131 ~ 
S7 . I am very grateful for these data to Steven Langdon who has 
allowed me to use material which will be incorporated in his 
doctoral dissertation for the University of Sussex on multi-
national corporations in Kenya . 
SS . Green , 1971 , p.160. 
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in which product differentiation might be expected to be based to 
some extent upon country-specific tastes and conditions and in which 
market research is required to uncover the relevant demand factors . 59 
It seems safe to conclude that these abnormally high research expen-
ditures abroad are for the purpose of such market investigations . 
The sectors in which market research and advertising tend to clus-
ter raise doubts as to whether marketing efforts by the multination-
al firms can always be viewed as benign . In the first place, even 
when underlying consumer preferences cannot be altered through ad-
vertising and persuasion, consumer spending patterns can be affected 
by the biassed flow of information which it produces. Certain pro-
ducts are vigorously illuminated, whether or not they are on consum-
ers' efficiency frontiers, while the remainder are left in darkness . 
Secondly, and far more serious, market research, far from generating 
changes or adaptations in the product, may instead provide informa-
tion on which to base changes in the advertising message so as to 
make the unchanged product appear to accord better with the locally 
preferred cahracteristics and culture. Advertising may provide mis-
leading information . 
There is also, of course, the very real possibility that advertis-
ing can, after all, affect tastes. As Boulding has pointed out, 
development is a learning process and preferences are learned just 
as are other elements of "knowledge."60 How they are learned remains 
"mysterious indeed 11 6l but only the very parochial (such as the 
"special case economist")62 could retain for long the notion that 
preferences, even at the level of characteristics, are immutable. 
Multinational firms may there f ore be playing their most important 
role of all in the conscious shaping of consumer tastes into a pat-
tern which is receptive to the particular consumption technology 
which they are selling. (In some instances, such as their stimula-
tion of the demand for "branded" milk-pow~er for babies, the effects 
have been reported as catastrophic) .63 
If these multinational corporate activities are affecting the 
technology of comsumption, and if that technology is seen as an ob-
ject of governmental development policy, it may be necessary to ab-
andon the present system in which, by implication, "all persuasive 
ai~empts are considered legitimate,"64 and to institute certain 
controls over the use of foreign brand names and certain forms of 
advertising. If consumers require more security in their purchas-
es, thought should be directed to cheaper ways of inspecting and 
controlling the quality of locally made products . Even a relati-
vely passive host government should be able to cut back on exces-
sive payments for imported consumption technology. 
59. U.S. Senate, 1973, p.584 . Above average such shares were also 
found in the industrial and farm machinery industries where re-
search on production technology suitable for local conditions 
was required. 
60. Boulding, 1966, p . 7. 
61. Boulding, 1966, p . 7. 
62 . I refer, of course, to Seers' classic paper on the limitations 
of the special case. Seers, 1963 . 
63. Artificial baby milk use has led to malnutrition and death in 
tropical Africa . Bottle-feedi ng has been promoted by vigorous 
advertising campaigns . Ne w Internationalist , August 1973 . 
64 . diTella , 1973 , p . 36 . 
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Interrelationships Between Production and Consumption Technology 
The interrelationships between "appropriate" consumption techno-
logy and "appropriate" production technology are rather more complex 
than is sometimes suggested . One must allow as many have not for 
1) the possibility of tradeoffs between objectives in production 
technology and objectives in consumption technology, and 2) the 
role of international trade. 
Frances Stewart draws out at some length the implications for 
choice of production technique of the development of alternative 
products for the satisfaction of given needs . 65 Choice of product 
undoubtedly greatly widens the potential for variation in production 
technology. She further posits that newer products (consumption 
technology), which are those most likely to be offered by multinatio-
nal firms, are likely to be both more capital-intensive and more 
technologically fixed in their production . While some evidence sup-
ports this hypothesis, there is no reason for this always to be the 
case; more luxurious tastes can frequently only be catered to by 
highly labour-intensive means of production . 66 
Just as there is no presumption that capital goods industries 
will be capital-intensive67 there is no presumption that "appropri-
ate" products will employ "appropriate" (i.e ., in this context, 
labour-intensive) technology. (Choice of product and, indeed of in-
termediate inputs, will also carry implications for foreign exchange 
earning or saving objectives, which are as important as employment 
objectives in some countries . Technological "appropriateness" can 
have other dimensions than labour-inten5ity).68 In considering this 
question it is necessary also to allow for the indirect effects 
generated through linkages between the industry the final product 
of which is the object of final demand and other industries with 
possibly quite different technological characteristics . This com-
plication further reduces the likelihood that simple generalisations 
in this sphere will be very helpful . 
It is therefore not correct "to regard the inappropriate products 
argument as a particular development of the simple capital intensity 
argument , rather than an alternative. 11 69 The former is a matter of 
consumption technology whereas the latter is a matter of production 
technology . Although there might be a stable relationship between 
them, there are as yet no firm empirical grounds for establishing 
what exactly it might be. 
A great deal of the discussion of appropriate consumption patterns 
also seems to employ closed-economy assumptions; there is, however , 
no necessity for production patterns to coincide with desired con-
sumption patterns, as is often implied, where the opportunity for 
trade exists . This is particularly important for smaller countries 
where the role of external trade is likely to be greater. Even if 
the production of goods which were "appropri ate" in terms of consump-
tion technology were capital-intensive one could still acquire them 
through imports while selling labour- intensive goods, which might 
65 . Stewart , 1972 , pp . 109-114 . 
66. New luxury styles in footwear , for example, are more labour-
intensive in their production than older , standardized shoe 
styles. 
67 . See Pack and Todaro, 1969. 
68 . A PhD . thesis at the University of Toronto by Roy Culpeper is 
uncovering a very wide range of foreign exchange-saving impli-
cations in alternative manufacturing processes in the Indian 
fertilizer industry. 
69 . Cooper 1972, p . 13. 
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themselves be "inappropriate" for local consumption, for export . 
Only if autarkic objectives are also part of the overall strategy, 
or if export markets are constrained, does the argument for approp-
riate consumption technology necessarily have implications for pro-
duction. In practice, as will be seen, it nevertheless indirectly 
often does. 
As has been seen, the domestic production of new products pro-
moted by multinational firms plainly may throw off many undesirable 
effects: 1) they may be more capital-intensive in production than 
the products they replace• 2) they may also generate frictional 
costs of redeployment even if, when the transition is complete, the 
factor-intensity in production is unchanged; 3) they may be "inap-
propriate" in the social sense, particularly if the products with 
which they compete are removed from the market or are available only 
at higher prices. 
What if new "inappropriate" products are merely imported by the 
host country and not locally produced? Are there costs from inap-
propriate consumption technology which are dissociable from the a-
bove mentioned possible costs from the relevant proudcts' local pro-
duction? . Conceivably, such imports may cause unemployment in com-
peting indigenous industries. Is there any other reason to oppose 
the introduction of such "inappropriate" new products through im-
portation from world markets? As long as there are individuals with 
the incomes to buy them, it is usual to say, why sho.uld they not 
have the freedom to do so? Luxury consumption should be attacked 
at its root by altering the distribution of income which is its ul-
timate cause rather than by attempting to control what are mere sy-
mptoms . If the consumption of some articles seems particularly un-
necessary and luxurious they can be heavily taxed (being careful to 
tax domestic production, should it arise, as well as imports so as 
not to create special incentives for the erection of import-substi-
tuting luxury plants) . As long as these articles are obtained 
through importation there are no particular vested interests created 
in support of the maintenance of the markets for the products in 
question, and so for the distribution of income. 
One might, of course, postulate that there is social harm from 
lavish consumption in the bad example it sets, the jealousy it en-
genders , or the decadence it shows . There do exist less controver-
sial social efficiency arguments, however, for retaining a simpler 
consumption technology in the sense of less differentiation even of 
imported products . In particular, there will be gains, in the form 
of smoother and cheaper acquisition of parts and provision of ser-
vicing, from restriction of the range of imported products of any 
particular type below the full extent of internationally available 
differentiation . If one is to restrict imports in this way, it ob-
viously makes sense to retain those which are most welcome and most 
likely eventually to be produced locally; these will be products 
which are on the essential-intensive and/or labour-intensive ends 
of the range of differentiation . 
It is when domestic import-substituting production begins , how-
ever , that the need for controlling product differentiation really 
becomes of major significance. Where consumption technology has 
not been controlled and the full range of differentiated imports has 
been permitted, one must guard against the unnecessary and costly 
"setting" of the productive structure in the consumption technology's 
mould . Import substitution need not, indeed should not, mean com-
plete replication of the import bill . Since many manufacturing in-
dustries benefit from scale economies, and since the size of the 
market in th~ typical less developed country is limited, the erec-
tion of a number of plants each producing competing differentiated 
product lines may involve considerable inefficiencies . Inefficien-
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cies of this type are typically compensated for by tariff and other 
forms of protection. Thus the industrial sector in the less develop-
ed countries is frequently -characterized by heavy protection, excess 
capacity and inefficiency in the production of a range of highly 
differentiated products. (Indeed this is the pattern in the Cana-
dian manufacturing sector as well) • The simpler is the original 
consumption technology, the less are pressures likely to be generat-
ed for the overdifferentiation of domestic production. This seems 
a more important issue in the interrelationships between consumption 
and production technologies in open economies than those relating to 
unproven generalisations about the likely factor-intensity of the 
production of appropriate products. 
v. Technology Policies and the Development of Appropriate Technolo-
gies 
Technology Policies 
The "inappropriateness" of technologies offere~ to the less deve-
loped countries, which sterns either from their factor- use character-
istics (production) or the type of products (consumption) and which 
is by no means universal in the multinationals' trade, can presum-
ably begin to be remedied once the less developed c;:ountries have 
themselves determined what they consider to be app:ropriate, and es-
tablished mechanisms to ensure that that is what they actually de-
mand and therefore acquire. The iikelihood that governments in im-
porting countries can and will formulate and control their national 
demands for foreign technology depends upon the character of the 
social and political system, the availability of information, admi-
nistrative strength and bargaining power and the influence of the 
major technology suppliers themselves in the formation and manage-
ment of economic policy. It may be, as Charles Cooper has pessimis-
tically concluded, that a suitable technology policy "is in many 
fundamental ways in direct conflict with the interests of the poli-
tical and eocnornic elites ••• (and) ••• rnust rest on the hope that the 
State, the high-income classes and foreign business ••• are either in-
herently progressive or else that they are sufficiently concerned 
about potential social tension to make timely concessions."70 He 
clearly implies that such hopes are slim. 
Yet technology contracts with multinational enterprises of what-
ever type can be and increasingly are being vetted by public autho-
rities with the power to refuse permission on the basis of price, 
restrictive conditions, local availability of comparable knowledge, 
and economic value to the country. If foreign investments are, in 
any case, subject to government approval, as in most cases they are, 
this further step adds a further dimension to this screening process 
(while it adds to the number of cases which require approval) • 
These procedures have recently been introduced in Mexico and the 
Andean Pact and seem likely to be introduced in more and more coun-
tries . 71 The criteria for assessing the suitability of the imported 
technology to local requirements are not yet as well developed as 
are those for assessing the terms of these contracts . In India, 
for example , ih assessing the terms of foreign collaboration agree-
ments, "No consideration is ordinarily given to ••• whether the parti-
70 . Cooper, 1973, pp . 300- 301 . 
71 . They are even expected by many in " liberal" Canada , and expec-
tation which, I am told , has led to brisk business for patent 
lawyers and similar experts there in recent months . 
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cular technology sought to be imported is the most suitable to our 
requirements" . 72 Clearly there would be a great deal to be gained 
through cooperation and exchange of information by the authorities 
entrusted with such screening responsibilities in the various coun-
tries of the less developed world, or in subregions thereof . 
Greater control can at the same time be exercised over the de-
gree of differentiation of locally produced goods . This objective 
can be achieved through industrial licensing which restricts the 
number of firms and the degree of differentiation in each product 
or industry . In some instances it may even be necessary to "turn 
back the clock , " as did Chile and Peru in reducing the number of 
automobile firms already in operation . Where such licensing can 
be controlled jointly by cooperating governments within the frame-
work of economic integration agreements, they will presumably be 
particularly useful . 
It may be politically very difficult to license only a few firms 
for domestic production even where local markets are quite clearly 
too small for the full range of differentiated products all to be 
produced with reasonable efficiency. Consider this Indonesian com-
plaint : " .. a concession to one company often invites protest, some-
times even diplomatic moves , from the other parties ... . • for a coun-
try . . • dependent •.. upon the goodwill of a number of donor countries 
. .• •. Even with a possible loss of efficiency, an open door policy 
is the only alternative . The result may be: a score of automobile 
assembly plants , fifteen pharmaceuticjl formulation plants, four 
condensed milk plants .. . .. and so on.7 
Moreover, the control of imported consumption technology may be 
a good deal more difficult and controversial than the vetting of 
imported production technology . It may be that simply seekinq to 
extend the consumption technology is the most that can be achieved . 
Can a relatively simple consumption technology be retained as 
development proceeds? As Lancaster has himself pointed out, the 
Soviet Union offers an example of an economy in which complex pro-
duction technology coex i sts with telatively simple consumption tech-
nology coexists with relatively simple consumption technology . 74 
Perhaps more to the point , can a relatively simple consumption tech-
nology offer social and economic advantages - in terms of social 
savings or improved distribution - without a concomitant alteration 
in the pattern of income distribution? It may be thought that if 
there e x isted effective demand for simple products they would al-
ready have been designed and marketed; that, in the absence of in-
creased income for the potent i al purchasers new consumption techno-
logies will be fruitless because there is insufficient effective de-
mand for the purchase of al t e r nat i ve products which mi ght i ncorpo -
rate them . It will no doubt i mmediately be r ecogni zed that whateve r 
merits this a r gument po s sesses it relates only t o that portion of 
consumption which is acquired upon markets and not t o the public 
sector's share . The state can, by itself, e xert considerable i n -
fluence upon the aggregate composition of demand even in relatively 
market-oriented economies . As far as the market is concerned, whe-
ther effective demand exists cannot really be established befo~e 
the relevant products are offered . 
What ~ be firmly stated is that: 
1) the offering of new products which offer more of the essen-
72 . Frankena , 1974 , p . 258 . 
73 . Sadli, 1972, p . 223 . 
74. Lancaster, May 1966, p . 15. 
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tial characteristics per dollar spent, and offer them in 
smaller units, is bound to increase the opportunities open 
to the poorer members of the world's population and thus to 
improve their welfare; this is quite regardless of whether 
the existing range of products available remains. Extension 
of the consumption technology rather than its transformation 
is sufficient to improve distributional welfare. 
2) there exists a bias in the consumption technology offered by 
the multinational corporation which derives from the location 
of its principal markets and its low marginal cost for fur-
ther exploitation of its existing stock of such technology; 
moreover, there is a bias in its research and the resulting 
change in consumption technology in the direction of more in-
essentials and product differentiation . 
Thus policy in the less developed country should be directed to-
ward the control or at least extension of consumption technology. 
Measures to extend consumption technology are obviously likely to 
be far more politically palatable than are more far-reaching mea-
sures to change the distribution of income, wealth and power . 
No doubt one of the most difficult areas with which to grapple 
is the influence which multinational firms exert upon the policy de-
cisions of governments in less developed host countries. They may 
seek directly or indirectly to influence the overall strategy of 
development and/or its detailed implementation through policies on 
taxes, tariffs, licencing and government expenditures. Evidence of 
such influence is not always easy to come by, but among the instru-
ments for its exertion have been threats, missions, bribery, diplo-
matic pressure and subversion as well as more subtle and indirect 
ones. No discussion of the role of multinational corporations in 
technology transger to the less developed countries would be com-
plete without reference to their potential influence upon technology 
policy formation there. Beyond this it is difficult to be very pre-
cise . 
In any control scheme, whether of technology imports or of pro-
duction itself, there exists potential for improper influence, cor-
ruption and abuse. There may also exist limited expertise and ad-
ministrative capacity for the efficient running of such systems. 
Where, however, "the discipline of the marketplace" is in any case, 
not working properly because of heavy rates of protection, where 
"improper" influences may well already have been exerted on behalf 
of the present inefficient structure of production, where the social 
costs of the present structure have been demonstrated to be consi-
derable, and where the necessary skills for government administra-
tion are increaslingly available, these traditional arguments against 
government import controls and industrial licencing schemes look 
less persuasive than they used to. 
There does seem to be visible progress toward an alternative and 
controlled structure of demand for technology in the less developed 
world which may be no less significant for the pattern of future in-
ternational (technology) trade than the conscious alteration of the 
pattern of imports of commodities was in a previous generation. Im-
port substitution in the field of technology trade will not, however, 
take the form of mere replication of formerly imported technology. 
What is, above all, being sought is an alternative technology, which 
is , to a large extent, not yet in existence. 
The Development of More Appropriate Technologies 
What is the future role of multinational corporations in the 
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development and transfer of more appropriate production and consump-
tion technologies . To write it off on the basis of the relatively 
limited such role which they have played in the past75 is to adopt 
much too static a worldview and to close one ' s eyes to a number of 
recent developments, notably in the field of manufacturing for ex-
port, in which these firms are already very much involved. 
Instead one must ask why the multinational firms have not been 
more engaged in the creation and transfer of more appropriate tech-
nologies in the past . Much of the explanaiton rests on fairly con-
ventional analysis of incentive structures . Among the major factors 
operating, some of which have already been mentioned, were and are 
the following:76 
1) private risks (particularly "political" ones) exceed the so-
cial risks, 
2) unskilled- labour intensive technologies, particularly those 
suitable for smaller scales of operation and simple consump-
tion technologies are likely to be relatively easy to imitate 
so that technological monopoly will not last as long, 
3) incentive structures in the less developed countries them-
selves do not favour such technologies, 
4) the firms have vested interests in (competing) technologies 
already available at very low marginal cost, 
5) the total markets for such appropriate technologies in terms 
of effective demand are still small and growing at slower 
rates than the markets to which they are more accustomed to 
gearing their products . 
Some of these factors may be influenced by policy makers in rich 
nations and poor through the provision of general incentives for 
innovation and the manipulation of the price structure so as to in-
fluence the direction of innovative effort . 
Given sufficient incentives, there are good reasons for believ-
ing that multinational firms will become significant suppliers of 
more appropriate production technologies and products. (This is 
not meant to underplay the likely political resistance on the part 
of some firms to any attempt radically to restructure incentives or 
encourage competitive new techniques which may prejudice the returns 
they are already earning under the present dispensation) . They are, 
after all, in by far the best short-run position to supply them. 
They have the managerial and organisational capacity , the capital, 
the research and development skills and the range of experience to 
respond to new market opportunities relatively quickly. 
This is true both of adaptations in existing production processes 
and products and of the development of totally new ones . As far as 
the former are concerned, design alternations and adaptations are 
more costly smaller scales of operation; multinational firms will 
highly specialized and large-scale operations can rapidly and fre-
quently alter product and component specifications in a way that is 
far more difficult, because more costly, for a relatively small firm 
in a less developed country once its capital has been "congealed" 
in its original plant . 77 The multinational firm can therefore both 
keep on the "technological frontier" and respond to new incentives 
with greater ease than can the firm in the less developed country. 
75. As for instance Mahbub Haq does, Haq, 1973 , p . 135 . 
76. Many of these explanations are those offered by Streeten, 1973, 
p. 10 . 
77. Frankena, 1974, p.259 . 
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Moreover, multinational firms are quite likely to control the use 
of such adaptive technologies in world-wide use, even when they 
have not themselves developed them. Contractual stipulations to the 
effect that local adaptations of licenced technology belong to the 
licensor rather than the licensee, while illegal in many developed 
countries, are frequent in technology agreements in less developed 
countries.78 (Apart from their evident cost and inequity, such 
provisions constitute an important disincentive to technological 
initiatives on the part of licensees). 
As far as wholly new products and processes are concerned the 
combined efforts of governments, international agencies, research 
institutes and private firms and individuals in the less developed 
world are unlikely to be able to match the multinational firms in 
effective research activity in the industrial sector for some de-
cades; so much the more will this be the case if these efforts are 
often not politically supported in the less developed world. 
The prospect of multinational corporate activity in the "new" 
and "appropriate " technology sector may be significantly affected 
by the technology policies of the governments of the less developed 
world, a point which seems to have been overlooked in previous dis-
cussions. In discussions of the benefits and costs of the patent 
system and adherence to the Paris covention in the less developed 
countries, for example, this possibility is ignored. It is usual to 
argue, with Harry Johnson, that "the contribution that the opportu-
nity to earn a profit in their markets makes to the encouragement 
of investment in the creation of new commercial knowledge is negli-
gible , 1179 and therefore that the less developed countries derive 
no gains from their continued adherence to the convention that mono-
poly rights to technology be recognized and paid for. But is this 
not too aggregative a view? Is it true for particular technologies 
of interest to the less developed world and the specialised firms 
which might cater to them? A distinction must surely be made be-
tween those technologies, the development of which would otherwise 
receive no encouragement, and those for which there are already ade-
quate developmental incentives in the developed countries . The 
policy solution would seem to lie in the abrogation of payments by 
the less developed countries for the latter type and increased in-
centives, jointly offered by the countries of the Third World if 
possible, for the former. 
Notice that if there are particular technologies sought, it is 
they that need particular support. The concerns expressed in many 
discussions of suitable technology policies and incentives have more 
to do with the choice between national innovators and foreign ones 
than with that between appropriate and inappropriate technologies. 
It is usually natively assumed that innovations by foreigners are 
likely to be inappropriate, whereas those by nationals will be ap-
propriate. 
In fact, foreign innovators can be a major source of research, 
development and innovation in the "new" technology sectors. In con-
sidering whether to offer patent and other protections for innova-
tions in their own economies, the less developed countries must con-
sider the implications for "desirable" R & D activities carried out 
under the auspices of foreign corporations. Markets for these tech-
nologies and products are to be found c;mly in the less developed 
countries themselves; thus their decisions, as they affect the in-
centives for this kind of research activity , are critical to for-
78. Sercovich, 197~; UNCTAD, 1972. 
79. Johnson, 1970, p .4 0 . 
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eigners ' behaviour . (Of course, it is possible for small l e s s deve-
loped countr i es to benefit from the innovations which a r e the p r o -
duct of others ' incentive systems . Li ke so many of these a rguments, 
however , this one is sub j ect to the fallacy of composition ; i f al l 
the less developed countr ies wi th this option pursued i t , it wo uld 
no longer be one) . 
One would expect a variety of new and smaller firms to arise in 
response to these new market opportunities . While the bulk of re-
search and development expenditure in developed countri es has been 
found by Schmookler and others to be undertaken in large firms , 80 
it does not follow that the research likely to be of greatest use-
fulness to less developed countries need be similarly concentrated 
there . Indeed there are some reasons for suspecting that smaller 
firms in the developed countries might be considerably more impor t -
ant in this range of the technology shelf than in that 98% of it 
which , according to the much-cited Sussex estimate , is geared to 
the needs of the developed countries . Small firms in such sectors 
as automobile parts and semiconductors are already earning consider-
able royalties from less developed countries on technology account .B l 
The types of research and development expenditure which are l ike -
ly to generate more "appropriate " production and consumption techno-
logies for use in low-income countries are notably not those in 
which scale economies and large inputs of capital are required . 
Rather, they are likely to depend upon skills and experience; they 
can therefore emanate from relatively small multinational firms 
specializing in this type of innovation . Smaller firms have been 
quite successful in generating new technologies in some sectors in 
the past. Large firms, after all, often tend to be overcautious , 
retain vested interests in older technologies, discourage creative 
endeavours through their team emphasis, and have ineffective commu-
nication and incentive systems; all of these factors can inhibit in-
novation and offset such scale economies as they may enjoy . Imita-
tion in new industries - the development of superior variants of 
the product or process - can frequently be managed by even the small-
est firms employing only "a few capable scientists and engineers , "82 
as in the case of the semiconductor industry . 
From the less developed countries ' viewpoint, the small size of 
a foreign technology owner is advantageous since it increases their 
relative bargaining s t rength and the likelihood that an agreementt 
can be struck at favourable terms . Small firms, for instance , have 
been found more frequently to participate in joint ventures than 
large firms , no doubt because of their more limited resources . (Ser-
covich ' s ultimate defens e of the patent system in the less develop-
ed countries rests on its pec uliar advantages to smaller fi r ms , 
which may have no other b ases for market strength, as have large ones , 
arrl which can make better part ner s for the l ess developed countries)8~ 
I f there are sufficient incentives offered , there i s no r eason 
wh y t h e multinational firms, including some newer and s ma l ler ones , 
shoul d not begin to create and d iffuse new and more appropriate pro-
duction and consumption t e chnology for use in the less developed 
c ountrie s . In the future, Baranson, for example sees these firms 
wi t h "greater emphasis on the expansion of employment opportunities 
thro ugh p roduction for world markets, more purposeful efforts to a-
d a pt production techniques in labor- surplus economies, and more in-
t ensive ef forts to rede sign industrial products for consumption by 
80 . Schrnookler, 19 66 . 
81 . Sercovich , 1973 ; Chang , 1971. 
82 . Mueller and Ti l ton , 196 9, p . 575 . 
83 . Sercovich , 1973 . 
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low-income groups.84 
The less developed countries are therefore faced with a dilemma . 
Should they offer incentives to foreign research and development 
activities of the type in which they are interested, or legally re-
quire local research expenditures, in the full knowledge that when 
successful, ownership of these technologies will rest with foreign 
corporations which will then control their pricing and use? If for-
eign corporations are truly the most likely to develop such new 
technologies quickly, the alternative must be to wait with their 
development until indigenous capacity (and political will) has 
developed to the point where the R & D can be undertaken by na-
tionals . Perhaps indigenous capacity would expand more quickly 
if the multinational firms did not compete for the available skill-
ed manpower and use it in their own more narrowly defined interest. 
The benefits of speed , probably lower risk and possibly even lower 
cost have to be weighed against the foregone domestic learning op-
oportuni ties and longer-term effects from having indigenous re-
search capacity and locally owned technology. How the balance is 
struck will depend upon the particular circumstances of the count-
ry in question . 
Whether more suitable technologies are developed for use in less 
developed countries by the less developed countries themselves will 
be heavily dependent upon government educational and other policies 
pursued there . In India, for example, it seems that domestic R & D 
has been discouraged by an inappropriate price structure and licens-
ing system.BS What little "indigenous design" there has been in 
the relatively advanced Indian machinery sector has primarily involv-
ed the replication of previsously imported items (some of them, ad-
mittedly, no longer obtainable abroad) or only the simplest of pro-
ducts.86 · · 
While there can be agreement that the development of local tech-
nical expertise through formal and informal educational efforts, 
some of them conducted or financed by the multinational firms them-
selves, is absolutely necessary if an independent inventive and in-
novative capacity or even the capacity effectively to absorb exist-
ing foreign technology is to be achieved, one must also recognize 
the dangers of offering inappropriate training and experience. The 
technological biasses found in the typical European or North Ameri-
can technical school , university or industrial establishment when 
transferred without adaptation to students , trainees and the very 
educational institutions of the less developed countries, can do far 
more lasting damage than the uncritical transfer of the technologies 
themselves . There can be little doubt that a good deal of the re-
quisite technological learning will best take place through indige-
nous adaptations and experimentation . 87 As Vaitsos has noted, sup-
port for technological "learning" by indigenous firms is legitimate-
ly based on the infant industry argument; protection for multination-
al firms starting up in a less developed country is not.88 
84. Baranson, 1973, p.18 . See also United States, National Acade-
my of Sciences, 1973 . 
85 . Frankena, 1974 . 
86 . Frankena, 1974, p.256. Pack and Todaro sug~est that the repli-
cation of vintage equipment no longer available on world mar-
kets may be an important function of an indigenous capital-
goods industry . Pack and Todaro, 1969 . 
87. Ranis, 1972, p.34 . 
88. Vaitsos , 1973. 
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The Political Demand for Appropriate Technology 
How likely is it that the governments of the less developed coun-
tries will adopt the kind of technology policies which seem to be 
necessary? The political economy of technology policy , to which 
Cooper addressed himself, suggests - although he did not himself 
make this point - that such policies are more likely with respect 
to some types of economic activity than others . 
Powerful interests, not necessarily including the multinational 
firms, could be e xpected to oppose a shift in the orientation of 
domestic consumption technology towards essential product character-
istics and away from luxury and internationally branded ones . (The 
much-cited example of the G.M . and Ford Asian cars do not alter 
this arguments;they involve fairly marginal alterations in the 
means of supplying the demand for transportation) . 89 Extension of 
the range of available products in the essential-intensive direc-
tion is probably the most one can realistically hope for . 
Such interests are also likely to look with some disfavour upon 
a restructuring of incentives which favours labour-intensive produc-
tion for domestic markets at the expense of the established capital-
intensive technology, or expanded state demand for more "appropriate " 
products or processes . Particularly might this be so if it seemed 
likely to generate a more inward-oriented (non-tradeable) output 
mix as some suggest it would.90 
The creation of special such incentives for multinational and 
domestic investors proposing to engage in new manufacturing for ex-
port, however, creates no such opposition from any quarter. As far 
as production for export is concerned, the "~ppropriateness" of the 
product is economically and politically irrelevant. Since the ulti-
mate buyer is a foreigner, it matters not how exorbitant or scanda-
lously luxurious the taste to which one is catering. Production of 
wigs, meerschaum pipes or exotic perfumes are all undertaken for the 
purpose of earning income and foreign exchange, not for their in-
herent worth or appropriateness to local society. Such articles 
can be produced for export in an egalitarian socialist state or a 
thoroughly capitalistic one in which the distribution of wealth and 
income is highly skewed . Indeed a shift in the complexion or the 
political objectives of the government of a less developed country 
which already possesses a luxury-goods industry catering to domestic 
demand might simply lead to the redirection of its production into 
export markets . In the case of intermediate products or components , 
the "appropriateness" of which are difficult even to conceptualize, 
when they are produced exclusively for export , the technology of 
consumption is also irrelevant. While, as has been seen, there is 
something in Frances Stewart ' s declaration that "it is inappropriate 
for developing countries to consume those goods that developed coun-
tries produce, 11 91 the further tenet that it is "inappropriate for 
developing countries to produce those goods that developed countries 
consume" is illogical and confining since it forecloses the possibi-
lity of developing exports of whatever kind from the poor countries 
89 . The automobiles to be produced for the Asian market were still 
to be very highly priced . Far Eastern Economist , Sept . 30-0ct. 
7, 1972. 
90 . Diaz-Alejandro, 1973 . "The difference in labour use per unit 
of output between non-tradeable (home) goods and all tradeable 
goods is likely, in fact, to be greater than such difference 
between the import-substituting and export sectors", p.21. 
See also Haq, 1973 . 
91 . Stewart, 1973; and reported in Streeten, 1973 . 
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to the rich . 92 
In the light of these possible political influences upon govern-
mental technology policies in the less developed countries, it is 
easier to forecast the development of more appropriate production 
technologies , and the continuing or expanded role of the multina-
tional firm in their sale , in the manufactured export sector than 
in other parts of the Third World's industrial sector; and, riskiest 
of all to foresee change in consumption technology through the agen-
cy of the multinational corporati ons . All these things may never-
theless come to pass , particularly if sufficiently stimulated by 
the World Bank, developed country governments and others in both rich 
countries and poor who are "sufficiently concerend about· · social ten-
sion , 1193 and Baranson may yet prove correct. In the meantime, how-
ever, it would seem to make more sense to be sure we understand the 
full implications of labour-intensive technology transfers by multi-
national corporations for use in manufacturing for export from the 
less developed countries . 
APPEND IX ON THE THEORY OF CONSUMPTION TECHNOLOGY 
Let us consider a simple two-characteristic example: a consumer 
whose preferences are expressed in terms of only two characteristics 
- "washing quality" and "attractive packaging", and who can choose 
among four types of soap which incorporate these characteristics 
and are priced as follows: 
SoaE A Soa,e B SoaE C SoaE D 
Washing quality per lb . 10 units 10 units 10 units 10 units 
Packaging per lb. 3 units 2 units 1 unit 0 units 
Price per lb . 20 cents 15 cents 15 cents 12 cents 
Washing quality per cent 1/2 unit 2/3 unit 2/3 unit 5/6 unit 
Packaging per cent 3/20 unit 2/15 unit 1/15 unit 0 unit 
Following Lancaster, one can portray the available consumption 
technology by locating the available products in characteristics-: 
space . The rays OA, OB, OC, OD in Figure 1 indicate the proportions 
in which the two characteristics can be obtained through the pur-
chase of each of the goods A, B, C, D. The point A indicates that for 
a cent expended one can acquire 1/2 unit of washing quality and 
92. It might be argued that the production of luxury articles or 
components of articles which are themselves unknown and unseen 
may be peculiarly alienating in a low-income economy . Such 
alienation as may be found in such circumstances is more like-
ly to be affected , however, by the circumstances of the work-
place, in particular the factory situation, than in the chara-
cteristics of the product . The products of plantations, mines 
or even peasant agriculture , let alone those of such more mod-
ern industries as tourism, are not obviously any less alienat-
ing than those of the manufacturer for foreign markets . 
93. Cooper, 1973, pp . 300-301. 
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3/20 of a unit of packaging . One can obtain any desired combination 
of the two characteristics by varying the proportions in which one 
purchases goods with the money to be spent . These possibility are 
depicted by the lines joining the various product points . Product 
B clearly dominates product C since one can acquire the same quanti -
ty of washing with a little more packaging (assuming that packagi ng 
carries positive value) ; the efficiency frontier is therefore giv-
Washing Quality Per Cent 
I 
2/3 
1/2 
1/4 
0 
1/15 
FIGURE 1 
2/15 3/20 
Packaging 
Per Cent 
en by the line ABD . Where the individual consumer settles will de-
pend upon his characteristic preferences, which can be depicted, in 
terms of conventional micro-economic theory, by a characteristics 
indifference map . He will attain his highest possible indifference 
curve at E, the point of tangency between the consumption efficiency 
frontier and the indifference curve II . It should , however, be ap-
parent that another consumer with a different set of characteristic 
preferences (and these preferences are bound to be related to his 
level of income), as shown by indifference curve II', might find he 
maximizes his welfare at a different point on the efficiency front-
ier, say F, which is clearly inferior to the point E when viewed 
from the first consumer ' s perspective; equally, for the second con-
sumer point E is inferior to point F . 
Consumers may consume inefficiently, i . e . , inside the frontier , 
in consequence of imperfect information, managerial incapacity, and 
so forth but neither the market mechanism nor any other force im-
parts any particular discipline upon them (as in the case of produc-
tion inefficiency) to improve their ways - except perhaps in the ex-
treme case in which the lower level of welfare resulting produces 
starvation . Indeed very little information seems to be available 
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as to the efficiency with which consumers actually spend in the pur-
suit of their preferred characteristics . The literature of agricul-
tural economics suggests that smallholders in poor countries are ty-
pically quite efficient producers, using inputs rationally in the 
pursuit of their objectives of high return and low risk; they are 
believed to do less well where the available technology is rapidly 
changing since there has not been time for the necessary experimen-
tation to have generated results . As far as consumption is concern-
ed, casual empiricism suggests that efficiency may not be so high; 
in any case, it is safe to assume that rapid changes in consumption 
technology will generate inefficiencies in consumption to the same 
extent that those in production do so in that sphere . 
Technical change in the sphere of consumption consists of the ap-
pearance of new products and/or the disappearance of old ones, and 
the consequent shifting in the consumption efficiency frontier. 
Where preferences differ, the desirability of any particular change 
in consumption technology will vary with individuals . Consider the 
two consumers, whose tastes are represented by the indifference cur-
ves II and II', which both stand for a whole (homothetic with res-
pect to the origin) map of such curves . The first consumer values 
washing quality relative to attractive packaging to a greater extent 
than the second consumer . Extending the frontier "northward" will 
clearly be of greater value to the first consumer; extending it 
"eastward" will be of greater value to the second. As long as the 
original collection of goods available is still intact (at the same 
price as before) , the appearance of new products which dominate those 
on the present frontier will improve overall welfare according to 
the Pareto criterion . Where, however, the appearance of new pro-
ducts is accompanied by the disappearance of old or by increases in 
their price, this statement can no longer be made. (Lancaster, May 
1966, p . 22) (Pareto-welfare criteria are, in any case, not so use-
ful in societies where the equity of income shares are of p~ime con-
cern. The conventional wisdom in the less developed countries, and 
perhaps in many developed countries as well, seems by now to have 
led us (certainly it has led Mr. McNamara!) to the point where Pereto 
criteria must be rejected as a guide to social welfare gains) . 
Let us now alter the characteristics in our example, to make the 
relevance of this discussion of consumption technology still more 
apparent. Let us portray "essentials" on one axis and "luxury ele-
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FIGURE 3 
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ments" on the other, where essehtials are defined as those for which 
there exists a zero or very low income-elasticity of demand, and 
luxury characteristics those in which there exists significant such 
income-elasticity. (One could readily enough alter the definition 
to suit the preferences of the planner , if one chose, so as to in-
corporate such "good" character1-stics as protein in foodstuffs as 
"essentials", or such "bad" ones as addictive quality in "luxuries " , 
regardless of the observed income-elasticity of demand for these 
characteristics). It will immediately be apparent that there may be 
powerful distributional (and therefore social welfare) effects ema-
nating from changes in consumption technology . 
Figures 2 to 4 portray changes in consumption technology in terms 
of "essential" and "luxury" charactristics of a set of products, all 
of which alter income distribution to the disadvantage of the poor . 
The indifference curves II and II' depict the tastes of the typical 
poor person and the typical rich person respectively . Products D, 
B and A constitute the original consumption technology, to which is 
now added product G. 
In diagram 2, the disappearance of good D or B, with the introduc-
tion of a new product G, lowers that part of the efficiency frontier 
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which is relevant to the poor and absolutely lowers their welfare. 
In diagram 3, the impact of the new product is such as to raise the 
price of the old since it has captured some of the market and low-
ered the scale at which the original product is produced, thereby 
raising its cost. Again, the effect of the shift in the consump-
tion efficiency frontier is absolutely to lower the welfare of the 
poor. In diagram 4, all of the gains from the appearance of new 
products accrue to the rich and the losses to the poor are only 
those of relative deprivation - reduction in income share. 
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COMMENT ON HELL EINER'S PAPER - GUSTAV RA NIS 
In assessing studies on the pros and cons of the MNC with respect 
to technology transfer and adaptation there has been a failure to 
take into account differing environmental conditions in evidence in 
each case. It seems to me that " good behavior" , from the point of 
view of appropriate technology and output mixes, is highly correlat-
ed with more competitive environments which force the abandonment of 
the " quiet life" ; on the other hand, when, due to p r otection etc ., 
large windfall profits are available to MNC ' s - as well as to the 
large domestic firms - both output mixes and technology chi ces are 
almost certain to be inappropriate . Companies which can make 30%-
50% profits regardless of their adaptability to local conditions a r e 
unlikely to "watch around" for possible innovative departures . 
If we are dissatisfied with the inward-looking and capital-inten-
sive structure of MNC's , and of the industrial sector generally , we 
have a choice of getting the state to intervene directly by pressing 
the companies to export more, change their technologies , and change 
their output mixes - or to move gradually towards a lower level of 
protection resulting in a reduction of windfall profits and the en-
forced search for more appropriate technology and output mix choice . 
The first alternative leaves the temperature in the industr ial hot-
house basically unaffected and tells the MNC , e . g . in automobiles , 
to e xport more - in exchange for which they are permitted to keep 
making unearned profits i n the protected domestic market . I n this 
way better export performance, it is claimed , can be assured , as well 
as changes in technology and output mix . But there are two problems 
with this approach - one , exports are "pushed out" , via subsidiza-
tion , giving the company its " required" profits and the balance of 
payments its " required" exports, but possibly at a large cost to the 
economy since it may have been accomplished by the expansion of a 
highly inefficient industry even with negative value added at inter-
national pri ces . Such "crimes " can be committed in the cause of ex-
port promotion, i . e . the artificial expansion of capital - intens i ve 
and inefficient industries directed towards exports , just as well as 
in the name of import substitution . This, for example , has been 
happening in South Korea in recent years . Secondly , and related , 
this alternative takes for granted the capacity of government offi-
cials , sitting around a table - and given the best intentions - to 
determine just what technologies , output mi xes, export patterns etc . 
should be established . More than likely, the decisions and outcomes 
will be quite arbitrary , and the determination as to wh ich MNC ' s to 
pressure and to do precisely what left to negot i ation . 
The second al t ern ative is to gradually reduce the protecti ve cover 
surrounding the i ndustr i al sect or , while at the same time making the 
(reduced) levels o f protection more even- handed as between import 
subs t itu t i on and e xport activitie s. Such g r adual withdrawal of pro-
t ection wo u ld force i ndus tria lists t o take ou t paper a nd penc i l a nd 
a d just their output and t e chno l ogy choicesin or der t o sur vive . Con~ 
sequently there wou ld resu l t a r e stricting of output i n d ire ctions 
mo re a nd mo r e in k e eping with the country ' s r e s our ces, a nd leading 
to a sub sta ntia l natural expansion of labo ur intensiv e indus tria l 
exports competitive in international markets . This seco nd approach 
needs to rely less heavily on specific or direct g overnment a ctio n 
and proddings , but very much on government ' s general ability a nd 
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willingness to evolve an indirect strategy of gradually reducing 
levels of protection and monopoly power while providing adjustment 
assistance to severely affected firms and workers in the old import 
substituting industries . 
With respect to Professor Helleiner's discussion of "consumption 
technology", I am very much in sympathy with the thrust of his paper 
here but am a bit concerned as to where "induced tastes" (via adver-
tising etc . ) end and where adaptive goods begin . After all, we can 
readily agree with the social waste implied by advertising but there 
remains a very touchy point concerning "utility and all . that . " For 
example, one would hate, even if one could, to tell an LDC ' s popula-
tion that it "should" produce only one kind of a shirt (as the Soviet 
Union used to) or that an open- toed sandal is "better" than Western-
type shoe . One should rather, it seems to me , concentrate on making 
sure that full information on all alternatives is . available and that 
there is sufficient workable competition so that advertising is 
"naturally" reduced and relative prices (of shoes and sandals) more 
nearly reflect relative costs . 
6 
IMPORT OF CAPITAL GOODS 
KRISHNA D. N. SINGH 
A significant feature in the balance of trade of a number of 
countries today is the volume of imports of capital goods i n cer-
tain countries and corr espondingly , the quantum of exports of such 
machinery and equipment by other s . Capital or producer goods , in 
this context may be deemed to cover mechanical (non-electrical) , 
electrical and transport equipment , together with the principal 
components and parts thereof , which are utilised as machinery and 
equipment in various production and manufacturing sectors . 
2 . The production of fabricated metal products, machinery and 
equipment registered a shar p increase in the 1960s . In the deve-
loped economies , production in this category (ISIC 38) rose from 
$134 . 6 billion in 1960s to $291 billion in 1970 while in the deve-
oping countries, production rose from $3 . 8 billion to $9 . 6 billion , 
the latter figure, however still constituting only 3 . 2 percent . 
The volume of trade in machinery and transport equipment (SITC com-
modity group 7) also rose rapidly in these years and total expor ts 
of such equipment increased from $27 . 7 billion in 1963 to $89 . 6 
billion in 1970.1) Almost the entire volume of such exports during 
1960-9 was from developed countries , with over 85 percent from the 
developed market economies , about 13 percent from centrally- planned 
economies, and only about 1 percent from developing countries . 2) 
In quantitative terms , out of a total trade of $89 . 6 billion in 
1970, exports of machinery from developed market economies were of 
the order t~ $78 . 5 billion , from centrally-planned economies $9 . 8 
billion and from developing countries $1 . 3 billion . While most of 
this trade was between developed countries (77 percent) , the volume 
of machinery exports to developing countries in quantitative terms 
rose from $8 . 02 billion in 1960 to $19 . 3 b illion in 1970 , constitut-
ing 33 . 4 percent of all imports by the developing countries in the 
latter year . With the increased tempo of industrialisation in this 
decade, there will be a further acceleration in demand for capital-
goods in developing countries . In this paper, it is sought to high-
light some of the significant trends and implications of such in-
creased demand and consequent increase in imports of machinery and 
equipment. 
l)U . N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics . Quoted in U. N. Industrial 
Development Surveys . (Volume I-V) Figures related to FOB exports . 
2)In this paper, the classification of developing countries , deve-
loped market economies and centrally- planned economies follows 
the classification of countries adopted in the U. N. Bulletin of 
Statistics and other U. N. publications . 
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3 . Apart from the direct impact on balance of payments, which 
is severe in the case of many developing countries facing acute 
foreign exchange constraints, the continuing dependence on capital 
goods imports by most developing countries has significant techno-
logical and socib-economic implications . The capital goods sector 
not only covers a very wide segment of manufacturing activity but 
is also indicative of significant stages in industrial growth . 
Such growth normally follows a fairly uniform pattern in relative-
ly free market economies, tending to concentrate initially on ma-
chinery repairs and production of non-durable consumer goods and 
simple machinery, components and spares, besides basic industrial 
raw materials and intermediate products, for which adequate inter-
nal demand is assured. The transition to the next stage viz that 
of production of more sophisticated machinery and components, for 
which there may be adequate internal demand and export prospects, 
is far more difficult and usually requires considerable effort and 
programming. Because of sophisticated technological requirements 
and the complex nature of production in the engineering goods in-
dustry and the heavy machine building sector in particular, the 
latter stage can get delayed indefinitely despite sufficient econo-
mic justification, if left to market forces alone . This may not 
of course have much immediate relevance in a number of developing 
economies, either because of size or level of development or speci-
fic factor endowments and circumstances. However, the problem does 
assume great significance in the case of number of countries in Asia , 
Africa and Latin America, which have growing internal markets of 
reasonable size and which are at various levels of industrialisa-
tion . In these countries it must be considered whether more deli-
berate efforts need to be made to channel investment resources to 
the machinery manufacturing sector. It may well be, as perhaps in 
the case of Brazil, that relatively little intervention by the 
State or institutional agencies may be called for, except in the 
form of promotional policies and incentives . Or, it may be neces-
sary, as in the case of India, to ensure that scarce resources are 
directed to priority sectors such as capital goods production in 
the form of direct investments through public sector projects for 
heavy mechanical and electrical equipment manufacture . In some 
countries, indirect measures and policies may suffice to correct 
any inbalances in the industrial growth pattern as may be necessary 
while, in others , more direct measures for resource mobilisation 
and channeling may be necessary. Irrespective, however, of the na-
ture and extent of policy and other measures, what is important is 
to assess industrial growth requirements and the prospects and pos-
sibilities of domestic capital goods production. 
4 . To assess the overallquantumof capital goods imports to deve-
loping countries, some order of-magnitude projections can be made 
of demand and anticipated imports. An indication of the projected 
requirements of capital goods in these countries can be obtained by 
projecting the increase in manufactured output to 1980 and thereaf -
ter applying a similar ratio between manufactured output and demand 
for machinery and equipment during previous years . While this is 
undoubtedly a simplistic approach and does not provide for a number 
of important variables such as the time lag in machinery installa-
tion and variations in the machinery-output relationship for differ-
ent sectors and levels of growth, it nevertheless enables a broad 
assessment of the magnitude of the problem . Manufactured output in 
developing countries is assessed to have increased from $26 . 9 bil-
lion in 1960 to $51 . 5 billion in 1970.3) On an assumed annual 
3)U.N . Industrial Development Survey (Volume V) . "Manufacture" in-
cludes industry groups listed in Major Division 3 of ISI classifi-
cation of all economic activities and includes both light and 
heavy manufacture . 
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growth rate of 10 percent, this figure would increase to $134 .4 
billion by 1980. The total demand for machinery and equipment, as 
represented by imports and domestic production in the machinery 
and metal fabrication sector rose from $11.82 billion in 1960 to 
$28.9 billion in 197o.4) If a similar relationship, as existed be-
tween total manufactured output and overall machinery demand in 
1970, is projected for the year 1980, the total requirements of 
machinery and equipment in that year would be of the order of $75 
billion. In terms of unit investment costs on machinery and equip-
ment as related to unit output value in 1970,the ratio works out at 
0 . 56, which has also been assumed for the year 1980.5) As for do-
mestic manufacture of machinery and equipment, the growth rate for 
the 1960-70 period was slightly less than 10 percent ($3.8 billion 
in 1960 to 9.6 billion in 1970) and assuming a somewhat higher 
growth rate of 11 percent for 1970-80, production by 1980 can be 
projected to reach $27.4 billion. This would still leave a balance 
of about $47.6 billion to be covered by imports from developed eco-
nomies unless domestic manufacture in developing nations can be sub-
stantially accelerated. Part of such imports may be covered by 
trade between developing countries but the overall shortfall would 
still continute to be of this order unless the assumptions are sub-
stantially modified. It must be added that since the projected 
figures are at constant prices, the actual import bill on this ac-
count would be much heavier and may well reach a level of over $70 
billion by 1980. This is likely to prove a staggering burden for 
the developing economies. While the growth rate for manufactured 
output is not likely to fall below 10 percent, the rate of 11 per 
cent for the machinery and metal fabrication sector may not be easy 
to achieve and to the extent of any shortfall, the import burden 
may increase still further. It is difficult to visualise the extent 
to which this growing import liability can be offset by increases 
in the volume and value of traditional commodity exports, with the 
notable exception of course of oil. It is, however, more likely 
that any increases in commodity export values will be more than 
compensated by increases in cost of industrial materials and equip-
ment, consequent on the rapid price escalation of oil and other 
energy sources. 
5. The impact and implications of projected machinery demand 
and imports has received considerable attention in many developing 
countries. Projections of such demand and imports, particularly in 
important sectors, were made for Brazil and some other Latin Ameri-
can countries, during the 1960's. In countries like India, where 
there has been a considerable degree of planning over the last two 
decades, fairly detailed projections are available on a continuing 
basis . Recently, a study undertaken in Mexico jointly by the UNIDO 
and Nacional Financiera, projected capital goods demand and imports 
(excluding the transport sector) for Mexico for the period 1976-1980 
1980.6) Sectoral studies have also been made in some other develop-
ing countries, but relatively few countries have made a comprehen-
sive analysis of the capital goods sector as a whole, in terms of 
overall machinery requirements over a period of time as related to 
possibilities of domestic manufacture. Such an analysis has to be 
on a continuing basis and undoubtedly requires a degree of sophisti-
cated planning but the prospects of rapidly increasing imports, both 
4)Domestic production refers to machinery and metal fabrication 
covered in ISI classification group 38. 
5)This ratio can be viewed in relation to the weighted average fig-
ure of 0.52 indicated in "Projection of demand for industrial 
equipment" an UN paper presented to the Meeting of Experts on 
Capital Goods organised by ECE in Geneve in February, 1962. 
6)Report of UNIDO-NAFINSA Group on Capital Goods Development--Mexi-
co (Phase I-B) UNIDO, 1973 unpublished. 
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of original equipment and components, spares and processed materi-
als necessita te such a study as an integral feature of industrial 
planning . The qualitative and quantitative implications would na-
turally vary from country t o country, depending both on demand and 
absorption rate for machine ry and equipment and on domestic invest-
ment programmes for the machine-building sector . The fact that ma-
chinery costs have increased considerably in recent years and are 
likely to increase even faster in the future is an additional fact-
or of importance. It is estimated that more than one-third of the 
increase in dollar expenditure of developing countries for capital-
goods between the latel950's and early 1960 ' s resulted from the 
rise in price of these goods . 7) From 1968 to 1972 the price rise 
has been even greater and has averaged 5-6 percent annually for a 
number of categories of equipment, followed by a probable rise of 
15 to 20 percent in 1973 alone, for certain types of equipment . 
6. Against the increased volume and cost of capital goods im-
ports, there has been a dramatic rise in machinery manufacture in 
some developing economies such as Brazil , India , Taiwan and the 
Republic of Korea, while a number of machine-building projects hav e 
been implemented or are under implementation in other countries in-
cluding Egypt, Pakistan, Thailand, Iran and the Philippines . The 
growth rate in respect of fabricated metal products , machinery and 
equipment was 9 . 2 percent during 1960-70 for developing countries 
as a whole . In some cases, as in Egypt and India, a relatively 
high growth rate was achieved through direct channeling of invest-
ment resources for this sector, through state-owned enterprises . 
In other cases, local factor advantages and circumstances have gene-
rated considerable inflow of private capital for machinery industri -
es, so as to meet rapidly growing internal demand as in Brazil or 
for exports as in the case of Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and the 
island economies of Hong Kong and Singapore . High labour costs i n 
Western countries and lately in Japan is resulting in increased 
movement of investible resources and technology to less developed 
regions, particularly in more labour-oriented branches, which could 
include production of wide ranges of parts and components for the 
machinery sector . In the larger developing countries the high de-
gree of protection, often in the form o f import controls and insist-
ence on partial domestic manufacture has also been an important con-
tributory factor to the growth of some capital goods industries , 
though such growth tends to be patchy where it is unrelated to a 
planned development programme for this sector . These trends will 
continue and, during the seventies, it can be reasonably expected 
that capital goods development will continue at least at its present 
pace and the growth rate may even be higher as emphasis on import 
substitution extends over an expanding demand base for machinery 
and equipment . The unplanned growth of this sector would , however, 
constitute only a partial answer and may give rise to other problems 
relating to productive effic i ency. 
7 . It must be recognised that the p r ocess of i mport substi tution 
in capital goods development, though f ai r l y succ e s s f ul in i ts e arly 
stages cannot, in most cases , be economically p ur sued beyond a poin t 
unless internal demand growth is high and sustained over a r e a s on-
able period of time or the possibilities of exports a re take n into 
account . Even when domestic markets are sizeable and gr owi ng r apid-
ly, other factors such as economies of scale , access to a nd a b s o r p-
tion of technological developments and innovation and productive ef -
ficiency in terms of international competitiveness over a period of 
time are vital determinants of the economic limitations o f import 
substitution. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled ov e r 
a period of time that machine building projects, whic h are init i at-
7)U . N. Industrial Development Survey (Vol.l) 
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ed as import-substitution schemes are able to deyelop into partly 
export-oriented projects . rnternal demand growth for specific cap-
ital goods subsectors is rar€ly sustained over an indefinitely long 
period and usually rises rapidly in the early and intermediate stag-
es of industrialisation and thereafter tends to stabilise at a low-
er level over a period of time . By this stage, domestic capital 
goods production must be able to compete effectively in internation-
al markets . Such competition is extremely keen as global manu-
facturing capacity in many machine-building subsectors, such as 
heavy electrical equipment, is often more than adequate. At the 
same time, the factor advantages in many developing countries , par-
ticularly cheap labour and sizeable internal markets, could enable 
their effective entry into this field, provided the criteria of ef-
ficiency and competitiveness over a period of time are recognised 
and fulfilled . 
8 . Any import substitution programme in this sector needs, there-
fore, to be carefully programmed. While an essential starting 
point is the projections of demand for various categories of machi-
nery and equipment over a 5 to 10 year period, the specific capital 
goods branches where domestic production can be efficiently under-
taken need to be carefully identified, together with the extent to 
which import substitution in terms of phased domestic integration 
may continue to be of comparative economic advantage. Indiscrimi-
nate efforts for import substitution in all branches or of all typ-
es of components in early production stages can have adverse reper-
cussions in the form of high manufacturing costs and productive in-
efficiency . This can be due to a combination of many factors . The 
growth of internal demand, together with initial export prospects 
may be quite inadequate for indigenous production on an economic 
scale, resulting in idle capacity . Or, the pressure for such sub-
stitution may lead to the import of obsolescent, second-hand plants , 
whose capacity is unrelated to local production requirements. The 
availability of indigenous technical skills may not be adequate for 
manufacture of sophisticated components without well- planned train-
ing programmes . In some cases, the related technology may not be 
appropriate or may incorporate undesirable and restrictive tie- in 
and other contractual provisions . The basic processed materials 
may not be available in many cases and may require backward linkag-
es to be planned simultaneously. To these factors, all of which 
may lead to higher production costs, must be added the policy impli-
cations of a higher degree of protection in the form of import con-
trols . Operating within protective import barriers, the cumulative 
effects of these factors are further accentuated because of lack of 
competition . These factors do not detract from the basic need for 
developing capital goods production; they only highlight the need 
for careful programming, so that such production can achieve econo-
mic and efficient levels and can stand the test of international 
competition within a reasonable period. 
9. Apart from the balance-of-payment implications of capital 
goods imports, the growth of the machine building sector needs to 
be viewed as an essential stage of industrial growth and technologi-
cal progress. Machinery imports directly serve as a training grownd 
for human resources in these countries and, from this viewpoint, 
constitute an important vehicle for technological trade. The tran-
sition from machine-operation skills to machine-building capability 
can be effectively bridged within a reasonable period, provided 
suitable technological assistance and systematic training is provid-
ed in the early stages . There are a number of instances of sophis-
ticated machinery products produced in developing countries compet-
ing in international markets within a few years of starting manufa-
cture. Significant examples are the exports of complete cement 
plants, heavy electrical equipment and 120 MW boilers from India 
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to other Asian countrie~; machine tool and heavy equipment exports 
from Brazil to other Latin American countries; flour milling equip-
ment from Mexico and certain categories of electrical and electro-
nic machinery and components from Taiwan , the Republic of Korea and 
Hong Kong to various countries . The actual period required to 
bridge the gap in manufacturing c a pability depends on various fact -
ors, among the most important of which is the nature of technology 
secured and the facilities for rapid absorption of such techniques . 
The international market for technology in the capital goods sector, 
though fairly limited, is not tightly knit, except in certain high-
ly sophisticated capital goods and developing countries have a de-
gree of choice in selection of appropriate manufacturing techniques 
in this sector. In India, for example, a number of heavy machine 
building projects are based on technology from the Soviet Union and 
other COMECON countries . Technological obsolescence also tends to 
be relatively slower in this sector than in many process industries , 
though acquisition of technology should be such as to enable con-
stant access to, and inflow of, latest technological developme nts . 
From this viewpoint, the "joint venture" concept represents the 
most appropriate corporate entity , as capital participation by tech-
nology suppliers would ensure both the effective transfer of techno-
logy, and the continuing access to technological innovations . These 
aspects can be provided through license agreements also, but are 
more difficult to ensure in fields involving complex manufacturing 
techniques . 
10 . It is necessary to consider capital goods production as be-
ing essential for the development of indigenous skills and the 
building up of skille d manpowe r resources in more sophisticated and 
precision manufacture. The r elatively higher application of the 
labour factor in machinery manufacture, as compared to sophisticat-
ed process technologies in other sectors, also results in greater 
employment opportunities, both directly and in the manufacture of 
sub-assemblies , components and spares . The manufacture of heavy 
machinery and equipment also brings, in its wake, considerable expan-
sion of the engineering goods s e ctor and can play a key role in the 
development of a wide range of metal fabricating industries . It 
can also serve as a base for absorption and future adaption of tech-
nology and production techniques in a number of production branches . 
The growth of technological service facilities such as detailed en-
gineering, which constitutes a major gap in many developing countri-
es would also receive a fillip with the expansion of the capital 
goods sector .· In fact, lack of emphasis on this sector can lead to 
a decline in technological deve lopment over a period of time , and 
under-utilisation of domestic facto r resources, particularly man-
power, apart from the fact that a very broad and diversified field 
of production may be left uncovered , 
11 . The determination of an appropriate pattern of capital goods 
development at a particular growth level, is however, a complex 
task and requires a comprehensive, selective and coordinated app-
roach. Since a large segment of the metal trans formation branches 
is covered by this sector, there is a very wide area to choose from, 
in the context of a country 's factor circumstances . It is obvious-
ly not possible to prescribe any uniform pattern for such sectorial 
growth in the developing economies. Conditions are divergent, both 
in terms of factor resources and levels of development, and program-
med growth of this sector must be considered in different stages, 
depending on such factor considerations . Initially, efforts have 
to be concentrated on the development of facilities for repairs of 
existing machinery and transport equipment, including automotive 
equipment. Together with repairs, the manufacture of simple spares 
and parts which require constant replacement can be undertaken ~ 
This stage has already been achieved in most developing regions . 
K.D . N. SINGH 127 
Mexico, for example, earns considerable foreign 7xchange in the re-
pair of machinery and manufacture of.si~ple ma~hine parts: Follow-
ing this initial development stage, 7t is ~os~ible t~ ~e~ineate a 
general process of evolution of machine- building facilities . The 
process can be hastened or retarded by a numi:er of.factors , among 
the most important of which is the proper orientation of government-
al policies towards imports of machinery on the ~ne.hand a~d.p:og­
rammed growth of efficient indigenous machine-building facilities 
on the other . 
12 . The capital goods sector can be considered under two princi-
pal categories ; mechanical , including transport , equi pment and ele-
ctrical equipment . Mechanical equipment covers a ver y wide range . 
In the early stages of development, simple machinery and equipment 
intended to produce consumer products of various types can be manu-
factured and thereafter more difficult items of fabrication and 
manufacture can be gradually introduced , constituting what may be 
termed "equipment of common use " the more important lines of which 
are as follows : 
(i) Castings , forgings , gears, standard parts, tools, etc . which 
can also be viewed as infrastructure industries for the growth 
of this sector _ 
(ii) Pumps, centrifuges and compressors 
(iii) Lifting, loading and conveying equipment 
(iv) Construction equipment 
(v) Machine tools, chip removing and chipless forming 
(vi) Diesel engines, industrial turbines, etc. 
(vii) Simple pressure vessels, process control equipment and other 
welded plate work and implements. 
Most of the above items of machinery are required for the growth 
of industrial and agricultural activity in any developing country, 
but there can be a large difference in the scope and range of pro-
ducts required at any particular stage. Broadly speaking, in the 
initial stages, only simple types of machine tools, small-size 
pumps, compressors, diesel engines are required and, in turn, the 
castings, forgings, gears and tools needed are also relatively un-
sophisticated. As the tempo of industrialisation grows, the larger 
and more difficult items and ranges can be taken up for manufacture. 
The production programme for more sophisticated machine tools and 
other machinery and equipment specifically required for various in-
dustries will, however, depend on the adoption of a coordinated 
programme of large-scale industrialisation covering specific indus-
tries such as iron and steel, cement, sugar and food processing, 
pulp and paper, petroleum and chemicals, mining and metallurgical 
industries, together with the development of the automotive and 
transport sector and transport facilities, including highway const-
ruction, railways and shipbuilding. The growth of the equipment in-
dustry will depend on the projected development plans for these and 
other sectors and any programming of machine- building manufacture 
must follow the programming of development of these branches toge-
ther with production sectors such as agriculture, public works, etc . 
besides a large range of consumer goods industries, all of which 
together determine the size of the domestic market for equipment . 
In developing countries , in which capital goods industries have de-
veloped considerably, the general pattern has been to start with 
"assembly" operations and gradually develop local production, both 
vertically in the same production unit or through backward linkages · 
with other producers of components and parts . In some cases, the 
linkage growth has been very satisfactory and a high degree of dome-
stic integration has been achi eved wi th major inputs being reason-
ably priced . In other cases , either there has not been any suit-
able development of linkage units or input costs have tended to be 
high for one or other of the reasons indicated earlier. 
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13 . As for electrical equipment, a high proportion is required 
by the electricity supply undertakings (possibly 70 to 80 percent 
in value) and the rest by industrial, commercial and domestic con-
sumers of electricity. The growth of this industry in many develop-
ing countries, appears to have taken place in three stages. In the 
first stage, electric supply has been derived from a number of local 
generating stations serving the distribution system in the nearby 
towns and villages and the demand for equipment is mostly for dist-
ribution lines and for small industrial and other consumers . The 
equipment needed comprise distribution transformers , poles, insula-
tors, conductors, switches , fuses, insulated wires, bulbs, and 
small and medium motors and starters for electric pumps , food- pro-
cessing equipment such as flour and oil mills , and small workshops . 
In the second stage , the source of power generation shifts to hydro-
electr i c sites and to large-size central thermal stations which are 
connected to load centers by l ong transmission lines . At the same 
time, industrial and commercial consumers take to more intensive 
power- consuming processes , using medium- size electric motors (say 
50-500 HP) for refrigeration , heating and other processes . The 
transmission line equipment includes medium-size power transformers 
(500-10 , 000 KVA), switchgear (11 to 33 KV), simple type power lines , 
cables, etc . The technical skills, investments and technological 
know- how required in the above two stages are not of a high order 
and many developing countries have reached this level with compara-
tive ease . Although most of the difficult items such as power gene-
ration equipment and sophisticated industrial drives are imported, 
considerable development has been achieved in producing most of the 
other equipment, together with durable electrical consumer goods . 
The third stage covers the manufacture of heavy equipment , such as 
power boilers, turbines , generators, transformers and circuit break-
ers for the increasingly large size of central power stations and 
the very high voltage grid systems . At the same time, electrical 
equipment required by large industries become increasingly sophisti -
cated such as motors in the range of 1,000- 10,000 HP with versatile 
process control equipment for steel , cement, paper, mining , metal-
lurgical , chemical and petroleum industries . The decis i on to set 
up manufacture of the above categories of equipment woul d naturally 
call for careful cons i deration of all related aspects , such as the 
size of the market (including export prospects), the level of tech-
nical skills, the availability of industrial raw materials , the 
availability and cost of capital, and the selection and acquisition 
of the most appropriate technology . The long-term success of these 
enterprises would depend upon the ability to master and absorb the 
technology in the shortest possible time and keep abreast of furth-
er improvements through adaptation and by research and development 
conducted by local scientific and technical manpower . 
14 . Both in respect of mechanical (including transport) and ele-
ctrical equipment, domestic equipment manufacture can adopt differ-
ent patterns, depending on the stage of growth . At each growth 
stage, it is possible to broadly define the principal production 
and technological gaps in the economy in respect of equipment re-
quirements. Once the sectoral production and technological gaps 
have been identified, some general criteria of selectivity can also 
be applied to determine the manufacturing potential of various capi-
tal goods products. These include considerations such as : (i) ma-
chinery items, including components and spares , which have a high 
labour content, (ii) products that can be produced with technologi-
cal efficiency at relatively small scales of produc t ion and which 
do not require sophisticated production lines , (ii i ) capital goods 
whose intermediate components are already produced or c an be manu-
factured on an economic scale and at reasonable cost, (iv) machinery 
items using raw materials produced in the country a t reasonable 
cost , (v) products having less likel ihood of rapid techno logical ob-
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solescence, (yi) products which have substantial export potential 
and (vii) certain capital goods items whose domestic production is 
considered essential for overall industrial growth . Consideration 
of the above aspects would be necessary both for export-oriented 
manufacture and production designed mainly to meet domestic requi-
rements, as the latter should also be developed primarily in re-
spect of items for which the country has a comparative advantage. 
At the same time, there may be certain producer goods items, the 
domestic manufacture of which may be considered necessary for rea-
sons of policy or for achieving a greater measure of domestic self-
suf f iciency in critical fields from a national angle. 
15. While the general criteria can serve as useful indicators, 
capital goods development has to be related to specific machinery 
products or groups of equipment . This presents a series of complex 
problems . Demand estimates for various categories of machinery 
based on growth projections of the principal machinery user sectors, 
are extremely difficult to project over a reasonably long period, 
in view of inadequate data. The application of growth models for 
the user sectors and value projections of the major machinery cate-
gories in each sector through the use of co-efficients of unit in-
vestment costs as related to unit value of output, yields useful 
results but needs to be constantly cross-checked in the light of 
actual experience . After initial identification of the groups and 
items of equipment which present scope for domestic manufacture, 
detailed pre-investment studies are necessary to determine the 
feasibility of any of the projects initially identified . Side by 
side, an active programme of investment promotion has to be under-
taken. Most capital goods manufacture involve sizeable capital 
outlay, together with long gestation periods, during which there is 
little return on capital, and private capital may initially be re-
luctant to invest in this sector in preference to consumer indust-
ries and other more lucrative and quick yielding investments. It 
is also necessary to overcome the initial reluctance of domestic 
user sectors, including governmental user agencies, to purchase in-
digenously-manufactured equipment, which would also probably be 
more expensive in the early years of manufacture. The development 
of suitable supply sources for key inputs such as processed material, 
components and parts may present serious problems. In early stages 
of domestic integration, the co-ordination of production comprising 
the import of certain components and parts with domestic manufactu-
re of others is extremely difficult. 
16. The above aspects necessitate a Fivotal role on the part of 
governmental authorities, both in the planning and in the implementa-
tion of any capital goods development programme . The complex nature 
of capital goods production, the longer gestation period that is in-
volved and the multifarious aspects that require continuing analy-
sis and co-ordination, warrant that the growth of this sector should 
not be left to market forces only . In most developing countries, 
governmental agencies do play a fairly active part in planning or 
co- ordination of industrial growth . This is all the more necessary 
in the case of the machine building sector and institutional agenci-
es for planning and financing need to be closely associated not only 
with the initial projections and identification of machinery pro-
ducts to be manufactured, but also with the successive stages of 
resource mobilization, selection of technology, determination of 
the levels and patterns of domestic integration, pricing of final 
products in relation to comparable imported products and the deve-
lopment of input industries. Various policy issues also need to 
be resolved such as sources and costs of capital facilities allowed 
for machinery imports, the degree of protection through import con-
trols or tariffs and the period of such protection, the incentives 
for export of machinery products, and the provision of technical 
education and manpower training facilities. Such policy aspects 
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need to be dovetailed to a much greater extent than in the case of 
other manufacturing sectors. Without effective planning and co-
ordination, there is likelihood that this sector would not only 
grow at a slow and inadequate pace but also in a haphazard manner, 
resulting in heavy import burdens and in adverse consequences for 
the economy. Balanced industrial growth necessitates the growth 
of machine-building industries in developing countries on a pattern 
which bears a close and consistent relationship with the overall 
industrial growth pattern of each country . While the imperatives 
of trade balances, foreign exchange and domestic resources, and spe-
cific factor endowment considerations would determine the specific 
relationship in each country , the significance of the capital goods 
sector needs to be fully recognized in planning and .co-ordinating 
future growth patterns. 
COMMENTS ON SINGH 1 S PAPER - NAK KWAN KIM 
Because of economic, technological and industrial backwardness, 
any effort to develop manufacturing industries in developing count-
ries often exerts pressures for importation of capital goods, most-
ly from developed economies. The magnitude and nature of sophisti-
cation of machinery and equipment which are to be imported will con-
tinue to be largely affected by its national industrial development 
strategy including export promotion and/or import substitution poli-
cies, the country's economic growth potential, industrial base al-
ready built and capability of producing quality capital goods at in-
ternationally competitive prices. On the other hand, accessibility 
of international credits, and availability of other forms of foreign 
aid and attitudes of aid receiving countries have been playing cru-
cial roles in determining the trade pattern of capital goods . In 
any event, it is often observed that the developing countries may 
have to rely on imported capital goods for industrial development, 
so that rising trends of imports of capital goods may therefore be 
welcomed phenomena instead of matters of concern. 
Greater attention should be focused on what sorts of manufactur-
ing industries the particular countries should develop and how to 
maximize effective utilization of imported capital goods in order 
to attain faster yet sound economic growth through fully exploiting 
the economy ' s potential factors of comparative advantage. Theim-
ports of capital goods will undoubtedly continue to exceed exports 
of capital goods in the case of most developing countries, and it 
seems that such a trend might be accelerated if the countries con-
tinue to carry out rapid industrial development scheme of diversi-
fied mode. 
The crux of the issues related to imports and/or domestic produc-
tion of capital goods is whether the economy will be able to utilize 
them in the most efficient way for attaining economic growth at a 
rapid pace. Improvements of managerial skills and administration, 
availability of skilled workers and the nation's absorptive capaci-
ty for advanced technology are determining factors affecting the 
efficient use of capital goods . Imports of capital goods should be 
viewed in connection with the over-all economic development process. 
If the imports of capital goods effectively contribute directly and/ 
or indirectly to the foreign exchange savings and generate employ-
ment opportunities at higher labour productivity, immediate unfa-
vourable trade gaps resulting from imports of such capital goods 
should not be a great concern to the national economy. On the oth-
er hand, if the economy is efficient enough to export outputs pro-
duced with those imported capital goods, the problem of foreign ex-
change payments can be partially counteracted . Why should the de-
veloping countries rely on exports of traditional export commoditi-
es for payments of capital goods imports? I may add that careful 
programmes and projections of detailed demand for capital goods 
over the forthcoming decade do not hold the key to success or fai-
1 ure of the industrial development scheme . 
Extreme complexity in composition of capital goods and rapid te-
chnological advancements in recent years make any reasonably accept-
able exercise in programming and projection for detailed capital 
goods of a wide range virtually impossible . It should also not be 
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overlooked that numerous factors affect importation and/or produc-
tion of capital goods. Interlinkages of one particular industry 
to the rest of the economy (both domestic and international) make 
such an exercise even more difficult . Rigidity derived from quan-
titative exercises should not bother the beauty of flexibility in 
the free-market system . 
The most reasonable thing the developing countries could possib-
ly do is that the government draw out general guidelines for deve-
lopment of the manufacturing industries and resort to monetary, 
fiscal and other economic development policy instruments and let 
the private sector take the initiative for development of capital 
goods and their related industries of manageable scale . The govern-
ment's policy should be directed to induce all industrial units to 
be aggressive and highly competitive in both domestic and interna-
tional fronts. 
However, there are large scale industries which require huge 
amount of foreign exchange as well as domestic capital for develop-
ment. Some of those industries may be essential and local markets 
are already well cultivated for outputs of those industries, but 
necessary financial resources can not easily be tapped from the 
private sector . A long gestation period might discourage involve-
ment of private sector in such industries . In most of the develop-
ing countries the opportunity costs of capital are considerably 
higher than investment in such industries . It might be reasonable 
in developing economies that the public sector initiate those large-
scale industries and turn them over to the private sector at an ap-
propriate time . Many examples could be cited that private sector 
is found to be more efficient compared with the public sector . 
7 
OFFICIAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE THIRD WORLD 
GERADO BUENO ZIRIBN 
I. INTRODUCTION* 
In this paper we intend to deal with official technical assist-
ance which is granted by means of agreements between governments 
and that which is granted by international organizations. Milita-
ry technical assistance, technical assistance between companies- -
including technology transfer and spontaneous scientific co-opera-
tion between researchers in different countries--remain beyond the 
scope of this paper. In addition, the paper does not deal with 
each and every aspect of official technical assistance. It main-
ly concerns assistance provided by capitalist countries and inter-
national organizations. It considers the role of technical assist-
ance from the standpoint of the development of the scientific and 
technological infrastructure of developing countries. When we speak 
of technical assistance, we are referring to the official kind . 
Technical assistance officially originated more than a century 
ago, and, in addition to economic aid from the great colonial coun-
tries, was largely a continuation of long standing activities. How-
ever, they were conceived as such only after the colonies reached 
independence . 
Technical assistance programmes became a part of the U.S . foreign 
policy only after the initiation of the cold war. For example, the 
Marshall Plan tried to forestall the "danger" that the progress of 
communist regimes represented to the capitalist world. They believ-
ed that technical and financial assistance would contribute to eco-
nomic development and political stability, thus preventing the in-
filtration and spreading of ideologies contrary to the interest of 
the so-called "free" world . American technical aid was not limited 
to Western Europe; it also flowed toward less developed areas . 
President Truman spoke about technical assistance as an endless 
flow of technological resources and scientific advances from the 
United States that would constantly mesh with the efforts of LDC's 
and stimulate the development of their internal resources and the 
improvement of their standard of living . !) 
However , the Korean War demonstrated the very essence of foreign 
* We are grateful to R. B. Wallace for his comments on the English 
version of this paper . 
l)President Truman ' s Inaugural Adress , January 20, 1949. 
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aid programmes; technical assistance for development stood aside to 
make room for military technical assistance . The greater part of 
the budget for external aid was absorbed by military assistance, 
which then became one of the pillars of United States military stra-
tegy in foreign countries. American technical assistance was not 
buttressed until after the USSR appeared on the international scene 
as a donor country to the LDC's, during the late fifties. 
In these years many studies and reports were published dealing 
with external aid and American technical assistance vis a vis the 
new independent states. The role and uses of aid programmes were 
variously interpreted in these studies. "Hopes and assumptions 
about the relationship between aid, development, political stabili-
ty and world peace were rarely spelled out, but it was recognized 
that, in the end, an aid programme must serve the interests of Ame-
rican national security in a broad sense. 11 21 
Technical assistance granted by wealthy capitalist countries--as 
well as economic aid and credits--is one of the modern methods for 
keeping Third World countries within the U.S. sphere of influence. 
It is not, as has been ideologically argued, a struggle for democ-
racy and freedom, but on the contrary, is a defense of capitalism . 
An example is the interruption of American help to Chile--except 
for military aid--while the socialist government of Salvador Allen-
de ruled the country, and its immediate renewal when a fascist regi-
me came to power . 
It should not be surprising, either, that the U.S.A. should off-
er nuclear assistance to Egypt, political leader of the region with 
the largest petroleum reserves in the world, and which had remained 
outside the U. S. sphere of influence for more than a decade. 
Bilateral technical assistance, as other forms of 'development 
aid' usually follows the economic interest of the providing country . 
Two of the norms that determine foreign aid policies are to develop 
the production of necessary raw materials in the recipient country 
and to ensure a market for the donors' industrial products. Because 
of this, a considerable proportion of credits, aid and technical 
assistance are tied to equipment, intermediate materials and techno-
logy supplied by the donor country. In this way, aid is transform-
ed into sales promotion and the development of the recipient count-
ries is distorted by the creation of a dependent productive struc-
ture. 31 
International organizations are influenced to a greater or less-
er degree by the political strategy of wealthy countries. One of 
the most abrupt manifestations of this influence is the expulsion 
of Cuba from the Organization of American States, or the refusal of 
the Interamerican Bank for Development-- because of 'technical reasons ' 
--to grant credits to the Unidad Popular Government of Chile.* 
The international organizations and advanced capitalist countri-
es have propagated a conception of development adopted by many Third 
World countries, according to which the increase in the gross nation-
al product is the main goal, while national autonomy, the distribu-
tion of income and the standard of living are secondary aspects . 
2)G . Ohlin, "The Evolution of Aid Doctrine" . in J. Bhagwati and 
R.S. Eckaus, Foreign Aid, Penguin Books, England, 1970, p.29. 
3)In this respect consult P. Drucker, an American consultant, 
"America Becomes a Have-not Nation" in R. A. Goldwin and H. M. Clor, 
Readings in American Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1971, pp . 556-568. 
* This could not happen in organizations of the U. N. where the so-
cialist countries are represented and the LDC's have relatively 
greater political weight . 
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This conception of development tends to transfer technology and pro-
duct organization from consumer societies to Third World countries, 
thus stimulating an imitation of their way of life. Experience in 
the Third World shows that economic growth itself is slowed, sooner 
or later, by the unjust concentration of income, the exhaustion of 
natural resources, the ignorance of the masses and the pseudoeduca-
tion of the elites. 
Many of these countries are ruled by traditional oligarchies, 
whose principal interest is to maintain this state of economic and 
technological dependence in which they thrive. Some of them even 
have resisted the reforms demanded by organizations such as the 
ALPRO as a condition for granting aid. Economic and technical as-
sistance, as . it is practised today, adequately serves the interest 
of the ruling oligarchies. 
Nevertheless, Third World countries that seek to develop autono-
mously can benefit from external aid if, conscious of the interests 
involved, they decide to face them. United, they can alter the ac-
tions of international organizations. The actions of the wealthy 
countries are, by their very nature, more difficult to modify, and 
require negotiation tools of greater power. The fact that rich 
countries depend, to a greater or lesser degree, on products of the 
developing countries gives the latter a potentially powerful tool 
of negotiation as was shown by the Arab countries in the case of 
petroleum. 
Official technical assistance will play an important role in the 
development of Third World countries only if it is channeled toward 
the creation and strengthening of the educational, scientific and 
technological infrastructure in o rder to develop the capacity for 
absorption, adaptation and production of technology. This requires 
a new approach to technical assistance programmes both regarding 
the donor countries or organizations and the recipient countries. 
Before dealing with this subject we will discuss the problems 
that official technical assistance programmes face today. 
II. THE PROBLEMS OF OFFICIAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES 
Since the beginning of technical aid programmes it has been stat-
ed that their goal is to eliminate assistance and put recipient 
countries on a self-sustaining basis.4) However, this goal was 
clearly utopian concerning technical assistance in itself, as has 
been demostrated by more than 25 years' experience in this field. 
Not only has this goal not been reached, but the technological de-
pendence of developing countries has become acute.* 
How can we explain this phenomenon of growing dependence despite 
increased amounts of technical assistance? 
We shall first proceed to compare official technical assistance 
in relation to other channels for the transmission of knowledge 
4)See documents about technical assistance by the United Nations 
and the Organization for Econo111ic Co-operation and Development, 
and Friedman M. •Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives", 
in J. Bhagwati and R.S. Eckaus, 0p.Cit . pp.63-78. 
* By technological dependence we do not mean a mechanical-causal 
relationship where external factors produce internal consequences. 
Dependence implies the interrelation of internal and external 
structural components. For a detailed conception of dependence, 
see F. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependencia y Desarrollo en Ameri-
ca Latina. Siglo XXI Editores, Mexico, 1969. 
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and skills from the advanced countries to the Third World and then 
analyze some of the general and administrative problems thatexplain 
the continuation of dependence . 
Broadly, one can distinguish between diffuse and captive know-
ledge . The former are freely accessible, and are transmitted by 
means of print, education, and personal contacts. Captive know-
ledge is sombody's property and access to it has to be purchased . 
Personal skills constitute a third and distinctive category : know-
ledge embodied in a human being . The skills that are important for 
technological development are embodiments of both diffuse and cap-
tive knowledge, the latter being acquired by experience, and is the 
most important for economic development . 
Official technical assistance programmes consist mainly of trans -
fer of experts, scholarships and other forms of training . They do 
not usually transfer captive knowledge except in the case of that 
supplied by socialist countries; this usually forms part of invest-
ment projects . This peculiarity is explained by the absence of 
private means of production in these countries and thus of the knCM-
ledge associated with said means. Training usually involves only 
the transmission of diffuse knowledge and the skills necessary to 
operate, but not to reproduce, technology . Missions of experts 
can transfer knowledge if they are involved in training of local 
personnel . But if they are dedicated to solving a problem by apply-
ing their skills, they would hav e rendered a service and not trans -
ferred knowledge . The personal skills that might be transferred 
are, in any case, of a much more limited value for development than 
corporate skills which are a form of captive knowledge . The analy-
sis which is presented in the following paragraphs considers the 
scope and limitations of technical assistance provided by govern-
ments of capitalist countries and international organizations . 
We proceed now to the forementioned general and administrative 
problems . 
General Problems 
a) The traditional conception of technical assistance is that c f 
a tool for transferring know- how. This conception stems from the 
premise that underdeveloped countries lack technical skills and 
that they, therefore, require technical assistance to develop. The 
thesis is very much like the one that maintains that foreign invest-
ment and credits are essential for the development of Third World 
countries since they lack capital . The former as well as the latt-
er deal only with part of the problem . 
The authors that favor foreign investment do not explain the 
great economic surpluses that are absorbed by unproductive activiti -
es and those that favor technical assistance do not inquire why 
these countries have not been able to develop the technical know-
ledge they need so urgently . This conception implies also a fall-
acy that can bedemonstratedbv analyzing the dynamics of the deve-
lopment of technical know-how. Here, the process of mutual inter-
actions between productive activities , the educational system and 
research plays a vital role . When these interactions arise in a 
framework of technological dependence what can happen , as is exem-
plified by the Mexican transformation industry , is the creati on of 
a regressive circle : "the educational level of you ng students has 
had to descend because , (among other things) , they do not need great-
er knowledge to contr o l procedur es and to over see the obedienc e to 
norms , unless they tak e par t in the pr ocess of f o r mu lating a nd esta-
blishing them " . 5) The mecha nical transfer o f f oreign technologie s 
crea tes an obstacle t o the devel opment of t e c hnica l skills because 
in this context they are not requi red . 
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Because of historical circumstances or by choice countries such 
as the USSR and China, that have relied on their own resources and 
knowledge, show that foreign capital and technical assistance are 
not essential requirements for development and that a static view 
of human capabilities is wrong. The important question, then, is 
that technical asssitance can only help technological and scienti-
fic development when this process is alive, internally generated 
and when foreign assistance does not become a palliative or a sub-
stitute, but complements internal dynamics as was demostrated by 
Japan. 
In the abstract branches of the sciences , where there is no in-
teraction with the productive system, it is possibl e to reach high 
levels of preparation but, owing to the scarce or nonexistent oppor-
tunities for research in developing countries, what happens is that 
the best brains migrated toward developed countries. 
b) Technical assistance programmes do not stem from the needs of 
the recipient countries , but from the possibilities and interests 
of the providing agencies . The technical needs that developing 
countries have in almost every sector of their economies creates a 
pressure to accept the different offers of governments and interna-
tional organizations . Many times the consequences are that the te-
chnical assistance plans or programmes of these countries are for-
mulated according to the offers of the providers and not by an in-
ternal process of the recipient countries . Thus, technical assist-
ance contributes to the imitation of development models where the 
principal objective is to increase production. 
c) Technical assistance has not been incorporated in policies 
that conforms to the development strategy of recipient countries, 
and has been managed independently from other channels for the uti-
lization of foreign knowledge such as technology imports. In addi-
tion, there has not been an organic relationship between technical 
co-operation and other forms of aid, particularly in the case of 
capital assistance . Since technical assistance is an essential 
part of capital assistance in the sense that its purpose is to 
train or provide people who will put capital to a better use, if 
this organic link were present, the effect of technical assistance 
would be enhanced . 
d) Because of the political context where technical assistance 
has taken place, and because most of the Third World countries lack 
long term development strategies , technical assistance has been 
channeled chiefly toward relieving social, political and economic 
pressures , internal and external, with short run objectives . In 
this way the educational, scientific and technological infrastruc-
ture of developing nations cannot be strengthened, and no amount of 
technical assistance will overcome the technological dependence of 
these countries. 
Administrative Problems6 ) 
These refer chiefly to the lack of co-ordination between agenci-
es in charge of technical assistance , the deficiencies of interna-
S)Guillermo Haro, "El Desarrollo de la Ciencia en Mexico", Espejo, 
No.2, Mexico, 1967. Parenthesis added by the authors of this 
paper. 
6)The problems of official technical assistance can be studied in: 
OECD, The Evaluation of Technical Assistance. Paris , 1969; Unit~ 
ed Nations, Study of the Capabilities of the United Nations Sys-
tem for Development. Geneve, Vol.II, 1969; and Stefan H. Robock, 
Brazil's Developing Northeast. A Study of Regional Planning and 
Foreign Aid, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1973; 
Enrique Martin Campo's conunents have been very useful. 
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tional experts and the lack of counterpart experts . 
a) Lack of co-ordination and programming The administration of 
technical aid by the donor and recipient countries is the task of 
several departments or agencies that are not duly co~ordinated. 
This dispersion leads to repetition of functions and increases costs, 
thus wasting resources and frustrating potential results. Although 
there is a wide consensus of opinion regarding the need of reorgani-
zing the administration of technical assistance by donor and recipi-
ent organizations, little has been done . The lack of programming 
causes most of the projects to be carried out independe.ntly one from 
the other. In addition, these projects lack a "previous definition 
of goals, instruments and expectations of success"; 7 l some are· even 
contradictory . 
b) International Experts One other serious problem regarding 
the administration of bilateral and multilateral technical assist-
ance is the absence of administrative staffs highly qualified and 
capable of solving technical problems, analyzing .needs , recruiting 
able experts and organizing highly efficient training courses and 
seminars.SJ The most frequently used means for providing technical 
assistance, up to the present, has been the international expert . 
However, besides professional experience, few of them have the abi-
lity to apply their knowledge in different situations as well as 
the capacity to transmit it by training local personnel. The pro-
blem becomes more acute because frequently missions of experts 
which should remain for a lengthy period co-operating with local 
personnel, leave too soon and, thus, are not able to assimilate the 
characteristics of the particular country involved. That is why 
their suggestions are often naive or inadequate. Many internation-
al organizations in charge of providing technical assistance pre-
tend to fill this knowledge gap with a briefing concerning the socio-
economic and political conditions of the recipient countries that 
in fact becomes a personal chat. The donor organizations face seri-
ous difficulties for recruiting high-level personnel. The reasons 
for this are, among others, inadequate wages, lack of vertical mo-
bility in the organization , the absence of horizontal mobility to 
the private sector and weak "esprit de corps" . The low level of 
the recruited personnel can be explained in part because many Unit-
ed Nations agencies are bound by rules that force them to obey na-
tional quotas while recruiting personnel. If the best of two pro-
spects is a citizen of a country whose employment quota is over-
subscribed , the other candidate will be the one chosen even if he 
has only the minimal requirements for the job. 
c) International Expert versus Host Country Expert Given the 
deficiencies of international experts, it shouldn't be surprising 
that the efficiency of the relationship between them and the host 
country experts has caused serious doubts to arise . Suffice it to 
quote some of the opinions voiced in several Unied Nations studies 
where technical aid is evaluated: "The most important independent 
goal of United Nations' technical assistance is training national 
citizens to continue the task after the experts have gone away; that 
7)Naciones Unidas, Evaluacion de las Repercusiones y la Eficacia 
del Programa de Cooperacion Tecnica de las Organizaci ones de l . 
Sistema de Naciones Unidas en Chile, Santiago de Chile, 1966, 
p.56 (E/4151/Add . 2) . 
S)Robert Goldscheider ' s book , The Role of Consultants in the Tech-
nology Transfer Process. United Nations, New York, 1968 , is 
quite useful for the establishment of rational crit eria for the 
selection of international experts. 
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is, the miss i on of the expert is to be without a job; therefore, it 
is surprising that in very many reports the project leaders of the 
Special Fund have not mentioned the situation of counterpart person-
nel training" . 9) It is curious the way this fundamental tool for 
the transmission of knowledge has been allowed to proceed at random, 
according to the opinions of each expert or of his national counter-
part . It is surprising that throughout twenty years enormous sums 
of money have been spent without anybody wondering as to the effici-
ency of that instrument in comparison with other possibilities" . 10) 
"If the rriost disquieting element of this description is the lack 
of orientation, training and substantial support of experts , then . it 
should be asked what is the value of the assistance provided by in-
ternational organizations if their accumulated knowledge and experi-
ences are not transmitted to developing countries by means of the 
exports ." 11) 
Briefly, when technical assistance is not a part of a coherent 
policy in which priority areas, goals to be achieved, and external 
and internal means for short, middle and long term action are not 
clearly specified, the results of such assistance can be very limit-
ed . In some cases they are even negative when the scarce internal 
resources of the recipient country are diverted towards areas lack-
ing priority . 
The donor organizations argue, with some reason, that the nature 
of technical assistance and its orientation towards the development 
aims of the recipient countries are inevitably influenced by the 
type of governments and agencies in charge of technical assistance 
in these countries . 12) 
III . THE NEED FOR A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 
A country can achieve rapid economic progress, as Brazil did in 
the 1950's, without relying on technical assistance . 13) However, 
policies regarding this subject, if rationally and coherently admi-
nistered, can accelerate economic growth. Nevertheless, the crea-
tion and setting into motion of this policy is a very difficult 
task, due to the various and non-coordinated sources of technical 
assistance and because short-run political factors interfere in 
decision-making . Besides, the demands of the various pressure 
groups within the country compete against each other . 
This establishes the need for a clear definition of national eco-
nomic development priorities by the recipient country and, in this 
context , also the role to be played by technical assistance , so 
that they may be adjusted gradually to the development requirements 
of the productive sectors and subsectors . 
To implement technical assistance policy, it is necessary to de-
sign a scientific and technological policy differentiated according 
9)Naciones Unidas , Desarrollo y Coordinacion de las Actividades de 
las Organizaciones del Sistema de Naciones Unidas . Informe de la 
Dependencia Comun de Inspeccion . Nueva York, 1969 . E64698 E/AC . 
51/31. 
lO)Naciones Unidas , Estudio sobre la Capacidad del Sistema de Nacio-
nes Onida para el Desarrollo . Ginebra , Vol .I I , 1969, p . 74, El 
subrayado es nuestro . 
ll)Naciones Unidas, Op . Cit . p . 84 
12)See OECD, Development Assistance , Paris , 1970 
13)See Stefan H. Roback , Op.Cit . 1973 
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to the branch and sector of production that will be stimulated or 
strengthened . 
The success of such policies will depend on their effect as a 
development catalyst; in other words, it depends on the stimulus 
that they create for technological absorption and local production 
of technology . 
Whatever the difficulties might be, one must bear in mind that 
if technical assistance is not integrated with a national develop-
ment policy, it could distort and frustrate a country ' s development 
efforts, particularly if it creates unrealistic expectations. 
A technical assistance policy should include the following levels 
of analysis and issues, amon.g others : 
Levels of analysis 
a) Definition of priorities Technical assistance priorities 
must be established in accordance with those of scientific and tech-
nological policy, and this latter must be linked to development po-
licy. 
This should be the logical. sequence within which the technical 
assistance policy . should operate. However, most of the developing 
countries lack explicit development scientific and technological 
policies. Some of these countries even turn to the source of tech-
nical assistance in order to identify their needs and to formulate 
their requests. 
b) Analysis of resources To set a technical assistance policy 
in motion, it is extremely important to study the real and potential 
resources of the recipient country, both internal and external. 
Many technical assistance programmes have met with failure because 
of ignora.nce of these resources . 
c) Co-ordination among the governmental agencies of the recipi-
ent countries The co-ordination among national departments in 
charge of technical assistance is a fundamental part of its admini-
stration . Such co-ordination would prevent duplication of functions 
within governmental agencies and within research and production 
centers. The assignment of functions to these agencies must be 
made taking into account the technical and administrative capabili-
ties of each. Thus, the negotiation powers of the government are 
strengthened vis a vis the technical assistance donors. 
d) Linking supply and demand The government should influence 
both the supply and demand of technical assistance through various 
incentives and regulations, favouring those programmes that satisfy 
the priorities established. It is also necessary to create systems 
that provide adequate communication between the centers requiring 
assistance and those that administer it. 
e) Short and long-run Technical assistance policy, as all poli-
cies in scientific and technological matters, should essentially 
emphasize the long-run. This is so because training of human re-
sources takes a long time and mainly because technology has long 
range effects on the organization of society. Disregard of the 
long-run usually implies, inadvertedly, the imitation of the way of 
life of consumer societies . 
Issues 
1. Technical assistance is successful only i£ it becomes innece-
sary after a reasonable period of time . It should contribute to 
the technical self-reliance of the recipient country and not only 
to economic and social welfare . If the country is not permanently 
better off when technical assistance is withdrawn, it will have per-
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formed only a relief function. To play such a role, technical as -
sitance should be directed towards the development of an education-
al, scientific and technological infrastructure in the recipient 
country. 
2. Multilateral technical assistance and that originating in ca-
pitalist countries trains local human resources and provides person-
al skills for the execution of technical services. An important 
proportion of the experts sent, function as consulting technicians, 
for example in preinvestrnent projects. Many times their recommenda-
tions find their way into contracts of technological transference. 
It is evident that a high proportion of these consulting services 
can be substituted or complemented by an information system concern-
ing knowledge which directs the search, selection and negotiation 
of technology according to the needs of the particular country in 
question and not according to the partial experience of said experts, 
however competent they may be. 
3. LDC's must give high priority to technical co-operation among 
themselves. This co-operation has the following advantages in com-
parison to the provided by the rich countries. First of all, regard-
ing their needs it is more adequate; secondly, it is freer of dis-
torting political conditions; and finally, it serves to strengthen 
the self-confidence of the LDC's. For example, this can be done 
within the framework of creating multinational educational and re-
search institutions and enterprises in which the rich countries do 
not intervene. 
4. The less developed countries should exert pressure to shift 
the balance from bilateral to multilateral capital and technical as-
sistance programmes. This shift would imply inherent technical and 
political advantages. The LDC's would influence more the direction 
of aid if it is centered within international organizations; multi-
lateral programmes could function on a more permanent basis without 
suffering from political changes; finally, the allocation of assist-
ance could be realized among countries on a more rational basis, 
thus coping with problems of a global nature and ensuring that as-
sistance forms an integrated whole with development policy. 
5. LDC's should only search for aid experts that remain in the 
country long enough to thoroughly train local personnel. 
6. LDC's should not accept 'technical assistance' whenever it im-
plies substitution of local personnel by foreigners, whenever it ti-
es the country to inconvenient forms of technology or educational 
development and whenever it signifies ideological, cultural or mili-
tary infiltration. 
PART III 
THE INTRA-NATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY 
8 
THE DIFFUSION OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY, 
THE ADAPTATION PROBLEMS 
MIGUEL ANGEL CUADRA 
The concern of evaluating the effects of technology on production 
is not new. The scholars of economy have long been concerned with 
these matters and in present times technology is considered capable 
of breaking static conditions through displacement of the production 
function. This, of course, indicates the importance of technological 
innovations; but it does not tell us how to diffuse this new techno-
logy and what will be the problems faced in its adaptation. 
That we haven ' t found a satisfactory answer is clearly seen in 
the fact of inadequate growth of agricultural productivity in the so 
called Third World countries. 
Even in countries which had a considerable agricultural develop-
ment, and which occasionally served as examples, as is the case of 
Mexico, we have found, recently, a deterioration in the rate of 
growth of the sector, causing serious problems. The aforementioned 
happened when a few years back we considered that the production pro-
blem of the agricultural sector was solved, and that we should worry 
instead about over production in regards to effective demand . Like-
wise, a decade ago, most of the analysts thought that agricultural 
technology could be rapidly transplanted to the underdeveloped world, 
causing swift increases in agricultural production. Some years ago 
the term "green revolution" was coined, and it just so happens that 
our country, where it all began, is now facing production problems 
in its agricultural sector . It is true that we have identified one 
of the culprits of this situation, besides the population growth , 
over which little can be done in the near future. This is the bound 
character of agricultural production and the structure of ownership 
of land, which is unfavorable to development and a very risky politi-
cal point . At least in Mexico it has been found that there ~xists a 
close relationship , between the growth of the agricultural sector 
and public investment for agricultural and cattle promotion. What 
we have not yet found, in my opinion, is how and where to focus the 
investment. This brings us close to the central point of the talk 
which I have been asked to give . 
Before thinking about the problems of transmitting and adapting 
technology, I would like to point out several serious mistakes which 
we have incurred . One of these is the total lack of interdisciplina-
ry works, and, characteristic of this, of being within our own spe-
cialized areas, possessors of divine truth and enlightenment. The 
result is that continually these enlightened people propose magic 
solutions, which in the end are very expensive, and result in a waste 
of resources in societies that cannot afford this luxury. Let me 
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give a few examples. The specialists in biological sciences pro-
claim as the absolute truth and only solution, the fact that not 
enough importance has been given to the development of improved va-
rieties, adapted to local conditions . This results in the multipli-
cation of experimental stations to begin, in a larger scale, a pro-
gram for production and adaptation of new plants and varieties. 
The same happens in the case of the specialists in animal sciences . 
The aforementioned is only part of the problem . This situation is 
aggravated when we include the lack of coordination, and although 
both specialists belong to biological sciences, little is done to 
establish communication . Some can produce improved pastures, analyz-
ing their results in the laboratory but not on the livestock itself , 
while on the other hand the others are feeding cattle on balanced 
rations in the laboratory, and not using the pastures that the first 
improved, because these are two different branch offices. 
The social scientists, sociologists, anthropologists or combina-
tions of these disciplines, whatever their name, according to their 
traditional habits, are less positive than the former in respect to 
solutions, and accuse them of being technocrats; of ignoring the 
special values that the traditional peasant keeps, and of exaggerat-
ing the importance of the technical change and economic incentives . 
They tend to encourage the somber criteria that no hope is conceiv-
able until the whole structure of rural society is altered and its 
values changed by the diffusion of social or mass communications 
systems. 
Others consider that the agrarian reform, or the reform of the 
agrarian reform, is capable by itself of solving all the problems , 
and in consequence become emotionally involved in these actions . 
Occasionally, one of the enlightened proposes some other unique 
solution, and conclude, for example, that cooperatives constitute 
the best credit supply systems. Judgements, true or false, but lack-
ing sense , for the evaluation of any policy should be within the con-
text of the local conditions, and related to diverse political alter-
natives of regional or national character. 
To this situation, already complicated, add in the scene of inter-
national "experts" . Completely devoid of the realities of a country, 
callous to capture them, and in most cases, ignorant to begin with 
of the language~ ready to solve the situation as soon as possible 
and from there, enlargen the horizons of its labor market. Absolute-
ly sure that if it works in their own country , it has not reason to 
fail in the country they are in. When things do not happen this 
way, they easily escape the problem by putting the blame on the na-
tives, who, without a doubt, belong to an inferior race . ~-
Within such a chaotic situation, even the most intelligent, best 
intentioned political leader will tend to become confused, not to 
mention the peasants. 
The aforementioned would be ridiculous if it wasn't unfortunate-
ly true . It is a fact, at least in Latin America, that in most cas-
es the extension services have been bad copies of North American 
services, and until a short time ago measures have been taken aimed 
at their reconciliation with the realities of the different countri-
es where they have to operate. 
Would it be feasible to determine, in this situation, how to 
solve the proble~s of adoption of technology? It is possible, but 
it would be convenient to establish a prerequisite: That the natio-
nal and local leaders __ be totally resolved to develop agriculture. 
This is a necessary condition, but in no way sufficient . Within 
the difficulty that generalizations exhibit for this topic, the 
awareness of at least three facts should be established . 
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a) Given the complex traits of agriculture in the underdeveloped 
countries, physical, economical, institutional and motivational, and 
its interdependence with the other sectors of the economy, the gene-
ralizations for the economical changes, institutional and organiza-
tional, should be carefully investigated and subject to experimenta-
tion before establishing them within a national program. 
b) The sustained growth of agricultural production is equivalent 
to agricultural development and consequently can be defined as a per-
fecting process of the structure . This implies technical, economic 
and political transformations , of attitude, and of the structure . 
Consequently, its intertemporary horizon is extensive . This implies 
that a unique and immediate solution is difficult . The process, 
even if everybody wishes to accelerate it to the maximum extent, 
will have to be slow . And if agricultural policy is to be continu-
ally subject to evaluations, to be able to correct its course if 
needed, continuity is indispensable; not the dramatic changes which 
sometimes occur owing to changes of administration or to political 
or merely personal circumstances. 
c) The last point I wish to refer to , which has turned to be much 
more important in those countries that have solved the other two is 
this: "For some time now the agricultural economists have defined 
the agricultural problem as one of systems ," this means that if ag-
riculture is to function efficiently , it is a must to take into ac-
count not one or two or more problems, but a global view that may 
grant us the power to solve, a group of conditions of interdependent 
action. This presents the problem that, for an underdeveloped count-
ry, the possibilities of making an attack on all fronts due to the 
sector's complex problems may be impossible, owing to the limitations 
of either economic or human resources. In these cases, resources 
should be adequately assigned, and taken where the largest marginal 
return to investment is found. One of the facts that must undoubted-
ly be considered, as we have mentioned before, is the variety of 
conditions in which agriculture does flourish. This implies a seri-
es of interdependencies which make undesirable any generalization 
not backed up by research and adaptation experimentation . This is 
important, not only in the transference of technology from country 
to country, but even within the same country. We find a clear exam-
ple of this situation in the so called "Plan Puebla". 
One of the experiments that has drawn most attention, and has 
proven to be somewhat successful is the so called "Proyecto Puebla". 
The Proyecto Puebla is basically experimental, its objective is to 
create and prove ways of accelerating the yield of a basic crop--corn 
in this case--for those farmers that produce barely at a subsistence 
level; employ~ng traditional methods . The objectives of this pro-
ject are: 1) Develop, test in the field, and refine ways of speedi-
ly augmenting the yield of a basic food crop for the small scale 
producer; and train technicians of other districts in the components 
and successful application of such methods" . 
In the Centro de Economia Agricola del Colegio de Postgraduados 
de Chapingo (or Chapingo School of Postgraduates Center of Agricul-
tural Economy) three pieces of research have been carried out on 
this plan, in order for the authors to obtain their master 's degree 
on science. 
The first of these, by Ing. Edgardo Moscardi, was presented in 
1972. Its name is Irrigation and Transference of Technology: a 
Study for the case of the Puebla Plan . The author tries to analyze 
which is the origin of the factors of resistance that create a bar-
rier for the transference of technology, and he starts by revising 
literature. He claims that some authors like Fromm, Foster and Eras-
mus, who have undertaken a careful analysis in Mexico of the resist-
ance to change , have established certain hypotheses about its beha-
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viour. Fromm, from the psychoanalytic point of view analyzes the 
traditional peasant's "Social character", defining him as a system 
of character traits, that develop to fit the social and cultural 
conditions akin to each social group. He starts out with the pre-
mise that, in most of the world, the traditional peasant is very in-
dividualistic and conservative ; he imagines that if these characteri-
stics are reactions of the farmers' conduct when confronted by the 
circumstances, we can modify them by acting upon them . But charact-
er traits are relatively immutable by circumstantial changes. 
Foster imagines the existence of a "limited good" to characterize 
the t raditional agriculturist. This image of the limited good is a 
consequence of the scarce goods that are available to him imposing 
a sort of solidarity before the community, which blocks his initia-
tive or progress. This way, the image of the limited good would be 
imposing a restraint on the desire to change, or a subtle repression 
on individual attempts to accept innovations. Frasmus ~roposes the 
"chosen syndrome", the explanation of the attachment to tradition 
that would cause the individual to perpetuate himself in a stereo-
type. This is more or less marked, depending on the communication 
and the circle of relations that may tend to strengthen or weaken 
this shy and/or distrustful personality. Moscardi, after dealing 
with these impressive concepts, argues that the only thing we may 
see clearly is that the nature of the group's social character im-
poses a particular slant on the relations of the individual with his 
environment, and can, in certain cases, depending on the characteris-
tics of those relations, show a relatively strong barrier to change . 
Granted the work is of an agricultural economist, who considers 
that solely analyzing economical factors is simplifying matters too 
much and will not, by themselves, give an explanation of behaviour, 
he supposes that what matters is how these elements interact in a 
decision-making process, in which a portion of risk plays a fundamen-
tal role in the barrier against change. Making use of regression 
models he decided to prove this hypothesis (risk) , and using the in-
formation extracted from a statistical poll of the Puebla Plan, es-
tablishes a theoretical model of adoption, in which a restriction, 
related to a probability of obtaining a minimum subsistence income, 
plays a very important role, supposing it tries to reflect the risk 
in the farmer's decision making process . 
These are his main conclusions: 
a) Risk plays an important role in decisions related to the produc-
tive process . 
b) The traditional farmer will respond favourably to the new tech-
nological practices, whenever -they are economically advisable, 
if their adoption does not imply such a risk that the individual 
may obtain an income below the minimum subsistence requirement. 
c) If the new technological practices provide an answer to the farm-
er's true needs as a basic economic condition, the process of 
transference of technology will be undertaken under more favour-
able conditions. 
The last piece of research , presented scarcely a month ago was 
by Ing. Jose Antonio Avila and its title is: "Factors that may act 
as restrictions in the application of the recommendations of the 
Puebla Plan". 
Without inference to the analysis of the previous works which 
imply that the farmer knows the recommendations and wants to follow 
them, and that there is no other institutional hindrance other than 
the risk, Avila assumes that: a) technology may be complex, b) That 
the insumos* do not get there in time, or in the required amounts, and 
c) the participant farmer is simply ignorant of the recommendations. 
* supply of money or credit 
M.A . CUDRA 149 
For this, he asserts behaviour models which he proves empirically 
through regressions and reaches the following conclusions . 
1) The study suggests that a high percentage of the participants in 
the Puebla Plan tend to follow the recommendations which refer 
to the dosage and application of fertilizers; the percentage de-
creases concerning recommendations for the proper time for its 
application and reaches a minimum in respect to the density in 
which sowing should be done . If you consider only these three 
factors , only 28 percent of the participants follows all the re-
commendations. 
2) Study suggests that the main causes of why the participant does 
not follow the recommendations is because he does not know them 
correctly . The risk, the complex technology , the insufficiency 
and lack of opportunity in the delivery of insurnos a r e causes 
that help explain why a participant will not follow the recowmen-
dations. 
These factors are found in a similar project which has been rela-
tively more successful . The factors responsible for this situation 
could be generalized in the following: a) Physical factors, b) Eco-
nomic factors, c) Organizational factors, d) Institutional factors, 
e) Cultural and Motivational factors , f) Scientific and technologi-
cal factors . 
It is clear that all these factors work in relation with one an-
other, and that is why it is defined as a " system problem", and it 
has also been mentioned that an underdeveloped country cannot easily 
attack it in all its fronts; it is therefore indispensable for the 
limited resources of a country to be ascribed in an economical man-
ner . 
From the aforementioned it is obvious that a problem of this na-
ture will require much research in diverse fields , that will allow 
the production of enough coordinated information to try to solve 
such a complex situation efficiently . Research to begin with should 
be planned with definite purposes in mind. An array of questions 
rise immediately . What type of research is necessary? Should it 
be of short or long range? Will the information allow us to ask 
how much will agriculture advance if it is diffused and adapted by 
the farmers? At what cost? How much will thi s process depend on 
new and advanced knowledge, if we know we are facing strong problems 
in the process of adoption of technology we have not yet overcome? 
This has a series of implications ,af every type , if we know a seri-
es of problems cannot be solved at a short range, others can, and 
we should try to establish an a9equate balance . Given a growing 
population and an industrial sector that may be set back by a delay 
in the agricultural sector . The political leaders that wish to sur-
vive cannot spend years waiting for results , and this will have to 
show in the budget . On the other hand , inadequately planned measur-
es taken at a short range, can turn into serious problems in a few 
years . 
This implies that apparently promising options that have worked 
on a local scale , should be carefully analyzed . The only conclusion 
which we have trust in, is that credit experiments , of farmers or-
ganizations, Puebla type projects, etc ., should be done initially 
in a small scale , and not be transplanted at a national scale until 
they are deeply analyzed, in order to avoid great downfalls. 
In consequence, it is a fact that the transference of technology 
from a nation to another (and from place to place within the same 
nation) promises great benefits , but is risky and complicated. 
When you compare technology and yields of one country with another , 
you may conclude that a transference of technology will translate 
into impressive advances in the agr i cultural sector; nevertheless, 
downfall after downfall should warn us that this is not the case. 
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The transplant of the agricultural technology is not easy or quick , 
and it often unfortunately happens that the investigators of an un-
derdeveloped country tend to follow the investigation manners of 
their colleagues in developed countries (to publish in some respect-
able Journal), thereby neglecting their nation's interests, and the 
local investigation consequently suffers a negative slant, due, in 
part, precisely to the transference . In Mexico, for example, for 
many years temperate zone investigation was neglected, and was only 
recently initiated . Of the transmission and adoption of the same, 
even simple processes can be complex from the receptors point of 
view. 
In my judgement, a long and painful investigation effort in short 
and long term interdisciplinary investigation, should be started by 
each country. Larger sums of money will have to be allocated to 
these processes, and the country should provide to both education 
and agricultural invest~gation, the best and larger part of its hu-
man resources. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE "GREEN REVOLUTION" 
ROBERT E. EVENSON 
Eight years have passed since the introduction of the high yield-
ing wheat and rice varieties in Asia and .Africa gave rise to what 
has been described as a "green revolution ." A great deal has been 
written about the promise and the failure of the revolution. Many 
discussions of the consequences of this new technology for employ-
ment and other resource adjustment problems have been published . 
It is very difficult, however, to glean from this literature a re-
alistic estimate of the actual gains (and losses) in welfare realiz-
ed as a result of these improved crop varieties over the past eight 
years , It is even more difficult to appraise the nature of the dis-
tribution among farmers and consumers of these gains or of losses 
that might have been realized in the process . 
It would be too pretentious to suggest that this paper offers a 
complete and detailed appraisal of these issues . The paper does 
report, in Part I, a crude estimate of the "gains" from the improv-
ed varieties . Perhaps of more significance than the rough estimate 
is the framework of analysis . The green revolution is treated, not 
as an exogenous and miraculous event , but as a consequence of econo-
mic activity directed toward the discovery and diffusion of improv-
ed technology . This perspective provides at least some basis for 
projecting future gains from technology discovery and diffus i on. 
Part II of the paper deals with the issue of the distribution of 
gains and losses from technology . The focus is on analytic perspec-
tive . The basic model utilized relates the demand for factors to 
product demand, factor supply and technical change . The implica-
tions of the model regarding the effect of technical change on fact-
or demand and factor prices clarifies a number of issues which are 
confused by many writers on the topic. 
A review of data in Part II I from a number of Asian countries 
supports the implications of the distributional model and indicat-
es that the most serious distributional implications of green revo-
lution type technical change ensue from the marked regional differ-
ences in its adoption. 
I . THE REALIZED GAINS FROM THE HIGHER- YIELDING WHEAT AND RICE VARI-
ETIES 
We are currently experiencing a growing sense of concern (or 
alarm) over the prospects for expanding food production at a rate 
sufficient to maintain per capita levels of consumption (Baghavan , 
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et al , 1972, Harris, 1973). It would appear that the "panic liter-
ature" of the pre-green revolution era in the middle 1960's is mak-
ing a comeback . The promise that was generated by the early exper-
ience with the green revolution has all but vanished . 
Surely the rapid rate of population growth currently being ex-
perienced in most poor countries is a matter for concern. Expres-
sions of alarm, however, contribute little to our understanding of 
the determinants of population growth or of food production . In 
retrospect, the high yielding varieties of wheat and rice have 
meant a great deal to the welfare of large numbers of people in 
several developing countries . In their absence, food consumption 
per capita would have been considerably lower over the past few 
years. 
It is not difficult to build "doomsday type" models of food and 
population growth . Malthus's pioneering work in this field showed 
that one need only ignore the capacity of an economy to discover 
more efficient techniques of production in order to reach a "dis-
mal" prognosis. In point of fact, virtually all economies have 
demonstrated a capacity to become more efficient food producers 
over time. We do not have Total Factor Productivity (TFP) measur-
es for many less developed countries . The series available for 
the agricultural sectors of the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, and 
India as well as the historical series for the United States , Is-
rael, and a number of other countries enable some generalizations 
however : 1) Rates of growth in TFP tend to range from approximate-
ly one percent per year in countries which do not devote signif i-
cant resources to technology discovery to upwards of four percent 
or more in those which do . 2) TFP series exhibit some cyclical 
behavior . Some of this is due to weather cycles of generally 
short duration, but more fundamental factors lie behind the longer 
cycles. 3) The contribution of the high yielding wheat and rice 
varieties represented a significant but certainly not a permanent 
increase in the rate of growth in TFP in a number of countries. 
In a number of countries not otherwise pursuing an aggressive 
research program, the initial successes of the high yielding varie-
ties created the false illusion that the temporarily high rates of 
productivity growth meant that a more permanent regime of rapid 
growth was underway. "Self-sufficiency" in rice or wheat product-
ion became a part of the politics of a number of countries. In 
fact, it is now clear that countries which had not managed to make 
the investments required for rapid productivity growth prior to 
the green revolution are not achieving it today. Indeed, the per-
spective emerging from studies of the determinants of productivity 
change in agriculture and of the discovery and diffusion of improv-
ed technology is that the green revolution was itself a manifesta-
tion of the failure of a large part of the developing world to in-
vest in technology discovery activity.l) Had the developing count-
ries pursued an aggressive program to build research institutions 
of high scientific quality, the improved varieties would have been 
discovered much earlier and would not have been unusual or revolu-
tionary. This does not mean that the process of technology discov-
ery necessarily results in a "smooth" incremental flow of new dis-
coveries, but it is generally the case that we do not observe dra-
matic technological developments in these regions of the world 
where research investment has been relatively high. 
Consequently, when we evaluate the contribution of the particu-
lar high yielding varieties associated with the green revolution, 
it is important that they be treated as exceptional and non-repeat-
l)See the discussion of the green revolution by the author in a 
recent paper (Evenson 1974). 
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able discoveries , They are non-repeatable in that the major gains 
to be had from the reserch programs in the CYMMT and IRRI research 
centers have been exhausted . 2) Further gains can be expected from 
these research programs, but they are likely to be relatively "or-
dinary" in character . There is, of course, some prospect for con-
siderable improvements in other crops . 
The major prospects for further extension of gains from the green 
revolution discoveries does not reside with the International Cent-
ers alone, but with national research systems as well . The plant 
breeding and agronomic research programs in the numerous gee-climate 
regions of the less developed world have realized a major gain in 
"Knowledge capital " in the form of new genetic material from the In-
ternational Centers . Many have already incorporated the new dwarf 
plant type material into these breeding programs . Indian plant 
breeders, for example, have developed " triple-dwarf" wheat hybrids 
and have produced new rice varieties based on the dwarf fertilizer-
responsive plant type . Countries and regions lacking research cap-
abilities have generally gained relatively little from the green 
revolution . 
This, of course, implies that agricultural technology is not 
easily transferable across international boundaries or , more parti-
cularly, across regions differing significantly in soil, climate , 
and economic characteristics. Most informed judgment (by agricul-
turalists, not economists) as well as a good deal of evidence sup-
ports the contention that very little costless, or nearly costless 
transfer between regions takes place . A recent study by the author 
and a colleague, Yoav Kislev (1973) concluded that, prior to the 
green revolution period, virtually no direct international transfer 
of wheat and maize production technology took place . Furthermore, 
indirect transfer between countries, that is, the extent to which 
one country benefited indirectly from research activity in another 
country was virtually nil if the transferee country had not develop-
ed a research capability of its own. 
The limitations to technology transfers are based on the speci-
fity of production techniques to soil, climate and economic chara-
cteristics. A specific crop variety is superior to other varieti-
es only under a limited range of these characteristics, and an im-
provement in that variety r~presents a real improvement only under 
a slightly broader range of these characteristics. This point has 
been missed by many observers of the green revolution. The often 
expressed disappointment over the slow rate of adoption of the new 
high yielding varieties in many countries reflects this . 3 
Any attempt to estimate the production increases due to the 
"green revolution" varieties must make some kind of distinction be-
tween the production i ncreases which might be attribut ed to indige-
nous research activity in national research systems and production 
increases due to the "high yielding var i eties" that were produced 
outside these national systems . The following development provid-
es a basis fo r utilizing available , though limited, data for doing 
this . 
Let the aggr egate p r oduct ion function descr ibing aggregate agri-
culture output as function of agricultural inputs and input "quali-
ties " be: 
2)'llri.s exhaustion is borne out by the fact that relatively little inp:'ovement 
has been made over the initial high yieldin_J varieties, especially of rice . 
3)Sare observers seem to be ju:lging the matter on the premise that the samll 
set of high yielding wheat or rice varieties develcped at CilMI' arrl IRRI are 
actually superior to alternative varieties on 100 percent of the wheat arrl 
rice acreage of Asia . 'llri.s is si.rrply :mt the case, as virtually all agricul-
tural data \'K>uld attest. 
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Y = f(fb(XbQb}, f (X Q )) m mm 
The production function f is homogeneous of degree one, and is 
written as a function of two "sub-processes," a biological process, and 
fb and a mechanical process, fm. Each process is a fuction of a 
vector of inputs (XbXm) scaled into standard "quality" units by a 
vector (QbQm). Sadan (1970) among others, provides some evidence 
that the elasticity of substitution between the two sets of inputs , 
Xb and Xm, is relatively low even though it may be quite high for 
different inputs within each process . For example, labor and mecha-
nical equipment are easily substitutable in the fm process. Our ma-
jor interest here is in identifying the relationship between output , 
Y, and Qb the quality composition of the biological inputs . The 
utilization of plants with improved biological properties (from an 
economic point of view) represents a change in this quality vector . 
If we make the assumption that the ratio of mechanical inputs, 
Xm, to land has rema ined unchanged since 1950 (or has changedSirOOth-
ly over time in this specification) the following estimable specifi-
cation of (1) is possible: 
- al a2 (a3+a4St) (as +a6zst +a7 (At +St) 
(2) Yt/Yso = C(Lt/Lso> (Ft/Fso> At RAt 
+as 2 2 
(At+St) )EXP(a 9HYVt+a 10HYVtAt+a11 (HYVt) +a12t 
Y7/Yso is the ratio of wheat (rice) production in period t to 
mean production in the years 1949-50-51 
Lt/L50 is the ratio of harves ted acres of wheat (rice) in period 
t to the mean land in 1949-50-51 
Ft/F50 is the ratio of fertilizer used on all crops (not avail-
able by crop) in period t to the mean land in 1949-51. 
Note: These variables are designed to measure the contribution 
of Xm and Xb to production. Preferably we should have data on lab-
or, machines and animal power. These "left-out" variables bias 
the land coefficient (if they are highly correlated with land) such 
that land "picks up" the contribution of the left-out variables. 
At, St, RAt and ZSt are knowledge capital variables . They are 
constructed from research investment or activity data; e.g.: 
t-5 
At= L pt+ .8Pt-4 + .6Pt-3 + .4Pt-2 + .2Pt-l 
1942 
The research measures are based on the number of publications (Pt) 
which have been screened for commodity relevance and for scientific 
significance by two international abstracting journals . Plant Breed-
ing Abstracts and Biological Abstracts. 
At is a measure of the research undertaken in agronomy and plant 
breeding specifically with wheat or rice. 
St is a measure of research activity in plant physiology, phyto-
pathology and soil-science . This work is not commodity specific 
and represents agriculturally related scientific research activity. 
RAt measures agronomic and plant breeding research activity in 
countries other than the country in question, but which are in the 
same gee-climate region . 
ZSt measures agriculturally related scientific research in other 
countries located in the same geo-climate zone . 
All research variables are expressed on a per sub-region basis. 
These latter three variables are designed to incorporate geogra-
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phic technology transfer specifically 1 if somewhat crudely, into 
the analysis , The geo-climate regions and zones are defined as mo-
difications of the agricultural climate classification of Papadakis 
[1966] and are discussed extensively in Evenson [19731. Table 2 
provides summary information for 33 major geo-climate zones group-
ed in 9 geo-climate zones. For purposes of this paper, geo-climate 
zone 1 includes most of the LDC rice production and geo-climate 
zones 1, 3, and 4 include the LDC wheat producing areas . 
The table indicates the 1971 levels of the variables. At and St 
expressed on a "sub-region" basis . The At variable is reported 
for each significant crop produced in the region and for all cere-
als . These measures give an indication of research activity per 
maj o r r e search "problem ." As the t able i ndicates , the relative 
levels of res e arch activity in the largely developed climate zones 
(7 , 8 and 9) have been roughly five times as great as the levels 
in the less developed cl imate zones (1 , 2 , 3 and 4) . The disparity 
in re s earch act i vi t y in the supporting sc i ences (St) is much great-
er . The cereal yield data shown in the table give a crude indica-
tion of economic per formance by region . 
HYVt is the percentage of wheat (rice) planted to "high yielding " 
v a rietie s defined by Dalrymple (1973) . This variable is designed 
to measure the contribution of the green revolution . 
Regression results for wheat and rice production in several Asian 
and Middl e Eastern countries for the 1948 to 1971 period are pre-
sented in Table 2 . The s e may be compared with the results of a 
simplistic version of the spe cification reported in Table 3 . The 
Table 3 results are based on the proposition that the national re-
search systems did not contribute to production (incidentally the 
two data sets differed slightly so R2 cannot be compared . In the 
Table 2 regressions the knowledge capital variables contributed 
significantly to R2) . Note that the simplistic version bears out 
the e xpectation that as the HYV percentage increases, the increment 
to production decreases . In fact , for the region as a whole, the 
production effect decreases to zero at less than 30 percent adoption 
for wheat and at about 50 percent adopt i on for rice. 
When we consider the results of Table 2 which incorporate the 
indigenously generated knowledge capital variables, the picture 
changes considerably . The key variable determining the value of 
HYV ' s is the indigenous research activity. The coefficient a 11 is 
highly significant in both regressions . The negative (but highly 
significant) coefficients, a 9 and a 10 , indicate that some diminish-
ing returns to increasing the HYV percentage still hold, but the 
implications are less serious than the simplistic model suggests . 
This diminution of the HYV contribution is, of ources, to be ex-
pected on the technology specifity grounds . The activities of in-
digenous research systems go a long way toward offsetting this dimi-
nution by mod i fying the technology . We should note here that Daly-
rmple in his survey, includes as high yielding varieties , many vari-
eties which have actually been produced by national research cent-
ers . 4 
In Table 4 , I have computed the economic value of the production 
of wheat and rice which would not have been produced had the high 
yielding varieties not been developed . This computation is based 
on the regression results in Table 2 and is a measure of the over-
4)See Dalrymple (1973). Mr . Dalrymple has been kind enough to pro-
vide me with unpublished data on high yielding varieties for 
1971-72 and 1972-73 . He indicates that he is now attempting a 
distinction between the purely "international" varieties and the 
joint product of national and international research effects . 
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Table 1 GEO-CLIMATE REGION 
Publications (1942-70) 
per Sub-Region 
Region # Wheat Barley Maize Sorghum Rice 
1. Tropical Zone 
1.1 Humid Equatorial -- -- 30.2 11. 6 111. 8 
1. 2 Humid Tropical 1. 5 .2 15 .1 2.1 121 .7 
1. 3 Dry Equatorial -- -- 4.7 1.1 22 .5 
1. 4 Hot Equatorial 8.4 -- 19.3 13 . 6 224 . 5 
1. 5 Semi-Arid Equatorial .o -- 4.1 32 . 2 8 . 6 
1. 7 Humid Tierra 20.4 20.4 30.6 26.0 20 .8 
1.8 Dry Tierra -- -- 42 . 4 -- 18.1 
1.9 Cool Winter Tropical -- -- 18.5 87.4 353.1 
2 . Tierra Fria Zone 
2.1 Tropical Highlands 8.0 6 . 7 132.9 28.2 --
3 . Desert Zone 
3.1 Hot Tropical .0 -- 2.0 -- 4 . 5 
3.2 Hot Subtropical 20.9 11. 8 -- -- 6 . 7 
3.7 Continental ·i. 4 1. 6 .0 .0 93 .5 
4. SubtroEical Zone 
4.1 Humid 30.4 4.7 51.6 1.6 63.0 
4.2 Monsoon 116.6 128.1 69.7 144.9 52.0 
4.3 Hot 105 . 7 46.7 47.6 156.8 6.6 
4.4 Semi-Arid -- -- 10.0 5 . 0 --
5. PamEean Zone 
5.1 Pampean 99 . 5 99.0 168.4 36 . 6 --
6 . Mediterranean Zone 
6.1 Subtropical 72.9 71. 3 33.5 11. 7 104 .9 
6.2 Marine 14 . 0 2.2 34.4 12.0 .0 
6.5 Temperate 77 .3 18 . 9 45.5 4.0 23 . 5 
6.7 Continental 67.0 27 . 7 133 . 4 8.3 1.6 
6.8 Subtrop . Semi-Arid 46.9 22.8 21.3 6.0 --
6.9 Contin . Semi-Arid 4.6 3 . 0 9.0 1.0 --
7. Marine Zone 
7.1 Warm 11. 5 5.4 -- -- --
7.2 Cool 78.9 236 . 3 92 . 9 -- --
7.6 ' cool Temperate 97.1 145.8 158 . 9 20 . 3 --
7.7 Cold Temperate 90.6 144.8 187.9 -- --
8 . Humid Continental Zone 
8 . 1 Warm 152.4 151.2 460.5 92.2 417.0 
8 . 2 Semi-Warm 164 . 3. 124.1 703.0 283.5 622.3 
8 .3 Cold 52.0 17.0 -- -- --
9 . Ste1212e Zone 
9 . 2 Semi-Warm 606.5 346 . 6 818.6 304.2 24 . 7 
9 .3 Cold 636 . 4 348 . 5 111.9 12 . 0 --
9.4 Temperate 38.2 35 . 5 -- -- --
Notes: Publications data from Evenson, R . E . and Kislev, Y. (1971]. 
Sub-regions are defined as n(l-d) + d where n is the number of individual 
the crop in country i. 
The term d = 0, when all countries in the region have the same acreage, 
Cereal grain yields are computed by simply totaling cereal production 
by country, international prices per Kg are approximately the same for 
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RESEARCH IN CEREAL GRAIN PRODUCTION 
Adjusted 
Cer. Pub . Basic/Crop Number Cer eal Gr ain Yields 
,Eub/ Pub . of Sub- LDC 19SO- Sl 1966-67 per 
Sub-Region S71/A71 Regions 
Share 
(:Kg/ha) (Kg/ha) Ratio 
A71 
-
11.00 13 . 79 l.2S3 48.3 . 90 1.00 
SL6 L06 lS.91 11 . 92 14 . 33 L20 
S . 00 . 86 28 . 1 . 32 
LOO 16 . 98 24 . 62 L4S 8 . 2 L S3 4 . 06 10 . 61 14 . S3 L37 
68 . 7 10 . 22 . 95 10 . S7 13 . 58 1.26 . 96 
6 . 35 LOO 8 . 6 
. 65 LOO 8.46 10.69 1.26 24 . 1 16.19 12.38 12 . 91 L04 .8S LOO 52 . 8 2.06 14.49 10 . 11 . 70 . so 
144 . 9 S.58 . 86 10. 39 13 . 77 1.33 1.00 
52.l . 62 
1.00 
7 . 93 12 . 84 1.619 
S2 . l . 62 8.72 7 . 93 12 . 84 1.619 
15.6 2 . 69 9.22 12.0S 1 . 307 
2 . 3 . 22 3.00 LOO 28.28 31.86 1.13 
15.8 . 76 16 . 94 1.00 8.99 11 . 80 1.31 
24 . S 6 . 26 4 . 00 . 60 9 . 98 1L83 1. 19 
S4 . 9 1.18 6.83 9.01 1.320 
28.4 L20 9 . 22 . 75 12 . SO lS . 65 l.2S 
102 . 7 1.31 6 . 91 .66 6 . 41 8 . 16 1. 27 
68 . 7 .99 6 . 05 1.00 S . 27 7.41 1.42 
7 . 5 . 80 2 . 00 1.00 14.21 17.93 1.26 
97 . 3 L 23 13 . 61 16 . 73 1.229 
97 . 3 1. 23 4.53 .20 13 . 61 16.73 1.23 
39.6 1. 9S 10.14 13.03 1.284 
SS . 4 2 . 59 18.68 .45 10 . 38 13.10 1.26 
16 . 8 . 80 7.24 . 2S 9.20 13 . 32 l.4S 
37 . 4 1.90 11.27 . 17 11.93 lS.86 1.33 
47 . 5 1.41 19 . 68 .30 10.79 14.48 1.34 
26 . 7 1.68 14.26 . so 8.64 7.75 1.13 
5 . 8 .20 4.61 . 66 6 . 16 6 .48 1.05 
120.l 2 . 02 17 . 0l 28.13 l.6S4 
4 . 4 2.00 2 . 00 . 00 2S.13 3S.48 1.41 
136 . 1 3.10 6.81 . 00 22.12 34 .82 l.S7 
120 . 3 1. 7S 21.71 . 03 18 . 44 28 . 86 l.S7 
133.9 1.46 8 . 00 . 00 9 . 62 20 . 79 2 . 16 
256.2 2 . 79 19.61 34 .02 l . 73S 
254 . 3 4 . 60 7 . 62 .00 24 . 43 42 . S4 1. 74 
291.S l.SO · 12 . 16 . 00 18. 77 33 . SS 1. 79 
34.S . 63 2 . 00 . 00 7 . 98 11.90 1.49 
3S7 . 9 1. 35 11.57 18 . 26 1. 578 
450 . 3 1. 10 1 2 . 92 . oo 12 . 29 21 .14 1.68 
382.3 1. 75 7 . 28 . oo 10 . 11 14.82 1.47 
36 . 9 1. 96 4 . 3 4 . 00 11 . 85 17 . 36 1. 4 7 
n 
countries in the region, and d = r A. - A /(2A . - 2)A . 
1 1 
Ai is the acreage of 
i =l 
approaches 1 as acreage in the region i s concentrated in one country . 
of the differ ent grains without price weighting. While prices vary considerably 
all cereals. 
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Table 2 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: WHEAT AND RICE PRODUCTION 
ASIAN-MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, 1948-71 
Independe nt Wheat Production Rice Production 
12 Asian Countries 
120 observations 
Variables 10 Asian-Middle Eastern Countries 
240 observations 
LN (A) 
LN (A)* s (a4) 
LN (RA) (as) 
LN (RA)* ZS (a6) 
LN (RA)* (A+S) 
LN (RA)*(X+S) 2 
HYV (a9) 
HYV 2 (alO) 
HYV* A (a11
) 
LN (Time) 
Constant 
,R2 (Adj . ) 
(al2) 
(a7) 
( 8) 
1. 0050 
(63. 5) 
. 0693 
(4 . 05) 
. 0112 
(1.10) 
. 00067 
( 4 . 36) 
. 1656 
(6 . 16) 
. 000046 
(2 . 29) 
- . 00068 
( 2 . 39) 
-00000074 
(4 . 35) 
-.0026 
( . 61) 
-.000071 
(. 86) 
.0009 
( 3. 63) 
. 296 
( 2. 33) 
-2.47 
.9 87 
1. 0217 
(107 . 4) 
. 0409 
( 2. 91) 
- . 0144 
( 2 . 54) 
. 00024 
(2 . 00) 
- . 0179 
(2 . 08) 
. 000010 
(1. 52) 
.00002 
( . 18) 
-.00000018 
(6. 00) 
-.0097 
(1. 96) 
-.000018 
( . 27) 
. 000039 
(5 . 70) 
-.0181 
(3 . 63) 
1. 22 
.998 
Regressions weighted by area and estimated citilizing Nelove-Baelestra techniques 
"t" ratios in parentheses . 
Table 3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: HIGH YIELDING VARIETIES 
Contributions; Simplistic Model 
Independent Variables Wheat Production Rice Production 
(13 Asian-Middle Eastern (12Asian-Middle Eastern 
LN (Land) 
LN (fert) 
HYV 
(HYV) 2 
Constant 
R2 
Countries 1948-71) Countries 1948-71) 
307 observations 282 observations 
.9836 1.0374 
( .0030) (. 0030) 
.0411 .0477 
(. 0058) ( . 0021) 
.430 . 0052 
(. 0018) ( . 0010) 
-,00085 -.0000 5 
(.00004) ( . 00002) 
.1758 - . 2208 
.98 59 .9965 
Notes: Dependent variable LN (Production). Regressions weighted by area harvest-
ed. Standard errors in parentheses. Production , land , a nd fertilizer scaled 
relative to average levels in 1948-49-50 . 
HYV is the percent of the acreage of wh eat or rice planted to "high Yield-
ing" varieties as defined by Dalyrmple [1973). 
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Table 4 ESTIMATION OF ECONOMIC GAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH YIELDING WHEAT AND RICE 
VARIETIES IN ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES 
1965-6 1966-7 1967-8 1968-9 1969-70 1970-1 1971-2 1972-3 
Wheat 
Aggregate Adoption 
Level . 001 1. 5 9 . 7 18 . 9 20.5 24 . 0 28 . 3 34.1 
Production Increase .01 1.5 10.9 18 . 3 19 . 3 22.l 24.0 28.2 
Economic Value at 
$75/m. ton in 
millions U. S. $ . 4 58 436 732 772 884 960 1128 
Rice 
Aggregate Adoption 
Level . 001 1.1 3 . 4 6 . 0 9 . 9 13 . 1 17.1 20 . 9 
Estimated Production 
increase . 01 1.0 3 . 3 5 . 5 9 . 6 12 . 7 16 . 5 20.7 
Economic Value at 
$100/m . ton in 
millions U. S. $ 1. 3 148 463 784 1365 1798 2329 2933 
Note : Aggregate Adoption Level computed from data provided by Dalrymple (1973). 
Percent production increase computed from regression coefficients in Table 2. 
all "gains " of the green revolution. Note, however , that it is not 
a measure of the contribution of the International Centers. In~-
Vact, if these results are to be taken strictly , the green revolu-
tion would not have occurred, if these countries had not . had an in-
digenous research capability . 
The implication of the Table 2 regressions are that if no furth-
er indigenous research is undertaknen , the marginal contribution 
of further adoption of high yielding wheat varieties will reach 
zero at about the 50 percent adoption level (this is because of 
the negative a9 and a10 coefficients) . The counterpart figure 
for rice is higher, in fact close to 100 percent . In both cases, 
further research activity in the national research systems will 
significantly extend the impact of the green revolution . The 
gains realized by 1973 are very impressive , on the order to 28 
percent for wheat and 20 percent for rice according to these data . 
II . DISTRIBUTION OF THE GAINS AND LOSSES 
As the previous section shows , the green revolution was not cost-
less . The gains have been realized in significant degree according 
to the willingness of countries to invest in research , and to a les-
ser extent in extension.5 Individual producers, likewise do not 
find the new technology to be costless to adopt . A considerable 
amount of effort must be devoted to learning , experimenting and 
evaluation by farmers . Setting aside these costs for the moment, 
however, we wish to turn to the distributional effects of the real -
ized gains. 
At least four dimensions to the distributional question are im-
portant here: 
5) For a comparison of the effect of extension and research as 
sources of real productivity gains in India see Mohan , R. and 
Evenson, R. (1974) . 
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1 . How have gains been distributed between conswners of wheat 
and rice and producers of wheat and rice? 
2. How have producer gains (and losses) been distributed between 
factors of production, land, labor and other assets? 
3. How have producer gains been distributed by scale of farm and 
by tenancy? 
4. How have producer (and consumer) gains been distributed regi-
onally within countries? 
We have some data from farm surveys as well as some data on fact-
or prices with which to begin to approach these questions. It is, 
however, very important to maintain an analytic perspective in this 
matter . To that end we turn now to a discussion of a model which 
relates technical change to factor and product markets. We will be 
particularly interested in the effect of technology on the demand 
for labor. 
The Technical Change a.00 Factor Markets : A Sirrple 'I\.io Factor Approach 
We start with a simple aggregate production fuction for agricul-
tural goods: 
Y = T F(L,K) 
where Y is aggregate output, L is labor, for the time being assumed 
to be homogeneous, and K is the aggregate of non-labor factors of 
production. T is an index of productivity. Shifts in T are neutral 
in that the ratio of marginal products of L and K are unchanged. 
Production is subject to constant returns to scale (a reasonable 
statement for most less developed countries) hence; 
(jf Clf 
f =Lf 2 + Kfk, where f 2 = aL and fk - aK 
Now we first suppose that the demand for Y is perfectly elastic 
at Py = 1, and that the supply of K is also perfectly elastic. The 
marginal conditions are: 
4) pi Tf£ 
5) pk Tfk 
Solving for equilibrium, we obtain: 
6) 
EP£ 'dP£ T 1 EL 
ET WI' ~ ~ ET. 
That is, the elasticity of the price of (and demand for) labor with 
respect to a change in technology is simply the reciprocal of the 
share of labor in total costs . This result is straightforward . A 
one percent increase in productivity has the initial effect of re-
ducing average costs by one percent. To reattain equilibrium, pro-
ducers will increase output and will bid up the price of labor un-
til average costs rise by one percent. Since the price of non-lab-
or inputs will remain constant and product price will not fall, 
this requires an increase of ~ percent in the price of labor. 
This case is the most f avoiable one for labor in the presence of 
productivity change. It is not as unrealistic as it might seem for 
many situations . A country importing substantial food grains faces 
a very elastic demand for agricultural products . Likewise, impor t-
ed inputs such as tractors and fertilizers may have very elastic 
supply functions. Of course land is inelastic in supply, but irri-
gated land may not be. In the case of a small region in a large 
country (such as Punjab-Haryana in India) the initial effects of 
productivity gains may not be too badly approximated by this simple 
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model . If the marginal product of labor is less than the wage rate 
by some factor d < 1, the elasticity is lower by this factor , d . 
It is easy to e x tend the model to allow the supply elasticities 
of K and L to vary . The expression for the elasticity then becomes : 
1 
1 + Sk(E~ - Ek) 
a + Ek 
where Ek, Ei are the supply elasticities of L and K. How we see 
that the elasticity of substitution enters the expression (unless 
the supply elasticities are equal in which case EP 2/ET = 1) . In the 
case of the region of India affected by the green revolution (Pun-
j ab-Haryana-Gujurat- U .P.) we would expect Ek to be less than Et es-
pecially in the long run . This would imply that EPt/ET would be · 
less than one and that K would increase in price more than L, in re-
sponse to productivity change . Labor can migrate into the regions 
and would have an incentive to do so . In fact with a low short run 
elasticity of labor supply and a higher long- run elasticity, one 
would expect wages to decline after some point . 
The implications of this model for productivity gains in parti-
cular regions is of considerable significance . To see this some-
what more clearly we need to relax the assumption of a perfectly 
elastic demand . Let the demand function for agricultural products 
be: 
P dY 
8 ) Y = <j> ( P ) ; n = y • dP < C 
The equilibrium conditions are: 
9) <j> (P) = T F(L,K) 
10) pi PTfi 
11) pk PTfk 
Constraining factor market equilibrium (that is, staying on the 
factor supply curves we have: 
12) EPi -(n + 1) (a + Ek) 
ET 
where l:i. = - no -n(SiEk + SkEi) + EkEi + a(Si£i+ SkEk) and l:i. is 
sitive, since (-n) is positive. Also 
EPi EPk -(n + 1) (Ek - E i) 
13) Er - ET l:i. 
po-
We n ow see that the elasticity of demand fo r labor with respect to 
technical change can indeed be negative . Its sign depends on the 
term - (n + 1) , and we can see that if the demand for agricultural 
products is inelastic , the price of labor wi ll fall in response to 
a gain in product ivi ty , (the fall will be greater the lower is a and 
the lower is Ei . 
We are now in a position to say something about the distribution 
of gain s from technical change . A 10 per cent change in T will low-
er average costs to producers by 10 percent . The term , - (n+l) the 
elasticity of total revenue , tells us by how much the prices to 
consumers will fall as the supply curve shifts by 10 percent . Pric-
es will fall by more than 10 percent and the consumer will capture 
more than 100 percent of the gains, if the elasticity of demand is 
less than one . Producers will respond by adjusting the amount of 
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L and K utilized such that average costs will be equal to prices . 
However, if the supply of labor is relatively inelastic, labor pric-
es will be bid down and labor will bear the brunt of the resource 
adjustment required . 
This is the classic "farm problem" case that has been a major 
issue in the United States where the aggregate price elasticity of 
demand is generally regarded to be low (- . 2 to -.4). It is very 
unlikely that this has happened in Asia as a consequence of the 
green revolution , however . The gains have been concentrated in 
wheat and rice production as opposed to affecting all food products . 
Hence price elasticities are relatively high . Furthermore, many 
of the countries in question are significant importers or exporters 
of these commodities . Again this means that a large expansion in 
production in one is not likely to result in a large decline in pric-
es . On the other hand, the realization of gains by all of the maj-
or rice producing countries in Asia is quite likely to lead to sig-
nificant price declines. 
A Simple Dynamic Extension of the Model 
We now extend the model by introducing time rates of change . In 
doing so, we acknowledge that we are sacrificing some realism by in-
troducing smoothness in productiv ity change and supply and demand 
function shifts . The real world does not change very smoothly. 
This can be minimized by applying the model to relatively short 
periods of time. We gain from the extension, in that we can integ-
rate population change and other types of shifts into the analysis . 
Let: 
Cl¢ p 
14) Y = ¢(P ,t) ; n =di) " y ~ I ¢ = D, be the demand function for 
agricultural products. 
15) y T F(L,K); 3T I T = T, at 
16) L g (P Q, , t); ~ 
P Q, 
£ Q, (l p Q, L 
Clh pk 
17) K = h(Pk,t); £k = apk ~ 
of labor and non labor inputs. 
• (lp Q, 
and solving for P Q, = at"-/ P Q, 
be the production function, and, 
ag I L L* Cl t 
Clh I K K*, b h 1 f Cl t = e t e supp y unctions 
Differentiating with respect to time 
we obtain : 
18) P Q, = i[ ( CT + £k) (D - (n + l)T) - Sk( CT + n)K* - (s ,Q,0 - skn + £k)L*] 
19) p = 
k ~[ (0+£ ,Q, ) (D - (n + 1) T) - S Q, (0 + n ) L* - (Ska - S Q, + £,Q, )K*] 
20) L L* + £ Q, p Q. 
21) K K* + £kPk 
22) y S Q, L + SkK + T 
Expressions (18) through (21) provide us with a basis for analyz-
ing the effect of technical chang e on the demand for both labor and 
non-labor inputs. They also enable an analysis of the effects of 
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¥xogenous shifts in the supply of labor, L*, or non-labor input~, 
K* on t h e demand for factors . (Equations (22) and (23) define T). 
Perhaps the point of most interest is that the effect of neutral 
techniyal change . depends, as before , on demand factors only . The 
term (D - (n+l)T ) shows that the sign of (n+l) will determine the 
direction of the effect of more rapid technical change . It also 
shows us that demand growth , D, from population and income growth 
will have a positive effect on the demand for factors even if demand 
is inelastic . 
The effect of an exogenous shift in the supply of labor, because 
of population growth or because of an increased de~and for labor in 
the non-agricultural sector, is determined by the L* term . Inspec-
tion will show that it has a negative sign in (18) . A rightward 
shift in the supply function of labor lowers labor prices .. An exo-
genous rightward shift in the supply of non-labor inputs , K* (as, 
for example, through a subsidy on credit or a subsidized machinery 
price) will not automatically tend to decrease the demand for labor . 
The sign of this effect is determined by , (a + n), a result famili -
ar to students of factors demand . When the elasticity of substitu-
tion is high and the aggregate price elasticity of demand low, a 
subsidy to machinery will reduce the demand for labor . 6 
Non-Neutral Technical Change 
We now modify the model to examine the effects of non-neutral 
technical change. Let the production function be : 
26) y 
27) L 
28) K 
F(L,K) where 
;JT£ 
TzL; Tz at 
Tz 
()Tk 
w-
Tk 
;r 2 and Tk are factor "augmentation" indexes . The solution for P 2 is now: 
6) £k-+oo I we can solve for: 
When D T K* 0 and when 
22) L 
Et 
Ska s2n p£ EP 2 
+ 
23) L 
E£ 
Sk(a nl ..... = EPk-
+ 
pk 
These are the standard R.G . D. Allen [19 ] results. The import-
ance of a and n in factor demand is readily apparent here . In 
both expressions a low a works to the benefit of labor as it mak-
e~ the own price elasticity lower and the elasticity of demand 
with respect to a negative change in the price of non-labor in-
puts is more likely to be positive. 
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The d irec t effect of technical change on the demand for labor 
differs from the previous result only in that the technical change 
term is a weighted average of the augmentation indexes . An indirect 
effect is possible through the second term which shows the effect 
of non neutral change on factor ratios. We note that it is unim- . 
portant if a= 1 . If a > l, relative capital augmenting change , (Tk 
> Ti l, will have an indirect negative effect on the demand for lab~ 
or . The third term shows the effect of an exogenously changing 
factor share . The implications for K* and L* are as before . 
The importance of this effect in connection with the - green revo-
lution remains quite debatable . The new wheat and rice varieties 
have probably been fertilizer and water augmenting. They have pro-
bably also been machine augmenting to a lesser degree, although in 
certain soils, especially for wheat production, mechanical power 
has been augmented since i t has a comparative advantage for deep 
plowing over animal power . It has also been mechanical power aug-
menting in cases where multiple cropping has been made more econo-
mic . It would be a pretty reasonable presu~ption that in most of 
the green revolution areas, a > 1 and Tk > Ti. 
Regional Issues 
One of the purposes of the discussion of the green revolution in 
part I of this paper was to emphasize the regional nature of the re-
alized gains. This is especially critical within large countries 
where a national market for the commodity is functioning, and where 
producers in only certain regions have realized green revolution 
gains . The specificity of technology superiority to soil and cli-
mate factors is almost certain to produce some uneven regional re-
alization of cost reduction by producers. This tendency is accen-
tuated by the low levels and uneven distribution of technology dis-
covery activity in most LDCs. (see Table 1) 
Consider a country with 2 regions, A and B. It produces rice in 
both regions and rice is marketed and transported from both regions 
to the major urban areas . Suppose first that demand is highly ela-
stic and that region A realizes a 10 percent increase in production 
from new varieties . The economic effects of this will depend on 
the mobility of factors. If labor were perfectly mobile, as produc-
ers bid up the wages in region A, workers would move from B to A. 
The wage increase would be the same in both sectors and determined 
by expression (7) 
The price of the immobile factor would rise in region A and fall 
in region B in such a way as to equate average costs for both regi-
ons . Labor is, of course , not a perfectly mobile factor . If it 
were the case that no factors were mobile between the 2 regions , 
the price of factors in region B would not change while the prices 
of factors in region A will increase in such a way as to equate 
average costs . Essentially, this me ans that the previous analys i s 
could be applied to region A. 
The real world is one where , agg r egati ve d emand i s not perfectly 
elastic and where factors e xcept f or land a re partially mobile. 
La bor is much less mobile between r e gio ns than f ertilizer and ma-
chines which are c l ose t o be ing pe rf e c tly mobile . The fact that 
as quantity supplied increases, pr i c e d e clines means now t hat pro-
ductivity cha nge in regio n A c a n reduce f actor i ncomes i n region B 
accordi ng to the deqree of immobil i ty of the factors. This is the 
essence of the "Appal achia " mode l i n which one region c an be serious-
ly damaged by productivi ty gains in another reg ion . As we will no te 
later , this is an important phenomena in India . 
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Table 5 LABOR INPUT PER HECTARE : HIGH YIELDING TECHNOLOGY 
VS TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY . lNDEX MAN HOURS PER 
HECTARE BY OPERATION . HI GH YIELDING TECHNOLOGY 
RELATIVE TO TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
OperatiIJJ 
Preparation 
800.nJ 
TransplantiIJJ 
WeediIJJ 
HarvestiIJJ 
Thrashing-
WinnCMi.IJJ 
All Operations 
All Operations 
(per Ton) 
Wheat : 
In:lia 
1967- 68 
131 
183 
152 . 
178 
158 
86 
Wheat: 
Pakistan 
1969-70 
155 
143 
145 
149 
Bajra: Rice: Rice: 
In:lia Philiwines Bangladesh 
1967- 68 1968 1967 
92 82 59 
167 100 115 
112 183 309 
134 
139 120 
185 
125 112 148 
81 
Wheat: India 12 Irrigated Fa:ans Aligarh Dist . U.P . (Dixit and Singh. 1970) 
Wheat : Pakistan - 143 Unirrigated Farms : Hazard Dist . (Rochin, 1971) 
Bajra : India - 74 Unirrigated Fa:ans : Kaira Dist . (Desai and Mohan , 1970) 
Rice : Philippines - 147 Fa:ans : Central Luzon and Zaguna (Barker and Mangahas 
1971) 
Rice: Bangladesh - 140 Plots: Camilla District (Hozue, 1968) 
III . A BRIEF SUMMARY OF AVAILA,BLE DATA 
The model discussed in the previous section identified t wo key 
parameters , the price elasticity of demand a nd the elasticity .of 
substitution , as determinants of the distribution of the ains from 
the high yielding technology. Unfortunatel y , we do not have reli-
able estimates of these parameters . Instead we are fo r ced to rely 
on data which can only indirectly provide answers to the distribu-
tional questions posed . 7 
Table 5 provides a sununary of " employment " data . The several 
studies sununarized show a pretty consistent pattern . Employment of 
man years per hectare has increased significantly as a result o f 
HYV technology , employment per unit of output has decreased . These 
data do not tell us what has happened to aggregate employment d irect-
ly . We do not know specifically what has happened t o total hectar-
es of crops produced o r of the effects of the shift from other crops 
to HYV crops . We also do not know how demand effects have aff~cted 
farm behavior . To the degree that the farms sampled in these stud i-
es have responded to these market effects , however, these dat a pro-
vide strong evidence that the HYV technology has not been heavi l y 
7)An estimate of the elasticity of substitution between labor and 
mechanical inputs of 1 . 44 was der ived for Indian data (Evenson , 
1973) . This is a relatively high elasticity and suggest that bias-
ed technical change will have an employment effect . 
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biased towards non-.labor inputs and that aggregate demand has been 
elastic . 
A thorough study of commodity price data would be required to 
determine the actual extent to which consumers share in the gains 
from HYV technology . We will not attempt it here except to note 
that the prices of wheat and rice in Asia did fall in real terms 
during the late 1960 ' s . Gover nment policies regarding imports , e x-
ports and the provision of price supports have to be taken into ac-
count in a thorough analysis . In the long run , the price on aver-
age cost consequences of HYV technology will show up in the form of 
real price declines as they have in Mexico . 
Dalrymple and Jones (1973) have analyzed the Mexican e xperience 
in wheat production i s of great importance in this regard . Unfor-
tunately, the S8ope of this paper has not included a thorough treat-
ment . They estimate that over the period 1950 to 1971 , average pro-
duction costs fo r wheat declined to approx imately one half the 1950 
level in real terms . They show also that prices received by farm-
ers and prices paid by urban consumers have also declined by appro-
ximately the same amount . Thu s , the Mexican e xperience bears out 
the proposition that over the long run , the great bulk of the pro-
ductivity gains will be distributed to consumers . 8 
Producer incomes and factor payments are affected, of course, as 
we have noted earlier . Before turning to the wage and income evi -
dence , however , we will di scuss the i ssue of scale and tenancy as 
determinants of producer shares in these gains . The " labor surplus " 
literature of a few y ears ago has left the unfortunate legacy of a 
predisposition toward the belief that the small non- commercial farm 
household is much less capable of rationa l discussion making than 
the larger farm . 
It is certainly very plausible that small farms may be injured, 
if they are slow to adopt the new technology . On the other hand , 
small farms are not necessarily inefficient . It is difficult to 
make generalizations on this score ,·. but a considerable number of 
production studies have concluded that " economies of scale " do not 
e x ist . 9 
We cannot explore the full set of such studies here . Table 7 
provides some evidence of this issue period from a sample of 54 
farms over a 9 year period in the Punjab in India . These data show 
that small farms tend to use more fe r tilizer and seed than the larg-
er farms and do not show a tendency to lag behind the larger farms 
in terms of adopti on of HYV production practices . We do not wish 
to generalize from this set of data . There are good economic rea-
sons for a lag in the adoption process by small farmers . They have 
a lower incenti ve to exper iment and to search for information . We 
have very little evidence, however, that they experience a signifi-
cant lag in adopting new technology . 
We turn finally to wage and income data which might give some 
indication of distribution of producer gains among factors and of 
regional distributional effects . Again we turn to the India data 
reported in Table 8 . Here we have a measure of wage rate changes 
8)The U. S. experience in this regard is similar . At times more 
than one hundred percent of the gains have been distributed to 
the consumer . This sharing of the gains in the short run is 
largely determined by relative rates of growth in demand for 
food and in the productivity of food production. In the long 
run, of course, factor mobility is the major determinant. 
9)See Saini (1971 and Evenson (1972) for a survey of these studies 
for India . 
R.E. EVENSON 167 
Table 7 PUNJAB INDIVIDUAL COST HOLDINGS DATA (1961-1969) 
EXPENDITURE DATA ON INDIVIDUAL FARMS 
1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 
Expend per acre 
SEED (Rs.) 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
Expend per acre 
FERTILIZER (Rs . ) 
Large 
r.aiium 
Small 
Expend per acre 
WELIS & IRR (Rs . ) 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
VALUE OF OUTPUT 
per acre (irr) 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
42 . 0 
52 . 4 
92 . 3 
84 . 7 
90 . 7 
ll2 . 5 
38 . 5 
49 . 1 
59 . 9 
38.3 
33.5 
85.1 
64 . 5 
77 .4 
65 . 7 
18 . 0 
30 . 8 
35 .4 
1095. 1 913 . 7 
1020 . 8 1051.3 
976 . 7 ll36 . 7 
33 . 9 
34 . 6 
70.6 
40 . 8 
60 . 5 
44 . 7 
9 .1 
34 . 7 
30 . 0 
716 . 7 
947 . 4 
833 .4 
24 . 9 
21.8 
48.1 
27.9 
36.9 
40 . 2 
9. 2 
15.4 
14 .4 
22 . 6 
21.5 
71.0 
25 . 1 
27 . 9 
61.8 
9 . 3 
13 . 8 
17 . 3 
515 . 1 443 . 8 
535 . 3 484.1 
521.2 470.6 
23.1 
18 . 7 
37 . 0 
30 . l 
21. 7 
37 .4 
8.8 
17.3 
25 . 9 
14 . 9 
13.9 
23 . 5 
16 . 3 
11. 7 
26 . 6 
7 . 4 
10.9 
31.8 
504 . 3 353 . 0 
400 .4 351.6 
507.5 452 . 5 
17.5 
13.4 
23 . 4 
15 . 8 
19.0 
22.9 
6 . 6 
13 . 4 
35 . 3 
410 . 9 
292 . 3 
345 . 3 
14 . 9 
14.7 
14 . 1 
12 . 7 
14 . 5 
24 . 2 
2 . 6 
16 . 3 
23.1 
438 .4 
345.6 
367 . 8 
Source : Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab, Farm Accounts in the Punjab, Publica-
tion No.117, 1969-1971, Chandegarh. 
for rural laborers for several Indian states . The table also reports 
a computed total factor productivity index level for these agricultu-
ral states. 
Two points bear mention : First , wage rates have changed as a con-
sequence of the green revolution. This is most readily seen in the 
data for the States of Punjab and Haryna after 1966. These states 
are the locus of the HYV wheat area in India . The second point is 
that rural wages in some of the states have fallen in real terms. 
It is easy to overstate the implications that appear in the data in 
Table 8 . A degree of caution is called for in view of measurement 
problems. Nevertheless these data are quite consistent with the im-
plications of the uneven regional distribution of productivity change. 
This sketchy discussion has not done justice to the many studies 
which are relevant and pertinent . A more thorough review should be 
undertaken . The data does suggest that some sharing of the gains 
(and these have been major gains) between consumers and producers has 
taken place, but that producers may have captured a larger share than 
has been the case in Mexico and other countries with similar experi-
ences . 
Producer gains have probably been distributed in favor of the hold-
ers of immobile assets . We do not have good data on land prices, but 
sketchy information suggest that in North India, land prices may have 
more than doubled between 1966 and 1972 and real wages rose by 40 per-
cent. Returns to managerial skills have probably risen by a factor 
intermediate between these two estimates. Many families in this re-
gion have probably realized a doubling in total family income . 
This distributional picture looks very different when regional dis-
parities are considered . In those parts of India (and other countri-
es as well) where productivity change has not been realized (and this 
is at least partially the result of research investment decisions by 
government), real producer losses have been sustained . 
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Table 8 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION 
WAGES IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE : SELECTED STATES 1957~1971 
Andra Pradesh 
carpenters 
Field laborers 
Bihar 
carpenters 
Field laborers 
Gujurat 
carpenters 
Field laborers 
Harayana 
carpenters 
Field laborers 
Maharastra 
carpenters 
Field laborers 
Mysore 
Carpenters 
Field laborers 
Punjab 
Carpenters 
Field laborers 
Tamil Nadu 
Carpenters 
Field laborers 
Uttar Pradesh 
carpenters 
Field laborers 
West Bengal 
Field laborers 
Current Daily Wages (Rs . ) 
1957 1961 1966 1971 
. 87 
.91 
. 87 
2.01 
. 87 
. 84 
2.01 
. 84 
. 92 
1.43 
2. 57 
1.26 
·2 . 84 
1.20 
4. 42 
1.62 
4. 51 
2. 52 
3 . 22 
1.33 
2.44 
1.57 
4. 46 
2.40 
2. 46 
1.18 
2. 69 
1.31 
1.80 
3. 08 
1.79 
3 . 71 
1.66 
5. 38 
1. 75 
5. 59 
3 . 34 
4.74 
2. 07 
3.01 
2.11 
6 . 09 
3 . 70 
3. 66 
2.05 
3.77 
1. 73 
2.49 
4 . 35 
2. 62 
4.34 
1.99 
7.71 
3 . 22 
9 . 83 
6. 55 
6.70 
2. 99 
3. 94 
2. 62 
12.11 
6.49 
4.98 
2. 41 
5. 64 
2.59 
3. 05 
Source: R.E . Evenson (1972) 
Irrlexes of 
"Real" Wages 
1966 1971 
(1961=100) 
92 . 6 
110.3 
78.9 
83 . 3 
90 . l 
80.3 
89.8 
96.0 
97 . 5 
103 . 0 
78.7 
85 . 4 
98.9 
111 . 7 
100 . 0 
116 .1 
84 . 8 
80 . 2 
91. 7 
98 . 8 
121.4 
74.0 
80 . 0 
100. 9 
114 . 8 
112. 4 
134.1 
108 .4 
116 . 5 
85 . 7 
88 . 6 
139 . 2 
139 . 6 
116 . 3 
117 . 8 
114 . 5 
107 . 6 
82 . 2 
Irrlexes of 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
1966 1971 
(1961=100) 
98 99 
109 149 
101 149 
105 160 
101 97 
90 108 
105 149 
94 102 
102 118 
100 105 
"Real" wages deflated by consumer price index for rural laborers by State . 
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THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY IN MANUFACTURING: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SKILLS 
NoBoRu TABE 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology transfer mechanisms and the flows of scientific and 
technological cultures in the developing countries have acquired 
new dimensions in this development decade. Where improvements in 
indigenous technology become crippled, technology inflows through 
effective transfer and the institution-building process can enable 
the developing economies to improve its own structural basis by re-
modelling the society to be receptive to new technology. 
New technology imported from abroad could not be fully utilised 
for the purpose intended unless the country has the human ability 
to absorb, to refine, and to apply them. Our .experience in the' 
past decades, however, seems to exemplify the fact that the rapid 
process of industrialization of ten generated a gap between the high 
level of technology and the organization and human ability to ef-
fectively use the technology. It is also this gap which has hind-
ered the satisfactory utilization of the valuable techniques im-
ported and which has lessened the effect of technological progress . 
The importance of this issue concerning the development and uti-
lization of skills has grown with the widening gap between the in-
digenous techniques and those of foreign countries. For this rea-
son , we may say that the conditions necessary for effective trans-
fer of technology are not fully mature unless institution-building 
mechanisms conducive to technological progress and to development 
of skills are simultaneously established . 
In retrospect , our experience has demonstrated that technology 
inflows, be it public or private , have not in may cases fully suc-
ceeded in generating forces in the developing countries in such a 
way as to make for economically viable and technically adaptable 
infrastructures . The reason for this may be that the critical ele-
ment of scarce resources in the developing countries does not lie 
in factor inputs alone but on institution building measures to ef-
fect the efficient use of existing resources in the society . It 
is intended that if the present pattern of technology inflows con-
tinues, the possibility of reaching the point of diminishing re-
turns may not be far off. Social cost may outweigh the economic 
effect, i . e., the gap between those who benefit from the adoption 
of new technology and those who are not able to adopt it is likely 
to widen, and the resulting social tension makes the process of 
technological development slower or even an abortive attempt. 
This trend (against which corrective measures have to be taken) is 
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prompted by a lopsided development in technology where linkage be-
tween pure scientific basic research and adaptive research is very 
poor and resources are largely concentrated in the former. 
This paper is divided into two parts based on case studies of 
training projects in India and discusses, (1) factors affecting in-
stitution- building mechanism in fish processing technology , and (2) 
role function of foreign experts in the development of skills . 
PART I CASE STUDY : MARINE PRODUCTS PROCESSING TRAINING CENTER , MAN-
GALORE , MYSORE , INDIA 
1 . Introduction 
Technological practices may be more easily transferred from one 
country to another in the field of industry than in agriculture . 
Agricultural technology to be transplanted requires receptive ecolo-
gical conditions , while fisheries technology lies somewhere between 
the two . New developments i n technology together with a careful 
study of local conditions go a long way towards facilitating its 
introduction in new areas . At t he same time difficult food situa-
tions together with an evergrowing demand for high quality foods 
makes it essential to f i nd substi tutes for foodgrains . In so far 
as the high nutritional value of fish has now been recognised , it 
is not surprising that such countries as Japan , Norway , W. Germany , 
Peru and the Soviet Union have attached particular importance to 
promotional activities in this area . _Todav Indi a , with a coastline 
of 3 , 500 miles aspi res to become a major fishing country- -and the 
introduction of new technology from abroad has been an important 
development along this road . 
Marine products are highly perishable and in order that they 
should reach the consumer in perfect condition they require to be 
properly handled and processed . Correct preservation techniques 
acquire even greater i mportance when a country ' s export potential 
is taken into account . Today India exports some Rs . 250 million 
worth of processed marine products and to increase thi s figure due 
consideration has to be given to the development of the most moder n 
fish processing methods on international l i nes . As hitherto both 
fishing and curing of fish were carried out according to tradition-
al methods , the greater part of the country ' s f i sh production was 
consumed on the home market . It was only after independence that 
technical co-operation with fishing countries l i ke Norway made it 
possible to take a great s t ep in the right direction . I n addition 
to technical aid , an a l l - round improvement i n the situation of the 
advanced countries also h ad favourable repercuss i ons o n the situa-
t i on in India . After 1952 s i gnificant moder nisat i on was achieved 
in fish catching techniques , distr i bution , etc . There remained 
howev er a serious p r oblem i n the great scar city of trained person-
nel for the preservation of f i sh and other marine products . It 
was hoped that by the application of modern processing techni ques 
such as canning and free z i ng , it might be possible to exploit a 
far larger propor tion of t h e resources available . With this end 
in view it was decided to seek technical assistance from Japan to 
set up a training center to initiate the fishing industries into 
modern processing techniques . In 1960 I ndia sent a three- man dele-
gation to Japan, and in 1961 the Japanese Government sent a fact 
finding mission to look into the situation. On 31st March 1962 
an agreement was signed between the two countries to set up a 
marine products processing training center at Mangalore on the 
west coast. 
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2. Objectives 
The aim pursued in establishing such an all-India training cent-
er was to provide the necessary training for technical personnel 
in the processing of marine products. It was hoped in this way to 
make good the serious lack of such qualified personnel, and also 
to re-orient the industry towards export. The Marine Products Pro-
cessing Training Center (MPPTC) was inaugurated in July 1963. It 
became the first institution of its kind to provide training in 
fish freezing, canning and the preparation of fish ham and sausage. 
Thus the intention was to fill certain serious technical gaps in 
fish processing which was essential to any scheme for the take-off 
and balanced development of the industry as a whole. 
The Government of Japan agreed to supply the necessary equipment, 
machinery, tools and training materials for the operation of the 
Center, as well as making available the services of seven Japanese 
teaching staff and technical personnel. At the same time the Gov-
ernment of India undertook to provide the necessary teaching staff 
to assist the Japanese experts; it also promised the necessary 
buildings, and took upon itself other running expenses connected 
with the maintenance and functioning of the training center. The 
Japanese experts were to impart practical and theoretical training 
in the processing of marine products with the assistance of their 
India counterparts. Five Indian officers were trained in Japan for 
this purpose. The Japanese Government provided materials, teaching 
aids, tools, etc. to the value of Rs. 1.2 million, while the cost 
of the building was Rs. 800,000. 
The agreement was renewed for a further period of two years, 
from 31st March 1965 to 31st June 1967, and further equipment to 
the value of some Rs. 1.7 million was provided to cover this peri-
od. Subsequently, the agreement was still further extended under 
the Colombo Plan until 30th June 1969. By the end of this period 
arrangements were made for the Japanese experts to hand over their 
training duties--both theoretical and practical--to the Indian 
staff. Up to this period the Center was run by the Fisheries De-
partment of the Government of Mysore. It was under the adminis t-
rative control of a director, and the leader of the Japanese ex-
pert team was its technical head. After 30th June 1969 the Center 
was transferred to the University of Agricultural Sciences in Ban-
galore, where it continues to function in association with a Fish-
eries College. According to reliable information, it is intended 
in the future to continue the course at the Fisheries College up 
to the level of the post-graduate diploma. 
3. Background 
The MPPTC is located on the waterfront at the juncture of two 
rivers . Mangalore is a rapidly developing fishing center. The 
Inda-Norwegian project at Karwar, which was started in 1962, has 
resulted in the mechanisation of some 500 fishing boats in the 
Mangalore region. Mangalore is a collecting and distribution cent-
er for various kinds of fish, such as mackerel , sardine, prawn (or 
shrimp), shark and cat fish, as well as for agricultural products, 
such as mango, pineapple, cashew and other vegetables. This acti-
vity provides an excellent environment for the working of the Cent-
er . 
The Kanara coastline is 180 miles long and fisheries in the re-
gion are considered to be more productive, particularly in mackerel 
and sardine. In 1956 a government freezing plant was set up in 
Mangalore and since then frozen fish has been exported. Today Man-
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galore has five freezing plants, and numerous ice plants belonging 
to both the public and the private sectors . It is estimated that 
sales of frozen fish produce a revenue of Rs . 10 million . It is 
said that a few years ago landings of the traditional "rampani" 
were so abundant during the peak season that as much as 25,000 tons 
a year of fish was turned to manure, due to inadequate transport 
facilities . Today the establishment of ice plants has however con-
siderably reduced this wastage. There are several fisheries high 
schools and primary schools, as well as government training centers 
that dispense training in modern fishing techniques. There are 
also many ice plants, cold storage, canning and freezing plants in 
the region. All these factors enhance the importance of the MPPTC 
and justify its location in the area . Indeed under these conditions 
the situation appears particularly appropriate for the training of 
technical personnel ("Indian Seafoods", Ernakulam, December 1969). 
In addition to this and besides the existence of the Japanese 
training center and the Inda-Norwegian Project at Karwar, the Pre-
Investment Survey of Fishing Harbours in 1969 had recommended the 
building of fishing harbours at Maple and Honavar in collaboration 
with Indian, Polish and Yugoslav consultants, at a cost of Rs. 180 
million and Rs. 120 million respectively. 
4. Performance 
The Center provides a one-year training course in the process-
ing of marine products, fruit and vegetables, for 30 students . Stu-
dents from all over the country between the ages of 18 and 30 hold-
ing at science degree or a diploma in food technology are eligible 
to apply. At the end of the year's course a diploma in Fish Process-
ing Technology of the Government of Mysore is awarded to the success-
ful trainees. Trainees are also selected from government depart-
ments and private food industries. The first training course was 
opened on 1st July 1963. During 1963-1964 30 candidates were train-
ed in the Center. The figures for succeeding years were 28, 30 
and 25 respectively. In 1967 a postgraduate course replaced the 
original course and since then the 30 trainees per year have been 
awarded postgraduate Diplomas in Fish Processing Technology. 
Japan, though recording an annual catch of some 7.2 million tons 
(India 1.4 million, Peru 10 million and the rest of the world 60 
million) nevertheless, together with other advanced fishing count-
ries, finds it extremely difficult to exploit the entirety of its 
resources. Indeed these countries have been able to exploit only 
a part of their marine resources and there are still great possibi~ 
lities for increased fish production and fish farming, the latter 
still in its experimental stage. Japan is a fish eating nation and 
a leading country in the building of fishing boats. Guided by tra-
dition, experience and the need to take radical action, it was 
quick to switch to modern methods of processing marine products, 
i . e . canning and freezing. Today freeze-drying, reduction, etc. 
have also been introduced . More than 200 species of marine pro-
ducts are landed. The greater part of the catch comes from deep 
sea fishing, coastal fisheries, and intensive fish cultivation in 
enclosed areas. It may be noted that fish farming over one hectare 
costs very little more than the farming of one hectare of land, the 
actual work involved being virtually less. 
The Japanese lay stress on high quality of processed products, 
hygiene, careful handling and close attention to detail during pro-
cessing. Modern cold storage and canning facilities today place 
the country's processing industry on a pedestal of its own . 
India can learn a great deal from Japanese experience . It still 
relies exclusively on its coastal fisheries, whereas what India 
most needs is to develop deep sea fisheries hacked by up-to-date 
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processing techniques . This then is where modern fish processing 
methods , such as freezing and canning (as practised in Japan and 
other advanced fishing nations) come into the picture, together 
with the Japanese technique of making fish ham and sausage . Follow-
ing the example set by Japan, India clearly wishes to develop her 
deep sea fisheries and become a major exporter of processed products. 
The Center is made up of four sections , each under a separate head: 
freezing , canning, ham and sausage production, and engineering . 
The freezing section has amodernrefrigeration plant with fully au-
tomatic controls . The technique applied is the contact plate freez-
ing system, whereas the Indo-Norwegian Project has both contact and 
tunnel freez.ing . There are two cold storage rooms with an ante-room, 
and the cold storage doors are provided with automatic air curtains 
to maintain high efficiency . The preparation room is air-condition-
ed . The temperature in the cold storage room is maintained at -2 0°c . 
Most of the fluid in the fish is converted into ice, so that fro zen 
fish may be maintained for a long time . Thawing is the final stage 
in the overall fish freezing process, i . e. defrosting . The "Refri-
geration chain" permits control of "dessication, discoloration, de-
hydration" as well as other physical, histological and biochemical 
changes during storage . In fact the freezing process actually con-
sists of the following stages: pre-handling, panning, freezing , 
packing and cold storage. 
The canning section is equipped with different types of automa-
tic and semi-automatic vacuum seamers . The canning process involv-
es handling of raw material, weighing , packing, filling, seaming, 
boiler operations, retort operation, packing, sterilisation, stor-
age, etc. A vacuum created in the tin by means of heat helps to 
preserve the flavour and vitamins in the fish, delays corrosion of 
the tin-plate, reduces pressure inside the tin during sterilisation, 
creates unfavourable conditions for the developlment of aerobic bac-
teria and prevents gaseous breakdown of products or proteins . Ste-
rilisation (at about 108°C) inactivates tissue enzymes, destroys 
micro-organisms and transforms the raw fish into an edible product . 
It prolongs the shelf life of the product while preserving its nut-
ritive quality. Frozen fish may also be canned after thawing. 
The ham and sausage section is equipped with an automatic conti-
nuous cooker for the manufacture of fish ham and sausage in synthe-
tic casings . The various operations involved are : selection of the 
raw material, treatment of the raw material, cutting, pasting, mix-
ing, stuffing, sealing, cooking, cooling, drying, inspection, pack-
ing and storage . In fact the appearance of fish ham and sausage 
has been the most spectacular recent development in the Japanese 
fish processing industry . It was developed from the traditional 
fish-cake called Kamaboko as a result of a change in food habits 
and the need to utilise species unsuitable for the Kamaboko . The 
use of "butyl rubber hydrochloride sausage casings" and of preser-
vatives such as sorbic acid have made the ham and sausage manufac-
ture a flourishing industry. Sausage is invariably made from froz-
en fish . The flesh is separated from the skin and bone and washed 
(as in the preparation of Kamaboko) . It is then passed through a 
food chopper and subsequently ground with addition of salt, veget-
able oil and preservatives. Starch is added and the sausage mix-
ture is stuffed into synthetic casings which are sealed with alumi-
nium wire closures . The sealed sausages are processed for about 
one hour at 86°C in continuous water cookers. The aluminium clos-
ure prevents reinfection of the shelf life of fish sausage or ham . 
The preparation of the latter is slightly differ ent from that of 
sausage which requires one month ' s preparation without refrigera-
tion . Besides training in the processing of marine products like 
sardine , tuna, shrimp (prawn), mackerel , lobster, crab , the Center 
also provides training in the processing of meat , poultry, eggs , 
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fruit and vegetables . 
In fact , the Center gives theoretical training in the following 
fields : general fisher i es problems (such as fishing methods, utili-
sation, marketing , etc . ) as well as fisheries by- products such as 
fish oil, fish meal; the chemistry and microbiology of food and 
fish ; fish preservation (various methods such as smoking , curing , 
pickling, chilling , drying , dehydration , etc . ); cold preservation 
of marine products, meat, fruit and vegetables; refrigeration (mak-
ing of ice, freezing and cold storage); canning, preparation of 
fish ham and sausage ; quality control and adjacent problems, and 
lastly the fundamentals of mechanical engineering in the food pro-
cessing industry , including refrigeration . 
Practical training accounts for 60 percent of the curriculum and 
includes training in food chemistry and microbiology, handling, op-
eration of refrigeration machinery , freezing techniques, canni ng 
methods , preparation of ham and sausage, as well as the basic prin-
ciples of operation of food processing machinery . 
The purpose of the Center is to provide training in these sub-
jects. It was not intended to have it undertake any other activi-
ties. It turned out to be difficult to assess the diffused impact 
and spread effect of this training based on techniques imported 
from Japan, a posteriori and any changes that occurred were the 
result of subsequent activities by men who had received training 
at the MPPTC. The Center worked on a non-profit basis, and the 
products processed were distributed localiy at cost price. 
5. Impact 
There is no doubt that the training given at the Center has had 
favourable repercussions on the food processing industry in general . 
Former students are associated with or have been responsible for 
setting up canning and processing plants in the states of Tamil 
Nadu, Maharashtra and Orissa under government auspices, as well as 
in Gujarat on a co-operative basis. Many former trainees are now 
serving as chemists, quality control officers , technologists and 
production managers of food processing industries in the Central as 
well as the State governments. Apart from Indian personnel, two 
officers from Ceylon have also been given training at the Center . 
These technicians undoubtedly introduce into food processing the 
highest quality standards required for export of processed marine 
and other food products . ("Indian Sea Foods", Vol.V, No . 2 , 1967) 
As a result of the training given by the Center, the number of 
food technologists working in the country has increased, and the 
plants they are associated with certainly process food products 
according to the most up-to-date methods and the strictest criteria 
of hygiene . The increase in fish exports may be attributed to im-
proved processing methods , the initiative and dynamism shown by ex-
porters of marine products and also the great need for foreign ex-
change . Whichever way one looks at the problem, there can be no 
doubt that the technicians trained at the MPPTC have played a most 
important role in this field of development . 
The indigenous method of fish processing was chiefly salting 
and drying, and even today about one-half of the fish landed in 
the country is preserved according to these traditional methods , 
and consumed internally. Modern methods which attribute greater 
importance to canning and less to freezing · ·have raised the export 
potential. In the region under consideration for example , the can-
ning factories resort to the practice of ice-salting to can the 
fish. A 200 gramme can costs Rs. 2 , whereas in the case of frozen 
fish the cost is mor e than five times as great . A government freez-
ing factory at Mangalore employs the Japanese (or MPPTC) method of 
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fish freezing, as a result of which large quantities of frozen 
prawns are exported to the U. S.A . Indeed the demand for frozen 
prawns in the U.S.A . has been a considerable stimulus to the prawn 
freezing industry. Frozen fish are rarely canned. Large process-
ing plants tend to export frozen fish, while the smaller plants ex-
port canned fish, fruit and vegetables . The former sell abroad, 
while the latter sell their canned food on the internal market. 
Fish ham and sausage are prepared in the Cochin region . 
The training given by the MPPTC has undoubtedly increased know-
ledge and skills in the Indian fish processing industry. The coun-
try has moved fast to adopt modern methods of canning and freezing . 
This has resulted in larger quantities of fish being processed, and, 
compared to traditional methods, has increased the income derived 
from this activity. Formerly a 10 ton capacity freezing plant was 
an unheard of luxury. The development of food processing has also 
modified the pattern of consumption, just as this pattern has in 
its turn affected the food processing industry. As has already 
been remarked, a serious food situation makes it essential to find 
other sources of food and fish, in particular, when properly pro-
cessed, finds a ready market. Properly processed fish retains its 
nutritive value and thus becomes a valid substitute for food grains. 
As more and more processing plants are brought into operation, em-
ployment possibilities also increase. Formerly only fishermen were 
employed in this type of activity; however, today the numbers em-
ployed in the proc~ssing industries have risen considerably as a 
result of the large numbers of technicians and skilled workers 
needed. The country's export earnings from marine products have 
soared to more than Rs . 250 million. This is obviously a stabilis-
ing factor in the adverse balance of payment situation. The fish 
processing plants have installed modern machinery and the high 
cost of buildings and equipment (greater than ever before) has 
brought about a situation increasingly favourable to savings and 
investment. 
There is also a greater demand for sea-going "processing facto-
ries", as well as for the most up-to-date techniques such as freeze-
drying and dehydration. 
Processing of fish at sea has yet to be introduced in India but 
this will hardly be possible before India develops her deep sea 
fisheries. 
6. Evaluation 
It may be said that the project, in association with certain mo-
dernising trends characteristic of our time , has encouraged the 
Indian fish processing industry to adopt, to a large extent, the 
modern techniques developed in the more advanced countries. In 
fact this process should continue unless a revolutionary change 
occurs in the industry and the new methods introduced are used to 
supplement existing indigenous practices . 
The Center has fulfilled the purpose for which it was set up, 
i . e. the training of technicians . In 1969 the Indian authorities, 
by then fully conversant with the subject, took over responsibility 
for the training course, and the Japanese experts, who had done 
their work with great enthusiasm, returned to Japan . It may be 
said that the Project has opened up new horizons for the Indian 
fish processing industry. 
One former trainee of the Center stated that the Japanese ex-
perts, who were seven in number , had taught well and with spirit . 
They had themselves cleaned their rooms, which had encouraged their 
Indian counterparts also to sweep and cle an . They had set a high 
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standard for hygiene, quality control, correct handling of raw mate-
rial and careful attention to the details of the work. They had 
even insisted on shoes being changed on entering the preparation 
room! The results of their honest efforts can be said to be far-
reaching . Another former trainee was frank enough to admit that 
the Indian counterparts did not share the enthusiasm of the Japanese, 
though later on, he added, following their example, they too became 
"leaders". 
It was clear that there was an obvious and pressing need for te-
chnical know-how to be brought to this field, and this was achieved 
mainly through training . Transfer of this knowledge was possible 
owing to adequate "absorptive capacity" on the spot, and the import-
ed technology did much to increase the profitability of local plants . 
The Project has achieved its purpose, though the impression remains 
that only part of the problem has been solved: graduates from the 
Center might well find themselves under conditions of control and 
supervision that would prevent them from disseminating the techniqu-
es they had acquired at the MPPTC. This possibility however is fair -
ly remote, since as a general rule processing plants are eager to 
accept modern methods . Furthermore, it may indeed be true that in 
many spheres technicians as such cannot be prime movers. Neverthe-
less, the knowledge and techniques acquired by them would serve them 
in good stead in the plants employing them. Particular stress has 
been laid on hygiene and quality control. When compared with the 
Indo-Norwegian Project which covered fishing, processing, marketing 
and the overall raising of the standard of living of the fishermen, 
the work done by the MPPTC may not appear so sensational, but we 
nevertheless feel that it has made a contribution, however small, 
towards the development of the fish processing industry. There was 
no base from which to start the work (such as the Indo-Norwegian 
Project had in the fishermen of the region), but the beneficiaries 
were the trainees of the MPPTC and through them the food processing 
industry of the country. 
The technical assistance provided here by Japan has enabled India 
to obtain more specialists in marine products processing, thereby 
developing its fisheries processing industry as a whole . 
PART II CASE STUDY: THE INDO- NORWEGIAN PILOT PROJECT, KERALA, INDIA 
1. Introduction 
Kerala is the largest fishing state in India. It is the major ex-
porter of processed fish to foreign countries . It has a short coast 
line (10 percent of all India) but produces 30 percent of total pro-
duction . Fish eating is a regular feature of the diet . The types 
of craft used for fishing are dub-outs , plank built canoes and cata-
marans . Mechanised fishing has introduced boat seines, gill nets, 
drift nets for sardines , long lines for horse mackerel, coast nets 
and shore seines. The advent of mechanisation, apart from providing 
a stimulus to the building of motor boats, has encouraged the estab-
lishment of modern processing plants, thereby increasing India's 
production of sea~foods . Commercial trawling has existed for some 
twenty years, gill netting and purse seining being used side by side . 
Over the last two decades, and thanks largely to the Indo-Norwegian 
Project, the Kerala fishermen have been able, with the help of mecha-
nisation, to make a breakthrough from traditional modes of fishing 
and consumption of fresh sea foods, or sea foods preserved for off 
seasons, to modern methods . 
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2. Objectives 
The Indo-Norwegian pilot project was started in Kerala under a 
tripartite agreement concluded between the Governments of India 
and Norway and the United Nations on 17th October 1952. The objec-
tives were to elaborate and transmit modern techniques and methods 
of organisation adapted to local conditions for the development of 
the fishing industry. The agreement also aimed at improving me-
thods of locating and catching fish, as well as handling, process-
sing and marketing . It was pointed out that the ultimate success 
of the Inda-Norwegian Project would not only substantially raise 
incomes, but would change the social and cultural attitudes of the 
local fishermen affected by the Project. It was felt that after 
finding suitable techniques it would be necessary to devise ade-
quate means of transmitting and getting them accepted by the local 
fishermen. With these ends in view the INP began its pilot work 
in two neighbouring coastal villages six miles north of Quilon, 
Sakthikulankara and Neendakara. 
The first Supplementary Agreement (Janaury 1953) covering the 
pilot project stated the following objectives in respect of the 
two fishing villages (Sakthikulankara and Neendakara) : 
(a) increase in returns for the fishermen's work 
(b) efficient distribution of fresh fish and improvement of fish 
products; 
(c) improvement of the health and sanitary conditions of the fish-
ing population, and 
(d) a higher standard of living for the community in the project 
area in general. 
The second Supplementary Agreement (April, 1956), in addition 
to the objectives promulgated under the first, stressed the need 
for providing certain facilities in the Quilon district hospital 
and improving the supply of fresh water to areas adjoining the Pro-
ject. It was also decided that a fishing center at Cochin should 
be started to train fishermen in the handling and operation of me-
chanised fishing trawlers and to study the economic feasibility of 
shrimp and fish trawling. 
The third supplementary Agreement (November, 1961) was aimed at 
modifying and expanding the schemes already executed and extending 
the Project to cover the States of Tamil Nadu and Mysore. The new 
Agreement signed in 1967 defined the work to be done by the INP as 
follows: 
(a) completion of the schemes initiated under the third Supplement-
ary Agreement (1961)1 
(b) development of off-shore and deep sea exploratory fishing; 
Cc) practical training and demonstration or modern technology on 
land and at seai and 
(d) procurement of equipment for vessels and shore installations. 
The present Agreement is to remain in force until March 1972. 
3. Management 
From the inception of the Project until April 1963, it was admi-
nistered by the Kerala State Government, under the supervision of 
the Government of India and in consultation with the Norwegian Pro-
ject Director. After the second Supplementary Agreement, as the 
main objectives of the pilot project at the two villages were at-
tained, it was handed over to the Kerala Government with such of 
its units as the health center, ice plant and cold store, boat 
building yard, workshop and Premo pipe factory, etc . With that 
new centers were started at Cannanore (Kerala), Mandapam (T.N . ) 
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and Karwar (Mysore) , and work expanded at Ernakulam. 
In 1963 the Government of India took over the administration of 
the Project at Cochin. Administration is now the responsibility 
of a Director in consultation, for important matters, with the Nor-
wegian Project Director . The latter leads a team of 23 Norwegians 
particularly qualified in fisheries technology, engineering, navi-
vation, processing, etc . 
Norway has provided all the necessary equipment as well as the 
technical experts. To date, Norway has spent Rs. 120 million on 
the Project, while India's contribution has been Rs. 60 million. 
4 . Performance of the Project from 1952 to April 1963 
The original project areas were intended mainly for carrying 
out experiments and disseminating the results of these experiments 
amongst other fishing centers . Even though the 1952 Agreement had 
envisaged an overall programme of development projects for the coun-
try, the bulk of the aid was for fishing only. Before the Norwegi-
ans came there had been no survey or description of the fishing 
community. Contact with the fishermen has now produced an interest-
ing picture of the local fishing communities in the two villages 
(see reference (3) by A .M. Klausen). 
In the villages of Sakthikulankara and Neendakara, Klausen de-
tected a relationship between the Roman Catholics and the spirit 
of capitalism. Even though the Catholics constituted a minority 
group in the villages, they were modern in outlook, as compared 
with the other population groups--Araya, Nair, Irava etc. Klausen 
found that the Catholic community was more responsive to work done 
under the Project and acted as an opinion leader to other communiti-
es. The Catholics maintained closer contact with the Project and, 
being more developed, were quick to change to mechanised fishing, 
unlike the Araya community which was backward. But for them, the 
two villages would not have achieved their present stage of develop-
ment. 
(a) Mechanisation of fishing: 
The traditional equipment of the Kerala fishermen included both 
seine nets and small (kochuvallam) and big (thanguvallam) canoes. 
Mechanisation came in with the Norwegians and resulted in an exten-
sion of the fishing grounds, greater security and new possibiliti-
es for overcoming the monsoon breakers. Furthermore, fishing me-
thods were improved with the introduction of modern nylon nets for 
drift net fishing at night. Day and night fishing thus became a 
practical possibility in all seasons . The main advantages of the 
new methods were quicker landing of the catch, greater profits and 
reduction in size of crews . 
Mechanisation of fishing craft was one of the main objectives 
of the Project from its inception . The work started with an at-
tempt to mechanise existing canoes . It appeared, however, that 
"the possibility of their becoming viable economic units was found 
to be remote and, consequently, the idea of mechanisation of indi-
genous craft was abandoned. Efforts were then directed to finding 
new types of mechanised boats" (see P . 153 Science and Technology, 
UN. Vol.III). The Project planned to design and build special typ-
es of powered craft suitable for local conditions. A boat build-
yard was built in Neendakara in 1954, and Norwegian models were re-
produced. In 1962 a new type of INP boat, rather bigger, with a 
more powerful motor and with trawl equipment, was built. Such 
boats have now found a secure place on the west coast . Up to the 
end of 1963, 143 boats of different sizes were constructed of which 
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125 were distributed to the fishermen at subsidized prices . 
(b) Training 
Motor-powered fishing requires skills very different from those 
needed for canoe fishing, both from the point of view of operation 
and maintenance . With a view to training fishermen in the handling 
and operation of mechanised fishing vessels, improved fishing tech-
niques, manufacture of gear and fish handling , a training center 
for fishermen was established in 1955 offering a 6-month training 
course. A total of 167 fishermen were trained by the Center up to 
1963. Special training in purse seining was given to 12 fishermen 
and 3 officers at Cochin . Besides these, 8 officers specialised 
in different branches of fisheries science and one physicist were 
trained in Norway . 
(c) Preservation and marketing of fish 
In order to ensure better preservation and marketing of fish , 
the Project introduced modern processing methods and established 
ice and cold storage plants at Neendakara . The Project organised 
a Fishermen ' s Marketing Co-operative Society to market fish in the 
hinterland (where fresh fish was not normally delivered) using im-
ported insulated fish vans and freezing units . In 1961 the Fisher-
men ' s Sales Organisation (INF) Ltd . was formed . This created some 
concern among local fish merchants and it was found that a lack of 
mutual understanding between Project, fishermen and merchants could 
have serious consequences . 
(d) Health and sanitation 
It is interesting to note that the INP, in its attempt to raise 
the general standard of living of the whole fishing community, paid 
particular attention to public hygiene , sanitation and medical ser-
vices . Originally the pilot project had consisted of three sections 
--fishing , health and construction and administration . A health 
center was established at Neendakara consisting of a maternity ward , 
preventive and curative clinics , a T . B. clinic , a family planning 
center, etc. Provision of clean drinking water was also found to 
be necessary. The project initiated a scheme to supply good drink-
ing water from a lake to the Project area . A pipe factory was esta-
blished which was later handed over to the Public Health and engin-
eering department. 
(e) Experimental and exploratory fishing 
Exploratory prawn trawling carried out as from 1955 by 4 medium-
size boats and 3 schooners belonging to the Project, besides prov-
ing the existence of prawn and the possibility of trawling for them , 
paved the way for commercial prawn fishing from Cochin . The Pro-
ject ' s fishing boats successfully demonstrated the us e of purse 
seining for sardine and mackerel for t he fi rst time in the countr y . 
One of the schooners also did a certai n amount of marine res earch 
and collected much valuable oceanogr aphic data. The Project assis t -
ed the Kerala University in building and operating a research vessel 
and oceanographic laboratory ; it also helped the Centra l Mar ine F i -
sheries Research Institute with oceanographic research . 
5 . Performance of the Project from April 1963 onwards 
A new era began in the history of the Project when it wa s taken 
over by the Government of India on 1st April 1963 and its act i vi t i -
es extended to the states of Tamil Nadu and Mysore . The Project 
assisted the Kerala Government in building a fishing harbour at Can-
nanora . It undertook construction of a modern slipway and marine 
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engineering workshop at Ernakulam for fishing boats in need of un-
derwater repairs . 
(a) Exploratory fishing 
Due to an insufficient number of large fishing boats , vast 
areas beyond a depth of 25 fathoms (1 fathom= 6ft . ; 1 . 83 m. ) had 
remained unexplored . Commercial fishing would benefit greatly if 
those areas could be exploited. To do this the Project acquired 
three modern trawlers from Norway in 1966 specially equipped for 
shrimp and deep sea trawling . Valuable data was thus collected at 
depths of between 25-60 fathoms extending from Karwar to Cape Como-
rin . 
In 1967, trawling operations uncovered rich deposits of prawns 
west of Quilon . An area of about 1,000 square miles in this region 
at depths of between 175-200 fathoms was explored by two other re-
search vessels . Lobster was also found . Survey work is to be un-
dertaken . 
Different types of gear are also being tried out in order to de-
termine the types of most suitable for fishing deep sea prawn and 
lobster . The Project also started purse seining investigations of 
distant tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean at present exploited com-
mercially by Japanese and Soviet fishing fleets. 
(b) Oceanographic and fisheries research 
A research vessel was brought from Norway in 1961 and a vast 
area between Goa and Cape Comorin surveyed. The Central Marine 
Fisheries Research Institute at Mandapam also uses this vessel for 
research . The work done to date includes a study of the upwelling 
pattern upon which depends the success of much pelagic (between sur-
face and great depth) and dermersal (on or near the bottom) fishing . 
A preliminary assessment of primary production along the west coast 
has been carried out . The Project has also assisted the National 
Institute of Oceanography, the Geological Survey of India and the 
Hydrographic Survey of India, and other institutions by providing 
facilities on board its research vessel . 
(c) Training 
The present Agreement provides for the training at the Ernakulam 
Center of skippers, mates, engineers and mechanics for boats, as 
well as shore technicians such as service mechanics, freezing plant 
operator~ and processing technicians . Seventy- five t r ainees have 
so far been trained in these fields . Besides 1 , 367 fishermen have 
been given training in fishing techniques (March 1969 figures) . 
(d) Mechanisation of fishing craft 
In 1963 the boat building yard at Neendakara was handed over to 
the Kerala Government. The Project has established three boat 
building yards at Cannanore, Mandapam and Karwar . Imported marine 
diesel engines and other equipment are being supplied to these cen-
ters by the Project. 
(e) Processing of marine products 
Since it aims at introducing modern preservation methods , the 
Project has constructed three well-equipped ice and cold storage 
plants in the three centers and one at Ernakulam . These function 
with contact freezing as well as tunnel freezing . A fish meal 
plant has also been built at Mandapam . 
A well equipped modern prawn processing hall and testing labora-
tory have been established at Ernakulam . Prawn processing for ex-
port was started with the raw material provided by Project vessels 
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since February 1967 , The frozen product is exported to the U. S . A. 
and although the primary purpose of the processing unit is to in-
troduce advanced fish processing techniques it is expected that it 
could in this way earn foreign exchange worth Rs . 1 . 5-2 million a 
year. The Project does not take raw material from the public, but 
depends on the catch brought in by its own fishing boats and govern-
ment vessels operating from Cochin . 
(f) Marine engineering 
India now has more than 6,000 mechanised fishing craft, of which 
over 100 medium trawlers are 60 ft . to 100 ft . in overall length . 
There are however no well-equipped marine engineering workshops or 
dry dock facilities available exclusively for such vessels. Conse-
quently, the larger vessels depend entirely on merchant shipping 
docks and workshops for dry dock repairs, which often results in 
loss of valuable fishing time . Being aware of this need, the Pro-
ject has started work on a slipway capable of docking vessels of 
up to 120 ft . in length and a marine engineering workshop at a cost 
of Rs. 2.5 million--the first of its kind in the country . 
(g) Distribution and marketing 
In 1966 the Project established a modern fish stall at Alwaye 
equipped with a medium- sized freezer and storage room . In 1968 
another stall was opened on Project premises . A number of other 
stalls are to be set up at various centers . This has made possible 
both better and more hygienic distribution and marketing of fresh 
fish . 
Exploratory fishing, training of fishermen, mechanisation of 
craft, distribution, etc . are also being done in the other Project 
centers such as Mandapam and Karwar, both started in 1962. 
6. Impact 
The impact of the Project can be analysed in two ways--on the 
fishing population and on the fishing industry in general. The im-
pact of the pilot project on the fishing communities of the villag-
es of Sakthikulankara and Neendakara was far reaching . Klausen 
shows that the Catholics , with their spirit of enterprise, were 
able to adapt to the new situation more swiftly . The Araya commu-
nity on the other hand , which was traditionalist in its outlook, 
lagged behind the Catholic minority resisting the changes introduc-
ed by the INP . They were reluctant for example to fish at night . 
We have already seen that a major objective of this technical 
assistance Project was to improve the standard of living of the 
local fishermen . Indeed, it was able to increase income, output, 
employment and investment and improve skills in fishing and i n the 
industry . According to Klausen the socio-cultural attitudes of 
the fishermen in the two villages have also changed . When mecha-
nised boats were introduced the "Catholic fishermen, instead of 
waiting for the fish shoals to knock at their doors, went out for 
weeks to find the fish". This represented a major breakthrough in 
fish catching . The fishing grounds were thus e x tended and wi t h 
modern equipment (echo sounders, winches, radio , telephones , elec-
t r ic lights, etc . ) fishing as such underwent a revolution . Intro-
duction of trawlers and nylon twines also further improved the 
situation . 
The fishermen met the challenge of modern boats very enthusias-
tically . They were happy to "own" motor-powered boats from 1956 
onwards . While the Catholics were very active and enterprising , 
the Arayas remained slow to accept the new techniques . It should 
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be pointed out that when the motor-powered boats were first build, 
profits from themwerenot very encouraging. But since then net per 
capita income has increased substantially. The following figures 
by Klausen give the net income per fisherman per year. 
Year 
22 ft. boat 
Canoe 
25 ft. boat 
1959 
251 
294 
Rs. In 1959 the net income from 
1960 1961 
764 616 
439 473 
991 1,381 
the power driven boat was not very 
great. In subsequent years it cer-
tainly registered a sharp increase. 
The fishermen are clearly attract-
ed by higher incomes, and if the 
motorboats had given no greater in-
come than before, they would natut-
ally have reverted to the old techniques. Only when deeply convinc-
ed through personal experience that mechanisation was yielding good 
results would they adopt the new methods. This approach has been 
in every way encouraged by the Project. 
The co-operative movement in fish marketing launched by the Pro-
ject on Norwegian lines was at first greeted with wry humour. It 
was not as successful as the new fishing techniques introduced in 
the region. "Co-operative sale of the fish would bar one of the 
most important courses of career since fishermen would all have to 
remain fishermen" (Klausen) . The local fish merchants resisted the 
organisation as a result of which the Fishermen ' s Sales Organisa-
tion failed. This experiment taught the Project that the fish mar-
keting problem could not be solved in a day and that co-ordination 
between the Project, the fishermen and the fish merchants was essen-
tial. In 1966 the market was in the hands of the private merchants. 
The attempt by the Project to improve on existing canoes also 
failed and so entirely new types of boats suited to local conditions 
had to be built. 
The health center had done valuable service in giving instruc-
tions about optimum diet and hygiene. It was noted that there was 
a marked increase in the average size and weight of a new-born child, 
by 2.54 ems. and 7 ounces respectively . The fishermen were able to 
get a good and stable income. From 1963 onwards, there was an in-
crease in expenditure on non-food items. The annual average income 
increased from Rs . 325 in 1963 to Rs. 1586 in 1963 . Indebtedness 
declined by 35 percent . Fishing, which was considered a menial job, 
began to be recognised and respected as a profession (Indo-Norwegian 
News Letter, October 1969). 
Educational facilities and fisheries training with the aid of 
highly skilled techniques increased, as did employment opprotuniti-
es. The Arayas accepted government posts in the Project . Klausen 
states that the Catholic minority reacted well to innovations in 
fishing techniques and less well to the new systems of distribution. 
The Arayas, on the other hand, reacted poorly to mechanisation but 
favourably to all services made available to them by the Project's 
health section and administration. 
The Project besides disseminating modern fishing techniques in 
the fishing community has also introduced modern methods in the 
processing plants, particularly with regard to frozen fish. The 
export of frozen shrimp and other marine products has increased 
and, doubtless due also to the Project, Kerala now leads the na-
tion in fishing, and fish processing. 
7. Evaluation 
Rather than find appropriate techniques suited to local condi-
tions, it is even more important to devise ways and means of trans-
mitting them and getting them accepted by the fishermen. The Indo-
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Norwegian Project has done valuable work in evolving techniques 
suited to the needs of local fishermen and in most cases these have 
been accepted. In the case of mechanised boats, the Catholic fish-
ermen, who were more modern in outlook, adopted them readily where-
as the Arayas gave preference to the distribution system and to im-
provements in hygiene . 
Even though at first there was not enough profit, the fishermen 
were confident that with better equipment they would be able to go 
farther out and catch more fish . The coats gradually became more 
popular owing to such incentives as higher and more stable prices 
for the catch, which was not the case of canoes. 
In the case of marketing the problem was more complex since it 
was largely sociological, coupled with difficulties in transport 
and distribution . We have seen that co-operative fish marketing 
did not catch on because of adverse local conditions. The fish 
merchants represented a .social elite and denounced the co-operative , 
while the fishermen could not free themselves from their grip. Un-
der the social conditions prevailing, fish flour and other new 
marine products could not yet be accepted. Fish eating is tradi-
tional and a change in food habits can only come with time. The 
traditional marketing system has to give way to a modern system. 
Unfortunately, the system introduced by the Norwegians failed, 
though nowadays co-operative marketing is common. 
When the Norwegian experts arrived at Kerala they were struck 
by the poverty and homogeneity of the coastal population. They 
were able to reduce the povery but divided the population into 
two groups, one rapidly accepting the new technology and the other 
accepting it more slowly or rejecting it altogether . There was in-
deed an improvement in the standard of living and social status of 
the local fishermen. Economic growth denoting prestige would be a 
natural demand for institutional reform favouring more investment . 
Klausen quotes the village headman at Authenthura as saying : "we 
as fishermen have not profited from the Inda-Norwegian Project, it 
is rather the opposite. We have tasted the new ways of life and 
we see the advantages of mechanised fishing among the Catholics 
but as we are not able to operate the boats succ essfully, our mis-
fortune becomes even more difficult to endure". The Project has 
now trained them to operate the boats more successfully and the 
picture is less dismal . The yardstick to evaluate the significance 
of the Project would be the extent to which the Norwegian techni-
cians have been able to infuse in their Indian counterparts and in 
the fishing community a long-term notion of what the country needs 
to become a major fishing nation with facilities for modern ocean 
going trawlers , up-to-date fishing gear and the latest processing 
methods and repair yards. 
Approximately Rs . 200 million have been spent on the Project 
and there are reasons to believe that this input will give adequate 
returns. The Norwegian Government has, since the beginning of the 
Project to the end of March 1968, spent about Rs. 92.4 million in 
grants. Furthermore, a credit agreement was signed on 16th Septem-
ber 1968 for a sum of Rs. 15.75 million . There has been some con-
cern that too much time is being devoted to experimenting with new 
boats (the old ones being unsuited for mechanisation) and to provid-
ing instruction in their use . But developing countries require 
assistance in the conduct of research which goes beyond mere teach-
ing and demonstration and which involves active participation in 
research . Developing countries need experts to evaluate resources 
in largeoceanareas and inland waters to help develop tropical fi-
sheries, etc . It has been suggested that programmes implemented 
by small groups of people are not likely to prove of much practical 
value (Science and Technology for Development , U.N . , page 170) . 
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This may be true but, once the number of local technicians increas-
es, the stage becomes set for steadier and more rational develop-
ment. 
The impact of the pilot projects has been noticed not only on 
the original survey villages but also on the neighbouring and other 
fishing villages of Kerala . Of the 6 , 000 motor boats at present in 
use , more than half are in Kerala . Due credit must go to the Nor-
wegians for having initiated the process of mechanisation . However, 
what India most urgently needs is that this stage of semi-mechanisa -
tion be succeeded by one of complete mechanisation , so as to b ring 
about a "blue revolution" and make the country self - sufficient in 
food and p r oducts of high quality . New horizons are being opened 
up , though the probl em is stil l far f r om being so l ved . 
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8 . Institution Building Aspects in the Fisheries Project 
(a) General remarks 
In order to ensure that transfer of technology is fully effective 
many inputs are necessary . Of these the part played by institutions 
is particularly importantl) • 
When the institutions provide the necessary incentives , the trans-
formation process i s swift . Not only do the institutions help the 
transfer to be productive but they , in turn , benefit from the pro-
duction process . When new technology finds suitable conditi ons i n 
the region where it is introduced the institutional structure in 
the region is bound to change . In fact, wherever the transfer 
practice is effective it invariably affects the institutional and 
technological aspects causing them to modernise and adapt rapidly 
to the changing situation . 
In the transitional stage of society values tend to change too 
frequently, in their turn modifying the i nstitutional structure, 
and at the same time the factors making up the institution . 
Normative relationships are said to exist when relationships be-
tween various factors abide by a common standard or norm . Those 
relationships do not purport t o be positive in their nature or to 
characterise the factors as such . They rather determine standard 
behaviour s to promote correct thi nking . Thus, for e x ample , where t he 
institutional factor is the adoption of a new technology , the norma-
tive relationship explain how the new technology and the adopter of 
that technology are related . The normative relationship is not here 
a positive one, for it must comply with a standard acceptable to the 
adopter . Thus the action pattern depends on the attitude of the 
l)"Institutions" are functionally specific social organisations 
which incorporate faster and protect normative relationships and 
action patterns, and perform functions and services which are valu-
ed in the environment (Milton J. Esman and Fred C. Bruhns " Institu-
tion Building in National Development : an Approach to Induced 
Change in Transitional Societies", in Comparative Theories of So-
cial Change, ed . by Peter W. Hollis, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Founda-
tion for Research and Human Behaviour, 1966) . 
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adopter within the framework of the process of adopting the new te-
chnology. This process has yet to evolve its own fully developed 
social organisation . 
Institution building is the process whereby the normative rela-
tionship and the action pattern are established2) . 
We maintain that it is the duty of the institution to build up 
both the one and the other . In doing so it may be said to be build-
ing itself . When the institution incorporates new ideas and actual-
ly protects them, these very ideas are automatically integrated in-
to the existing social structure . Institution building is thus the 
process by which new ideas and functions are integrated into the 
society as a whole . When society is willing to adopt a new techno-
logy, that technology finds a place in the population and to this 
extent the institution is said to have been built . 
We thus see that in the case of adopting a new technology the 
new institution penetrates gradually more and more deeply into the 
popular consciousness . When the adoption of an improved technology 
becomes socially worthwhile , we can say that it has helped to build 
up the institution . Institution building in fact may challenge the 
existing pattern of organisation and remodel it according to the re-
quirements of the day . Thus, in the case of land ownership where 
the overall pattern is weak, institution building may require that 
the pattern be remodelled as an incentive to the adoption of new 
technology. The response of the prevailing social environment to 
the institution ' s activities are also brought out by the institu-
tion building aspect . In fact this may be compared to building new 
houses in order to lodge the facts more comfortably, or at least to 
repairing and readjusting the old ones . 
(b) The marine products processing training center in Mysore 
Here we are concerned first with the way the MPPTC succeeded in 
surviving in the face of the institution building process . This 
it was able to do through technical assistance and through the in-
fluence which, by contacts and agreements, it was able to exert on 
similar organisations (INP, etc . ). 
We now come to the variable factors inherent in the institution 
building process . The fish processing technology was brought from 
Japan and other advanced fishing countries . Traditional methods 
were inadequate and the processing techniques introduced by the new 
technology appeared novel , superior in that they were modern, and 
particularly suitable in that they were economic. Certain modern 
techniques of marine product processing such as freezing, canning 
and the making of fish ham and sausages were entirely new to the 
Indian fishing industry . Prior to the introduction of freezing and 
c anning , fish were caught and processed by out-dated unproductive 
techniques. The new methods of the MPPTC (i . e . Japan and other 
countries) made possible quick hygienic processing of marine pro-
ducts as well as their preservation for long periods without dete-
rioration of quality . 
The new methods were considered superior to the old ones in that 
they were more modern and made it possible to satisfy the changing 
demands of the day . Another variable, the fact that the new methods 
were suitable, also played its role . In all activities involving 
transfer of technology , suitability to local conditions is paramount . 
2)Institution building emphasises (i) the creation of new organisa-
tions or the radical change or remodelling of the existing struc-
ture of organizations prevalent in the traditional societies, and 
(ii) the pattern of interaction between the institutions and their 
environment (Esman and Bruhns op.cit.). 
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Be it a case of full transfer, or only partial adaptation, if local 
conditions are ignored there is no chance of success. Suitability 
means that the local fishermen adopt the new technology (the mecha-
nisation of boats for example) because they find it suitable, pre-
senting certain advantages and capable of yielding higher returns . 
In all such cases the profit motive predominates . In the same way 
the adoption of freezing or canning techniques by a plant is moti-
vated by the idea of profit. 
It may be said that the three variable elements enumerated, as 
well as certain others, have been responsible for the institution 
building process in the introduction of new fish processing techno-
logy. They have been diffused into the society which is essential 
for the overall process and structure . Institution building thus 
sees to it that these new ideas are incorporated in the system and 
at the same time integrated into the region where the processing 
industry is located . 
We will now discuss certain general aspects i . e. the institution 
building variables (besides those listed above), and the institu-
tion's contacts and dealings with other organisations. 
(i) The MPPTC has played a leading role in providing training in 
freezing, canning, the preparation of fish ham and sausage and 
fisheries engineering . Being the only one of its kind, it has 
gained importance as a processing training center and set a valu-
able example to be profitably followed by others . 
(ii) The objective of the Project was to train adequate numbers of 
technical personnel. Socially speaking, it aimed at a general 
raising of the status of the fish processing industry as a whole. 
The beneficiaries are the processing plants, through the techni-
cians trained at the Center . Thus, when the goal is a valid one, 
from the social point of view, the building process may be said 
to be taking place . 
(iii) Under the project programme each year 50 trainees were given 
training in various aspects of marine products, fruit and vege-
table processing. Thus, an ever increasing number of special-
ists were made available to the industry as a whole. 
(iv) The resources made available through technical assistance 
(teaching aids , staff, machinery, etc.) contributed substantial-
ly to building up the foundation on which the training was based . 
(v) The internal structure of the Project itself made it possible 
to ensure training in modern techniques at all levels . 
(vi) The variable factors already referred to above were closely 
interlinked, each and all pursuing the same objective--i . e . im-
provement of the structure of the fish processing industry and 
the introduction with the new techniques of a spirit of novelty, 
modernisation and appropriateness. 
(vii) Control over the allocation of responsibility and the distri-
bution of the resources needed by the Project was, generally 
speaking, in the hands of the State Government, while specific 
organizations supplied the candidates . We have analysed the im-
pact made by a project on other organisations and the support 
it has obtained from them in the matter of recruiting technical 
personnel, finding resources and obtaining candidates. The Gov-
ernment, and in some cases private processing plants, sponsored 
some of their candidates for training at the Center . In this 
respect, the MPPTC was able to apply a criterion in the final 
choice, but plants requiring modern techniques had perforce to 
apply to the Project, and to that extent the latter's influence 
was strongly felt. 
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(viii) Relations of the MPPTC with institutions or agencies such 
as the lndo-Norwegian Project were based on the fact that the 
lNP was also striving to achieve general improvement in the fish 
processing industry and raise the overall standard of living of 
the fishing community . ln the Mangalore region and particularly 
at Karwar, the lndo-Norwegian Project has indeed rendered consid-
erable service to the fishermen . Conversely the fishermen have 
increased fish catches thereby providing a ready source of raw 
material to the Center for further training in processing . ln 
this regard the Project has again been able to exercise its in-
fluence on local fishermen ' s societies . 
(ix) The processing plants employing trainees from the Center were 
also coaxed into aligning themselves on the MPPTC programme . At 
the same time, the work of the Project in such aspects as the 
training of qualified personnel, research etc . has also made it 
possible to extend education through field work . Complementary 
bodies which make use of these facilities also obviously tie in 
with the programmes of the Center . The processing plants which 
had originally supplied the trainee later recovered him as a 
skilled or more highly qualified worker. Sufficient research 
was not done and therefore in this respect the lndo-Norwegian 
project did not achieve all that it set out to do . Training 
was good and the trainees are now working as technologists, 
quality control officers, etc . 
(x) Public opinion has on the whole reacted to the Project with 
enthusiasm. Though there is a strong desire to see it develop 
into another lndo-Norwegian Project, it is recognised that it 
has accomplished what was most necessary for the processing in-
dustry . The Government freezing plant at Mangalore has adopted 
the contact freezing technique as proposed by the Center and the 
management believes that the work of the Center has contributed 
vastly to an improvement of the processing industry in the State . 
The role played by information media has not been great; however, 
contact between the Project and the public has disseminated know-
ledge of modern processing methods and painted a colourful pic-
ture of the industry . 
The work done by the Center has resulted in more technical per-
sonnel working in fish processing plants, an improvement in process-
ing techniques, stricter quality control, more hygiene, a rise in 
exports of seafoods and greater economic and technical efficiency 
of the plants. These factors have all contributed to institution 
building and the introduction of the new technology. 
(c) The lndo-Norwegian project, Cochin 
The lndo- Norwegian Project became operational long before the 
MPPTC and covered the entire fishing industry from the landing of 
the catch to the final stage of the distribution of the product . 
The great novelty of the Project in the early 1950 ' s was the mecha-
nisation of fishing, which after a certain period became more pro-
fitable than the traditional method and was also an improvement in 
that boats could be operated at any time of the year and over long 
distances. This modernisation aspect, as well as the fact that 
mechanisation appeared to be particularly suited to conditions in 
the region, did much to enhance the prestige of the Project in its 
work on diffusion of the new technology. rt took the lead in mecha-
nisation and today there are more than 6,000 power-driven fishing 
craft in the country . lts goal of raising the standard of living 
of the fishing communities was to a large extent attained, particu-
larly through better health and sanitation and more up-to-date ca-
tching, processing and marketing techniques. The programme became 
a valuable stimulus to the entire industry via mechanisation, bett-
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er processing and improved distribution . The socio-cultural atti-
tudes of the fishermen have been modified by the Project, a fact 
reflected in the enthusiasm of certain sectors of the population 
for speedy mechanisation . The Project has not only devised a suit-
table technology, but has in most cases been able to get it accept-
ed by the local population . This has been particularly the case 
with mechanisation , though an attempt to introduce co- operative 
marketing of fish had been a failure . 
Much training was given in fishing, engineering and processing 
techniques which went far in raising the overall level of the in-
dustry . Experimental and exploratory fishing by the Project ' s re-
search vessels has opened up new vistas i n deep sea fishing. The 
ice and processing plants set up by the Project constitute models 
for others to follow; the boat yards and other facilities are ,help-
ing to increase the catch and the outlook of the fisherman has been 
favourably modified and modernised . The Project has exercised an 
influence on numerous plants , as well as on the Central Institutes 
for Fisheries Research , Fisheries co- operatives , Fisheries Educa-
tion, the Marine Fisheries Research Institute and others , at Erna-
kulam, Mandpam, etc . Project initiated work in freezing techniqu-
es is also being done at the MPPTC, Mangalore. Cont act with the 
public through information media is encouraging and the population 
feels a debt of gratitude to the Project for having raised the 
standard of living of the fishing communities in the region and 
generally improved the state of the industry . 
(d) Conclusions 
Both projects (the MPPTC and the INP) have common ground between 
them and they have been able to institutionalise themselves on the 
basis of the working principles and contacts described above . The 
fact that the new technology is economically sound and technically 
easy to apply, that it has been found suitable by those who have 
adopted it, as well as its manifold advantages over traditional 
practices--all go to enhance the validity of the institutional as-
pects . The projects have been instrumental in introducing new 
ideas and creating new functions through modernisation of fishing, 
processing, marketing, etc . The socio- cultural attitudes have also 
undergone a steady change . In addition to the introduction of the 
new fisheries technology together with the benefits derived from 
it, new institutions have been built up which have integrated the 
new processes . As a result of the operation of these institutions , 
fishermen's marketing societies have sprung up . Many modern pro-
cessing plants have been built, many trained workers made available 
to the labour market; export of seafoods has increased, quality has 
improved , mechanisation has been intensified , the reputation of the 
fishing industry enhanced , the relationship between new techniques 
and practices, and those adopting them stabilised , and finally, 
patterns for future action established . In short, these projects 
have greatly contributed to institution building and the process 
in this developing country is bound to pursue its course as a tre-
mendous amount still remains to be done . 
COMMENTS ON TABE's PAPER - SEIJI NAVA 
Dr . Tabe presents a very positive and favorable impact that both 
the India-Japanese training and India~Norweigian projects have had 
on the development of marine products and training of skilled labor. 
For a number of reasons, projects of this type can be successful 
and pay off can be great. The first is the consideration of the 
factor endowment . Indian Ocean is known to contain a vast amount of 
fish and marine resources . In the past, these resources have hardly 
been exploited, unlike in the case of the Atlantic and Pacific Oce-
ans . The recent increase in the tonnage of fish produced from the 
Indian Ocean has been accounted for mainly by four non-Indian Ocean 
countries, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Russia. Secondly, world demand 
for fish and other marine products has been rising rapidly . Third-
ly, because the fishery involves a relatively simple rather than 
high technology, the adoption and diffusion of technology have been 
made easier . Finally, these two projects are concentrated not on 
the national level but in a certain limited number of closely link-
ed villages where the fishery is the major occupation. 
Two projects are related but differ considerably with regard to 
the scope, expenditures and objectives . The Indo-Norweigian project 
covers the entire fishing industry from the landing of the catch to 
the final stage of the distribution of the marine products, as well . 
as research . 
On the other hand, in the case of the India-Japan project, train-
ing of labor skill in the processing of marine products, vegetables 
and fruits is its basic objective although Dr . Tabe does not fully 
high~light this. The problems and difficulties associated with the 
Norweigian project are likely to be greater than those of the Japa-
nese project. Modern fisheries require an urban rather than the 
rural base of operations involving motorized vessels, fishing har-
bours, storage facilities and access to markets. 
Dr. Tabe points out certain indications as the sign of success 
for these projects . For example, income, foreign exchange earnings 
and employment are said to have gone up as the result of these two 
projects . But no systematic figures are provided and no attempt is 
made to qualify possible benefits and costs of the projects . The 
only income figures cited are of 1959 to 1961 or those of some 15 
years ago . Certain crucial figures such as prices, the size of ex-
ports in relation to total products, the export and domestic market 
distribution are not given . Although the author describes that the 
Catholic group has adopted the mechnization of fishing boats more 
readily than the Araya group, no statistical information on such 
factors as income distribution is presented. 
While the Norweigian project still goes on, the Japanese project 
was terminated in 1969, when Indian authorities took over responsi-
bility for the training course. Dr. Tabe states that Indian staff 
became fully conversant with the subject and Japanese experts were 
no longer needed. Does the disengagement symbolize Indian success 
in obtaining the new capacity to produce trained man-power in the 
field? Or to what extent, did this indicate the end of politically 
pre-determined technical assistance? 
As a whole, the paper does deliver the main and important mess-
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age . Namely, transfer and diffusion of technology especially in a 
field such as fisheries can't be expected to occur as a spontane-
ous process . Rather, it requires institutionalized channels of ac-
tion and assistance to identify and adapt a most appropriate tech-
nology and to increase the absorptive capacity . 
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THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE FULL UTI LIZATION 
OF RESOURCES 
NAK KWAN KIM* 
Introduction 
Before the end of the Second World War, the southern part of Ko-
rea was predominantly an agricultural product producing economy 
and most of the manufacturing facilities were located in the north-
ern part of the country . The division of Korea in 1945 led to 
those industrial facilities, including major electrical power gene-
rating complexes, being absorbed into the north . Whatever progress 
the Republic of Korea made after the division was virtually erased 
when the country was devastated by the Korean War of 1950-1953 . 
Persistent inflationary pressures threatened the daily lives of 
the rapidly growing population which was swelled by massive migra-
tion to the southern part of the country . 
The Republic of Korea not only suffered from an acut e shorta~e 
of vital manufacturing goods but was also troubled by severe short-
ages of staple foods . The unemployment situation steadily deterio-
rated and this caused considerable social unrest . 
During the eight years following the cease- fire , the Republic 
of Korea strove to recover from the economic catastrophe caused by 
the war, relying heavily on foreign assistance, much of which was 
in the form of grants-in- aid . A large amount of final consumer 
goods flowed into the country to help the population to sustain a 
subsistence standard of living . However, it was far from suffici-
ent to bring about self- propelling economic g r owth . Most of the 
population had to suffer stagnant, if not deteriorating , economic 
conditions and intolerable social injustice . 
In an attempt to save the country from economic collapse , the 
armed forces assumed control in 1961 and gave top priority to eco-
nomic development . The new dynamic Government realized that not 
only would the foreign grants- in-aid not continue forever but also 
that reliance on such aids alone would never solve the basic econo-
mic conditions of the country : the country itself had to be self-
motivated . Drastic changes in basic economic development strategi-
es were needed to accelerate growth on a sound basis and the Gov-
ernment launched an ambitious industrialization scheme placing the 
*Currently an Economic Affairs Officer (Senior) , Research and Plan-
ning Division, ECAFE secretariat, Bangkok, Thailand. The opinions 
expressed in this paper are strictly the author ' s own and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the ECAFE secretariat . 
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strongest emphasis on export expansion . 
The new Government exerted a strenuous effort to create employ-
ment opportunities by injecting huge doses of capital into manufac-
turing industries .and social overhead capital, such as electricity 
and transportation. Monetary and fiscal policies were redesigned 
in order to be effective in mobilizing domestic financial resourc -
es and to channel them into economically productive industrial sec -
tors . Doors were also opened wide to attract foreign capital to 
supplement newly adopted economic development strategies . Demands 
for foreign capital goods and raw materials were stimulated as a 
result of carrying out outward-looking strategies. Foreign borrow-
ings became necessary to finance a part of the vigorous investment 
drives, but it was clearly understood by both the public and the 
private sectors that foreign loans would have to be repaid with in-
terest. Ancicipating the mounting pressure of foreign debt servic-
ing on the economy and the continued needs for imports , the Govern-
ment adopted a vigorous export-first policy. 
This paper will seek to investigate how the Republic of Korea 
has been striving to attain maximum utilization of available re-
sources and what are the visible and invisible consequences, in-
cluding choice of technology, resulting from persuing such polici-
es. 
1. Inward- and Outward-looking Policies 
In retrospect, there was a notable change in the country's eco-
nomic development strategies during the past two decades, 1953-1973 . 
The economic policies up to 1961 may be characterized as inward-
looking and those of the subsequent decade may be said to be out-
ward-looking. 
In the first period, there were a few industrial plants for 
such industries as textiles, flat-glass, bottling, cement, sugar 
refining, and wheat flour milling, brewing, newsprint and rubber . 
Many of them were wholly or partly financed by foreign grants-in-
aid, and a large part of the raw materials, except those for flat-
glass and cement, were provided by foreign assistance. Almost all 
of them were produced for domestic consumption. Under such econo-
mic conditions, the entrepreneurs and businessmen inevitably focus-
ed their attention on securing raw materials and other price-inela-
stic commodities allocated by foreign grants-in-aids. Since the 
quantity of those allocated foreign grants-in-aid goods was usual-
ly insufficient to meet effective demand in the domestic market, 
the profits of the businessmen were almost always assured. The 
government's manipulation of quotas for such goods have resulted 
in many unhealthy incidents . Domestic currency was considerably 
over-valued at the official rates but those exchange rates were 
limited to such cases as sale of Korean currency to foreign resi-
dents in the country and remittance of foreign exchange to students 
abroad. 
Moreover, persistent inflationary pressures coupled with acute 
shortages of domestic capital virtually eliminated any possibility 
of effectively channelling domestic capital to development of manu-
facturing industries. Any financial resources were directed to 
economic activities of a speculative nature in which the yields of 
capital were considerably higher than the long-term capital invest-
ment in the manufacturing industries . Banking loans were limited 
to the government-favoured industries and these were often charged 
negative interest rates. 
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In such an economic system, it was virtually impossible to ex-
pect entrepreneurs to make efforts to increase labour productivity 
and improve the efficiency of managements. No one perhaps even 
considered the possibility of introducing advanced technology into 
the economy . The economy continued to be stagnant and just relied 
on foreign assistance . This is one of the reasons why the rate of 
increase in creating employment opportunities was far below the 
rate of increase in the economically active population , which sub-
sequently made the unemployment and even underemployment s i tuation 
worse. Entrepreneurs paid very little atten t i on to e liminating 
the inefficient factors in their economic units , thus addi ng fue l 
to inflationary pressures already acute i n the coun try . This , i n 
turn, served as a dis i ncentive to employed as well as unemployed 
workers and their families who suffered while a handful of windfall 
profit making entrepreneurs enjoyed conspicuous consumption . 
The rural sector of the economy also deteriorated . The pricing 
policy for agricultural products was badly designed and managed , 
and thus failed to provide any incentives to increase farm outputs . 
The fact that farming incomes were so low stimulated large numbers 
of the rural population to move seasonally to urban areas in the 
hope of earning , not saving , some wages to solve their daily food 
problems . This worsened the unemployment situation i n the urban 
area . When such an economic system was deeply rooted, any foresee-
able sharp decline in foreign grants-in-aid was certainly a big 
blow to the country . 
Despite all those economic stagnation and slumps which seemed to 
last for many years, no one overlooked the necessity for providing 
education for children even iftheyentailed the sacrifice of their 
livelihood . However, a large portion of the country ' s intangible 
assets, human capital, were wasted because the economy was incap-
able of providing employment oppurtunities in such a way that they 
could effectively exploit the use of whatever skills they had acq-
uired . In other words, the country failed to make full use of its 
major available economic resources, manpower . 
As was mentioned earlier, the new dynamic Government adopted 
new economic development strategies which may be characterized as 
outward-looking economic growth models led by the export expansion 
scheme . Domestic currency was devalued and frequently adjusted to 
attain the national goals . l) Various schemes, such as direct sub-
sidies, and an import linking system, were used to provide incen-
tives for exporters by allowing the selling of a certain quantity 
of imported goods in the domestic , market . Tax exemption and exemp-
tion from import duties were provided for importation of goods 
which would be used for producing exports. The wastage allowance 
(or technical gains) system has been applied under which a part of 
imported raw materials can be processed and sold in the domestic 
market at much higher rates than exports at prevailing exchange 
rates . The favourable banking credits bear considerably lower in-
terest rates for exports. Although there are many economic defects 
2) in such export promotion schemes, it certainly brought in a siz-
able amount of foreign exchange and helped substantially to activ-
ate industrial development and increase incomes . The creation of 
both direct and indirect employment opportunities has been enorm-
ous. 3) 
l)Nak Kwan Kim , "Is Korea ' s Export Promotion Scheme Consistent with 
Her Industrialization?", Asian Economies, Research Institute of 
Asian Economies, Seoul, June 1972 . 
2)Ibid. 
3)Youngil Lim, "Impacts of Exports on Output and Labor Absorption 
in South Korea", (mimeographed), East- West Center , University of 
Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii . 
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A generally observed phenomenon is that developing countries 
usually start with import-substitution industries and later shift 
to export some of their products . Many commodity exports of the 
Republic of Korea have gone through this process . However, in some 
instance, the Government encouraged development of export-oriented 
industries which did not go through such a stage. Some of the 
spare part assembly plants and bonded factories may belong to this 
category. A large-scale shipbuilding industry recently launched 
in the country may also be cited as an example. 
Although a large portion of capital goods and technical know-how 
has had to be imported and production had to be supervise·d to meet 
international standards during the initial stage, it undoubtedly 
contributed to the increase in value added in the economy. It will 
certainly activate the economy, in varying degrees, to supply in-
termediate products to such industries . Such stimulants will be 
shared both by existing industries and those which are yet to come 
into production. One of the strikingly advantageous factors is 
that the suppliers of the capital goods and technological know-how 
generally bring in superior kinds if their products are mainly for 
export rather than for the domestic market. Under such a scheme, 
the ratio of net foreign exchange earnings to a unit of exports 
may not be as high as the economy wishes to attain during the ear-
ly stage . However, such ratios will increase as efficiency in pro-
duction rises . Managerial improvements, increase in labour produc-
tivity, introduction of up-to-date advanced technology, and the ac-
tivation and the improvement in efficiency in the related industri-
es will help to raise such ratios. This scheme will also give tre-
mendous intangible assets in quality of human capital in all facets 
which cannot be quantitatively measured . 
Under the outward-looking development strategy, the country vigo-
rously carried out an industrial development scheme of an irnport-
replacing natures in both competitive and non-competitive industri-
es. Direct credits at the concessional terms were extended to high-
priority industries. The non-tariff and tariff barriers were em-
ployed mostly for protective measures . To attract the inflow of 
foreign capital needed to supplement development financing, guaran-
tees were given for the repayment of foreign borrowings for priori-
ty industrial projects. Although there may be some arguments 
against the provision of such assistance,4) it may seem reasonable 
for a developing country, such as the Republic of Korea, to initi-
ate projects with those measures . However, it is necessary to note 
that the Government should gradually reduce the extent of protec-
tion in order to accelerate the competitive strength of those in-
dustries on the international front . The continuous provision of 
protection to those industries which do not strengthen their inter-
national competitiveness and at the same time do not have much link-
age to other domestic industries may no t make much sense from the 
national economic welfare point of view. Under this new strategy , 
most of the import-replacing industries a r e geared to export their 
products in the shortest possible time . In other words , impor t -re-
placing industries will be urged to be ef ficient by increasing 
their rate of productivity . In order to be efficie n t, they will 
strive to adopt up-to-date technologies and adjust t he s cale o f 
the industries to the economic optimum according t o inter national 
standards . Managerial improvements will become essentia l so a s to 
become competitive in the international markets. Such an effort 
will be further stimulated by the fact that they are obliged to re-
pay foreign debts in terms of foreign exchange . This implies that 
they have to render direct and/or indirect contributions to export . 
One of the new economic policy measures adopted within the frame-
4)Nak Kwan Kirn, op . cit . 
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work of the outward- looking economy strategies is the promulgation 
of foreign capital inducement laws. It provides handsome incen-
tives to those who extend loans and to direct investors . The Gov-
ernment, of course, examines whether such loans and direct invest-
ments are in harmony with the country ' s industry and infrastructu-
ral development schemes . Political stability with strong economic 
development minded leader-ship , rapid economic development perform-
ance coupled with availability of a relatively cheap and industri-
ous labour force, accessibility of plant sites, and other infrast-
ructure are some of the factors which have attracted a sizable 
amount of foreign capital into the economy. Although such a large 
inflow of foreign capital might have been causing some concern, as 
long as the economy is capable of repaying, by sufficiently increas-
ing net foreign exchange earning, it should not impose any serious 
burden on the economy . The large inflow of capital and investments 
has undoubtedly contributed much to the huge increase in employment 
opportunities and also helped to accelerate the economic growth . 
The imported foreign capital goods and productive facilities have 
been bringing advanced technologies embodied in them. This provid-
es opportunities of acquiring skills and experience of advanced te-
chnologies in diversified areas to a greater number in all the dif-
ferent classes of occupations, thus adding greatly to the country's 
intangible assets . Moreover, it will not only generate skill en-
dowments in a static sense but also upgrade the quality of manpower 
wh i ch can be easily converted to any new types of more sophisticat-
ed industry which will be developed in due course. 
2. Over-all Economic Growth Performance and its Financing 
A drastic upswing was recorded in the economic growth rate dur-
ing the second half of the period under study, 1963-1965 to 1970-
1972. In the first half of the period, GNP, in terms of 1970 con-
stant market prices, rose only 1 . 2 percent points higher than popu-
l a tion growth rates, and private consumption expenditure rose at a 
rate slightly higher than that of GNP . The ratios of private con-
sumption expenditure over GNP rose from 80.2 percent in 1953-1955 
to 82 . 3 percent in 1960- 1962 . Gross investment , which was equiva-
lent to a meagre 7 . 1 percent of GNP in 1953-1955 rose only slight-
l y to 9 . 5 percent in 1960-1962 . During this first period , some 
sectors, such as manufacturing industries , mining and quarrying 
and construction works and electricity and transportation, register-
ed progress, but those sectors share of total value added was only 
11 . 8 percent in 1953-1955 and 18.7 percent in 1960-1962 . The agri~ 
cul tural sector was virtually stagnant . Moreover, it should be not-
ed that the high growth rates in some sectors of the economy were 
largely attributable to the fact that the base year of the compari-
son is the year when the economy was devastated by war. 
The per capita GNP in 1962 was equivalent to only $102, although, 
in the subsequent years, it attained the considerably higherrate of 
10.1 percent . The leading sectors of the growth were manufacturing, 
construction, and the social overhead capital sector, particularly 
electricity and transportation . Much effort was exerted to develop 
the agricultural sector but its performance was not as good as oth-
er sectors of the economy . Marginal propensity of private consump-
tion expenditure with respect to GNP steadily declined over the 
years. This may be largely attributable ta income increases and 
the Government's concerted effort to provide a favourable climate 
for investment. Per capita GNP in 1972 rose to $298 , thanks partly 
to the success achieved in reducing population growth rates during 
the decade . 
Since external transactions played an increasingly significant 
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Table 1 GNP and its Industrial Origins 
(in thousand million won at 
1970 constant market prices) 
GNP 
Private consump-
tion expenditures 
Gross domestic 
fixed capital for-
mation 
Exports of goods 
and services 
Imports of goods 
and services 
Industrial origin 
of GNP 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing 
Mining and quar-
rying 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Other services 
and social over-
head capital 
- Electricity 
- Transportation 
Annual average of three years 
1953-1955 1960-1962 1963-1965 1970-1972 
A 
890.65 
714.45 
63 .32 . 
13. 37 
97 . 42 
890.65 
421.18 
7.86 
62.13 
15.98 
372 . 18 
3.45 
15 . 70 
B 
1,178 . 39 
970 . 33 
111. 61 
36.20 
121. 79 
1,178.39 
493. 65 
16 .70 
130 . 04 
29.13 
501. 22 
8.11 
36.68 
c 
1,433.33 
1,126.94 
172 . 77 
61.17 
154 . 04 
1,433.33 
583.10 
22.14 
186.06 
43.55 
590.31 
1 2 .59 
54 . 83 
D 
2,813.24 
2,063.47 
663.32 
494.64 
739.07 
2,813.24 
744.66 
31. 05 
660 . 67 
149.75 
1 , 227.85 
51. 64 
166.05 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973. 
Annual compound 
rates (%) 
B/A 
4.08 
4.47 
8.43 
15 . 29 
3.24 
4.08 
2.29 
11. 37 
11.13 
9.06 
4.34 
12 . 99 
12 . 89 
D/C 
10.11 
9.03 
21.19 
34 . 80 
25 . 11 
10 . 11 
3.56 
4 . 95 
19.84 
19.30 
11. 03 
22.34 
17.15 
role in the country's economic growth process during the second phase , 
trade aspects will be further elaborated . As shown in table 2 , ex-
ports of commodities registered an annual compound rate of 32 . 1 per-
cent. This is quite impressive if it is compared with export growth 
performance during the earlier years. While commercial exports still 
occupy the lion's share (79 . 6 percent in 1970-1972), e xports from the 
bonded processing zone undoubtedly contributed greatly to the increase 
in exports during the 1960s. Export of manufactured goods (SITC 5-8) 
was equivalent to 49 . 0 percent of the total export of goods in 1964, 
but it rose sharply to 82 . 1 percent in 1971 . 
During the first seven years under study, a large portion of im-
ports was financed by foreign grants-in-aid . However, in the 1960s, 
imports financed by the country's earned foreign exchange showed a 
great increase and the foreign loans turned out to be an increasingly 
important source of financing imports which are needed mostly for the 
country's industrial and infrastructural economic development. In 
1970-1972, the foreign grants-in-aid represented only 4 . 2 percent of 
total commodity imports . The imports of machinery, transport equip-
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Table 2 Commodity Trades by Channels 
(in million US dollars) 
Annual average 
1953- 1960- 1963- 1970-
1955 1962 1965 1972 Annual compound rates 
of chang:es (%) 
A B c D B/A D/C 
Exports 
Total 27.3 42 . 8 127.0 1 , 175 . 6 5 . 8 32 . 1 
Commercial 27 . 3 41.1 113 . 7 936.0 5 . 3 30 . 2 
Bonded process 0 0 . 03 8.9 215 . 5 48 . 9 
Others 0 1. 4 4 . 4 24 . 2 23 . 8 
Imports 
Total 310.0 360 . 5 476 . 0 2 , 300 . 0 1. 9 21. 8 
Commercial 118 . 7 126 . 4 221 . 9 1,524 . 7 1. 9 27 . 2 
Official 191 . 3 215 . 7 170 . 2 96 . 2 16 . 2 6 . 9 
Foreign loans 0 1. 5 39.4 523 . 4 38 . 2 
Relief and others 0 16 . 8 44 . 5 155 . 9 17 . 0 
Source : As for table 1 . 
ment, mineral fuels and other raw materials contributed greatly to 
the increase in imports . Insufficient outputs of food staples con-
tinued to disturb the country ' s balance of payments position . 
In order to activate full participati on of manpower for economic 
growth , the Government started to mobilize both domestic and fore i gn 
financial resources and channel them into productive industrial and 
related sectors of the economy . Fiscal policies were restructured 
to be effective in tapping the financial sour ces without causing ad-
verse effects on the economic growth act i vities . Monetary policies 
were redesigned to encourage savings and utilize them for economical-
ly productive means at continuing base . Implementation of such po-
l i cies may have helped to boost national savings , which contributed 
45 . 4 percent of total investment in 1963- 1965 and 63 . 0 percent in 
1970-1972 . The economy has also been successful in channell i ng fo -
reign borrowings to supplement its economic growth efforts . These 
foreign borrowings were used largely for the importation of capital 
goods for diversification and expansion of the country ' s productive 
capacity and for development of social overhead capital , such as · 
electricity and trnasportation . Net foreign borrowi ngs f i nanced 
only 6 . 8 percent of total investments in 1963-1965 but their share 
rose to 27 . 5 percent in 1970- 1972 . 
The Government anticipated that foreign loans and direct fore i gn 
investment would continue to play an important role in the countr y ' s 
economic growth processes . However , it is also expected that the 
ratios of repayments of principal loans (excluding those for less 
than three years) ar.d interest plus remittance of profits incurred 
from direct investments to current receipts from invis i ble and vis-
ible trade will be reduced from 14.8 percent in 1973 to 8 . 8 percent 
in 1981 . The inflow of foreign capital and the effective mobiliza-
tion of domestic financial resources have helped to finance v i go-
rous investments in manufacturing and in such infrastructural sect-
ors as electricity and transportation and constructi on in order to 
make the economy operationally efficient . 
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Table 3 Financial Sources and Investments by Industries 
(in thousand million won at 
current market prices) 
Annual average of 3 years 
1953- 1960- 1963- ~
1955 1962 1965 1972 Annual compound 
rate(percentage) 
Gross domestic 
capital formation 
Fixed capital forma-
tion 
Agriculture, fores-
try and fishery 
Mining and quarry-
ing 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Social overhead 
capital and other 
services 
-Electricity, water 
and sanitary ser-
vices 
-Transportation, 
storage and com-
munication 
Increase in stocks 
Total investment 
A B c D B/A 
9.76 37.02 104.83 771 . 83 20.98 
7.10 36.48 89.55 720.05 26.34 
0.80 
0.05 
1. 49 
0.03 
4.09 10.11 65.65 26 .25 
0.30 1. 05 4.77 29.17 
7.45 22.28 142 . 60 25.86 
0 . 74 1. 46 9.66 58.08 
4.74 23.91 54.65 497.37 26.01 
0.35 
1.18 
2.66 
3 . 05 7.36 60.64 36.24 
8.22 19.J9 198.32 31.96 
0.54 15 .28 51.78 -20.37 
9.76 37.02 104.83 771.83 20.98 
National savings 4.83 6.87 47.64 486.26 5.16 
Foreign savings 4.93 28.08 51.01 272.78 28.21 
-Net borrowing from 
the rest of the world 1.06 0 . 64 7.10 212.12 -6 . 97 
-Net transfers from 
the rest of the world 3.88 27.43 43.90 60.66 32.23 
Statistical discrepancy 2.08 6.18 12.79 
Source: As for table 1. 
3. Availability and Use of Human Resources 
D/C 
33 . 00 
34.69 
30.64 
24.14 
30.37 
30.99 
37.09 
35.16 
39.71 
19.05 
33.00 
37.36 
27. 06 
62.47 
4.73 
10.95 
The discouraging economic performance and its gloomy economic 
prospects were further disturbed by a continuously high annual po-
pulation growth of 2.9 percent up to 1962. The new Government has 
been carrying out effective family planning schemes throughout the 
country and as a result the population growth rate has been steadi-
ly declining year after year and fell to 1.9 percent in 1972 . The 
population is estimated to be 32.4 million in 1972. Despite all 
the economic hardships, the Government and the general public have 
never overlooked the essential need for giving education, and this 
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Table 4 Educational Level of Population (6 years old 
and over) in 1970 
Total Male Female 
Thousand percent- Thousand percent- Thousand percent-
persons age persons age persons age 
Population 26,261 100 13,108 100 13,154 100 
Attending schools 7,945 30 ,25 4,352 33 . 20 3,594 27.32 
11-9 years 7,118 27.10 3,818 29 . 13 3,300 25.09 
10-12 years 616 2 . 35 379 2 . 89 237 1.80 
13 years and over 211 0 . 80 154 1.17 57 0.43 
Not completed 815 3 . 10 498 3 . 80 317 2 . 41 
1-9 years 569 2.17 294 2 . 24 274 2.08 
10-12 years 113 0.43 87 0.66 26 0 . 20 
13 years and over 133 0.51 116 0 . 88 17 0 . 13 
Graduated 12,375 47 . 12 6,462 49 . 30 5 , 913 44.95 
6 or 9 years 9,779 37.24 4,618 35 . 23 5,162 39 . 24 
12 years 1,893 7.21 1,288 9.83 605 4.60 
14 or 16 years & over 703 2 . 68 557 4.25 146 1.11 
Never attendeda) 5,125 1,796 3 , 329 
Can read and write 2,187 972 1 , 215 
Cannot read and write 2,299 514 1 , 785 
Source: Government of the Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, 1970 Popula-
tion and Housing Census Report. 
a) Persons whose ages were 10 years or over were surveyed. 
has contributed greatly to the accumulation of huge intangible as-
sets in the country . 
Because of the extreme complexity , it is virtually impossible to 
give even a rough estimate of the quality and quantity of the human 
capital available in the country . An interesting exercise5) has 
been carried out to obtain a rough aggregated magnitude of those 
factors of the country ' s human resources . It revealed that, in 
1972, direct and indirect investments in formal educati on (exclud-
ing investments in compulsory education and primary schools) were 
equivalent to about 22 . 8 percent of GNP . The same study also esti-
mated the average annual growth rates of human capital to be 9.9 
percent during 1960- 1971 . During the same period, the physical 
capital rose 6 . 8 percent , and this subsequently increased the ratio 
of human capital over physical capital from 62 . 7 percent in 1960 to 
86.3 percent in 1971 . 
The other general way of looking at the quality and magnitude of 
the available manpower in the country would be the ratios of the 
population at different educational levels and its illiteracy rates. 
The 1970 Populati on and Housing Census Report revealed that 50.2 
percent of the population of 26 . 3 million more than six years old 
had graduated or at least attended schools , while 30 . 3 percent of 
that 26 . 3 million were attending schools . Although 19 . 5 percent of 
that 26.3 million had never attended schools , 42 . 7 percent of them 
were not illiterates . It also revealed that the majority of the 
illiterates belonged to old- age groups There was some indication 
of discrimination aga i nst female eduction but it was only of slight 
significance . 
5)Y . H. Nam and I.Y. Cheung , Analysis of Economic Value of the In-
vestments in the Education in Korea, Korean Development Institute, 
Seoul, July 1973, (mimeographed in Korean) . 
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Table 5 Population and Economically Active Population 
Annual comEound rate of chan~es 
1963 1967 1971 19671'.'.1963 1971Ll9f!:Z l9:ZL:'.J SH:i3 
~in thousand persons) (P e r c e n t a g el 
Population 27,184 .30,067 .32,429 2.55 1. 91 2.23 
Economically active population 
Farm 5,281 5,315 4,918 0.16 1. 92 0.89 
Non-farm 3,372 4,189 5,247 5.57 5 . 79 5.68 
Employed 
Farm 5,129 5,191 4,846 0.30 -1. 70 o. 71 
Non-farm 2,818 3,723 4,862 7.21 6.90 7.06 
Unemployed 
Farm 152 124 72 -4.96 -12.71 -8.92 
Non-farm 554 466 385 -4.23 - 4 . 66 -4.45 
Sources: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook 1973. 
Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on the Economically Active Popula-
tion, 1971 
As mentioned earlier, the huge dose of domestic and foreign capi-
tal that was channelled into various sectors of the economy created 
additional employment opportunities and activated demand for all 
classes of workers. Many unemployed begin to find paid jobs and 
semi-skilled workers were encouraged to train themselves to become 
skilled workers as incentives and prospects of better employment op-
portunities became available. Since the second half of the 1960s, 
many industries have begun to feel acute shortages of certain kind 
of skilled workers, technicians and engineers and this will undoubt-
edly be intensified as the country actively pursues aggressive in-
dustrial expansion strategies of a diversified nature. Such pheno-
mena were clearly reflected in the increase in wages for workers.6) 
The widespread communications and availability of employment op-
portunities which require both skilled and unskilled workers in 
manufacturing industries may help to shift workers from low produc-
tivity industries to higher productivity industries . The employ-
ment migration from rural areas to the urban areas in all age groups 
is also quite remarkable. The reduction of males employed in farm 
households and the sharp increases in those employed, non-farm house-
holds clearly illustrate dynamic changes in employment migration in 
the economy. The large employment migration of males of productive 
age groups to non-farm households is worth noting . The attraction 
of higher incomes and the greater demand for female workers as a 
result of rapid expansion of labour-intensive industries coupled 
with social changes breaking the traditional rigid social system 
which used to discourage female participation in non-household work 
in rural areas may have stimulated the flow of a huge labour force 
to economic activities in urban areas including manufacturing and 
its related industries. The growth rate of female employees was 
higher than that of male employees during the later 1960s. It 
should be noted that increases in employment in manufacturing indus-
tries and in the social overhead capital sector for both male and 
female are quite significant, while employment in primary industri-
es generally declined during the period under study. 
Implementation of such aggressive economic development strategi-
6)Korean Development Bank, Monthly Economic Review, November 1973 
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es not only resulted in rates of increment of employment exceeding 
those of the economically active population , but also contributed 
much to the increase in labour productivity.?) Although quantita-
tive analysis might be necessary to measure the extent to which 
the various factors have contributed to the increase of labour pro-
ductivity during the last two decades, it may be said that such in-
crease in labour productivity is largely attributable to importa-
tion of capital goods which have embodied advanced technology. 
Improvements in workers' skills may also have added to the rise 
in labour productivity as they accumulate experience in the compe-
titive system . However, one should never overlook the fact that 
management has been urged to focus its attention on improving la-
bour productivity in order to survive in the increasingly challeng-
ing domestic as well as external fronts . Keen competitive behavi-
our in each economic unit among the same type of industry which 
continuously confronted by stern competition from abroad will in-
evitably make each economic unit more efficient. The aggressive 
and dynamic attitudes of the management, the workers, both skilled 
and unskilled, the technicians and the engineers will help to level 
up labour productivity and upgrade their efficiency so as to pro-
duce goods of improved quality at competitive prices . The Govern-
ment has been and should continue to readjust its industrial and 
commercial policies so as to attain a self-propelling and self-reli-
ant economy . 
Greater increase in the demand for skilled workers will stimulate 
the potential labour force to improve its professional proficiency . 
Moreover, deiversification of industrial bases and acceleration in 
development of industries have boosted demand for trained technici-
ans and engineers. The need for such professional and technical 
manpower will be accentuated as the country carries out industrial 
development schemes which will require professional services in or-
der to make them competitive in the international market. 
Rapidly increasing demand for better qualified manpower in limit-
ed supply will boost wages, and the provision of higher wages will 
stimulate both existing and potential workers to be highly compet-
ent in their work . In addition, the higher wages will stimulate 
entrepreneurs to do everything possible to increase labour producti-
vity and, at the same time , urge them to invent more to make their 
industries highly competitive . This will help to make full use of 
human resources and, at the same time, help to improve quality of 
manpower . This will in turn generate the country's prime engine 
for economic growth . 
4 . Choice of Technology : Production Factor Mix 
The general impression is that the Government has been tackling 
the problems of unemployment and underemployment with massive doses 
of investment and with diversification of industrial bases rather 
than placing emphasis on development of labour-intensive industries . 
The criteria which were and may still be used for choosing techno-
logy in the process of industrial development and in the course of 
allocating financial resources is whether a certain industry can 
export or directly and/or indirectly contribute to strengthening 
the economy so as to make it competitive on both the domestic and 
the international front . Capital saving may not be the criteria 
used for choosing technology as long as it can be manageable by 
the economy . As a result of implementing such policies, per capita 
?)Korea Productivity Center, Index of Labour Productivity, various 
issues, Seoul . 
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income grew, but foreign debts should not be a threatening matter 
as long as the economy continues to be capable of increasing its 
net foreign exchange earnings at a sufficiently rapid pace . It 
turns out to be a matter of how successful the economy can be in 
making itself more efficient and aggressive and in tactfully adjust-
ing to the constant changes in both internal and external economies . 
The focus has been centred around how to make full and most effici-
ent utilization of the potential economic resource of the country , 
human capital . 
In order to reveal the general trends of trade- offs between emp-
loyment and capital that have resulted from carrying out such econo-
mic development strategies during the period under examination, the 
direct and indirect effects of export production and the development 
of competitive import-replacing industries on employment will be 
discussed . The factor intensity of direct and indirect skill re-
quirements for production of such commodities in trade will be high-
lighted. No doubt there will be changes in factor intensity and 
skill requirements for domestic market oriented industries, but they 
may be inferred by studying the commodities in trade. 
W. Hong has carried out a painstaking quantitative exercise in 
order to idendify the capital-intensity and the labour-intensity of 
32 industrial sectors . Naturally, such an exercise cannot complete-
ly eliminate the built-in bias, but it may help us to draw some very 
broad conclusions . Estimates are made of the direct and indirect 
requirements of capital in terms of thousand dollars and the direct 
and indirect requirements of labour inputs in terms of the number of 
persons per $1,000 worth of outputs based on the 43 by 43 input-out-
put table for the 1968 economy . The former is divided by the latter 
in order to derive direct and indirect factor intensity for one unit 
of output. Annual data for exports and competitive imports for the 
industrial sectors are compiled for the decade, 1962-1971. 
Based on the aforementioned quantitative studies, the following 
classifications are made for the sake of convenience : 
Capital-intensive industries 
Chemical fertilizers 
Petroleum products 
Glass and stone products 
Basic chemicals 
Paper products 
Other chemical products 
Steel products 
Electrical machinery 
Fibre spinning 
Printing and publishing 
Coal products 
Textile fabrics 
Labour-intensive industries 
Non-electrical machinery 
Lumber and plywood 
Rubber products 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Fishery 
Coal 
Finished textile products 
Other minerals 
Leather and leather products 
Beverages 
Wood products and furniture 
Processed foods 
Iron and steel Tobacco 
Transport equipment Other agriculture 
Non-ferrous metal products Rice, barley and wheat 
Finished metal products Forestry 
It is revealed that , in 1962, as much as 82 . 3 percent of exports 
from those industries were shared by labour-intensive industrial 
products . However , the figure fell to 74 . 4 percent in 1966 a nd to 
71 . 5 percent in 1971 . Although the share of exports of labour-inten-
sive industrial products might have declined during the decade , they 
recorded an increase in the annual compound rate of 32 . 8 percent and 
remained large foreign exchange earners . F inished texti le products , 
miscellaneous manufactured goods , raw products, wood products and 
furniture, lumber and plywood are some of the major labour-intensive 
industrial products which have contributed significantly to t he pro-
N.K. KIM 
Table 8 Exports of Selected 32 Industrial 
Sectors by Factor Intensity 
(in million US dollars) 
1962 1966 -- --
Capital-intensive industries 9.6 63.1 
Labour-intensive industries 44.5 183 . 6 
Total 54.1 246.7 
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1971 --
303 . 3 
760.9 
1,064.2 
Source: W. Hong, Factor Supply and Factor Intensity of Trade: The 
Case of Korea (1962-71), (Korea Development Institute, 
Seoul, 1963) . 
vision of employment for skilled and unskilled workers. It is an 
indication that the country has been striving to activate any la-
bour-intensive industries which could be competitive in the inter-
national market by fully utilizing the abundantly available manpow-
er that the country possesses. At the same time, exports of capi-
tal-intensive industrial products have been increasing at an annual 
compound rate of 41.2 percent during the period. Growth rates of 
such commodities as glass and stone products, electrical machinery, 
steel products, spun fibres, textile fabrics, and finished metal 
products are certainly impressive. The export performance of che-
mical fertilizers and other chemical and petroleum products are 
particularly worth noting as new-comers in the middle 1960s. 
The country has been successful in exporting goods which used to 
be products of competitive and even of non-competitive import indus-
tries half a decade ago. The increased absorption of the labour 
force into such industries, and particularly those of higher profes-
sional training, is a result of development of such capital-inten-
sive industries.Bl It is true that some of those modern large-
scale industrial plants are built-in potential competency of local 
engineers, technicians and skilled workers who could handle modern 
large-scale industries in an efficient way and only technical as-
sistance of short duration will be provided by foreign engineers. 
These potentialities will be further cultivated by experience gain-
ed by working at modern large-scale industries, and will play a 
crucial role in the process of developing more sophisticated indus-
tries of a diversified nature in the coming years. 
During this rapid process of industrial growth, there were sig-
nificant declines in imports of competitive goods, such as chemical 
fertilizers and petroleum products. However, imports of transporta-
tion equipment, finished metal products, electrical machinery and 
basic chemical goods continued to grow. The economy has been and 
perhaps will be persistent in developing such industries regardless 
of whether they are of a capital-intensive or labour-intensive na-
ture. Rapid expansion of such import-replacing industries--with 
the aim of starting exports of those products in the shortest pos-
sible time--will be activated with the best possible combination of 
economic factors of production so as to be competitive in the inter-
national markets. This undoubtedly swell the demand for engineers, 
scientists, technicians, and skilled and unskilled workers to flow 
continuously into these productive activities. 
Although there are some availability ani conceptual problems in the 
relevant data, Hong has also attempted to estimate direct and in-
direct requirements for engineers, scientists, technicians, cleri-
cal workers, and skilled and semi-skilled workers for a unit in-
crease of export products and competitive import-substituion indus-
8)It has been observed that 3 to 6 percent of the total number of 
employees in the recently initiated large-scale establishments 
are scientists and engnineers. 
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Table 9 Direct and Indirect Skill Requirements 
for Export Producti6n and Competitive 
Import-replacing Production 
Engineers Clerical Skilled Semi-
and Technicians workers workers skilled 
scientists workers 
Export E'roduction: 
1962 0.7 1.9 7 . 8 42.3 63.0 
1967 2 . 7 8.9 46.6 125 . 5 221.6 
1971 6.6 20 .6 128.6 327.7 549.1 
Competitive import-
replacing production: 
1962 3.0 6.4 3.8 86.0 139 . 1 
1967 8.0 17 .9 101.4 145.0 280 . 5 
l971 12.3 28 . 0 159.0 331.0 558.0 
--~ - --·· - --· 
Source: As for table 8 . 
Total 
115 . 6 
1,032 . 8 
273 . 4 . 
553 . 0 
1,088.5 
ries. That exercise is carried out based on the 1968 input-output 
table. Similar estimates were also made for 1962-1971.9) 
The direct and indirect requirements for engineers, scientists 
and technicians for export production increased at a faster rate 
than those of skilled and semi-skilled workers during 1962-1971. 
This may be attributable to the fact that the e xpor t industries 
have become increasingly technology-intensive and/or linked with 
the technology-intensive import-replacing industries developed in 
the country during the period. The absolute numbers of direct and 
indirect requirements for various categories of workers for one 
unit of competitive import-replacing industrial output are higher 
than those output for exports in 1962, and the direct and indirect 
demand for scientists, engineers, and technicians has also been 
growing at a fas ter rate than that for skilled and semi-skilled 
workers in both categories of industries during the period under 
investigation . It may a lso be that the competitive import-replac-
ing industries have been more technology-intensive than the export 
industries during the same period. 
It may be assumed that the share of technology-intensive indust-
rial goods in total exports will be increased faster than that of 
skilled and/or labour-intensive industrial goods as the developed 
of competitive import-replacing industries and other new technology-
{ntensive industries will gain greater emphasis in coming years. 
This will mean that the manufacturing industries development has 
not only been helping to increase employment but also to level up 
the professional competency of workers of all categories in the 
process of the country's economic growth. 
Conclusion 
The economy is not well endowed with industrial raw materials , 
and domestic capital and foreign exchange reserves are scarce. 
The capital goods producing facilities are inadequate, and basic 
9)Comprehensive input-output tables for the 1970 Republic of Korea 
economy were made while this paper was under preparation. A quan-
titative exercise may be performed to supplement this study in 
due course . 
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science and technology are still backward compared with the indust-
rially developed economies. The country has an abundant supply of 
human resources which may be said to be of high quality relative 
to most of the developing countries. The efficient utilization of 
those human resources available in the country was virtually ignor-
ed up to the early part of the 1960s. 
The present Government shifted from defensive to aggressive eco-
nomic development policies. Such policy changes urged entrepreneurs 
to run their economic units in the most efficient way and redirect-
ed their attention to make their firms highly competitive not only 
in the domestic market but also in the more challenging interna-
tional markets. The Government's urge to increase exports left no 
alternative to entrepreneurs but to strengthen their competitive-
ness on a continuing basis. The Government has been successful in 
making the entire economy fully aware of the fact that the only way 
for the economy to survive is to increase efficiency in industrial 
activities. In other words, it has been placing top priority on 
the maximization of efficiency in such a way that each economic 
unit is to be highly competitive on both the domestic and the in-
ternational front rather than encouraging any particular kind of 
technology to be used in the country. The choice of technology 
actually in use in the Republic of Korea is the outcome of the im-
plementation of the outward-looking economic development strategy 
emphasizing efficiency and export promotion. 
The foreign debt repayment obligations have been persistently 
pushing all economic activities to be highly efficient so as to 
make themselves capable of increasing the net foreign exchange earn-
ings, and the Government has been providing active assistance to 
entrepreneurs to motivate them in every possible way to attain the 
national goals. The inducement of advanced technological know-how 
became essential as long as such technological know-how was economi-
cally beneficial and well suited to the given dynamicaly changing 
conditions on both the domestic and the international scene. For 
the purpose of attaining efficiency in economic activities, improve-
ment of managerial skills became essential and stimulated demand 
for competent manpower in all the various types of occupation. 
This, in turn, required more professional service of a sophisticat-
ed nature and will subsequently increase the demand for highly en-
gineers, scientists, and technicialns. That trend of development 
in the economy will stimulate the labour force to improve its com-
petency, as the need for more efficient manpower in all the vari-
ous skills becomes more pressing. Continuous cultivation and ex-
ploitation of human resources in the quantitative as well as the 
qualitative sense is synonymous with the exploitation of the poten-
tial factors of comparative advantages in the dynamic setting of 
the country. Those efforts together with the successful provision 
of inputs of other productive factors consequently resulted in a 
sharp increase in the exports and the attainment of the faster 
growing industrial structure. This, in turn, serves as the prime 
engine of the rapid economic growth and full utilization of human 
capital in the development process. 
COMMENTS ON KI M'S PAPER - DO NALD M. STRACY 
I think the optimism evident in Dr . Kim ' s paper is largely justi-
fied , although I must admit to sharing some of the doubts voiced by 
Prof . Yakubovsky . Dr . Kim ' s paper is an interesting account of the 
Republic of Korea ' s take- off in the past decade, although it is too 
soon yet to be able to say whether the momentum of recent years can 
be maintained until per capita GNP attains the level already reach-
ed in some countries which are still customarily labelled as deve-
loping countries . Much emphasis is placed on appropriate govern-
ment policies , especially those operating through market- forces . 
In view of the policy followed for many years in New Zealand of 
protecting domestic manufacturing industry by import licensing , I 
found the reference to the policy of requiring import-substitution 
industries to become competitive by international standards as soon 
as possible and to start exporting, of particular interest . This 
appears to indicate a highly desirable concern on the part of the 
authorities not only for the balance of payments but also for the 
welfare of the consumer . Such concern is not always to be found in 
other countries where the exploitation of the consumer by local in-
dustry is condoned by the government, with the passive or even ac-
tive support of organized labour, in the mistaken belief that only 
by following such policies can full employment be attained or main-
tained . 
During the five years 1966-1971 Korea ' s exports of industrial 
goods increased very rapidly, and although much of this increase 
was in exports of labour- intensive goods, there was also a large 
increase in exports of capital intensive manufactured goods . It 
could be instructive to seek the reasons for this, since the accept-
ed widsom would suggest that the capital invested in capital - inten-
sive industries could have been used to better advantage elsewhere, 
resulting in an even greater increase in income and employment . 
The assumption here of course, is that the shortage of foreign ex-
change is a bottleneck in development, but this certainly seems to 
be the case with Korea in view of the large amount of foreign bor-
rowing undertaken. 
It is mentioned in the paper that inadequate agricultural pro-
duction continues to pose a problem, not least for the balance of 
payments . It would seem to be more meaningful to attribute this to 
a low increase in productivity per worker in agriculture rather than 
to the reduction in the farm labour force . It may be that a little 
less emphasis on the development of the manufacturing sector, and a 
little more emphasis on the development of the agricultural sector 
would have paid off handsomely . In t his connection I would mention 
that New Zealand's very high productivity in pastoral farming is 
due in part to the ready availabi l ity of extension services based 
on domestic research, as well as on farm investment . 
Korea's trade deficit g rew from $350 million in 1963- 65, to over 
$1,100 million in 1970-72, if I have interpreted Table 2 corre ctly . 
The servicing of the overseas debt will require about 15 percent of 
foreign exchange earnings in 1973, and it is estimated that in 1981 
the servicing of existing debt will take almost 9 percent of foreign 
exchange earnings . This suggests that the balance of payments may 
necessitate some consolidation of the recent growth of exports and 
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of national income . What is relevant here is the composition of 
imports in recent years . If a substantial part represents imports 
of capital equipment, then it may be possible for exports to conti-
nue to expand at a rapid rate , but if imports have consisted mostly 
of raw materials, semi-finished manufactures and consumer goods 
then some slowing-down in the rate of growth of the economy may be 
inevitable , unless increased emphasis is given to the development 
of those industries including service industries with a low foreign 
exchange content. 
It is also encouraging to note the importance placed by the gov-
ernment of Korea on family planning as an integral element of its 
economic and social polic i es . Even in developed countries a high 
rate of population growth whether from natural increase or from im-
migration severely limits efforts to raise per capita GNP. Where 
there is a continued high rate of natural growth f population, the 
resulting strain placed on a country ' s education system retards im-
provement in the quality of labour force . It is not really neces-
sary to add that the shortage of skilled persons of all kinds is 
usually one of the main bottlenecks to development in less develop-
ed countries . 
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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: 
AN ADVANCED COUNTRY'S VIEWPOINT 
HARRY G. JOHNSON 
1 . Issues in the Theory of Comparative Advantage 
The pure theory of international trade, as shaped by the English 
classical economists in response to and criticism of the mercanti-
list school of thought that classical economics vanquished in be-
coming a scientific study, is concerned with two central questions , 
one "positive" and one "normative." The positive question is the 
explanation of why international trade takes place; the normative 
question is the explanation of why (in contradistinction to the 
mercantilists' concern with the zero-sum game of increasing nation-
al power) trade is generally beneficial to both trading partners, 
and the conditions under which this general presumption may fail 
to hold. The key to both questions is the principle of comparative 
advantage, which in terms of the language of power can be put as 
the principle that, no matter whether a country is absolutely strong 
or absolutely weak, it can maximize the power available to it by 
concentrating on those activities in which it is relatively more 
powerful and hiring the services of specialists in those activities 
in which it is relatively weaker. 
From the standpoint of this central general principle, it is a 
matter of secondary importance what the source of comparative advan-
tage or disadvantage may be; and the classical statement and demon-
stration of the principle by Ricardo relied on a simple example in 
which Portugal's comparative advantage in wine, and England's in 
cloth, reflected a God-given difference in climate conditions . (It 
is an interesting reflection that Ricardo's example already involv-
ed what has in modern times become known as "north-south trade.") 
With the emergence of industrial civilization on the one hand, and 
of sophisticated general equilibrium economic analysis on the other, 
interest shifted towards the analysis of the causes of comparative 
advantage itself, which could no longer be regarded as a fact of 
nature. While the major architect of the change, Bertil Ohlin, him-
self had an eclectic view of the variety of reasons for which compa-
rative advantage might differ among industrial nations, the dominant 
explanation, associated with the names of Ohlin and his older Swedi-
sh colleage Heckscher and more recently of Samuelson, came to be 
the factor-proportions explanation; that is, that differences in 
the relative abundance of factors of production among countries 
would produce differences in the sets of commodity and factor pric-
es yielding equilibrium in countries with similar tastes in the ab-
sence of trade, and therefore systematic differences related to re-
lative factor supply differences between the optimal production and 
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consumption patterns that nations would choose at a conunon world 
set of commodity prices. The explanation was made more concrete 
and spcific by the assumption that the factors of production in 
question could be identified with the post-Ricardian, broadly Mar-
xist, division of the key factors into capital on the one hand and 
labour on the other (the classical Ricardian emphasis on land hav-
ing been sumberged in the transition to industrial society), though 
it should be remarked that some of the leading theorists (e . g . , 
Samuelson) stuck to the identification of the factors as labour 
and land, from either conventional respect for tradition or sophi-
sticated awareness of the difficulties inherent in capital as a 
"produced" and not an "original " factor of production, or both. 
The relative factor availability theory of comparative advantage, 
in its specification in terms of differences in relative "endow-
ments" of capital and labour, differences in capital-to-labour ra-
tios, or most simply differences in national wealth and affluence, 
seemed to make a great deal of practical sense in the understanding 
of what appeared to be the dominant form of international trade, 
particularly in the nineteenth century world economy centered on 
Great Britain, the exchange of exports of manufactures for imports 
of food and raw materials . At the same time (a point to be discuss-
ed in more detail later) it made the scientific principle of compa-
rative advantage a focus of ideological dispute between those who 
regarded the existing inequality of international distribution of 
income and wealth as natural or at least scientifically understand-
able and those who regarded that inequality as unjust, offensive, 
and immoral. Hence the great deal of effort that has been devoted, 
and largely wasted, since the 1930's (and indeed by critics going 
all the way back to the mercantilist period) in misrepresenting the 
theory of comparative advantage as maintaining such obvious absurdi-
ties as that income per capita should be the same in all countries 
or that under no circumstances will it ever be economic for India 
to have a steel industry or Mexico and other less developed countri-
es an automotive industry; and in listing all the theoretically pos-
sible cases in which market prices and costs might not correspond 
exactly to true social alternative opportunity costs, as if the pos-
sibility of market failure is sufficient to prove the certainty of 
government success. 
Be that as it may, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson factor-propor-
tions model of comparative advantage, or more accurately its crude 
empirical identification of factors with material capital in the 
form of buildings and machinery on the one hand and with labour in 
the form of undiffeLentiated human bodies on the other hand, has 
been sharply challenged in two major respects in the current period 
of scientific economic development since the second world war. The 
first challenge came from Leontief's empirical finding that, contra-
ry to expectation, American imports were capital-intensive and ex-
ports labour- intensive, a finding Leontief explained by the hypo-
thesis that American labour is much more productive than other 
countries' labour (he reckoned that an American worker represented 
three times the "labour power" of foreign workers). Subsequent re-
search has led in a variety of directions, of which the most inter-
esting and suggestive have been the rediscovery of "land" as a fact-
or of production, in the specific proposition that the U. S. imports 
resource-intensive products domestic production of which requires 
the use of capital as a substitute for abundance of natural resourc-
es; elaboration of "human capital" as a component of the ostensible 
contribution of the time of human bodies to the production process; 
and the influence of the U.S. tariff in partially nullifying the 
comparative advantage of other countries in terms of abundance of 
cheap labour time and leaving the statistics of trade to be dominat-
ted by the influence of sub-categories of capital in the broad sense , 
including both human capital and technological superiority. 
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The second challenge has come from students of the micro-econo-
mic details of international trade and investment patterns among 
advanced countries, who have concentrated on what has come to be 
known as "the technology factor" in international trade and invest-
ment and whose major intellectual contribution has been "the theory 
of the product cycle . " The technology theory was originally pres-
ented, in line with the prevailing methodology of "positive econo-
mics," empirical testing of rival hypotheses , and an "adversary 
procedure" in the determination of scientific truth, as a superior 
alternative to the factor proportions theory; but subsequent test-
ing has shown that both theories, and some differentiated sub-spe-
cies of the technology approach, have substantial explanatory power 
but not sufficiently commanding power to dispose conclusively of 
rival claimants . This is not really surprising, and in fact is a 
predictable consequence of the artificiality of the rival-hypothe-
sis-testing approach . Every blind man who touches a part of the 
elephant learns some of th.e truth about it--but not the whole truth; 
and only the rare unfortunate is unlucky enough to be caught in ge-
neralizing about the elephant from an unrepresentative hand-hold 
on the tip of its tail . 
2 . Comparative Cost, Technology, and Development Theory 
It would be an obvious mistake to assume either that models of 
comparative advantage are de"signed for the purpose of suggesting 
possible lines of government intervention in the operation of inter-
national competition, or that those concerned with international 
trade policy as a means of promoting various domestic economic poli-
cy objectives and national economic goals look to the theory of com-
parative advantage for inspiration in their policy thinking and re-
commendations . Nevertheless, theories of comparative advantage at-
tempt to base themselves on a reasonable abstract model of contempo-
rary production processes, the same empirical reality as concerns 
policy-makers and policy-prescribers, and in a very broad sense mo-
dels of comparative advantage suggest ways in which trade policy 
may or may not be able to improve on the results of unrestricted in-
ternational competition, from the national or even the cosmopolitan 
point of view. 
Thus the Ricardian model for explaining the existence, and the 
nature of the gains from, international trade, based as it was on 
differences in comparative cost created by nature--and the unexplain-
ed differences in absolute advantage which the theory sought to dis -
miss as irrelevant were presumably natural in origin as well-impli-
ed a static and permanent distribution of comparative advantages 
and disadvantages which economic policy could do little but accept 
gracefully or seek to alter with the outcome only of a pointless 
reduction of real income and economic welfare . This view was re-
flected in the two major exceptions to the case for freedom of in-
ternational trade allowed by classical theory; the "terms of trade" 
or "exploitation of monopoly power" argument for protection, which 
involves both a static positive analysis and a contra-cosmopolitan 
nationalistic concept of economic welfare; and the "infant industry" 
argument for protection, which as the name itself implies involves 
the assumption that men are everywhere the same and in adulthood 
equally competent. 
By contrast, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, with the pro-
duced-means-of-production capital as the factor used co-operatively 
with human labour, suggests either that comparative advantages and 
disadvantages are determined by national differences in the willing-
ness to accumulate capital, reflecting long-run differences in na-
tional time preferences and therefore in a fundamental sense given 
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by nature, or that current comparative advantage differences re-
flect the presence of nations for historical reasons at different 
stages of the process of accumulation of desired capital stocks per 
head, so that comparative advantage differences will change over 
time as the process of accumulating capital from different initial 
historically-given endowment positions converges on a long run eq-
uilibrium of equal capital accumulation per head (assuming similar 
tastes and preferences across countries) . In either case there may 
be an argument for policy intervention to stimulate capital accumu-
lation , in the one case if private preferences in favour of cur-
rent as contrasted with future consumption or of current consump-
tion as contrasted with wealth accumulation are judged to be social-
ly myopic, on the other if the rate of accumulation of capital to-
wards the long-run equilibrium level is deemed to be slower than 
is in the true social interest . Such policy intervention should 
logically be directed at incentives to capital accumulation, and 
not involve trade intervention as such; but trade intervention may 
be incorporated in the argument on the supplementary assumption 
that import-substitution creates more incentive for capital accumu-
lation in import-competing industries than it destroys in exporting 
industries, or on a variety of arguments of the general infant-in-
dustry type to the effect that protection is necessary to teach the 
public the benefits of accumulating capital in industrial form . 
Both the Ricardian and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models car-
ry the implicit assumption that involvement in international trade 
entails the enjoyment of economic benefits from efficient resource 
utilization with little or no cost in terms of serious disturbance 
to men's livelihood and economic and social lives--in the Ricardian 
model because comparative advantage is ineluctably fixed by nature, 
in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model because change associated 
with accumulation of capital per se is likely to be slow, regular, 
and predictable. The case is far different with technological dif-
feences as a source of difference in comparative advantage, and 
technological change as a chronic disturber of existing patterns of 
comparative advantage . 
Before this point can be developed further, it is necessary to 
observe and appreciate that "technology" as a sourc.e of comparative 
advantage is not, as some writers and commentators on trade and 
trade policy seem to believe, a free good capriciously and invidi-
ously distributed by nature among the nations of the world . Techno-
logy is a capital good or investment good produced by the invest-
ment over time of material resources that yield their returns over 
further time, and (in contrast to "basic scientific research") is 
typically invested in by private enterprises and also by governments 
in the expectation that the profits will justify the costs of the 
investment . This basic characteristic involves an economic logic 
being at work in the generation of technology and its diffusion 
through the world economy, and if the effects of such generation 
and diffusion of technological knowledge on international patterns 
of comparative advantages as reflected in changes in comparative 
advantage in particular categories of traded goods, which has best 
been expressed in Vernon's theory of the product cycle. This logic 
is frequently ignored in discussions of technology in the context 
of international trade and economic development. On the one side 
there are the beliefs that "high technology" is the secret rather 
than the symptom of affluence, that appropriate technology can be 
developed without material cost, and that technological knowledge 
should be provided free of cost or profit margin to less developed 
countries by the advanced countries that bear the cost of investing 
in its creation. On the other side, there are the beliefs that tem-
porary monopolists of new knowledge and their employees are entitl-
ed to charge all that the traffic will bear; and it is unfair of 
consumers, producers and governments in other countries to under-
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mine such monopoly profits and wages by regulation of prices and 
competitive conditions, or by developing substitute technologies; 
and that it is grossly immoral for poor countries toattract techno-
logical transplants by virtue of their povery level of wage costs, 
and especially immoral of corporations in rich high-wage countries 
to respond to profit incentives to transplant technology from tech-
nology-abundant labour-scarce countries to technology-poor labour-
abundant countries. 
To resume the main theme of the argument, technology, unlike. the 
natural climatic conditions of the Ricardo model, can be both moved 
from one location to another and accumulated or decumulated; and, 
unlike the material capital of the specified Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuel-
son model, it can be accumulated fairly rapidly on a massive scale, 
though (an important point) it cannot be quickly decumulated or 
transformed from one specific form into another. 
To be more precise, the application of known technology to the 
development of production in new locations, particularly low labour-
cost locations, can be carried out fairly quickly. This is partly 
because co-operant requirements of material capital equipment are 
not all that expensive and are obtainable through international 
trade in machinery and components on level terms with rival produc-
ers, while structures are largely a matter of domestic labour cost; 
partly because financial capital is fairly mobile internationally, 
particularly but by no means exclusively as a result of the develop-
ment of the multinational or transnational corporation; and most 
fundamentally because technology by its nature is capable of being 
taught to and learned by large numbers of young adult human beings 
of little above average intelligence, almost regardless of their 
native culture, in training programmes of specialized types whose 
cost varies largely with the general level of wages and incomes in 
the society. (And even if the proportion of the population capable 
of the requisite learning is relatively small, the absolute numbers 
available are usually abundantly large.) 
On the other hand, the decumulation and conversion of past in-
vestments in technological capital necessitated by economic change 
and unplanned obsolescence is expensive and socially painful, pre-
cisely because such technological knowledge is embodied in special-
ized form in the skills and knowledge of particular human beings. 
Here the relevant factors are partly biological and partly social 
and conventional. The biological factors are the relatively long 
productive life of the typical human being, a life expectancy that 
has been rapidly lengthened, particularly in advanced countries, by 
the progress of medical technology in particular and the technologi-
es of diet and nutrition, physical self-care, and safe community 
living in general; and whatever biological reasons there may be for 
decline in the capacity to adapt and to learn new skills and habits 
after reaching adult maturity. The social-conventional factors, in 
large part anachronistic and counter-efficient, centre on the con-
vention that a man (or woman) should choose and prepare for a par-
ticular life-time career in adolescence and early adulthood, there-
after concentrate his attention and learning activity on that career, 
and be rewarded by an imcome rising with advancing age in and accu-
mulating experience of that career. The result is that successful 
conversion of specific "human capital" to another form is impeded 
more than necessary by the inflexibility of adult workers and the 
sharp drop in income that faces the technologically displaced work-
er in looking for a new skilled employment. This point is accentu-
ated by a tendency Helen Hughes has called attention to on more 
than one occasion at this Conference, that while the workers in the 
developing countries receiving technological transplants tend to be 
efficient, skilled, and flexible, the workers in the developed coun-
tries suffering the international trade competition effects of tech-
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nological transplants tend to be much less flexible and adaptable . 
This would seem to be an almost inevitable characteristic of tech-
nol;gial transplantation; the workers in the expanding industries 
in the less developed countries will tend to be "hungry" and hence 
efficient and anxious to stay that way, whereas the declining in-
dustries in the developed coutries will tend to be manned by work-
ers of below average skill (and earnings) and above average age--a 
common characteristic of declining industries whether import-compet-
ing or not, and a reflection of the forces that make technological 
transplantation possible . 
3 . Problems of Technological Trade 
Certain problems associated with involvement in technological 
trade, for both advanced and less developed countries , follow logi-
cally from the foregoing brief description . We deal first with the 
problems for developed countries . 
A fundamental problem is that, to an extent that is difficult 
to determine, the standards of living and affluence enjoyed in the 
developed countries are a consequence of a temporary monopoly of 
superior technology (though "monopoly" is a misleading word, since 
the industries and firms involved are in active competition with 
one another), buttressed by restriction of foreign competition 
through tariffs and other protective techniques, and even more 
through restriction of immigration and hence enjoyment of the bene-
fits of technological superiority in the form of higher wages for 
the advanced-country workers rather than lower prices for consumers 
everywhere. Standards of affluence achieved through labour scarci-
ty and resulting high wages stand to be lost permanently through 
the development of production of technology-based goods in less de-
veloped countries, and this loss is accelerated by the reduction 
of trade barriers and, probably more important, by the technology-
diffusing influence of the multinational corporation . The reason 
why the extent of this problem is difficult to determine is that 
to an important but unknown extent high wages represent , not arti-
ficial scarcity of ordinary labour supported by trade and immigra-
tion restrictions, but the necessary return on the costs of the in-
vestments in the training of skilled labour and the training of 
successive generations of replacements. To the extent that this 
is the case, technological diffusion is not a threat to the wages 
of labour in the advanced countries, but a factor increasing the 
potential gains from freedom of trade and geneial economic progress, 
as maintained by classical comparative advantage theory . 
Other problems are associated with the embodiment of technology 
in trained human skill : to recapitulate, the longevity of the work-
er and his declining ability to adapt and change skill and occupa-
tion with advancing age; the reinforcement of this disability by 
the social conventions of the life-time career with income rising 
with age and experience; and the further tendency of workers in 
declining industries in developed countries to be less skilled and 
older than the average . In addition there is the general presump-
tion that technology-intensive industries whose technology has be-
come fairly static and which have in consequence become ripe for 
technological transplantation are likely to be both geographically 
localized and labour- intensive , and hence to have the political 
power to insist on governmental measures to protect their liveli-
hoods against competition . (There may also be some probability 
that workers in such industries will prefer tariff and quota pro-
tection to various kinds of adjustment subsidy.) 
For the developing countries, there is obviously the problem of 
advanced-country intervention to restrict developing-country exports 
220 AN ADVANCED COUNTRY'S VIEWPOINT 
of technological products if these grow rapidly enough to cause 
"market disruption"; and such market-disrupting rapid growth is 
likely to occur as a result both of the speed with which such pro-
d~ction can be expanded in one country and the possibility of rapid 
imitation and expansion of production by other developing countries . 
Apart from that, there is the possibility that technological compa-
rative advantage may move rapidly from one low-wage country to ano-
ther lower-wage country, raising the same problems as it does with 
technological competition between advanced and less developed count-
ries. Even without such competitition among developing countries, 
rapid expansion of technological exports may result largely in low-
er prices for advanced country consumers rather than higher incomes 
for developing country producers. There is also the possibility, 
to which many commentators have recently been calling attention, 
that developing countries competing with one another for technologi-
cal transplants, particularly by multinational corporations, may 
wind up paying more in terms of tax subsidies, protection, export 
subsidies, provision of cheap local capital, and guarantees on the 
repatriation of earnings and original capital investment , than the 
benefits that the presence of production using advanced technology 
bestows on the economy in the way of higher wages, development of 
labour skills, and training of domestic managerial talent. 
Finally, there are problems resulting from the facility with 
w.hich a magical faith in technology, on the part of both private 
engineers and public servants, politicians and the electorate, can 
be transformed into new and plausible versions of two old arguments 
for protection. One is the "national defence" or "self-sufficiency" 
argument, which lends itself particularly to government protection 
--especially in the sophisticated form of modernization subsidies 
and subsidization of scientific research and development--of "high 
technology" industries in the advanced countries. The othe r is the 
"infant industry" argument, particularly appealing to less develop-
ed countries hoping to transcend the limitations of their limited 
stocks of material capital and human engineering skills by "leaping 
stages" in the slow process of growth of affluence in western econo-
mic history, through selective protection of a few high-technology 
industries . With the latter argument in particular, there is the 
usual problem of drawing the line between wisely accelerating the 
natural economic tendencies towards development of low-wage regions 
and foolishly squandering resources on developments that will be 
profitable only when general affluence and educational levels have 
been raised sufficiently . 
4. Problems of International Trade Policy in a Technological World 
The list of problems of international trade policy on the agenda 
of the current "Nixon round" of G.A.T.T. negotiations for trade 
liberalization is formidably long and contains some extremely thorny 
items. The notoriously most difficult are trade in agricultural 
products, especially temperate zone cereals and related products, 
the problem of so-called "non-tariff barriers to trade" and the pro-
blems of adjustment assistance and the prevention of "market disrup-
tion." Agricultural trade problems will not be dealt with here, 
though it should be remarked that the essential problems are funda-
mentally technological in origin . The resort to agricultural pro-
tectionism in modern times (approximately since World War I) was 
the combined result of improvements in the technology of land trans-
port that opened up vast new areas of fertile land and sea transport 
that made their output available to and relatively cheaper than do-
mestic production for the European market, and of military concepts 
and technologies that made agricultural self-sufficiency and the 
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availability of large nUII)bers of potential peasant-soldiers desir-
able in the interests of national self-defence. More recently, 
the problem of domestic agricultural poverty suggesting protection 
as a policy solution is closely associated with the interaction of 
rapid labor-saving technical progress in agriculture and low income 
and price elasticities of demand for foodstuffs and cropped raw 
materials. Most recently, the trade problems potentially associat-
ed with the "green revolution" are, as the name itself suggests, 
the consequence of improvements in agricultural technology in the 
hotter regions of the world ; and the potentialities of such improve-
ments are barely beginning to be realized in large-scale applicat-
tion . 
The other two problems are also more or less closely associated 
with technology as a factor in determining national comparative 
advantages and shifts in them over time. The problems of adjust-
ment assistance and the avoidance of market disruption are obvious-
ly directly consequential on the development of new technologies, 
their diffusion in response to differences in labor cost levels 
(and also the growth of markets with affluence), and their effects 
in rendering existing technologies or the existing locations of 
production using recently-developed technologies obsolete . But 
most of the problems grouped under the general heading of "non-
tariff barriers to trade" are also associated more or less directly 
either with technology itself, or with the variety and complexity 
of ways in which governments can attempt to promote the use of te-
chnology by domestic producers and protect such producers from the 
competition of foreign users of rival or the same technologies . 
Thus health and safety regulations of product characteristics, and 
trade marking and labeling of products, are genuinely or ostensibly 
prompted by the desire to protect consumers against potentially 
dangerous side-effects of technologically complex products, or to 
inform them of the use of ingredients that they cannot detect or 
ascertain for themselves. Preferential governmental purchasing 
policies may be motivated by protectionist objectives or by prob-
lems of assessing technological performance characteristics and 
having adequate recourse against suppliers whose products may have 
unsuspected technological weaknesses or injurious side effects . 
"Regional development policy" may involve either covert protection 
of obsolete or emergent technologies, or an unobjectionable desire 
to raise the technological level of the region and its population 
to the national standard . 
For the purposes of broad discussion, the international trade 
policy problems associated with technology as a determinant of 
comparative advantage may be divided into two groups : those asso-
ciated primarily with trade in technologically advanced products 
among advanced countries, and those associated with trade between 
advanced and less developed countries based on the diffusion of 
technology to the latter in consequence of their lower levels of 
wage costs . 
As regards trade among advanced countries, the general principle 
that should guide judgment is the classical policy implication of 
comparative advantage theory, namely that (with the exception of 
the pursuit of import-restricting policies by countries that may 
be relatively large enough in world trade for such policies to im-
prove their terms of trade at the expense of foreign producers and 
consumers--an exception which incidentally -can be taken as inappli-
cable to the policies of less-developed countries, though often 
wishfully assumed to apply) improt restriction has its main effect 
in reducing the economic welfare of the consumers of the country 
practicing it, and (the classic analysis of " dumping") export sub-
sidization has its main effect in increasing the welfare of f oreign 
consumers at the e xpense of the domestic taxpayers who pay the cost 
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of the subsidy, provided . that du~ping is not u~ed temporarily only, 
as a device for bankrupting foreign producers in order to clear the 
way for establishment of a monopoly by the domestic exporters. (It 
should be noted that this last proviso, like some other blanket con-
cessions of classical theory to th~ protectionists such as the "in-
fant industry" argument for protection and the argument for the ta-
riff as a bargaining weapon, requires more careful examination with 
the aid of modern trade and value theory than it has yet received. 
Specifically, both the welfare-theoretical necessity of time-dis-
counting in assessing the net welfare effects of time-separated 
costs and benefits, and the industrial organization concept of 
potential entry as a restraint on the exercise of monopoly power, 
need to be brought into a sophisticated analysis of monopoly-moti-
vated temporary dumping, just as time-discounting of future poten-
tial benefits . for comparison with current costs, and the possible 
erosion of potential gains through substitutions acting over time, 
need to be brought into the analysis of the "barganing tariff.") 
Apart from "optimum tariff" ("terms-of-trade") possibilities, 
the main source of damage to other countries' economic welfare by 
a particular country's commercial and related policies is associat-
ed, not with the policies themselves, but with the possibility of 
unexpected significantly large-scale changes in those policies,dis-
ruptive of market opportunities on the expectation of which other 
countries have made specialized investments of material, human, 
and technological capital. Avoidance of such disruptions requires, 
first and foremost, an international monetary system proof against 
seriously deflationary developments that give countries strong in-
ducements to preserve domestic employment at the expense of employ-
ment in foreign countries, through intensification of import re-
striction and resort to export subsidization. (Inflationary inter-
national monetary developments, while in many ways comparably dis-
ruptive of expectations and trading and investment patterns based 
on them, have tended to have the beneficial effect in recent years 
of inducing countries to reduce their import barriers and their ex-
port subsidies.) Second, it requires international agreements re-
stricting the ability of countries to use import protection and ex-
port promotion as means of staving off the adjustments of indust-
rial structure required by world economic change and evolution. 
The proper solution, in general terms, is to work as closely as 
possible to the establishment of complete freedom of trade, this 
being the system of guarantee easiest to specify and enforce. But 
this in turn requires the development of legitimate policies, al-
ternative to protection for coping with the adverse effects and 
strains of economic change on national economic structures mediat-
ed through changing international trading patterns consequential 
on changes in comparative advantage and disadvantage. 
This problem is particularly acute in the context of changing 
trade patterns between advanced and developing countries, reflect-
ing the diffusion of technology in response to differences in gene-
ral levels of wage costs. Here, discussion of the problem of al-
ternatives to special protection for production and labor in advanc-
ed ' countries threatened by rising competition from the transfer of 
technology to lower-labor-cost production in the developing countri-
es has given rise to the two concepts of "adjustment assistance" and 
"safeguards against market disruption." Three points are worth 
making in connection with these concepts. 
First, from the standpoint of the advanced countries , adjustment 
assistance should be considered in the general context of economic 
change and adjustment to it, rather than the specific context of 
change mediated through changes in international trade (both im-
ports and exports) and the still more specific context of increas-
ing competition from imports. The basic fact is that the general 
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philosophy of competition and free enterprise (though it has been 
evolving re\pidly in recent years) still rests on 'an asswt\ption of 
slow and gradual change which the entrepreneur and his workers 
should be able to recognize in good time and to which they should 
be expected to adjust with their own resources--with the sole im-
portant exception of change due to the evil machinations of unprin-
cipled foreigners, against whose malevolent activities the nation 
should protect its innocent and worthy workers and businessmen by 
exercise of its sovereignty in commercial policy . That assumption 
ne.eds to be replaced by the recognition that in a world of fairly 
rapid technical change, which may be generated and in fact is most 
usually generated by domestic rather than by foreign developers and 
appliers of such technology, no one can be reasonably expected be-
yond rather narrow time and space limits to forecast technical 
change and its consequences at all accurately , and that society as 
a whole has a general obligation to adopt and implement policies 
for minimizing the individual damage, and maximizing the individual 
exploitation of opportunities, resulting from technical change that 
is-agreed to be of beneficiality to the community as a whole . This 
obligation is particularly incumbent on society in the case of te-
chnology embodied in specialized skilled labor, owing to the longe-
vity of embodied human capital and the limited stock of knowledge 
that the individual worker has the material and mental resources 
to collect and C\nalyze . 
Second, again from the standpoint of the advanced countries, 
adjustment assistance and safeguards against market disruption need 
to be considered as complementary and not as substitute policies . 
Adjustment assistance is designed to increase the speed with which 
change can be absorbed and digested; safeguards against market dis-
ruption are designed to slow down the speed of the change that has 
to be absorbed and digested. Optimwt\ policy with respect to change 
assciated with shifting comparative advantage in response to the 
development and diffusion of technology requires joint optimization 
with respect to both types of policy, not prior choice of one line 
or other of policy and subsequent optimization with respect to it 
alone. Both policies also require drawing a fine line between opti-
mal pacing of change and protectionist resistance to change, a line 
which is probably significantly easier to draw and maintain where 
the two policies are considered jointly than when the full weight 
of responsibility for controlling the rate of change and absorption 
of it is placed on one type of policy only . 
Finally, with reference now to the developing countries, it must 
be recognized that they have an interest in optimization of the rate 
of change and absorption of it by the developed countries, which is 
not simply reducible to max imizing the rate of expansion of their 
exports that the developed countries can be obliged to accept and 
adjust to as best they can . There is a real problem of adjustment 
to and optimal control of the diffusion of technology and its re-
sults in changing patterns of comparative advantage , whose solu-
tion will not be facilitated by blind insistence that the principle 
of free trade and maximum efficiency in the use of world resources 
implies unrestricted access for developing countries to the markets 
of the advanced countries and unlimited obligation of the developed 
countries to tolerate and shoulder the costs of whatever economic 
disruption and social distress may be i nvolved for their citizens . 
Quite apart from the strong probability that such an attitude will 
dispel goodwill in the developed countries towe\rds the less develop-
ed, and so provide support to protectionist and export opportunity-
restricting policies in the developed countries , its implementation 
in trade policy arrangements might well be adverse to the trading 
interests of the less developed countries themselves. It has been 
a long-standing contention in the political-economy theory of the 
development problem, especially among Latin American economists, 
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that freedom of trade is unfair as between developed and less deve-
loped countries because its effect is to raise labor incomes in the 
developed country exporters and to keep labor incomes unchanged , by 
lowering export prices, in the developing countries . The grain of 
truth in this contention is that competition within and between 
less developed countries with surplus or elastic populations tends 
to drive prices down to subsistence , on classical unlimited-labor-
supply lines ; and this is likely to be the result of unlimited com-
petitive expansion of exports made initially highly profitable by 
the diffusion of technology to and among the developing countries . 
The fundamental solution to this problem obviously lies in the con-
trol of population growth in the less developed countries , pending 
ultimate arrival of the stage of development at which procreation 
is controlled by voluntary choice of the number of children the 
parents can afford to feed , house, and educate to their own or bet-
ter standards of productive contribution . In the meantime, control 
over the speed of development of trade based on technological dif-
fusion may , intentionally or unintentionally , have the effect of 
contributing more to the raising of living standards and the streng-
thening of automatic economic pressures for developmen t than cut-
throat competition among developing countries in exporting t e chnolo-
gically advanced products to the deve loped countries . 
13 
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN PACIF IC 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT : A SUMM ING-UP 
HEINZ w. ARNDT 
Just as we recognise in Professor Kojima the father figure of 
the continuing series of Pacific Trade and Development Conferences , 
so we must clearly acknowledge Professor Miguel S . Wionczek as the 
progenitor of this Sixth Conference . It was he who some years ago 
reminded the PAFTA group that several Latin American countries bord-
er on the Pacific; he persuaded President Echeverria to give his 
official blessing and support to an invitation by Mexico to host 
the conference; and last but not least, he chose the theme : " The 
Role of Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development" . Let 
me begin this summing up by expressing our debt to Miguel Wionczek , 
good economist and good friend . 
It is doubtful whether transfer of technology would have been 
chosen as the theme for such a conference ten years ago, or whether 
it would have been chosen even this year had the host been one of 
the Asian countries . The growing importance attached to the inter-
national transfer of technology in thinking about economic develop-
ment largely reflects the shift of emphasis from physical and finan-
cial capital to human capital- - technological and other knowledge , 
skills and attitudes- -as factors in economic growth . It also re-
flects increasing concern about the costs , economic and non-economic , 
of the main, or at least the most conspicuous , channel for the trans-
fer of technology from developed to developing countries , the multi-
national corporations . If capital were stiil regarded as of primary 
importance, direct investment could be replaced by borrowing . It 
is because of the importance attached to the element of technologi-
cal and managerial know- how in the direct investment package that 
the problem of "untying the pack age", of seeking ways of securing 
the know- how without direct investment , has begun to loom so large . 
And nowhere larger than in Latin America . 
This , too , is not hard to explai n . The obvi ous, and probably 
suffic i ent , explanation is the enormous shadow cast over Latin Ame-
rica by the United States, the overwhelmi ng preponderance of the 
US-based multinational corpor ation . Other parts of the less develop-
ed world (and even advanced countries in Europe and Oceania) are 
worr i ed about foreign ownership and control , but their anxiety has 
not reached the almost obsessive degree one notices in Latin America, 
precisely because direct investment capital has come to those re-
gions from a greater variety of countries . The theme of the conf-
erence, therefore , has been a most particularly Latin American one . 
In his welcoming address , Miguel Wionczek ~aid to the foreign 
participants : "We would like you to see this problem from our point 
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of view". Speaking as one of the foreign participants, I can assure 
him that the three days of discussion have very greatly helped us 
to do so. I am sure all of us go away with a much better understand-
ing of the reasons for Latin American concern. May I add that we 
also leave deeply impressed by the intellectual ability and integri-
ty of the Mexican contributors to the discussion, even when we did 
not entirely see eye to eye with them, and by the vigorous effort 
of research and policy experimentation that is being put into this 
problem area in this and other Latin American countries. 
There is still a serious dearth of empirical knowledge about the 
mechanisms of transfer of technology, about the costs 0£ alternative 
mechanisms, about their effectiveness and about the operation of al-
ternative regulatory policies. Miguel Wionczek mentioned in one of 
his statements his regret that among the papers there were not more 
case studies. I share this regret. Apart from the paper by Dr. 
Tabe which, however interesting, dealt with a relatively remote case, 
we were tantalised by glimpses of empirical work, especially Dr. Gi-
ral' s fascinating insights into the inner workings of the chemical 
industry. If only we could have had a paper by him, and one by Dr. 
Campos on the data being accumulated through registration of licens-
ing agreements. 
The conference Agenda divided the subject into four "themes": 1. 
The context of international relations in the Pacific region as it 
affects development, trade and technology, 2. International trade 
in technology, 3. Intra-national diffusion of technology, and 4. Te-
chnology and comparative advantage in trade. I will say little in 
this summary about the first and last. The first gave the four au-
thors generous scope of which they freely availed themselves. Dr. 
Martinez Legorreta sounded some of the keynotes of the Latin Ameri-
can point of view: the threat of the multinational corporations, of-
ten supported by the US Government, to the sovereignty of Latin Ame-
rican countries; regional integration as a counter to "dependence"; 
and the need to turn for new sources of technology to the socialist 
countries. The two papers by the two participants from the Soviet 
Union whom everyone was happy to welcome for the first time to a 
PAFTA conference exuded a genial optimism about the prospects for 
economic development and co-operation in the Pacific. Professor 
Ranis focused his statement of a North American point of view on 
the interesting and persuasive hypothesis that resource-poor count-
ries in Asia have accomplished the transition from the import-sub-
sti tution to the export-oriented phase of industrialisation more 
easily and effectively than those whose more ample resource endow-
ment has allowed them to delay the painful adjustment, with possib-
ly serious consequences not only in the form of slower growth but 
also less equitable distribution. Dr. Okita's paper gave an account 
of Japan's experience in the acquisition and adaptation of technolo-
gy which left at least one listener as mystified as ever about the 
social and political conditions which made possible in Japan what 
seems so heartbreakingly difficult, if not impossible, everywhere 
else . 
Professor Harry Johnson, in the penultimate s e ssion, showed, wi th 
his usual analytical brilliance, whe re and how techno logy transfer 
fits into the theory of comparative advantage, but his policy recom-
mendations related more to the problems of structura l adjustment 
which were the theme of the last conference than to those aspects 
of technology policy of greatest interest to the Latin American par-
ticipants. 
The main discussion of these aspects took place in relation to 
the second and third "themes", especially in and on the excellent 
and comprehensive papers by Drs. Helleiner and Thedim Lobo, though 
the distinction drawn by the organisers between "international trade" 
and "intra-national diffusion" of technology got lost in the process. 
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I propose, therefore , to divide the issues broadly into positive and 
normative, in other words, those to do with description and analysis 
and those to do with policy . 
Issues--Descriptive and Analytical 
Quite early on there was general agreement that the title of the 
conference was something of a misnomer and that the slant which has 
been lent to most recent discussion of the subject by its connection 
with the multinational ogre may be somewhat misleading . What the 
less developed countries need is not so much transfer of the high 
technology of the industrially advanced countries, but adaptation, 
or better still, as Helen Hughes emphasised, a widening of the spe-
ctrum of technologies available and in use in the industrial sector 
of developing countries . The emphasis in recent discussion has been 
on "captive" technology, technical know-how which is subject to pa- · 
tents or otherwise the property of (usually, though not necessarily, 
private) enterprises, and more particularly technical know- how in 
manufacturing industry. The suggestion in one of the Latin American 
papers that this captive knowledge is "more important for economic 
development" than all other knowledge and skills was withdrawn by 
the author under challenge , but it was generally agreed that it is 
this captive knowledge that presents the most difficult problems , 
precisely because it is not freely available but has to be purchased 
at often considerable cost . Professor Kojima raised the interesting 
question why the problem of captive technology which is so serious 
in manufacturing does not arise in agriculture (though one partici-
pant mentioned omimous recent signs of trade marks covering chicken 
raising and such); here, most new technology, as the striking exam-
ples of the high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice show, is made 
freely available to all countries, and this would also seem to be 
the case in most service industries . But the question was not taken 
up. Clearly, although it may be true, as Professor Johnson emphasis-
ed, that all knowledge costs something to produce, it is not the case 
that all knowledge, even all economically valuable technology, is 
sold at a price. The reasons might be worth closer examination . 
As far as most industrial technology is concerned, the cost of ac-
quiring it in one way or the other is inescapable. The question for 
the developing countries is how the costs might be minimised . The 
peculiarity of direct investment as the mechanism of transfer is 
that it combines , in one package, not merely capital and entrepre-
neurship but also various kinds of know-how, including not only the 
technical innovation which may be patented but also the technology 
embodied in capital equipment, the engineering knowledge and experi-
ence needed to instal, service and maintain the equipment and to 
adapt both machinery and process, the managerial knowledge and ex-
perience needed to operate the plant efficiently, recruit, train and 
supervise the workforce and market the product, and finally the in-
ternational contacts which give access to finance and export markets. 
The main objections to direct investment as the mechanism of trans-
fer are that the technology imported by multinational corporations 
is frequently inappropriate, that the direct financial cost of tech-
nology thus obtained is often very high (though in the nature of the 
direct investment package, particularly where transfer occurs through 
internal transactions between head offices and branches or subsidia-
ries , the cost can usually not be identified), that multinational 
corporations do little to transmit knowledge to the nationals of the 
host country and may indeed inhibit local research and development , 
and that in extreme cases extensive foreign ownership and control 
of a developing country ' s industries undermine a country ' s national 
autonomy and identity . Most of this was familiar ground , but Dr . 
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Helleiner developed the first objection by analysing in some detail 
the distinction between production and consumption technology . He 
suggested that it is particularly in relation to the latter that 
the net benefits to the less developed host country of the opera-
tions of multinational corporations are liable to be negative, but 
agreed that it was one thing to protect consumers from pointless 
product differentiation and mendacious advertising--though even 
here there is no easy remedy since fiscal discouragement of adver-
tising needs to be accompanied by an acceptable alternative source 
of finance of news media- -and quite another for Big Brother to lay 
down what range of goods and services consumers may have . 
The most obvious alternative means of acquiring foreign technolo-
gy is by the purchase of patents or trademarks or by licensing con-
tracts . The general view among Latin American participants was 
that these methods also tend to impose excessive costs on the deve-
loping countries. While few seriously advanced the extreme view 
that all knowledge should be free, there was said to be much evid-
ence of exploitation of purchasers in less developed countries by 
owners of such industrial property because of the weaker bargaining 
power and inadequate information at the disposal of the former, and 
of the use of patents and trademarks for the exploitation of consum-
ers through product differentiation and oligopolistic pricing. 
A third mechanism of international transfer of technology, through 
import of capital goods, was the subject of two papers, but niether 
addressed itself to this aspect. The paper by Dr. Singh was devot-
ed primarily to arguing the case for an industrial policy of import 
substitution in relation to capital goods, and incidentally led 
Helen Hughes to suggest that the import bill for capital goods could 
be greatly reduced in most LDCs by more effective utilisation of 
the existing capital stock and by adoption of less capital-intensive 
methods. Dr. Fajnzylber reported on a study of international trade 
in capital goods which yielded the interesting conclusion that sup-
ply is becoming more competitive, with possibly beneficial effects 
for the less developed countries, but the study was not designed to 
throw light on imports of capital equipment as a means of transfer 
of technology. 
One paper discussed international transmission of "diffuse" ra-
ther than "captive" knowledge, through official technical assist-
ance. While highly and probably unduly critical of most past ef-
forts by national and international agencies to assist developing 
countries through technical assistance, mainly on the ground that 
this effort has too rarely succeeded in building up self-sustaining 
institutions and technological capability in the host countries, it 
was valuable in stressing that "captive" knowledge, however acquir-
ed, is not enough without a wide range of other knowledge and skills . 
Issues of Policy 
The discussion of policy ranged so widely that any summary must 
be highly selective and inevitably somewhat arbitrary . Let me be-
gin by mentioning two notions, each clearly attractive to many in 
the Third World and each in my view a will-o ' -the-wisp . The first 
is the example of Japan . The fact that Japan achieved her status 
as one of the world's most advanced industrial countries without 
until quite recently admitting any direct investment capital inevi-
tably raises th.e question in many Latin American minds : "Why cannot 
we do this too? " Why not buy foreign technology, as Japan did , 
without surrendering ownership of any part of the domestic economy 
to foreigners? The paper by Dr . Okita gave some of the answers , 
and participants in discussion added others . Japan , even 100 years 
ago, possessed many prerequisites for development with which most 
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less developed countries to- day are still ill-endowed : an efficient 
central and local government administration, an actual or potential 
entrepreneurial class , a high degree of soci al cohes i on and disci-
pline , and a relativel y high level of mass education . On this bas i s , 
Japanes·e government over a century pursued a determined policy which 
for long gave priority to improvements in general a nd technical edu-
cation, infrastructure and productivity in agriculture . Even so, it 
took Japan 100 years to catch up, and one knowledgeable observer 
questioned whether Japan might not have obtained foreign technology 
at lower cost had she liberalised her policy on direct investment 
sooner . 
The other notion is that the less developed countri es should seek 
new technology in the socialist countries . Dr. Yakubovsky referred 
in his paper to technical assistance and training provided by the 
Soviet Union to India and Sri Lanka in connection with various in-
dustrial projects, but these did not seem to differ in any material 
respect from similar projects and technical assistance supplied to 
LDCs by western countries. He also stated that the Soviet Union has 
never refused a request for technological know- how by a less develop-
ed country and never will. I have no knowledge which would enable 
me to challenge this statement . But I confess I remain sceptical . 
Are we really to believe that there is no technical know-how, no 
blueprint, which the Soviet Union would not readily hand to any oth-
er country, free of charge? 
At a more realistic level, five main lines of approach to the 
problem could be distinguished among the welter of written and oral 
suggestions. To list them--from right to left as it were--they were : 
1 . Correction of faulty domestic policies which contribute to the 
high cost of foreign technology, 2. Improvement of local knowledge 
of the international market for technology, 3 . Upgrading of engineer-
ing and other skills needed to make the best of importeed technology, 
4 . Government regulation of various kinds, and 5. International agree-
ment . · 
1. Examples under the first heading were protectionist policies 
which enabled multinational companies to earn monopoly profits, un-
necessarily generous tax and other incentives to attract foreign in-
vestment, and other distortions of relative prices . 
2 . If a major source of excess costs was the weak bargaining 
situation of local purchasers of technology due to their ignorance 
of the market, much could be done by improved information . Compani-
es could not be forced to give up trade secrets, but, as Dr. Campos 
explained in a most interesting account of the new Mexican system 
of registration of all licensing agreements, it should be possible 
to give local firms much information about alternative foreign sourc-
es of supply of technology and of the terms and conditions on which 
it is available . 
3 . Upgrading of local engineering and other necessary skills is 
a long-term task about which volumes could be and have been written. 
Dr . Giral , in a few trenchant setences, complained that "we force 
our Governments to apply restrictive measures instead of raising the 
level of education and practical training of our factory workers , 
farmers, fishermen , all the people who need to assimilate and adapt 
and apply new technology, not merely know-how , but know- what, know-
where, know- why " . 
4 . A large proportion of the papers by .Latin American partici-
pants , and many contributions to the discussion , were firm in recom-
mending government control o r operation of enterpr ises as the only 
soluti on to t h e problem , p r eferably as part of " coordinated national 
planni ng i n t he national interest" . Such general professions of 
faith remi nded one of Professor Johnson's reference to the practice 
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of "listing all the theoretically possible cases in which market 
prices and costs might not correspond exactly to true social alter-
native opportunity costs, as if the possibility of market failure is 
sufficient to prove the certainty of government success" . But there 
were also more specific and realistic proposals . Mention has al-
ready been made of the Mexican system for registration of licensing 
agreements. Dr. Salgado reported on the new policy package adopted 
by the Andean Group, including requirements for the gradual trans-
fer of a majority share of the equity of foreign-owned enterprises 
to local owners, limitation of the legal rights of owners of indust-
rial patents, and a technology policy some parts of which are begin-
ning to be carried out . 
The most comprehensive set of proposals was put to the conference 
in the paper by the Brazilian expert, Dr. Thedim Lobo, who was un-
fortunately unable to be present. His list of objectives for a po-
licy for the transfer of technology in developing countries was quot-
ed by Miguel Wionczek and, although it provoked Professor Johnson 
into sharp and not unjustified criticism for being too vague and in-
sufficiently grounded in economic analysis, it seems to me worth 
quoting again in this summary; for, better than anything else I have 
seen, it indicates the trend of thinking among informed Latin Ameri-
can opinion on the subject: 
1. To be compatible with the goals set forth in the industrial de-
velopment policy, as well as in national plans for economic de-
velopment and scientific and technological progress . 
2 . To import technology, rather than importing capital or goods. 
3 . To buy technology, rather than leasing it. 
4. To remove obstacles to the absorption and domestic diffusion of 
technology, through measures aimed at eliminating explicit or 
implicit restrictions embodied in transfer agreements . 
5. To appraise the know-how to be imported. 
6. To strengthen the competitive and bargaining powers of domestic 
enterprises , offsetting their disadvantages vis-a-vis foreign 
enterprises . 
7. To reduce the costs of importing technology . 
8. To support technological progress in domestic firms. 
9 . To support the development of national engineering firms, as 
well as technical and economic consultants. 
10. To support the development of research centers . 
11. To promote exports, especially of manufactured goods. 
12. To provide a better knowledge of alternative sources for the 
supply technology . 
13. To prevent know-how payments from turning into a form of remu-
nerating capital not subject to risk. 
14. To allow only in special cases the payment of know-how on a per-
centage basis, always establishing a ceiling for such payments . 
15. To prevent know-how from becoming a patent of unlimited duration . 
16 . To engage foreign enterprises in domestic efforts for scientific 
and technological development. 
17. ' To avoid impairing the inflow of external savings and the trans-
fer of needed technology. 
When, however, Dr. Lobo in his paper proceeded to outline the 
"institutional machinery" he envisaged for implementing such a poli-
cy, many participants felt compelled to part company. An Industrial 
and Commercial Development Council, operating at inter-ministerial 
level, as well as through an Executive Secretariat with wide-ranging 
functions and through "specific bodies charged with" such tasks, 
among many others, as control of tariffs, control of imports, cont-
rol of foreign investments , promotion of external trade and "the 
screening, negotiation and registration of technological contracts 
and the granting of patents and trademarks", seems ideally designed 
to bring almost any development process to a grinding halt . 
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5. Finally, reference was made to efforts under way in various 
international fora to promote reform of the present system of trans-
fer of technology in various ways, including a Code of Conduct a 
draft of which, recently prepared by a Working Group of the Pugwash 
Conference on Science and World Affairs under Professor Wionczek's 
chairmanship, was tabled at the conference. The spirit in which 
this task is being approached is also well reflected in the relevant 
section of the draft of t)le Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of Sates adopted by a recent meeting, held in Mexico, of an UNCTAD 
Working Group on that Charter : · 
Every State has the right to benefit from the advances and de-
velopments in science and technology for the acceleration of 
its economic and social . development. 
All States should promote international scientific and techno-
logical co-operation and the transfer of technology, with pro-
per regard for all legitimate interests including inter alia, 
the rights and duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of 
technology. In particular, all States should facilitate : the 
access of developing countries to the achievements of modern 
science and technology, the transfer of technology and the 
creation of indigenous technology for the benefit of the deve-
loping countries in forms and in accordance with procedures 
which are suited to their economies and their needs . 
Accordingly, developed countries should co-operate with the 
developing countries in the establishment, strengthening and 
development of their scientific and technological infrastruc-
tures, and their scientific research and technological activi-
ties so as to help to expand and transform the economies of 
developing countries . 
All States should co-operate in exploring with a view to evolv-
ing further internationally accepted guidelines or regulations 
for the transfer of technology taking fully into account the 
interests of developing countries. 
Conclusion 
Having deliberately confined the body of this summary to the many 
practical, down-to-earth issues which were discussed at the confer-
ence, I would fail in my duty as a reporter if I did not mention in 
conclusion some of the broader• more ideological, differences which 
coloured much of the debate and which, it would not be unfair to 
say, tended with some exceptions to range the Latin American and 
Soviet participants on one side and the other foreign--North Ameri -
can, Asian and Australasian--participants on the other . 
Sometimes it sounded like old-fashioned "socialism vs capitalism" . 
More often it was expressed in terms of a conflict between a "market-
oriented" and a "state-control" approach . There were charges from 
the one side that the other believed it could "leave everything to 
the market " and pained protests that the intention was rather to 
have government use the market as an instrument of national policy . 
There were charges from the other side that the one side wanted to 
control everything and pained protests that the intention was merely 
government regulation of the sort which is all-pervasive in the US 
economy. Clearly , there were real differences of emphasis , just as 
there were real differences of opinion about the degree to which 
multinational corporations were subject to market pressures or mani-
pulators of the market . 
More significant , perhaps , were the differences between the two 
groups in their views--feelings is the better word--about the future , 
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and on this issue the two Soviet participants were clearly ranged 
with the other foreigners, indeed I doubt whether any of the latter 
saw the prospects in quite such rosy hues. I confess I was distress-
ed and surprised, as a visitor to Latin America, to encounter so 
much bitterness, almost desperation, among our Latin American col-
leagues. One does not often hear eminent, sober academics use the 
language of international confrontation, about their countries "run-
ning out of patience", condemning "mere tinkering with the rules of 
the game", rejoicing that th.e enemy has been found "much more vul-
nerable because of dependence on supply of raw materials" and warn-
ing that "the beginning of a transfer of economic power· from develop-
ed to certain less developed countries" is at hand . 
There is so much more poverty in Asia than in Latin America, cer-
tainly, as far as I can judge, than in Mexico; there is so much evi-
dence of achievement in economic development in Mexico, as in Brazil; 
Mexico seems to have so much more of the natural resources, material 
and human capital for fu.rther development than many Asian countries, 
that the visitor finds it hard to account for the prevailing sense 
of failure and impotence. When one reads of all the intolerable 
burdens which, according to our Latin American friends, weigh down 
the latecomers in industrial development, and of the insuperable 
obstacles in their way, one would not believe that Japan, Sweden or 
Australia could ever have made it. 
I hope these last remarks will not suggest that I have quite 
failed to see the problem from the Latin American point of view. I 
think we foreign visitors have all learned a great deal, but we may 
be forgiven for wishing that, just occasionally, as for Dr. Samuel 
Johnson's amateur philosopher, "cheerfulness" would "break in". 
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